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Technology, environment and 
modern Britain: historiography 
and intersections
Jon Agar
This collection explores the interconnected histories of technology and 
the environment in the context of modern Britain, broadly speaking 
from the late eighteenth century to the late twentieth. It is an extra-
ordinarily rich subject, and one of immense potential. The histories of 
technology and the environment should be considered together for two 
compelling reasons. First, the artificial and the natural are not separate; 
technologies are made from materials that have been extracted and 
modified from environments, while nature has, to varying extents, been 
engineered. Technologies are typically assemblages, most often techno-
logical systems, with components that can be material or social in char-
acter, and many of the components will have been derived, ultimately, 
from natural sources. Likewise, organisms have ‘become tools when 
human beings use them to serve human ends’.1 This point can of course 
be extended to include not just organisms but modified, natural environ-
ments more generally. Environments, when cast as means towards ends, 
are technological in form.2 Second, technologies and environmental 
and living systems share the feature of having often complex, function-
ally understood internal structure; they are types, even predominant 
types, of material organisation that surround and shape us. As organised 
entities they are at least as important as, say, our political structures for 
making us who we are, or enabling or limiting what we can do. They also, 
crucially, have an intertwined history. To understand the environment or 
technological systems of a lived- in place such as Britain, where there are 
layers upon layers of use and re- use, requires us to recognise and uncover 
their ‘essential historical’ character.3 The historical analyses that emerge 
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are, necessarily, combinations of environmental history, history of tech-
nology, social, political and cultural histories.
In this introduction I  have three aims. First, I  will reflect on 
the historical studies of technology and environment, as applied or 
institutionalised in Britain. Second, I offer an eightfold categorisation of 
ways of intersection between environment and technology as a guide to 
thinking about the subject. These are: (1) environment as an input into a 
technological system; (2) environment as something natural made into, 
or a component within, a technological system; (3) environment as some-
thing changed, usually damaged, by outputs of technological process; 
(4) environment as something alongside an artificial world; (5) environ-
ment as something untouched by artifice; (6) environment as something 
represented through technology; (7) environmental knowledge as some-
thing organised by being registered with technology; and (8)  environ-
ment and technologies as interconnected cultural imaginaries. Finally, 
I will aim to survey the relevant secondary literature and introduce the 
contributors’ necessarily diverse chapters.
History of technology and environmental history  
in – and of – Britain
Even though the limitation is problematic, for reasons that will be 
stated, the historical understanding of the intersection of technologies 
and the natural environment can be begun (but certainly not finished) 
by considering the intersection of two specialities, the history of tech-
nology and environmental history. In the Anglophone world, a self- 
styled history of technology was  institutionalised in the mid- twentieth 
century, with relevant markers being Londoner Charles Singer’s edited 
volumes A History of Technology (first volume 1954, eventually reaching 
eight tomes) and the establishment of the Society for the History of 
Technology in 1958 in the United States.4 Environmental history as a spe-
ciality organised itself a little later, growing rapidly in the United States 
in the 1980s. Both specialities could claim a roster of scholarly ancestors, 
from George Perkins Marsh to Lewis Mumford.
In the 1990s, the notion that the intersection of history of tech-
nology and environmental history was a growth point was already widely 
held. Jeffrey Stine and Joel Tarr, in their 1998 survey article and mani-
festo, began with the observation that it was ‘difficult to write environ-
mental history without paying at least passing attention to technology’, 
before arguing that a ‘review of past literature reveals numerous authors 
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who have touched upon the interactions of technology and the environ-
ment, but few have pursued the topic directly’.5 Areas of attention they 
found in the American literature included the environment in urban 
settings, public and occupational health, industry and pollution, the con-
trol of natural resources (notably water) and environmental policy and 
politics. ‘Topics ripe for historical analysis’ were also identified by Stine 
and Tarr.6 The intersection has been revisited several times since, evi-
dence of sustained historical interest.7
But the intersection in the case of Britain might, at first glance, 
seem to be stymied by the apparent weakness of both fields. Take envir-
onmental history. The prominence of environmental history in the 
United States has begged unflattering and unfair comparisons with the 
state of the subject in the United Kingdom. Clapp began his survey text 
with the statement that the book was ‘a foray into environmental his-
tory, a branch of historical writing not yet widely practiced in Britain’.8 
Luckin in 2004 noted that in Britain environmental history has ‘long 
remained at the margin of academic debate’.9 He accounted for this mar-
ginalisation by the constriction of working within established scholarly 
frameworks for understanding industrialisation, and the availability of 
the social history of medicine (as well as demographic and public health 
histories) as an ‘alternative focus’ for urban- environmental studies. He 
also identified encouraging, if disparate, signs of change, including 
studies of pollution (Wohl,10 Brimblecombe,11 Hamlin,12 Mosley,13 to 
which could be added Thorsheim14 and Winter15) and of nature/ culture 
relations (Passmore,16 Thomas,17 Coates18) as well as new institutional 
homes and sources of research funding. Nevertheless, Luckin diagnosed 
a ‘missed opportunity’, as a result of which environmental history in 
Britain remained ‘underdeveloped’. Tim Cooper, in an online survey art-
icle for the Institute of Historical Research broadly agreed with Luckin.19 
He noted that ‘historical concerns with environmental questions have 
originated from different historical and disciplinary circumstances in 
Britain’, not least geography, history of the British Empire,20 economic 
history,21 and landscape studies,22 to which should be added the dis-
tinctive and immense contribution of Oliver Rackham.23 Furthermore, 
despite landmark surveys of the subject by Simmons24 and Sheail,25 
Cooper also identified ‘an apparent reluctance among environmental 
historians working in Britain to address the environmental transform-
ation of the British Isles’.26
The history of technology in the United Kingdom has attracted less 
direct commentary on its status and state,27 and what there is has hardly 
displayed edification or a meeting of minds.28 However, two points can be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin4
4
made. First, history of technology has not sustained and grown its insti-
tutional presence as a singular identity in the United Kingdom compared 
with, say, the United States or Germany.29 Second, and this largely accounts 
for the first point, history of technology has been explored in an extremely 
diverse set of speciality frameworks, including history of science, cultural 
geography, industrial archaeology, economic and social history (espe-
cially of industrialisation), economics, history of human and veterinary 
medicine, agricultural history, history of architecture and design and the 
autochthonous historiography of engineers and other technical experts.
Technology, like the environment, is something that exists at many 
scales, and the national is not necessarily the best scale to choose as a 
frame of analysis. Indeed, a focus on the national has been superseded 
by interest in the transnational in both history of technology and envir-
onmental history.
Therefore the history of technology and environmental history 
in  – and of  – the United Kingdom is often hidden within many discip-
linary specialities. This diversity is no bad thing. As Cooper writes, if ‘we 
take the environment in both its material and cultural forms to form an 
important object of study regardless of disciplinary perspective, there 
is hope for a period of historical research that will be more holistic and 
integrative in approach’.30 The same can be said of technology. But when 
we are surveying the intersection of environmental history and history 
of technology in modern Britain we are necessarily going to have to pull 
together and make sense of a heterogeneous collection of scholarship.
Eight types of combination
McNeill, in his environmental history of the twentieth century, organised 
his subject matter into spheres: a lithosphere and pedosphere of rock and 
soil, the atmosphere (urban, regional and global air and air pollution), 
the hydrosphere (water use and supply, rivers, seas, groundwater, 
dams, floods, wetlands and coasts), and biosphere (land use and agri-
culture, whaling and fishing and biodiversity), while also considering 
technological change specifically in three later case studies (chainsaws, 
automobiles and nuclear reactors).31 Since each of the spheres also 
contained histories of technologies it would be possible to use this sort of 
classification to organise thoughts on how technology and environment 
have intersected in modern Britain. But such an organisation would also 
put the primacy on environmental categories. So, rather than divide 
the subject matter by spheres, I  will review eight types of technology/ 
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environment interaction, noting work done, introducing the chapters, 
and offering thoughts for further research.
(1) Environment as an input into a technological system
The engineer- turned- historian Thomas P. Hughes generalised his histor-
ical investigations of the electrical power- and- light networks32 to offer 
an influential historiographical model of the growth of technological 
systems.33 For Hughes, technological systems ‘contain messy, complex 
problem- solving components’, which can be ‘physical artefacts, such as 
the turbogenerators, transformers and transmission lines in electric light 
and power systems’, organisations, legislative artefacts and when ‘they 
are socially constructed and adapted in order to function in systems, nat-
ural resources, such as coal mines’.34 These systems were orchestrated 
by ‘system builders’, either independent inventors (such as Edison, typic-
ally beginning with radical invention) or corporations (such as General 
Electric, typically focusing on conservative, cumulative invention). 
Engineered natural resources are part of the system – see (2) – but out-
side the system lay a further ‘environment’:
A technological system usually has an environment consisting of 
intractable factors not under the control of system managers, but 
these are not all organizational. If a factor in the environment – say, 
a supply of energy – should come under the control of the system, 
it is then an interacting part of it. Over time, technological systems 
manage increasingly to incorporate environment into the system, 
thereby eliminating sources of uncertainty.35
Take British industrial history. A  system builder such as Isambard 
Kingdom Brunel sourced environmental inputs for his Great Western 
Railway. Components to which inventive focus is applied are, in Hughes’ 
model, ‘reverse salients’. The external natural environmental elements 
here would include coal and timber, while wooden sleepers would be 
classic reverse salients. Eventually (after prior experimentation with 
stone, which created an uncomfortable ride) sleepers were made 
from softwood spruce, fir or pine, imported from the Baltic, cut and 
laid heart- side down.36 Timber as an input into British ship- building 
is discussed in this volume by Mat Paskins.37 Sometimes the external 
environment to a technological system can be on immense scales. The 
ocean and even outer space had to be configured as safe spaces for 
telecommunications, as Jacob Ward shows in his chapter on the cables 
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and satellite projects of the British Post Office.38 Another exemplary 
technological system, Metropolitan Board of Works’ chief engineer 
Joseph Bazalgette’s London sewers of the 1850s and 1860s, took as 
inputs human excreta, waste water and rain.39 Earlier, as Christopher 
Hamlin has shown, developing Hughes’ analysis, the would- be systems 
builder Edwin Chadwick was confronted by anti- systems opponents 
across London’s political landscape during the ‘pipe- and- bricks sewer 
war’.40 The linkage between sewage and British agriculture has been 
explored by other historians.41
My observation here is two fold. First, natural environmental inputs 
into technological systems can be found for all systems that make the 
infrastructure of modern Britain, and they have a history. Commodity 
history is an important source for such histories of environmental inputs. 
Second, we could, if we were bold, imagine an ambitious target of tracing 
all of these inputs through time – the result would be a substantial histor-
ical mapping of natural- technological system interfaces.
(2) Environment as something natural made into, or a component 
within, a technological system
Arthur McEvoy offered the generalisation that ‘technology is the point 
of interaction between the human and the natural’.42 But the value 
of drawing on Hughes’ work is that it qualifies McEvoy’s statement in 
important ways. Yes, the edge of a technological system is an interface, 
but engineered nature is found within technology as system components 
as well as nature lying outside as inputs, as in (1) above, or as something 
for which technological systems have consequences, as in (3) below.
A fine, worked example of engineered nature within a system can 
be found in Daniel Schneider’s history of late nineteenth- century sewage 
treatment in England and the United States.43 In places such as Enfield, 
Exeter and Davyhulme, the application of the new science of micro-
biology transformed traditional practices, intensifying and simplifying 
biological processes to form ‘industrial ecosystems’, hybrids of concrete, 
steel, organic waste, nematode worms, and bacteria, at the centre of 
sewage treatment systems.44 The 1896 invention of Donald Cameron, 
city surveyor of Exeter, was one example:  he called it the ‘septic’ tank 
to distinguish it from the anti- septic approach of others, in which putre-
faction and odours were prevented by the deliberate killing of resident 
micro-organisms.45
Engineered nature is the subject of the chapters in this collection 
from Matthew Holmes (discussing barley) and, in a provocative and 
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critical fashion, by Dominic Berry (discussing the potato), the start, per-
haps, of ‘new techno- environmental histories of Britain’.46
It is interesting to speculate what the agricultural or military his-
tory of Britain might look like if the industrialising organisms approach, 
deployed by Ann Greene in the case of the American Civil War, was 
applied to re- examine the horse as an organic, shaped component of a 
technological system of agricultural production or military logistics.47 
Another thought is that the technological systems approach becomes 
even more pertinent if we widen the ‘natural’ from the organic to the 
inorganic, in which case all components become engineered environ-
ment in source at least.
(3) Environment as something changed, usually damaged, by 
outputs of technological process
Attention to aspects of the environment that are changed by outputs 
of technological process has been the dominant theme in ‘impact his-
tory’ scholarship that has addressed technology and the environ-
ment. Furthermore, the changes analysed have been typically negative 
ones: the relationship being one of pollution, degradation or destruction. 
A search of the span (1995– 2015) of the journal Environment and History 
reveals that 47 per cent of papers that took Britain as their area of inquiry 
focused on the consequences of pollutants, including such subjects 
as alkali pollution in St Helens, ‘copper smoke’ in Llanelli, stone decay in 
Oxford and Exeter, smoke pollution in Liverpool, post- war English beach 
pollution, and the side- effects of pesticides.48
There is a very large literature on industrial pollution, mostly urban 
and comparative in focus.49 Brimblecombe set out to trace the ways ‘our 
ancestors fouled the air’ in his long history of London interior and exterior 
air pollution.50 He has also, with Bowler, surveyed the subject for York.51 
Mosley showed how ‘Manchester, once fêted as the “symbol of a new age”, 
had come to epitomise the grimy, polluted industrial city:  it was … “the 
chimney of the world” ’; it was also a site where, by the 1840s, ‘vegetation 
was all but banished from the city centre’ and the term ‘acid rain’ was coined 
in 1872.52 Bill Luckin has examined the politics of the polluted Thames of 
the nineteenth century, while Leslie Wood has described the technical 
means and measurement of partial twentieth- century restoration.53 There 
are destructive impact histories from soil erosion54 to workers’ bodies55 to 
whole landscapes.56 Positive or neutral tones are rare.57
We might also include the impacts of failures of technological systems 
here, as well as the consequences of working technological systems noted 
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above. The flood defences of Eastern England, for example, were most 
certainly a technological system, albeit an assemblage of relatively low 
technologies such as earthen banks and concrete walls, before the 1953 
devastation that claimed the lives of 307 on land.58 The Thames Barrier is 
a high- tech response, or ‘technological fix’ as analysed by Matthew Kelly in 
his chapter.59 Likewise, Shane Ewen has argued, in his study of Sheffield’s 
Great Flood of 1864, which claimed over 250 lives, that much more 
attention should be paid to the engineering politics as they intersected 
with other social interests in histories of municipal water supply.60
Some of the literature has been careful to show that the influ-
ence has been two- way, while still focusing on the downstream, 
negative consequences of technological change. The social and pol-
itical response to negative changes has been an integral part of this 
literature on pollution. Frick traced the nineteenth- century smoke 
abatement movement.61 Anti- noise campaigns in the twentieth cen-
tury have been described by Bijsterveld62 and Agar.63 Indeed the litera-
ture on the rise of the conservation and environmental movements can 
be placed here.64
The ‘paradox of technology, that environmental disruption is 
brought about by the industrial economy, but that advancement of the 
industrial economy has also been and will be a main route to environ-
mental quality’ reminds us that technologies were deployed in response 
to pollution or degradation.65 There is a history here of water filters, 
smokeless fuels,66 the separator device (introduced in 1926) that kept oil 
from bilge water,67 the emergency oxygenation barges of the Thames,68 
and so on, much of it to be written.
The impacts of technologies are discussed in several chapters of 
this book, but form the focus of Ralph Harrington’s chapter on the bull-
dozer, as both historical agent and metaphor, Tim Cole’s chapter on the 
automobile, and Jessica van Horssen’s account of the ‘contamination 
chain’ of asbestos from Canadian mines to Manchester council housing.69 
An interesting contrast to these destructive impacts is Jennifer Wallis’ 
analysis of nineteenth- century ‘aerotherapy’, the marketing of which 
presented a ‘harmonious relationship between modern machinery and 
“natural” landscapes’.70
(4) Environment as something alongside an artificial world
Let’s do some weed theory. The notion that weeds were plants out- of- 
place (in Mary Douglas- esque terms) was commonplace by the nine-
teenth century.71 This classification depends on both the existence of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9historiogrAphy And intErsECt ions
9
cultural boundaries (of garden or cereal field, say) but also the agency 
of organisms to transgress such boundaries. There are longue durée his-
tories of weeds from ice age glacial moraine to opportunist colonisers of 
Neolithic fields and middens (such as fat- hen Chenopodium album). There 
are medium- term histories of weeds travelling as part of the Columbian 
exchange as a constituent in the formation of neo- Europes.72 And there 
are histories of weeds that properly fall into later, modern periods, 
such as the arrival of Japanese knotweed in Victorian times, ironically 
popularised by the champion of the ‘wild garden’, William Robinson, in 
the 1880s, which became a notorious weed in the late twentieth century 
(costing, to take one example, an estimated £70 million to clear from the 
London Olympic site at Stratford).73
The intricate interplay of technological systems – roads, railways, 
buildings, canals and so on  – creates a pattern of edges within which 
organisms grow. These weeds aren’t transgressors in quite the same 
way that infuriates the gardener. Some are encouraged by the flow of 
substances through technological systems. Take, for example, the Danish 
scurvygrass (Cochlearia danica) that has spread from seaside to inland 
roadsides on the outwash of salt and grit applied as de- icer.74 Or the 
nettles that spring up from nutrient- saturated ground, the product of 
fertiliser run- off from industrial arable farming and phosphates from 
household detergents.75 Such an interaction of technological system and 
environment might better be classed under point (3) above.
But other weeds are more strictly just adaptive generalists, whose 
evolved strategies for propagation fit the niches of technological 
edgelands. Indeed, we might think through the weeds of modern Britain 
in a different way. The point is not that there is unexpected impact (as 
invasive species) or meaning (as cultural category) that would jus-
tify historical/ sociological attention, but that there isn’t  – uncannily 
so. Therefore start from the observation of the uncanny unimportance 
of weeds. Human- built, artificial technological systems are set up so 
that nature is unimportant.76 Great effort is expended to produce the 
smooth urban surfaces  – hard surfaces with minimal cracks to make 
infrastructures resistant to weeds. Edgerton, in The Shock of the Old, 
rightly argues that historians of technology should pay far more attention 
to maintenance than they currently do.77 ‘That we neglect maintenance 
when we think and write about our technology’, he writes, ‘is an instance 
of the great gulf there is between our everyday understanding of our 
dealing with things and the formal understandings in … our histories.’78 
The examples he gives are all of mechanical maintenance:  the repair 
of cars and aeroplanes. What he misses is the fact that maintenance is 
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one of the activities most central to policing the boundaries of nature 
and technological system, and a proper subject for intersecting environ-
mental history and history of technology. The places where this vigilant, 
systematic maintenance against nature is relaxed (and even then only 
partially) are significant  – the selective growths of gardens and arable 
agriculture – and are where weeds are most powerfully meaningful.
Type (4)  interactions are certainly not confined to the botanical. 
Indeed this is where we might place the environmental history of the com-
mensal organisms of modern Britain, from the mammals (e.g. the brown 
rat and urban fox) and birds (the feral pigeon,79 which moved from its 
restricted niche of sea cliffs to the artificial rockscape of city centres), to 
micro- organisms (consider the interactions of the Legionella bacterium 
with the technological system of cooling towers and air- conditioning,80 
or other ecologies of bacteria with the technological systems of antibiotic 
use in medicine and veterinary practice).
(5) Environment as something untouched by artifice
It is a cliché of the environmental history of (modern) Britain that there 
is no wilderness, no landscape that has not been shaped to some degree, 
usually profoundly, by human activities.81 Many commentators have also 
noted that wilderness was a key concept for emerging environmental 
history in the United States, as well as being a critical site for its second 
wave.82 Putting these two points together can be part of the explanation 
for why environmental history has not thrived in Britain.83
So it might seem that this category, of environment as something 
untouched by artifice, will have little application in our context. But, as 
Esa Ruuskanen shows in his chapter for this collection, Irish boglands 
were perceived as unspoilt frontiers, wastelands in need of commer-
cial exploitation, by English observers in the late eighteenth century.84 
Furthermore, the very conditions that allow the cliché to exist  – the 
widely held view that there are unspoiled parts of the land – mean that 
wilderness, or something like it, does have a relevant history as a cul-
tural construct in modern Britain. The ‘something like it’ is, of course, 
‘countryside’. However much farmed, industrialised, and home to tech-
nologies (low and high) of all sorts, ‘countryside’ was still available to be 
mobilised as a category in opposition to city, urbanity, materialism and 
so on. The list of course is long, and has been the focus of one of the most 
important early types of environmental history- manqué:  the cultural 
studies of Raymond Williams.85 More recently, the deleterious effects of 
English rural nostalgia have been the subject of historians’ debate.86 The 
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contrast between the Quantock hills as a past landscape of poets and as a 
new ‘windscreen wilderness’ as seen from the car are the subject of Tim 
Cole’s analysis in this collection.87
Furthermore, beyond rurality and countryside, ‘wilderness’ itself 
has been occasionally mobilised, not least, as Rachel Woodward and 
Marianna Dudley have discussed, by military authorities in relation to 
land  they have possessed, such as Salisbury Plain. ‘ “Wilderness”, the 
quality that first attracted the military to many of its training areas’, notes 
Dudley, ‘had been preserved by the military, at first by serendipity, and 
in more recent years by military- environmentalism’ (in other words the 
deployment of environmental framings for military ends).88 She follows 
Woodward in insisting that this wilderness aspect is not a given but a 
construction, a portrayal of the countryside used by the army to justify 
occupation.89 A tiny creature, the fairy shrimp, a crustacean that breeds 
in the brief puddles that fill the ruts made by tank tracks, is the poster 
beast of military- environmentalism.90
The surprising military origins of another form of environmen-
talism, environmental concerns as a tool of diplomacy, are revealed in 
the chapter in this collection by Simone Turchetti.91 As he demonstrates, 
NATO’s environmental programme, shaped by British governmental 
advisers, was prompted by the UK’s ‘worst ever oil spill disaster’, a 
pollution of the wilderness of the sea: the 1967 Torrey Canyon breach on 
rocks between Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.
(6) Environment as something represented through technology
Media technologies, especially print, photography (from the mid- 
nineteenth century), recorded sound (from the 1870s), broadcast radio 
(from the 1920s), television (from the 1950s), the world wide web (from 
the 1990s) and social media (2000s), have been means of representing 
the environment in modern Britain. As such they form one type of inter-
section between environment and technology. There are histories here of 
production, transmission and consumption.92
The polymath environmentalist and civil servant Max Nicholson 
collaborated with Ludwig Koch to produce 78 rpm records of wild bird 
song in the 1930s.93 Natural history film- making, to take an extended 
example, has a distinguished history of production in Britain. Born into 
a farming family, his father also a gamekeeper, Cherry Kearton began 
using the new ‘scientific invention’, the motion picture camera, to film 
birds in 1903.94 He had previously provided photographs ‘taken direct 
from nature’ to illustrate his brother’s book, British Birds’ Nests (1895). 
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He took his camera abroad, filming in British East Africa (1909, 1910), 
India and Borneo (1911), North America and Canada (1912) and 
Central Africa (1913), in all senses following hunters’ tracks, showing 
his films to British audiences. The trusted naturalist- traveller with a 
camera was developed further for a new medium, television, by David 
Attenborough, starting with Zoo Quest in 1953. Peter Scott’s Look series 
for the BBC natural history unit at Bristol began in 1955.95 Televisual 
authority – in Gouyon’s terms the ‘telenaturalist’ – had to be carefully 
crafted, and distinguished from ethologists, such as Konrad Lorenz and 
Niko Tinbergen, whose authority came from science and the printed 
word.96
While movie cameras may be specially adapted for natural his-
tory film- making, the mediating technologies here (camera– darkroom– 
editing, room– transport– cinema projection for movie pictures; 
camera– darkroom– editing, room– radio transmission– television set for 
television) are largely unchanged by the fact that the mediated content 
was natural historical in character. They were not designed specifically 
to represent aspects of the environment. This feature distinguishes these 
mediating technologies from those in the next category.
(7) Environmental knowledge as something organised by being 
registered with technology
Interactions of types (6)  and (7)  are both forms of representation. 
Nature when it is mediated as in type (6) is certainly shaped – features 
are selected, a mediating frame is imposed, and so on. In type (7) this 
goes further: the technological system involved is expressly designed to 
register and represent aspects of the environment as data and ultimately 
as knowledge. Such technological systems include the central working 
tools of conservation and environmental management.
Historiographically, this topic falls within the intersection of history 
of technology, environmental history and, since it concerns systematised 
knowledge, history of science.97 It would include the development of 
natural historical practices of classification, which in the modern period 
would include the acceptance, development and use of the eighteenth- 
century Linnaean system, the cartography of the Ordnance Survey and 
the Hydrographic Office, the ways of seeing and recording practices of 
natural historical societies (paying attention to the identities of ‘amateurs’ 
and ‘professionals’ as they came into focus in the later nineteenth cen-
tury98), the role of instruments99 and model organisms,100 the work of 
museums,101 and, vitally for the twentieth century, the government 
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bureaucracies of environmental management as they co- developed with 
the campaigning work of civil society bodies. Modern Britain is a land-
scape overlaid with virtual classifications (7 per cent of land in England, 
to take one country, are Sites of Special Scientific Interest, SSSIs, while 
other acronyms – AONBs, NNRs, SPAs, SACs – go further102), many with 
Biodiversity Action Plans.
Indeed, noticing one of the most significant ways that the natural 
environment and technological systems intersect in modern Britain 
requires us to recognise bureaucracy as a technological system.103 I have 
explored elsewhere the consequences of central government being both 
metaphorically presented as machine- like and being an organisation of 
clerical work that has itself been mechanised.104 John Sheail, more than 
any other historian, has traced the development of conservation as an 
interplay of government and non- governmental organisations, although 
not from a history of technology perspective.105 Thomas Turnbull, in his 
chapter, shows how computer models of environmental impact, a new 
form of systematised knowledge in the early 1970s, were received and 
criticised by British politicians and bureaucrats.106
It is crucial to put history of technology into the historical accounts 
of conservation and environmental management. A  fine example that 
demonstrates why it matters is Jennifer Hubbard’s work on the North 
Atlantic environment. She shows that fisheries biologists, from around 
1900, first approached the marine environment in ways that were 
both framed by understandings of the terrestrial environment, but also 
decisively shaped by the technological systems of measurement at their 
disposal.107 As these technologies changed, for example with scuba 
gear and undersea cameras in the 1950s, so were enabled different 
conceptions of the marine environment. Other British environments 
have similar, important histories to tell.
(8) Environment and technologies as interconnected cultural 
imaginaries
The final type of interaction is imaginative. Environmental components, 
especially organisms, can be sources of inspiration for new technolo-
gies. The theme here is not engineering as a mode of approach to life – 
although that is important elsewhere and has been explored by historians, 
mostly of the American life and human sciences108  – but instead, as 
Peter Coates puts it:  ‘Rather than posing the question “can technology 
improve nature?” let us inquire, “can nature improve technology?” ’109 
This has been popularised under the title ‘biomimicry’, but a historian’s 
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caution is needed. ‘Various aspects of how technologies are naturalized 
by learning from nature require more rigorous investigation than they 
currently receive in biomimics’ writings,’ notes Coates; these ‘include the 
character of the inspirational role that advocates of biomimicry claim for 
natural substances and processes; the relationship between “naturfact” 
and “artifact”; and the attitude toward non- human nature of the nature- 
inspired inventor’. He re- examined key cases:  the nineteenth- century 
invention of barbed wire and the spines of the osage orange; the Wright 
Brothers and bird flight; and the Swiss electrical engineer George de 
Mestral and the invention of Velcro based on burdock burrs. Also, most 
relevant in a British context are the imaginative relationships between 
the giant, extraordinary Victoria regia leaf and the 1840s– 1850s glass-
house designs of Joseph Paxton.110 We don’t really know how typical such 
a mode of engineering imagination has been. At present, the historical 
writing on this theme is patchy.
But, on reflection, this category could and should be expanded. 
I have tended to take ‘modern’ in a minimal fashion, a mere period con-
tainer. But the modern is also a substantial cultural construct. The sim-
ultaneous invocation of environment and technology is distinctive of 
imagery of modern Britain – think of the ‘motoring pastoral’ of Shell’s 
County Guides.111 It could be found, for example, in the centrepiece 
of the Festival of Britain of 1951, the Dome of Discovery (see also Tim 
Cole’s chapter here112); it is discussed by David Matless in this volume 
in his chapter on the representation of environment and technologies in 
the Science Museum’s iconic Agriculture Gallery, recently dismantled.113 
Yet the general history of the environmental and technological ‘modern’ 
cultural imaginary in Britain has yet to be written. David Nye wrote of 
a distinctive American ‘technological sublime’, in which the awe of the 
human- built world was grafted on  to that of the natural.114 Has there 
been such a thing as a British envirotechnological sublime? If not, 
why not?
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to provide an overview of the historiography 
of environmental history and history of technology as they intersect and 
as they relate broadly to modern Britain. In particular, I have offered an 
eightfold typology that maps the ways that technology and environment 
might be considered to interact, and show how some existing historical 
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writing and arguments might fit within such a rubric.115 The objective 
was to reveal some of the patterns of this historiography while also 
suggesting some ways forward. I am convinced that the intersection is 
an important and exciting focus for further work. In particular, there is 
the opportunity to write a new envirotechnical history of infrastructures, 
organisms, cities and countrysides. The chapters of this volume illustrate 
some ways that such history might be uncovered.
I will finish with a couple of provisos. First, it is clear that for 
many potential subjects a combination of types of interaction will be 
present – and, indeed, such promiscuity is to be expected. For example, 
a combined environmental and technological history of an event such 
as the 1953 North Sea flood or the 1976 drought would have nearly 
all types of interaction at play.116 Second, there will be subjects that 
are important but should not be hammered into these categories like 
square pegs into round holes. Where, for example, does hunting with 
guns fit? As a frame for later film- making it might be described under 
(6), but a bullet hitting a woodpigeon is hardly a case of mere mediated 
representation! As a source of conservation and environmental pol-
itics, certainly, as argued by Sheail in his discussion of the shooting 
of seabirds for white feathers at Flamborough Head in the 1830s, it is 
allied to topics I have placed in (3) and (7).117 As an aspect of British 
imperial identity the subject connects, rightly, to a broader cultural 
history.118 It is also part of the politics of country and city, mentioned 
under (5).119 Hunting with guns could be squeezed into (3), the hunted 
target understood as part of the natural environment that is damaged 
by the outputs of a technological process. Perhaps, in such cases, we 
can see the typology not as a one- size- fits- all classification but as a tool 
for the historiographical imagination, suggesting relations we had not 
previously considered.
Chapters in this collection explore the intersections of techno-
logical systems (from construction work to housing, from roads to 
satellites, from farms to flood barriers) and environments (from woods 
to cities, from boglands to outer space). Engineered nature is discussed 
by contributors, from the atmosphere in nineteenth- century air baths to 
new crop varieties of barley and potato. The representation of environ-
ments is also analysed, from agricultural land and technology in museum 
displays to the simulations of early and controversial computer models. 
But the hope is that this collection will also inspire. There is so much still 
to be researched about the intertwined histories of technologies and the 
environment in modern Britain.
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Encroaching Irish bogland frontiers: 
science, policy and aspirations from 
the 1770s to the 1840s
Esa Ruuskanen
Introduction
I begin this chapter with quotes by Arthur Young (1741– 1820), an 
English social and political observer and writer, who spent years in 
Ireland in the 1770s and published a detailed account of his observations 
and a survey, extensively cited later in the nineteenth century, based on 
the knowledge he gathered on that journey. When he covered the topog-
raphy of the island, he marvelled how ‘the bogs, of which foreigners have 
heard so much, are very extensive in Ireland’. As a man who had devoted 
his life to the improvement of agriculture and the social conditions of 
the rural poor, he maintained that ‘the means of improving them [bogs] 
is the most important consideration at present’. Young envisioned how 
a country so widely covered with ‘wastelands’ could possess a lush, 
cultivated countryside and wealthier population and serve as the granary 
of the industrialising England.1
Arthur Young’s writing in a sense bespeaks the quite common 
notions and, moreover, visions of the future of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth- century Western and Northern European elite and scholars 
related to boggy, fenny and marshy areas. First of all, there were vast 
tracts of bogs or mires still in an almost wholly natural condition in the 
frontiers near or beyond the settled and almost wholly artificial areas of 
the then European economic or political powers – not only in Ireland but 
also in East Friesland, Livonia, Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod Oblasts, 
Norrland, Ostrobothnia and Sápmi (Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish 
Lapland) among others.2 When we think about the most famous frontiers 
in the nineteenth century we usually name American prairies, the 
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backwoods of colonial Africa and Southeast Asia, Siberian woodlands 
or the polar regions. These frontiers and the ambitions to map and tap 
them attained far more publicity in late eighteenth- and early nine-
teenth- century European media and popular culture than peatlands, 
which, nevertheless, also became the objects of economic, political 
and scientific meaning- making, which unavoidably began to shape the 
society– nature nexus in these particular areas. Bogs, fens, marshes and 
mires, as such, were conceived as wastelands and barriers to progress 
or civilisation. Increasingly commercial and technology- and science- 
oriented perspectives on peatlands and wetlands gathered momentum, 
aiming at transforming these areas into territories that were seen as 
being made valuable by local people or by massive intervention of state 
or enterprises. Consequently, quite distant and distinct environments 
were bound together when it comes to the appraisal of nature.
This chapter seeks to explain these meaning- making, valuation and 
commercialisation processes concerning bogs in Ireland from the 1770s 
to the 1840s. The Industrial Revolution, a crucial landmark considering 
the development of a new mindset regarding the set of assumptions about 
and notions of frontiers or wastelands, originated in Ireland in the 1770s. 
It was during that decade that Arthur Young also published his survey of 
Ireland, which, compared with earlier writings on the matter, was unique 
in its thoroughness and, should I say, certain imperial ethos. At the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century the amount of publications and reports 
focusing on how to tame bogs increased and the first commission was 
charged with finding ways to improve these wastelands. The temporal 
end of this study, in turn, is in the 1840s before the Great Famine, which 
started the reassessment of past policies and priorities. Besides, late 
 nineteenth- century plans for improving Irish bogs largely rested upon 
the plans and aspirations outlined already between the 1770s and 1840s.
In his pioneering work The Making of the English Landscape, William 
George Hoskins stated that his focus was on the ways in which humans, 
for instance, ‘have reclaimed marshland, fen, and moor’, ‘created fields 
out of a wilderness’ and ‘made canals’.3 My focus is rather on the question 
of why humans aimed at reclaiming peatlands, in this case particu-
larly bogs, in Ireland. Therefore I do not trace how the plans and ideas 
expressed in the sources finally materialised, or how many acres, when 
and where were converted into arable and forest land or industrial- scale 
peat extraction sites, and how this all altered the natural flora and fauna 
in the drained or fragmented bog areas. This kind of study has been done 
excellently by Oliver Rackham on Britain’s ‘ordinary landscape’ and how 
it has been made ‘both by the natural world and by human activities, 
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interacting with each other over many centuries’.4 In this chapter I am, 
though, more interested in the notions, values and future visions to be 
traced in the texts, and, in addition, what they tell us about the chan-
ging human– peatland relationship. I  do not, however, consider bog-
land frontiers merely as a social construction, but equally as part of a 
tangible material world. Having read the sources used in this study, one 
can nearly sense the many- metres- thick peat layer, as well as muddy and 
watery soil awaiting ‘industrious drainers’ and ‘spirited improvers’ in the 
vast bogs of Ireland. Human– peatland relationship(s) should indeed be 
contemplated as an ambiguous and intricate process of interrelatedness 
within which both parties are active actors. To put it simply, humans also 
become the objects of their own agency and, therefore, the outcome of 
the action is difficult to predict, unlike the outcome of rule- based causal 
processes. Coincidence and even chaos play bigger roles than when exam-
ining natural or cultural processes as such, separated from each other.
As primary sources, I use parliamentary Committee Reports related 
to draining and cultivating Irish bogs and improving the inland navi-
gation, as well as publications of, for example, Arthur Young, Thomas 
Newenham, Richard Griffith, James Dawson, Joseph Hume, Robert 
Monteath and Sir Robert Kane on the reclamation of Irish bogs for the 
benefit of agriculture, canal transport, silviculture and the prosperity 
of the country. Especially the assumptions and plans made by Arthur 
Young and Sir Robert Kane were etched in the general debates over the 
drainage issue and their conclusions became widely cited later in the 
nineteenth century. In addition to these works, the four detailed and 
practical reports from the Committee Respecting the Draining of Bogs 
in Ireland between 1810 and 1814 set the priorities for the ideal geo-
graphical locations of the intended drainage, as well as how the drained 
soil could be best utilised, and provided decision makers and landowners 
with the then most accurate scientific knowledge on these areas; in total, 
the commissioners surveyed 731,976 English acres of various bogs.5 
Altogether, it is important to contemplate whether the sources describe 
best practice rather than the state of affairs. In many cases they do cover 
the already materialised ‘improvements of wastelands’ up to a point, but 
mostly they envisage the future of agriculture and inland navigation in 
Ireland and Great Britain as well and how the goals could be achieved by 
means of the drainage.
Theoretically the issues covered in this chapter are intertwined 
with discussions on frontiers, environmental knowledge and enviro-
technical imaginaries. Michael Redclift has outlined that ‘frontiers can 
be seen as both material realities and as social constructions, whose 
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ideological utility often develops slowly, without clear lines of demar-
cation’. This is an apt remark when studying various historical peatland 
frontiers. Redclift considers migration and settlement, the manage-
ment of resources and the effects of globalisation as the main processes 
that determine the development of the frontier.6 In my case, those who 
were devoted to the drainage issue tried to fight emigration and find 
ways to settle the then uninhabited or sparsely populated wastelands. 
Their main aim was to find better ways to manage previously useless 
or valueless resources and convert them into valuable property. In a 
sense, the environment was seen as an input into a technological and 
commercial system.
The effects of (proto- )globalisation can be found in this case too, at 
least up to a point, since the Irish economy became ‘inextricably bound 
to the rest of Britain’ in the nineteenth century, as Michael Turner puts 
it,7 and the British economy, in turn, can be contended to have become 
bound with its colonies and those European areas that were important 
to the empire’s security of grain supply and raw materials. That question 
could also be turned into one that deals with the effects of British imperi-
alism dominated by London. In this case, those who had adopted a British 
identity with its ambitions, or, paraphrasing Mary Louise Pratt, ‘imperial 
eyes’,8 in a sense tried to execute the British civilising mission to ensure 
the material progress of Ireland. The civilising mission also related to 
nature, aiming at making it blooming and wealth- producing.
Bogland frontiers can be analysed in terms of knowledge and 
technological systems and how they impact the altered ecologies. I seek 
to disentangle how accumulating knowledge on peat soil, as well as 
new drainage, canal transport and peat extraction and processing tech-
nologies, inspired those who devoted themselves to the civilisation of 
nature to reappraise peripheral areas and to promote the conversion 
of these areas into territories that are seen as being made valuable. As 
the main processes that determined the development of these frontiers 
I  consider settlement, the management of resources and the effects of 
the  centralised laissez- faire trading system dominated by London. The 
whole complex question can be placed in category (5) presented in the 
opening chapter by Jon Agar.9 Later, in the twentieth century, it might be 
described under (3) and (7), but that is another story.
British scientists and politicians who envisaged how boglands 
could be transformed into valuable property took part in the building 
and dissemination of socio-technical imaginaries. In Jasanoffian terms, 
these imaginaries become enmeshed in performing diverse visions of 
collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities 
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to nation states.10 In my case, socio-technical imaginaries articulated 
visions of social futures and of risk and benefit for society. It is therefore 
essential to consider how these imaginaries have provided underlying 
rationale for visions concerning drainage. Furthermore, projects that 
transformed the environment can be seen as the reflections of socio-
technical imaginaries and changing aesthetical, economic and societal 
values to nature. Plans and visions – even as ideas and beliefs – meant 
the increasing rationalisation and commercialisation of peatlands.
When late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century scholars 
and engineers talked about bogs they used a different set of definitions 
from the ones of today. In Ireland, peat was nearly always termed turf. 
Knowledge about the peat soil and the hydrology of bogs accumulated 
gradually and became tested in practical efforts to reclaim former 
peatlands. Irish bogs were divided into flat red bogs and mountain 
bogs, depending on their location and the composition of the peat soil. 
Mountain bogs – mountain blanket bogs in the current term – occur on 
relatively flat terrain in the mountain ranges above 200m altitude and 
are characterised by heavy rainfall and low evaporation, and red bogs – 
or raised bogs – occur throughout the midlands of Ireland and got their 
name because the dry peat looks brownish- red in colour. Overall, bogs 
have played a fundamental role in Irish culture. In some regions their 
reclamation for fuel peat was an important part of the local economy. 
However, the perceptions and the use of bogs were subject to consider-
able changes in the modern period.
Bogland frontiers framed and labelled
The drainage issue had been more or less on the agenda in Ireland 
already from the beginning of the eighteenth century. William King, 
Fellow of the Dublin Society, published in 1685 an article in which he 
labelled Irish bogs as ‘a great destruction to Cattle’, ‘a great hindrance 
in passing from place to place’ and ‘a shelter and refuge to Tories and 
Thieves’, and ruminated ‘how they [bogs] may be remedyed, or made 
useful’, for example, as meadows. Moreover, the Crown could consoli-
date its control over the remote areas and, at the same time, promote 
cattle farming.11 King’s arguments, however, can be viewed more as a 
backing to the police practices under the rubric of regimentation rather 
than as a particularly serious plan to steer the minds of the landowners 
on attacking the drainage issue. His treatise simply lacks detailed and 
practical survey and technical advice for entering into the work.
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Some freeholders tried to advance the reclamation of Irish bogs in 
the eighteenth century, and the Dublin Society tried to further drainage 
works in principle at least. Henry Brooke, one of these drainers, even 
wrote a guidebook entitled A Brief Essay on the Nature of Bogs, and the 
Method of Reclaiming Them based on his experiences in 1772 and gave 
quite detailed descriptions of how a bog can be converted into arable 
land. Brooke was a writer and pamphleteer born in Rantavan, County 
Cavan, Ireland in 1703, who ran a farm at Rantavan in the 1770s, where 
he drained a lake and got a bog instead. Brooke was personally interested 
in transport and the commercial revolution of the eighteenth century.12 
His book, however, was targeted at those landowners living in a similar 
environment and having an interest in practical instructions related to 
the drainage. Thus, it is hard to find an imperial ethos in Brooke’s plan, 
aiming at a comprehensive civilising mission when it comes to nature and 
Irish ‘wastelands’ as a whole. That was an angle, or even a mindset, which 
became apparent in Arthur Young’s thorough survey Arthur Young’s Tour 
in Ireland, 1776– 1779.
Young was already an established agricultural and political 
writer when he published the survey on Ireland. He carried out many 
experiments on his own farms and reported on the practices of other 
farmers after touring the major agricultural districts of several coun-
tries in order to do a personal survey. Young also gathered information 
by corresponding with the leading agriculturalists of his age, both at 
home and abroad, including John Sinclair, the Chairman of the Board of 
Agriculture, and George Washington in America. Young always urged the 
traveller to depart from the main roads in order to survey agriculture that 
was less influenced by access to trade with urban or industrial areas.13 
That working method led to him travelling the vast Irish bogland areas as 
well, which impressed him in many ways.
‘Although the proportion of waste territory is not, I  apprehend, 
so great in Ireland as it is in England, certainly owing to the rights of 
commonage in the latter country, which fortunately have no existence in 
Ireland’, Young began the description of boglands, ‘yet are the tracts of 
desert mountains and bogs very considerable’.14 By framing and labelling 
certain areas as ‘waste territories’ Young in a sense ignored all the land 
use conventions and techniques the locals had practised in these areas. He 
does not cover whether, for example, bogs were seen as waste territories 
by the rural poor. In fact, that seemed to have been quite an inessential 
question for the men who devoted themselves to the civilising mission.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, dichotomous ideas of 
wasteland as ruined or defiled nature became fully codified in Western 
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philosophy and literature. In that context, wasteland refers to land that is 
as yet unmodified by civilisation. As Vittoria Di Palma puts it, ‘the waste-
land is defined not by what it is or what it has, but by what it lacks’.15 In 
the eyes of drainers and improvers, bogs certainly lacked something, for 
example, permanent settlement, good road and canal connections, pros-
perous holdings, green cultivated land and even picturesque scenery. It 
remains, however, unclear whether the rural poor themselves shared that 
picture. Their voice is totally missing from the sources. Historically the 
human– bog relationship in Ireland and in almost every so- called peatland 
frontier area in Western and Northern Europe, however, had been quite 
mobile, a strategy for adapting to the environment and also resourcefully 
utilising the best offerings of nature rather than transforming it.16
In Ireland, the main function of bogs had been to provide fuel for the 
bulk of the rural population. Turf production by using such approved low- 
tech tools as sleáns (two- sided spades), wooden wheelbarrows, etc. was 
an important part of the work year: between cutting, drying, harvesting 
and drawing home the turf, a labourer’s annual supply required up to 
one month’s work. Like the potato, the bulk of the turf harvest was not 
marketed. Economic historian Cormac Ó Gráda even argues that ‘abun-
dant fuel was one of the factors which made life for the poor in Ireland 
bearable’.17 Boglands had been turf- cutting frontiers without any wide- 
ranging improvement aims for the freeholders and many landlords as 
well, whereas in Young’s visions these areas rather represented agricul-
tural, navigation and settlement frontiers with more thorough ambitions.
Young concluded that the main reasons for the lion’s share of the 
Irish bogs still being unreclaimed were the custom of leaseholders and, 
equally, the poor grip on reality of the majority of the landlords. He 
described how ‘the minutes of the journey show that a few gentlemen 
have executed very meritorious works even in these [bogs]; but as they, 
unfortunately for the public, do not live upon any of the very exten-
sive bogs, the inhabitants near the latter deny the application of their 
remarks’. Boglands had largely remained untamed and uncultivated. 
‘Trifling as they have been on the Irish mountains yet are the bogs still 
more neglected,’ Young notes. Having then given a detailed account 
of the costs expected from the drainage, which he considered to be 
‘very moderate’, Young encourages both parties to diligently attack the 
drainage issue. ‘Whatever the means used’, he persuaded, ‘certain it is 
that no meadows are equal to those gained by improving a bog.’18
It is possible to find all the frontiers considered in my study 
already in Young’s pioneering survey. Boglands were agricultural 
frontiers as they were places waiting to be converted into pasture and, 
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consequently, opening settlement frontiers that could become more 
permanently and firmly inhabited. For Young, boglands represented 
not so much a terra nullius but rather areas at the edge of cultivation 
or beyond it. It would be possible to, paraphrasing legal terms, dismiss 
a case, but wouldn’t that be inefficient and a pure waste of resources 
given that the estimated costs were moderate and the anticipated 
benefits manifold? In a similar vein, Young criticised the state of 
affairs when it comes to inland navigation, which was quite inextric-
ably linked to the drainage issue. ‘But of all public works, none have 
been so much favoured as inland navigations,’ Young lashes out at the 
decision makers, ‘but under the administration of this [Navigation] 
Board, which consists of many of the most considerable persons in 
the kingdom, very great attempts have been made, but I am sorry to 
observe, very little completed.’19
Navigation frontier as the opportunity for profit or efficiency 
from a new technology emerged once again in a proposition that came 
from inside the Dublin Society. The writer using his author abbrevi-
ation W.V.  proposed in 1801  ‘that a company be formed, consisting 
of subscribers … to be incorporated by act of parliament, and called 
the Waste Land Company of Ireland’. That company would ‘have power 
to purchase from tenants, in fee simple, red or black bogs … lying 
together; or strands, or marshes, usually covered with the tides’ and 
‘also to cut canals to neighbouring towns, for the purpose of supplying 
them with turf and water’. The author was quite pessimistic about 
finding enough capital from private persons to embark on extensive 
drainage works. He justified his proposition by arguing that
it is conceived the reason, why the bogs of Ireland have not been 
improved by individuals is, because they have neither property nor 
power, property to undertake a heavy work, or power to cut drains 
through neighbouring lands, or to get manure elsewhere than on 
the ground, and therefore that great bogs can never be improved 
but by a company, under the powers of an act of parliament.
Having once completed the drainage, ‘such a company could carry on 
their works as well as any canal company’. The agricultural frontier aspect 
is also covered in the proposition. W.V. mentions that ‘bogs, in the course 
of their improvement, are well- suited to the growth of hemp and rape’.20
Young’s and W.V.’s plans, even as ideas, meant the increasing com-
mercialisation, commodification and rationalisation of boglands. Within 
that context, frontiers are conceived, as Gordon M. Winder and Andreas 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin30
30
Dix formulate it, ‘in terms of modernising commercial projects backed 
by cultural imaginaries and scientific, technical and political calcula-
tion that are set to work in environments’.21 With the process of mod-
ernisation, boglands as objects became increasingly socio- natural and 
thus connected to the desires, aspirations and demands of the British 
civilising mission.
Bogland frontiers surveyed and assessed
In addition to the works of Arthur Young and other late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth- century improvers, the Dublin Society and the Irish 
Parliament also tried to prop up the drainage issue. The Irish Parliament, 
for example, passed an Act in 1731 to ‘encourage the improvement of 
barren and wasteland, and bogs’. The charter of the Dublin Society from 
1750, in turn, recites ‘that several of the nobility and gentry of Ireland, 
having observed vast tracts of land and bog in Ireland uncultivated, and 
a general want of skill and industry in the inhabitants to improve them, 
had formed themselves into a voluntary society for promoting husbandry 
and other useful arts’, including ‘draining bogs’. There were, however, 
many drainers and improvers who were not satisfied with how things had 
progressed in practice in the late eighteenth century and at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. The government was expected to step forward 
to advance the issue more sensibly.
The appointment of a special committee with special power 
to manage the task, including expensive and extensive surveys, was 
pushed by, for example, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was Chief Secretary 
of Ireland in 1807 and 1808, and Thomas Newenham, an Irish political 
writer and former MP. They both had the political assets to win support 
from London. Wellesley wrote a memorandum to the Home Secretary, 
Lord Liverpool, on the drainage of the bogs of Ireland and proposed ‘the 
appointment of a Commission with power to survey the different bogs 
and ascertain their extent, the practicability of draining them and the 
expense of that operation’.22 Newenham’s A View of the Natural, Political, 
and Commercial Circumstances of Ireland published in 1809 followed the 
optimistic perceptions of Arthur Young and positioned the Irish drainage 
issue as significant to the success of Great Britain as well. Newenham 
also saw the costs following from the drainage as very moderate. ‘Such 
an expenditure’, Newenham judged, ‘would unquestionably enable 
Ireland to supply, most amply, the growing wants of England, after satis-
fying those of her own rapidly increasing population.’ He estimated that
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if one- eighth part of this [bogs of Ireland], consisting such land 
as, by situation, nature of soil, and abundance of natural manures, 
appeared most favourable circumstanced for cultivation, were 
reclaimed, 3,600,000 average barrels of the different sorts of grain, 
even with the present defective mode of husbandry, might be annu-
ally obtained.
Ireland could be easily transformed from ‘waste territories’ to the granary 
of industrialising England, whose dependency on the grain imports was 
substantial.23
Finally, Parliament appointed the Committee Respecting the 
Draining of Bogs in Ireland in 1809. Already active proponents of the 
drainage issue, for example, Charles Vallancey, Richard Griffith, John 
Leslie Foster and John Staunton Rochford, were nominated to the sec-
retary of the commissioners to be appointed to that task. Vallancey, the 
acting chairman of the committee, was an English- born military sur-
veyor who was sent to Ireland in the late 1760s, and Richard Griffith was 
Chairman of the Board of Works, an Irish geologist and mining engineer. 
Rochford served on the Dublin Society’s chemistry committee, and 
Foster was an Irish barrister and nephew of John Foster, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer of Ireland. The task of surveying Irish bogs by counties, 
to be carried out by the assigned engineers, was directed by the Board 
of Works of Ireland.24 Ultimately, the appointment of the parliamentary 
committee can be seen as a result of a decades- long deliberation and 
civilising mission in terms of the ‘wastelands’ of Great Britain. Besides, 
the time was favourable for the initiative, since Britain was at war and 
stronger self- sufficiency was desired.
The committee authored four detailed reports on the bogs of 
Ireland between 1810 and 1814 and provided the House of Commons 
with an impressive amount of agricultural, soil chemical and topograph-
ical knowledge and, in addition, plans on how, where and at what cost to 
commence the drainage. The reports also contained pioneering research 
into peat deposits. No other such surveys were conducted in Ireland in 
the nineteenth century with respect to the thoroughness, geographical 
coverage and the amount of work.
The commission concluded that the drainage would benefit Ireland 
and also England in many ways and estimated that all flat red bogs ‘might 
be converted to the general purposes of agriculture’.25 As for mountain 
bogs, the commission was rather optimistic and judged ‘that not only 
they, but a considerable portion of the mountain soil, may be improved 
at a small expense, so far as to afford excellent pasture and meadow’.26 
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Not only was the state of agriculture expected to be improved, but inland 
navigation would also be advanced. ‘Whenever the bogs shall have 
been perfectly drained’, Richard Griffith calculated, ‘it will doubtless be 
a matter well worthy of the consideration of the proprietors to obtain 
navigable communications with the main land, for the purpose of pro-
curing gravel, lime, etc., and for the more easy and cheap conveyance to 
market of the produce of the bogs.’27 Lime and fine gravel were blended 
with peat soil to reduce its acidity. On the whole, the commission was 
convinced that the increasing land value would cover the expenses of the 
improvements that had been made to it.28
The committee’s contribution to the mapping of Irish bogland 
frontiers bound these environments with complicated trading networks 
in a more illustrative and reasonable way. The agricultural or navigation 
frontier was not just an Irish frontier but a British frontier as well. Farm 
products played a crucial role in stoking the Industrial Revolution. In 
the future visions of the commission, Ireland would bear an apparent 
resemblance to the then much more cultivated and manicured environ-
ments in Western Europe. The cultivated and canalised low- lying lands 
of Ireland would see a constant flow of materials and products from 
inland to the seaports and to England, and vice versa. Even the most 
‘desolated’ and ‘abandoned’ mountain districts would be used as pas-
ture. Trading networks and their associated practices and interdepend-
encies allowed boglands to be viewed through ever more calculative 
and speculative eyes. That desired march of progress demonstrated 
how new technology became embedded in the future visions. The age of 
canals and steam would be realised in the back garden of industrialising 
England and an infinitely greater bulk of goods could be carried in much 
greater security on barges than in wagons and at a very much smaller 
expenditure of horse power and labour. Paradoxically, rather low tech-
nology, for example, spades, mills and weirs, and lots of strong men and 
women were still needed to drain the water from boggy areas. Actually, 
that was the way peatlands were prepared for improvements until the 
late nineteenth century when machines and dynamite were tested in the 
drainage.
Consequently, boglands would become almost wholly artificial 
environments. In fact, there would hardly be intact bogs in Ireland 
any more except for the roughest and most desolate ones, should the plans 
of the drainers and improvers be fulfilled  – only meadows, fields, turf 
extraction sites, canals and afforested mountains instead. Consequently, 
peatland ecologies would begin to tilt towards monoculture:  natural, 
rare  and diverse bog flora, including Sphagnum mosses, bog cotton, 
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heathers, black bog rushes, bog myrtle, royal fern and sundew, would 
be replaced by plant species that humans valued most both economically 
and often aesthetically. Despite the ambitiousness and far- reachingness 
of the plans, the commission did not see any hazards for the locals arising 
from the drainage except the increasing flood risk. That, however, could 
be obviated
by deepening the beds, and removing channel obstructions in these 
small rivers, sufficiently to render them capable of effecting the quick 
discharge of the waters, without flooding the country, as otherwise 
the injury that might be produced by the floods in the low lands 
would counterbalance the advantage of drainage in the bogs.29
Environmental learning, in this case, became a process characterised by 
interest in practical details, utilitarian values and the ambition to develop 
suitable technologies and engineering to drain the water from bogs.
Bogland frontiers revisited and reopened
The reports of the committee were ultimately not published and made 
open to the public. Quite soon, they were buried among the endless 
archive of the British parliamentary papers after the drainage issue 
took a backseat in the government’s political agenda. Richard Griffith 
made an attempt to raise the issue by publishing a book in 1819 in 
which he largely reiterated his arguments already floated years ago 
in the reports. The book was dedicated to Robert Peel, former Chief 
Secretary for Ireland and a rising star in the Conservative party, who 
Griffith thought had power to promote the issue in Parliament. Griffith 
was, however, politically experienced enough to tie the issue to a more 
burning question, namely the poor law question. ‘Let the legislature 
open to the people new sources of profitable labour, by the extension 
of inland navigation and by reclaiming the bogs,’ Griffith writes; ‘by 
doing this, they would afford present employment to the poor, and 
gradually throw three million acres into the land market; which would 
reduce the extravagant rate of rents; and thus meet the existing evil in 
a double form’. Griffith stressed that ‘Ireland must now be considered 
as an integral part of the Empire’. The measures that to him appeared 
of the most immediate importance for the improvement of Ireland 
were ‘the further extension of her Inland navigation; the draining of 
her Bogs, and the adoption of a liberal system of Religious and Moral 
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Education for her Poor’.30 A  new angle was opened in the drainage 
issue and socio-technical imaginations of boglands.
Robert Fraser, an Irish statistician and surveyor, wrote in Sketches 
and Essays on the Present State of Ireland in 1822 for the acting Committee 
of the Society how
it is of importance to remark, that the reclaiming of these bogs is an 
undertaking of great national importance; inasmuch as the whole 
of the two millions of acres, are capable of being converted into the 
production of grain, and that at the same time the improvement of 
these bogs, would be a great source of employment, to the redun-
dant population of this country, their full cultivation, would ensure 
to England, supplies of grain, at moderate prices, which might 
render it wholly independent of foreign countries, for the food of 
its manufacturing population.
Fraser wondered that ‘no legislative measure has been adopted, in order 
to facilitate the reclaiming of those extensive tracts’.31 Tackling the poor 
question in Ireland by means of promoting drainage was also addressed 
by a few British politicians in the 1830s. Joseph Hume, a radical MP, 
for example, tried to expedite the solving of the issue by publishing a 
scheme for ‘improving bogs and other wastelands in Ireland’, based on 
the arguments already brought forward by Arthur Young, the committee 
and Richard Griffith.32
Whether eventually applied to the poor question, agricultural 
improvement or inland navigation, Irish bogland frontiers became 
viewed ever more dominantly within the imperial context in the 1820s 
and 1830s. James Dawson, an entrepreneur who experimented with 
steam power on the Grand Canal in the early 1810s and later on also 
entered the mining business, argued in letters that originally appeared 
in Carrick’s Morning Post in 1818 and 1819 how drainage and canalisa-
tion was the best way to ‘promote the civilisation and improvement of the 
interior of Ireland, to supply the increasing agricultural wants of Great 
Britain, and provide employment for our superabundant population’.33 
Naturally that would also rejuvenate the business of canal companies, 
as well as mining enterprises reliant on good canal networks. Robert 
Monteath, a forester and silvicultural writer, in turn, promised in his 
book in 1829 that if
[my] plan of improving the wastelands of Ireland, taken in con-
nexion with my other plans of improvement on bare, rocky soils, are 
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set on foot, Ireland will soon be the richest and most independent 
of the three British nations, and the noblemen, the gentlemen, and 
above all, the farmer and the labourer, will, in their own sphere, be 
equally benefited and enriched.34
Monteath dedicated his book to the Duke of Northumberland, Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland. For Monteath, mountain bogs represented silvi-
cultural frontiers with splendid prospects. In this case too, frontiers 
connoted a perspective viewed from a centre and involved imperial 
power relations.
The projection of values, plans and aspirations on to the bogland 
frontiers remained quite unchanged until the 1840s. The perspective was 
dominated by a concoction of agricultural, inland navigation and settle-
ment prospects. With the exception of Robert Monteath’s work, silvicul-
tural interests were covered only sparingly. This goes for perceiving bogs 
as fuel frontiers as well. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century 
drainers and improvers almost downplayed the significance of bogs as 
a source of fuel. For them, cutting and drying turf by hand for heating 
purposes may have seemed archaic and ineffectual.
Boglands as fuel frontiers became framed later in the early 1840s 
by Sir Robert Kane, an Irish chemist, who focused on frontiers that 
extended vertically downward in terms of resources for extractive activ-
ities. Before that, bogland frontiers epitomised horizontally extensive 
frontiers for agricultural and transportation activities. Kane had seen 
how ‘the employment of turf as a source of heat in industry is extending’ 
and judged that ‘there is in our bogs amassed a quantity of turf, which, if 
the peculiar characters of that fuel be suitably attended to, may become 
of eminent importance to the country’. Whereas the locals cut turf by 
hand and ‘spoiled [it] by its mode of preparation’, Kane envisioned fully 
mechanised turf extraction. ‘It is only by operating on a great scale, and 
with powerful machinery, in fact,’ he writes, ‘only by manufacturing 
compressed peat largely for sale that the operation can be made to prac-
tically succeed.’ And that was supposed to be just the beginning of the sci-
entific and technological processing of peat. ‘Not merely may we utilise 
turf in its natural condition, or compressed, or impregnated with pitchy 
matter,’ Kane analysed, ‘but we may carbonise it as we do wood, and pre-
pare turf charcoal’ for many industrial purposes, including railway and 
steam boat engines, ironworks, textile factories and breweries.35
What makes Kane’s book of special interest is its divergent national 
overtone. Unlike Griffith or Fraser, Kane does not stress the benefits of the 
exploitation of peatlands for Britain but brings out how the gain resulting 
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from new technology and activities would especially profit Ireland. He 
does not see, in the terms of Kenneth Pomeranz, Irish boglands as ‘ghost 
acres’36 for England’s Industrial Revolution but as valuable resources for 
Ireland’s underdeveloped industry and also for national self- sufficiency.
Altogether, Kane’s vision was a high- tech response to the exploit-
ation of bogs. It involved a series of then modern technologies, including, 
for example, hydraulic press and high pressure engines, and a series of 
industrial practices. To Kane’s mind, the exploitation of bogs should 
be based on scientific- economic knowledge and calculation. Boglands 
were to service manifold aims and the transition to mass production of 
both soft and hard commodities. These aims benefited the empire and 
his homeland, Ireland, as well. The concept of bogland frontiers became 
broadened by new knowledge and technologies that repeatedly pushed 
the frontier into various layers of strata. Most importantly, making intact 
bogs valuable was no longer only to be achieved by converting them into 
arable land or engineered canal networks.
Later advocates of the drainage and reclamation of bogs often 
invoked late eighteenth- century and early nineteenth- century drainers 
and improvers to back up their arguments. Calculations and priorities 
changed, but the total aim remained the same in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and early twentieth century: to transform boglands into places that 
are being seen to be made more valuable. Various visions put into prac-
tice had begun to alter the ecologies of untapped boglands over a wide 
area already in the nineteenth century, although the peak in drainage 
and the use of peat as a fuel occurred later in the next century.
Summary
Historically, the exploitation of peatlands has been sold to investors, 
policy makers, citizens and local people as the continuation of techno-
logically driven futures with a particular notion of progress. Focusing 
on late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century Irish drainage, reclam-
ation and inland navigation plans and visions, this chapter looks at the 
imaginaries of technological progress and commodification of nature 
and how they take the form of material- discursive projects of making the 
future. Such visions of social futures were developed by English and Irish 
scientists and politicians who aimed at turning vast Irish boglands into 
valuable property by civilising nature.
The period under scrutiny was in many ways a tipping point 
in values, notions and ambitions and meant increasing calculation, 
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commercialisation and rationalisation of bogs as natural resources. 
Common to these writings was the future vision they expressed for 
Ireland and the whole British Empire and how that vision was fundamen-
tally based on strong faith in the advancement of science and technology 
to tame and refine ‘wastelands’, as bogs were labelled and assessed. Irish 
boglands became viewed through imperial eyes and tied to the British 
civilising mission. The aim of so- called drainers and improvers was to win 
support for their plans not just from Irish landowners and the economic 
elite but from the cabinet and Parliament.
Arthur Young’s thorough survey Arthur Young’s Tour in Ireland, 
1776– 1779 emerged as a signpost of the new wave of scientific-
technological improvers aiming at transforming boglands into terri-
tories that were seen as being made more valuable. Young’s survey was 
rather optimistic with respect to the appraised potential of Irish bogs for 
pasture and tillage and the general development of the island through 
the improvement of wastelands. Thomas Newenham, an Irish political 
writer and former MP, followed the perceptions of Arthur Young and 
positioned the Irish drainage issue as significant to the success of Great 
Britain as well.
The optimistic spirit of Young and Newenham and other improvers 
of the time was shared by the Dublin Society and its members, envisioning 
an upturn in the economic and political conditions of their homeland 
now as an irremovable part of the empire. The appointment of a par-
liamentary committee in 1809 to enquire into the nature and extent of 
the several bogs in Ireland, and the practicability of draining and culti-
vating them, represented the apogee for improvers in terms of political 
publicity. The committee authored four detailed reports on the bogs of 
Ireland between 1810 and 1814 and provided the House of Commons 
with considerable agricultural, soil chemical and topographical know-
ledge and, in addition, plans on how and at what cost the drainage could 
be commenced. The committee’s contribution to the appraisal of Irish 
bogland frontiers bound these environments with complicated trading 
networks in a more reasonable way. The agricultural or navigation fron-
tier was not just an Irish frontier but a British frontier as well. Improvers 
envisaged how the cultivated and canalised low- lying lands of Ireland 
would see a constant flow of materials and products from inland to the 
seaports and to England, and vice versa. That desired march of progress 
demonstrated how technology, particularly steam power and barges cap-
able of moving heavy produce, became embedded in the future visions.
The reports of the committee were ultimately not published and 
made open to the public. Richard Griffith, being disappointed in the 
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outcomes as a member of the committee, tried to raise the issue by 
publishing a book in 1819, in which he largely reiterated the arguments 
already floated years ago in the reports. Griffith was, however, polit-
ically experienced enough to tie the issue to a more burning question, 
namely the poor law question. Griffith and Robert Fraser, an Irish statis-
tician and surveyor who published a book on the matter in 1822, saw the 
drainage issue as crucial in tackling the rural poor question by providing 
land for settlement and extra income for rural people living in poverty.
The projection of values, plans and aspirations on to the bogland 
frontiers remained quite unchanged until the 1840s. The perspective 
was dominated by a concoction of agricultural, inland navigation and 
settlement prospects. Sir Robert Kane, an Irish chemist, opened a new 
perspective by focusing on frontiers that extended vertically downward 
in terms of resources of extractive activities. Kane envisioned how turf, 
having been cut by hand by locals for centuries, could become a vital 
fuel for the industrialisation of Ireland. Kane’s vision was a high- tech 
response to the exploitation of bogs: he introduced fully mechanised 
turf extraction and utilisation practices and called for mass production 
of peat products from turf charcoal to turf coke. Making intact bogs 
valuable was no longer only to be achieved by  converting them into 
arable land or engineered canal networks.
Altogether, the arguments developed by English and Irish 
scientists and politicians between 1770s and 1840s meant active 
rethinking of bogs and expectations related to them and laid the 
foundations for material environmental transformations. To refer to 
Jon Agar’s types of technology/ environment interaction (see Chapter 1), 
Irish boglands were perceived and also mastered as wastelands in need 
of commercial exploitation. That articulation conflated imaginaries of 
technological and social progress, capital accumulation and profits 
and benefit.
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Landscape with bulldozer: machines, 
modernity and environment in  
post- war Britain
Ralph Harrington
A natural history of the bulldozer
In the landscape of post- war Britain the bulldozer was not a native 
species but a naturalised one. Some might even have called it invasive. 
The bulldozer arrived in Britain as a consequence of war and as part of 
an army. Massed formations of crawler tractors with bulldozer blades, 
manufactured in the United States, crossed the Atlantic as vital elements 
of the vast armoury of equipment brought to Britain by the American 
armed forces during the Second World War (see Figure 3.1).1 The bull-
dozer itself, while in origin a civilian machine, has always had a close rela-
tionship with the technologies of mechanised conflict, and in important 
respects it was the Second World War that created the bulldozer as we 
know it today and spread its use throughout the world. Certainly it was 
the Second World War that played the key role in bringing the American 
bulldozer to Britain.2
The origins of the bulldozer lie in agriculture and construction in the 
inter- war United States, and the twentieth- century bulldozer is a distinct-
ively American device, rooted in distinctively American circumstances: it 
is a machine of big spaces and big structures, of cheap land and expen-
sive labour, of wide horizons and sweeping transformation. And the 
word ‘bulldozer’, too, was made in America. When the Illustrated London 
News introduced the bulldozer to its readers in early 1941 it explained 
that ‘The word “bulldozer” is used in American slang phraseology to 
mean “to intimidate or coerce”, and the coercive powers of this almost 
incredible machine would seem to be considerable.’3 It is a word with a 
complex history, in which agriculture, mechanical engineering, conflict 
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and politics intersect and connect, but that has consistently embodied 
and expressed a nexus of brute force and coercive violence. The first 
published uses of the word are from the United States in the 1870s and 
refer to organised racist violence in the politics of the post- Civil War era, 
particularly in the South.4 ‘ “Bulldozing” is the term by which all forms 
of this oppression are known,’ explained one writer of 1879, describing 
‘the violent methods which have been employed to disfranchise the 
negroes, or compel them to vote under white dictation, in many parts 
of Louisiana and Mississippi’.5 The notoriety of the ‘bulldozers’ of the 
American South evidently brought the word and its associations into 
more general usage during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. By 
circa 1900 ‘bulldozers’ could be found in agriculture, mining and metal-
working activities that involved the application of force to aspects of the 
physical environment that needed to be reshaped, exploited, and, in the 
terms used by Jon Agar in the opening chapter of the present volume 
to summarise the second of his technology/ environment combinations, 
transformed into a component within a technological system.
In agriculture, the bulldozer was a vertical wooden blade used for 
smoothing rough ground, held in a wheeled frame and drawn by oxen, 
mules or by hand. These scraping implements developed in the American 
West and seem to have been particularly associated with the Mormon 
Figure 3.1 A picture taken in the spring of 1944 of the US Army engineer 
depot at Thatcham, Berkshire, showing massed ranks of bulldozers and 
tractors being prepared to accompany the D- Day invasion forces.
Source: National Archives and Records Administration/ US Army Signal 
Corps 111- SC- 189366.
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farmers of Utah, sometimes being known as ‘Mormon Scrapers’.6 In the 
1880s commercially available machines such as the ‘Western Bulldozer’ 
and the ‘Fresno Scraper’ used wheeled frames and pivoted blades, com-
bining some of the attributes of the later mechanised bulldozers and 
tractor- driven scrapers.7 These devices were used in agriculture for 
clearing and preparing land and for earthmoving during construction 
projects such as railway building, confirming the value and adaptability of 
the principle that would later be employed by the mechanical bulldozer. In 
mining and quarrying, meanwhile, ‘bulldozing’ was the use of explosives 
to break large boulders into smaller pieces, either below ground in ‘bull-
dozing chambers’ or on the surface.8 The direct, unmediated application of 
powerful force to the thing being destroyed or reshaped is the key element 
that unites this use of the term ‘bulldozing’ to its uses in the parishes of 
Reconstruction- era Louisiana. Similarly in metalworking the ‘bulldozer 
press’ was a machine in which plates and bars were shaped by a powerful 
crosshead ram moving in the horizontal plane.9 The resemblance of this 
machine to the vertical blade of the bulldozer, pushing with brute force 
against the earth in order to reshape it, is very strong, and it is possible 
that the bulldozer blade, and thus the entire bulldozer vehicle, received 
its name from comparison with this piece of equipment, so that the der-
ivation from the ‘bulldozers’ of the American South or from the Western 
agricultural implement may be indirect rather than direct.10
Precise lines of etymological descent, however, are less important 
than the underlying denotative and connotative content of the term ‘bull-
dozer’, which remains consistent across more than a century of usage 
and a broad range of applications: the shared associations of brute force 
and violent coercion. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to 
bulldoze something has consistently meant the use of force to reshape 
the environment: physically, but also socially and politically. As, during 
the  1920s and 1930s, the bulldozer developed into an ensemble of 
powerful tractor running on caterpillar tracks deploying a large adjust-
able blade – a creation that was honed and perfected in the 1940s under 
the pressures of war  – these associations became ever more strongly 
entrenched.
The modern bulldozer, as with other mechanical earthmoving 
equipment, was known in Britain before the Second World War but 
was present only in very limited numbers and was not widely used in 
 construction or related fields: ‘little was seen of this class of equipment 
until vast numbers were brought into the country from America during 
the Second World War’, noted one earthmoving expert looking back on 
the development of British construction technology in 1964.11 When the 
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engineer V.W. Bone addressed the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in 
1936 on ‘modern developments in tractor- drawn excavator equipment’ 
he felt it necessary to describe the bulldozer in some detail:
My first example is the ‘Bulldozer’, which consists of a large rect-
angular plate reinforced at the bottom or cutting edge, located at 
the front of the tractor and attached through girders to the cater-
pillar track side frames. This type is especially adapted to pushing 
dirt, rock, debris, and other material ahead of the tractor. The blade 
has a vertical movement in relation to the tractor, which is under 
the control of the operator so that the thickness of the cut being 
taken by the blade on the ground or the amount of material being 
pushed along can be regulated.12
Bone went on to observe that the bulldozer was a new development that, 
although ‘employed extensively on large excavation projects, particularly 
in the United States of America’, had yet to achieve its full potential in 
Britain: ‘in this country we have only touched the fringe of the possibil-
ities of tractor- drawn excavating equipment’.13
It was not until the introduction of thousands of earthmovers by 
the Americans during the Second World War that the bulldozer became 
an established feature of the British landscape. These machines built 
ports, roads and airfields to serve the war effort. They often worked in 
places that had seen no such large- scale or rapid development before, 
and in rural districts in which mechanical earthmoving and modern con-
struction methods of any kind were a novelty. In 1941 the bulldozer was 
thought by the Yorkshire Post to be sufficiently unfamiliar to its readers 
for a brief description of it to be necessary:  ‘American- built machines 
normally employed in road- making in rough virgin country’.14 The 
bulldozers described in this case were, as it happens, Canadian, and were 
working on forestry and land clearance in Scotland, but it was their US 
counterparts from 1942 onwards that were to have the greatest impact 
on the British landscape during the war. In September 1943 an article in 
Picture Post discussed the role of the bulldozer in sustaining Allied mili-
tary activity, and stressed its distinctively American identity:
The most important new factor in our air policy is not a flying 
machine but a land machine – the bulldozer. This powerful cater-
pillar tractor, armed with a long steel blade, which digs into the 
ground, tears out boulders and tree stumps, and can even be turned 
on walls and small buildings, is the central machine in the whole 
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American armoury … The Americans, in fact, are teaching us how 
to mass- produce aerodromes.15
For wartime Britain the bulldozer was thus an icon of American techno-
logical modernity, bringing the techniques of that quintessentially 
American socio- industrial technique, mass production, to the reshaping 
of the earth itself.
In 1944 the writer D.W. Brogan reflected on the wartime signifi-
cance of the American military bulldozer in his essay ‘The Bulldozer’, 
in which he identified this machine as a key symbol of the Allied war 
effort and saw in it a promise of the new society that victory would 
ultimately bring. Brogan began by listing various impressive Allied war 
machines: Flying Fortress bombers, amphibious trucks, Sherman tanks. 
But these instruments of war, he argued, were not as socially or politic-
ally significant for the Western world as what he termed ‘instruments of 
peace turned to the uses of war’:
The bulldozer is politically mightier than the tank, for in the bull-
dozer Europe has seen an instrument of power made directly 
by American civil society, serving indeed a military purpose, but 
bringing the Old World a flavour of the New, of that world of 
repeated mechanical novelty in which wars are not quite episodes, 
but are no more than great but manageable crises of American 
production.16
The bulldozer thus embodied the way the great wartime coalition had 
been underpinned by American technological might and industrial 
organisation, and had brought the strengths of the New World to the 
aid of the Old. Brogan saw hope for the post- war world in a continu-
ation into the era of peace of this coalition created to serve the purposes 
of war:  he saw hope in the ongoing work of the bulldozer. He ended 
his essay by observing that having received American help to win the 
war, the Europeans would certainly want ‘to be left to manage their own 
affairs’, but in clearing away the debris of conflict and building the peace 
‘they would like help from the country of the bulldozers, the country of 
humane miracles … The bulldozer has cleared away more than ruins.’17
Bombsites and bulldozers: rebuilding Britain
‘During the Second World War’, observed one construction industry 
engineer in 1964, ‘crawler- mounted bulldozers became widely known 
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as miracle construction equipment.’18 The British earthmoving and con-
struction industries were well aware of the importance of the war in 
bringing American mechanisation into the British landscape, and of the 
significance of the transformation this represented. The war ‘brought to 
this country a far larger amount of muck shifting and other plant than we 
had been used to,’ commented one industry insider in the Proceedings of 
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers in 1947. ‘Scrapers, bulldozers, and 
dumpers, fathered in the USA, were of great use over here in the prepar-
ation of aerodromes, camps, temporary roads, drainage and tank traps.’19 
In his 1944 essay D.W. Brogan described the impact of the bulldozer on 
British industries and landscapes previously unmarked by rapid techno-
logical progress:
First came the bulldozer; it came into parts of England which had 
been left outside the main stream of mechanical progress, into East 
Anglia, into the southern rural counties. It came in and did more to 
change the face of the land in a few months than had been done at 
the same speed since Roman times … roadmaking and construc-
tion in general are the most backward parts of British technical 
practice. And the latest American devices were demonstrated in 
parts of England more backward than most.20
In other texts the impact of this new earthmoving technology on an 
unchanging, enduring landscape, deeply rooted in the past (or at least 
upon a landscape represented in these ways), was narrated in such a 
manner as to emphasise historical continuity rather than disruptive 
change. ‘British rural roads excite admiration and wonder,’ observed 
the American authors of Bulldozers Come First:  The Story of US War 
Construction in Foreign Lands (1944). ‘Constant military maneuvers, 
involving long convoys of trucks, tanks, and mobile guns, should rut 
and ravel their tar- macadam surface, but few signs of distress are vis-
ible.’21 The endurance shown by British roads during the war, like the 
endurance shown by Britain as a whole, was rooted in history: ‘Many 
British rural roads have followed their present alignments for cen-
turies. Cromwell or even Caesar may have started the consolidation 
of their bases.’22 Thus the arrival of the new construction technology 
could be seen as congruent with the past rather than constituting a 
break with it, as the new world of modern technology came to the 
rescue of the old but did so by building upon its achievement and its 
values. In that sense the American bulldozer grinding its way along 
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the British rural road was a microcosm of the entire Anglo- American 
war effort.
As noted earlier, the bulldozer came to a Britain in which heavy 
construction and earthmoving equipment had previously found very 
little application.23 This may have been partly due to the innate con-
servatism of an industry still dominated by craft processes and work 
patterns, and sceptical of technical innovation,24 but also reflected the 
relatively restricted size of most construction projects compared with the 
huge schemes in America that were only made possible at all by exten-
sive mechanisation. Environmental factors were also an issue restricting 
the use of bulldozers and similar machines in the British Isles, or were 
believed to be: many British engineers in the 1940s appear to have been 
convinced that bulldozers would not work well in wet weather and that 
British soils and geology were not suitable for them.25 Yet the wartime per-
formance of the American machines left no doubt as to the benefits they 
offered. As well as literally preparing the ground for new construction, 
their contribution to clearing rubble was invaluable, both at the fighting 
fronts and in bombed cities in Britain. This vital work also brought the 
bulldozer a high degree of public visibility. When earthmovers were 
working at remote (and highly secured) airfields and other military sites 
they were largely out of sight, but in bombed city centres they became 
performers on a much more public stage. Their contribution was noted 
as early as 1941, with newspapers introducing their readers to ‘This 
new machine, the “Bulldozer” … now being used in London streets for 
clearing away bomb damage’,26 ‘this almost incredible machine’,27 ‘The 
bulldozer tractor’ that ‘can deal with all obstacles – debris, mud, water’.28 
Gradually, as the number of bulldozers in Britain grew and their con-
tribution to clearing away urban war damage become increasingly well 
known and appreciated, the machines entered the British imagination 
and became icons of wartime endurance and symbols of hope for the 
future. There was nothing the bulldozer could not do, it seemed, in this 
landscape of urban rubble: the Sketch’s humorous diarist even suggested 
in 1944 that if Britain ran out of real ruins to show the predicted influx 
of future tourists expecting to see the scars of war, ‘all we have to do 
is take a bulldozer and ram a few of our surviving public buildings’ to 
make some more.29 American men and machines played an important 
and well- reported role in rebuilding bomb- damaged sites in British 
cities, and in constructing both temporary housing and new permanent 
housing estates.30 The Daily Express reported in December 1944 on a 
site in London where the US Army was working on the construction of 
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temporary housing, and drew a sharp contrast with the labour- intensive, 
technology- averse practices on an adjacent building site in the hands of 
British workers:
American troops completely equipped with trucks and machinery, 
are maintaining a racing speed in clearing sites and laying bases for 
600 temporary homes for Lambeth Council. On the British site yes-
terday, only partially cleared and levelled, a dozen workmen were 
unloading bricks, smoothing cement and laying drains for tem-
porary homes. A  single cement- mixer was the only machinery in 
action. An unused steam shovel stood at the front of the site.31
The Express reporter quoted the British foreman as telling the officer in 
charge of the American working party that ‘One of those bulldozers in a 
few hours could level the ground it’s going to take me weeks to clear.’32
The rubble of destroyed buildings that bulldozers cleared away 
in urban areas was often collected and reused, some being transported 
as ‘blitz brick’ to rural construction sites where, worked by yet more 
bulldozers, it formed an aggregate foundation for new runways and 
other military installations.33 Thus the bulldozer constituted a very 
material link between the urban and the rural landscapes of wartime 
Britain. As D.W. Brogan had noted in his comments on bulldozers 
transforming rural areas,34 the impact of bulldozers on the land-
scape of wartime Britain was not limited to bomb- damaged towns 
and cities:  ‘Bulldozers alter the face of Britain’ was one newspaper’s 
description of the way ‘virgin countryside’ had been ‘bulldozed’ for 
military purposes.35 ‘War has changed most things in our island 
home, but none more so than the countryman and the countryside,’ 
observed the Manchester Evening News in October 1943:  ‘Chestnut- 
covered walks have been torn up by bulldozers and excavators, rolling 
out giant aerodromes.’36 The changes wrought by the bulldozer were 
not limited to war construction, but reflected the increasing presence 
of this machine and others in the ordinary work of the land, as the 
countryside column of the Western Gazette noted: ‘Ancient hedges are 
grubbed out by gyro- tillers; ancient banks and ditches are levelled 
by bulldozers.’37 The War Agricultural Executive Committees made 
increasing use of bulldozers as more machines became available, and 
bulldozers were used by the Women’s Land Army to clear and level 
land for farming.38 There was concern from some observers about 
the potentially destructive effect such machinery would have on the 
British countryside: ‘Because the military authorities and Government 
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have shown us what can be done in the way of removing hedges by 
the aid of “bulldozers”, people are wondering what will be the out-
come.’39 In general, however, the increasing involvement of modern 
bulldozers, scrapers, excavators and similar equipment in agriculture 
was welcomed as a beneficial side-effect of the war and there were 
efforts to expand it in order to increase the land available for agricul-
tural exploitation. Questions were asked in Parliament about whether 
the government could take measures ‘to make use of the “bulldozers” 
used on aerodromes in order to clear the land’.40
Beyond the work of the bulldozers in rubble clearing, civil and mili-
tary engineering and agriculture within Britain, the exploits of similar 
earthmovers overseas at the fighting fronts of the war received much 
attention, further increasing the prominence of these ‘new weapons 
of the present war … these indispensable machines’.41 In North Africa 
and the Far East, and later in Italy, France and Germany, the role of the 
bulldozers that were an essential element of the Allied armed forces was 
extensively reported. Writing in the Daily Express of the fighting in Sicily 
in the summer of 1943, Alan Moorehead commented that ‘The bulldozer 
was the tank of this campaign … The bulldozers pushed their ugly snouts 
right up to the front line.’42 For the Yorkshire Post in March 1944 the bull-
dozer was ‘becoming an essential weapon in the Far Eastern war. The 
Japanese are excellent at light- weight warfare in the tropics; but they 
cannot rival the array of heavy machines … which the Allies are now 
bringing against them.’43 For Picture Post, reporting on the advance of 
the Allied armies from their Normandy beachhead in August 1944, ‘The 
clanking and thumping of the bulldozer is as familiar at the front as the 
sound of the guns.’44 Tales of the heroism of bulldozer drivers, who were 
often exposed to enemy fire as they worked, were frequently reported, as 
in this example from the coverage of the advance of the American Fifth 
Army through Italy in October 1943:
At one of our crossings of the Volturno I watched a bulldozer cutting 
away a newly- won river bank so that tanks could cross. Within a 
few minutes a German shell directed from a hill overlooking the 
river killed the driver. I saw another man take his seat immediately 
and the work proceeded until another shell destroyed him and the 
bulldozer. Within the next half hour two more bulldozers and their 
drivers were knocked out by the deadly accuracy of the enemy fire. 
The last one was hit just as it had pushed the last load of muddy soil 
aside, allowing for the passage of tanks. No fighting troops could 
have died more heroic deaths than these four bulldozer drivers.45
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Bulldozer crew bravery in a lower key was reported by The Times in 
February 1945, as British soldiers advanced towards the Rhine: when a 
bulldozer ‘came clanging along the road to Cleve on a dark night’ the 
soldiers leading the advance advised the driver and his mate that the road 
ahead was under small arms fire. ‘ “But we are armour,” they protested, 
and continued on their way through the darkness.’46 This account also 
emphasises the ambivalent position of the bulldozer, simultaneously civil 
and military, part earthmover and part tank. This was a continuity that 
worked both ways, enabling the bulldozer to take its place in the military 
arsenal during the war, but also allowing it to act as a conduit for the 
continuation of a militarised culture of coercion and clearance into the 
landscapes of peace, in Britain and elsewhere.47
The issue of bringing the wartime technologies of earthmoving to 
bear on the problems of the post- war British landscape was already exer-
cising minds while the fighting was still under way. The task of recon-
struction, observed the Sphere in December 1943, ‘will require the use of 
every available bulldozer, muck- shifter, scraper, tipper and dumper’, also 
noting that such machines would be ‘with the exception of jeeps, almost 
the only vehicles made to War Office specifications which will have a com-
mercial value in peacetime’.48 By the autumn of 1945 the British govern-
ment, keen to secure this modern technology for the economic benefit of 
the country, was negotiating with the Americans over the disposal of US 
earthmoving and construction equipment to the public works and com-
mercial building sectors, and ministers were urging ‘the building trade 
to accept mechanization ungrudgingly and use it to the full’.49 Farmers 
too were being encouraged to adopt modern ‘labour- saving machines’ 
including crawler tractors and bulldozers, which were ‘admirable for 
levelling, clearing sites, back- filling trenches or excavating’.50 The 1940s 
and 1950s were a period in which technological modernity applied to 
agriculture became one of the most potent images of a modernising, pro-
gressive Britain,51 and in farming and forestry bulldozers were adopted 
with enthusiasm, partly driven by the easy availability of war surplus 
machines, and while not all experiments in their use were successful, 
these adaptable machines did find increased application in clearance and 
ground preparation works.52
The use of bulldozers in British construction expanded greatly 
during the 1950s and 1960s, partly as a result of the huge size of new 
building works. Large- scale construction of building developments and 
new towns, roads and airports provided both extensive employment for 
fleets of modern bulldozers and other equipment, and an arena in which 
their technology and the ways in which they were used could be further 
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developed. In place of the laments of civil engineers of the 1930s and 
1940s that British clearance and construction projects could not offer 
scope for the degree of mechanisation to be found in the United States, 
came an eager grasping of the opportunity offered by such schemes as 
the ‘motorway programme with its associated mammoth earthwork 
problem’.53 (See Figure 3.2.)
With its power and flexibility the bulldozer emerged from the 
Second World War as a universally adaptable wonder- machine, and a key 
element in the effort of rebuilding and reshaping the post- war landscapes 
of Britain. Peter Merriman has noted the important role of the Caterpillar 
company in exploiting the transition from war to peace in Britain through 
the employment of their machines, which had constituted a vital part 
of the Anglo- American wartime workforce, on peacetime projects. The 
appearance of British- built Caterpillar tractors and bulldozers in par-
ticular represented a new Anglo- American collaboration:
For the North American company Caterpillar the motorway marked 
the ‘beginning of a new era … of progress and opportunity’ which 
would be aided by their reliable, efficient and economic D8 tractor. 
During World War Two Caterpillar tractors could be seen to be part 
of an army of imported machines turning Britain’s waste- lands into 
Figure 3.2 The construction of the M1 motorway through Bedfordshire 
in 1959 is marked by a swathe of bare earth, cleared and levelled by an 
army of machines such as the bulldozer prominent in the foreground.
Source: photograph taken by Ben Brooksbank and reproduced by 
permission of the photographer.
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spaces for the practice of an efficient, modern and mechanised 
farming industry, but the D8 was ‘now built in Great Britain’, at 
their new Glasgow factory. This was a British tractor ‘helping to 
build a better Britain’ and helping Caterpillar to fulfil their duty to 
strengthen the economy, society and ‘the nation’.54
This continuity legitimised the enterprise of physical transformation and 
made it part of a progressive historical process. As Scott Kirsch and Don 
Mitchell have written with reference to the large- scale civil engineering 
projects of the post- war decades, efforts to transform landscape ‘were 
part of an ancient, and in some ways technologically cumulative, history 
… And the conversion of military technologies to civil uses was also a 
long- standing enterprise.’55 Within this historical trajectory, the bull-
dozer became the symbol and the harbinger of a new world.
The dark side of the bulldozer
In Britain the bulldozer entered the public imagination in the 1940s 
and 1950s as a potent image of rebuilding and transformation. Even 
the incoming General of the Salvation Army was described in 1946 as 
a ‘bulldozer- driver’, and declared that he would ‘devote everything to 
making the Army the bulldozer of Evangelism, seeking to drive through 
the ruins and desolation of our shaken civilisation, a road by which men 
may travel toward the Kingdom of God’.56 Bulldozers were part of the 
modern mechanised transformation of a war- ravaged country, clearing 
away, repairing and rebuilding. The work they carried out clearing 
roads and rescuing people trapped by snowstorms during the severe 
winters of the post- war years, or clearing the damage caused by floods, 
also contributed to the positive image of these machines.57 Reviewing 
the clear- up operations following the floods of 1953 the Geographical 
Journal specifically praised the contribution of the ‘bulldozer and other 
war- time American machines’ that had ‘made a vast difference’ in the 
recovery work.58
As the 1950s and 1960s went on, however, darker and more 
destructive images of the bulldozer began to gain more prominence 
in public environmental discourse. The periodical Sport & Country 
summarised the ambiguities of the bulldozer as early as 1950, 
observing that ‘the bulldozer itself is going to be kept busy enough 
in connection with future agricultural enterprises’ because of ‘our 
country’s desperate economic plight’ but also asserting that ‘in the 
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bulldozer we have a horrid symbol of all that is inexorable in farming’s 
mood to- day. The super- powered crawler stands for all else that is 
farming’s “latest”.’59 The association of bulldozers with environmen-
tally damaging extractive industries such as quarrying and open- cast 
mining was also an increasing matter of public concern in the 1950s.60 
‘Using bulldozers to tear away topsoil and wrench a mixture of coal 
and earth from seams near the surface not only disfigures more of 
the English landscape than we can spare but does lasting harm to the 
productivity of the land,’ declared the Manchester Guardian in 1955.61 
As large- scale urban redevelopment and road building gathered pace 
the bulldozer became the single most potent image of the damaging 
schemes that threatened landscapes and communities.62 The seem-
ingly inexorable advance of caterpillar tracks and huge steel blades 
across the land gave those opposing such schemes a new sense of 
urgency: ‘we will wake up one morning’, a protester against a by- pass 
plan for Bangor told a reporter in 1953, ‘and find the bulldozers have 
come’ – the suggestion being that the earthmovers were effectively a 
hostile army of occupation moving under the cover of darkness to seize 
the land from its defenders.63
The association of bulldozers with urban rebuilding made them 
into an ambiguous symbol, combining destruction and regeneration in 
a potent, mechanised agent of transformation. Louis MacNeice captured 
this aspect of the bulldozer in his 1962 poem ‘New Jerusalem’: ‘Bulldoze 
all memories and sanctuaries:  our birthright / Means a new city, ver-
tical, impersonal’.64 References to bulldozers and bulldozing became 
staples of newspaper articles reporting on controversial and damaging 
development schemes and protests held against such schemes fre-
quently focused on bulldozers as particular targets. Protesters chained 
themselves to the bulldozers, poured honey or sugar into their fuel 
tanks, blocked their paths and lay down in front of their tracks.65 The 
act of throwing oneself in front of the bulldozers, or threatening to do 
so, became an almost ritualistic aspect of new developments,66 to the 
extent that the writer Douglas Adams was able to use this scenario as the 
starting point of his 1978 science fiction radio series (and subsequent 
novel) The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy.67 Some in the new protest 
movements were wary of the image created by such direct action:  in 
1973 one member of the planning board responsible for the Lake District 
National Park warned his fellow board members, who were divided over 
the possible route of a road in the district, that they would ‘begin to look 
foolish’ if they associated with those who wanted to ‘lie down in front of 
bulldozers’.68 The risk of appearing foolish did not appear to trouble the 
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Duke of Rutland, however, who declared in the summer of 1977 that ‘he 
would lie down in front of the bulldozers’ to prevent work starting on 
the coalfield that threatened the Vale of Belvoir and his home, Belvoir 
Castle.69
During the 1960s and 1970s in Britain the word ‘bulldozer’ 
became a shorthand for the whole process of destructive develop-
ment: machine became metaphor, the bulldozer standing as the symbol 
of the entire vast and seemingly unstoppable machine of development 
and its accompaniments of heedless politicians, greedy developers 
and faceless bureaucracy. During these years historic streets were 
‘abandoned to bulldozers’,70 in towns marked for rebuilding concerned 
observers saw ‘streets full of charm and character look sadly neglected, 
apparently waiting for the Great Bulldozer’,71 and archaeologists were 
urged to ‘battle against the bulldozers’.72 The ‘bulldozing’ of ancient 
monuments was in itself a particular focus of concern, with experts 
warning that ‘huge archaeological treasure houses will be lost for ever 
before the advance of the bulldozers’.73 Whether what was threatened 
was long- established communities, vulnerable historic towns, or the 
fragile remnants of the past, the symbolism of the bulldozer as emblem-
atic of a mechanised society heedless of what it destroyed was ever 
more widely reflected in critical press coverage and protest activities.74 
Bulldozers were often anthropomorphised as destructive animals, and 
the sites with which they were associated were characterised in terms 
of war zones, battles and violent destruction: ‘Bulldozers groan where 
the hungry children used to play,’ wrote one reporter of the rebuilding 
of Jarrow in the 1960s, ‘and the part between the centre and the Tyne 
is like a battlefield now.’75 Those opposed to destructive developers saw 
their struggle in terms of armies: ‘On the one hand stand the forces of 
“development”, their bulldozers massed like the chariots of old, their 
chemical equipment as menacing as the plagues of Egypt; on the other 
are ranged a small government agency, the Nature Conservancy, and a 
growing popular movement,’ wrote Bruce Campbell in the Guardian as 
he introduced the first British ‘National Nature Week’ in May 1963.76
The bulldozer was seen as the emblematic machine of a new 
era in landscape transformation, a slow- moving machine perhaps but 
one possessed of enormous brute force, momentum and transforma-
tive power. Before the ‘age of the bulldozer’ previous generations had 
been content ‘to modify and improve their properties’, but now small 
settlements were ‘threatened by total demolition’, warned one archi-
tect concerned at threats to old buildings and small villages in 1962.77 
The same applied to the rural landscape, in which the increased 
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mechanisation of farming and estate management found expression in 
images of bulldozers uprooting trees, destroying habitats and stripping 
soil. An increasingly important concern of the environmental movement 
during the 1960s and 1970s was the threat posed to ‘traditional small 
holders and small farmers’, held to be responsible custodians of the 
Earth, by the ‘bulldozer- farmer’,78 hungry for land to exploit through 
modern machinery in order to gain the greatest yield in the shortest 
time. The various agencies of the British state were another target for 
environmentalists, and these same agencies were often among the most 
enthusiastic early users of the bulldozer on a large scale. Particularly 
notable in this respect, and to environmentalists particularly notorious, 
was the Forestry Commission: T.C. Smout has written of the role of ‘a 
new generation of drag- lines, bulldozers and mole ploughs’ in making 
possible the destruction of moor, bog and fen and its replacement by 
regimented plantations of Sitka and lodgepole pine in Scotland during 
the 1950s and 1960s.79 For people concerned to protect areas of natural 
beauty such as the Quantock Hills, the Forestry Commission was ‘the 
despoiler of beauty’ under whose aegis ‘bulldozers will take over’.80 As a 
machine equally at home in urban clearance and rural redevelopment, 
the use of which linked finance, economics, politics, agriculture and the 
environment, the bulldozer was seen as an all- encompassing symbol of 
the threat posed to the ecosystems of the Earth by the malign exploit-
ative forces of modernity – an image summed up in The Ecologist’s cover 
illustration for July 1972 (see Figure  3.3), which showed a vast bull-
dozer looming threateningly over city and countryside alike.81
In symbolising the destruction by faceless bureaucratic and com-
mercial forces of the precious and fragile natural environment, the bull-
dozer could also be seen as the emblematic expression of the use of 
force by the collective to crush the individual, expressing a political idea 
that was gaining traction during the decades of the twentieth century 
during which the bulldozer itself rose to ascendancy. As the historian 
David Schalk noted in 1971, ‘The metaphor of the bulldozer or steam-
roller has been frequently used to describe the condition of  twentieth- 
century man caught up in the vast impersonality of institutional 
society.’82 This situation had been conceptualised by Cyril Connolly 
in 1944 as presenting humanity with a dualistic choice between indi-
vidual freedom which permitted growth and renewal on one side, and 
bureaucratised, mechanised collectivisation on the other:  ‘Well, which 
side are you on? The Corn- Goddess or the Tractor? The Womb or the 
Bulldozer?’83 The year 1944 was of course also when D.W. Brogan had 
published his essay on the bulldozer as symbolic of the virtues of the 
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New World offering hope to the war- torn lands of the Old. Brogan saw 
synthesis leading to progress, whereas Connolly saw a choice between 
continuation and annihilation – but the bulldozer was at the heart of the 
argument for both.
Figure 3.3 Front cover of The Ecologist, July 1972.
Source: reprinted with permission of The Resurgence Trust (www.
theecologist.org, www.resurgence.org).
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On the tracks of modernity
‘The green mantle of Earth is now being ravaged and pillaged in a frenzy 
of exploitation by a mushrooming mass of humans and bulldozers,’ 
warned Michael Soulé in a pioneering work on conservation biology in 
1980.84 Forty years after the Second World War led to its proliferation 
across the globe and the acceleration of its career of brute- force clearance 
and transformation, the bulldozer had become an emblem of global dev-
astation rather than global progress. This dark side of the bulldozer had 
always been an innate aspect of a machine whose power to create was 
always rooted in destruction. The work of the bulldozer is to push aside, 
to clear away, to bury. It is a machine that prepares the ground for the 
new, and in doing so it obliterates the old. It buries the evidence, levels 
the ground and moves on, both creator and destroyer. In the post- war 
world the bulldozer negotiated the passage from past to future across 
the rubble- strewn landscape of rebuilding. The future was highways, 
hospitals, power stations, shopping malls and spreading suburbia, with 
the bulldozer, itself becoming ever larger, more powerful and more effi-
cient, leading the advance of urban modernity.85
At the beginning of the bulldozer’s career in wartime and post- 
war Britain it represented a distinctively American technological mod-
ernity, welcomed as clearing the way for society to move towards a 
brighter future. Over the next half- century that promise was dimmed 
by uncertainties and fears, and the very Americanism of the bulldozer 
seemed itself an aspect of its negative characteristics as symbol of 
‘western or American cultural imperialism, lurching across the globe 
like a runaway bulldozer levelling everything in its path’.86 The bull-
dozer of the 1940s and 1950s had stood as an emblem of progress, 
but the hope for a better future that technology had long seemed to 
offer was, for an increasing number of people in the era of Cold War, 
environmental destruction and urban expansion, far outweighed 
by the dangers it unleashed. A  leitmotif of the nuclear age (hinted 
at in Soulé’s imagery of a threatening ‘mushrooming mass’) was the 
partnering of the bulldozer with the atomic bomb to create a summary 
image of the all- encompassing destructive power humanity possessed 
in the modern technological age. In 1963 Lewis Mumford warned that 
‘our age will be known to the future historian as the age of the bull-
dozer and the exterminator’ given that ‘the building of a highway has 
about the same result upon vegetation and human structures as the 
passage of a tornado or the blast of an atom bomb’.87 The architectural 
historian James Marston Fitch was suggesting by the early 1970s that 
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‘man now runs the literal risk of losing all the past, man- made and nat-
ural – either piecemeal, to the bulldozer, or instantaneously, to nuclear 
weapons’,88 and the same theme was revisited in 1984 by the philoso-
pher and environmentalist Richard Routley to argue for the connect-
edness of environmental ethics and nuclear ethics: ‘The Bomb and the 
Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s Box.’89 From 
being the machine that would clear away the debris of the past and 
reshape the land to create a bright future, the bulldozer had become 
symbol of a technologically driven apocalypse that threatened to grind 
past, present and future alike into destruction beneath its inexorable 
tracks and irresistible blade.
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Locality and contamination 
along the transnational asbestos 
commodity chain
Jessica van Horssen
Natural resources often take widespread, diverse paths as they are 
removed from their natural habitat, shipped to factories either near or 
far, and processed into marketable goods available around the world. But 
what happens when a natural resource is toxic? How does contamination 
change at each stage along its global commodity chain? How have the 
risks toxic resources pose to human health been regulated by those in 
positions of power in ways that overlook those most vulnerable in society?
This chapter examines these questions by following transnational 
contamination along the Canadian asbestos commodity chain, which 
I  call the ‘contamination chain’. For the purpose of this chapter, I  will 
focus on the transnational path asbestos took from Canadian mines to 
factories and homes in Greater Manchester during the interwar and post- 
war period. Canada extracted the majority of the world’s asbestos in the 
twentieth century, and British politicians, city planners and consumers 
saw the fireproof mineral as being crucial to creating safe, long- lasting 
communities. When it came to asbestos, however, it was never as simple 
as supply and demand, and with this chapter, I  intend to broaden our 
understanding of environmental and social justice through a close exam-
ination of how the people of Manchester came to experience toxicity in 
both the workplace and the home.
Philosopher of science Bruno Latour calls asbestos ‘a perfect sub-
stance’, and ‘one of the last objects that can be called modernist’ before 
the illusions of its modernity were revealed by large- scale disease 
rates and workers’ compensation cases.1 It is important to remember, 
as outlined in the opening chapter of this volume, that environmental 
artefacts like asbestos could only be deemed both a ‘perfect substance’ 
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and a tool of contamination after going through an intense technological 
process. In this way, asbestos is a technological artefact, reflecting both 
society’s ambition to protect itself from the dangers of fire and society’s 
fear of being harmed by the very thing thought to protect.
Asbestos is a fireproof mineral formed deep within the Earth’s crust 
during the Devonian period between 410 and 355 million years ago, as 
large land masses broke apart and collided. This occurred throughout the 
world, but in the case of Canada’s ‘asbestos belt’, the mineral developed 
along with the Appalachian Mountain Range in what is now the Eastern 
Townships region of the French Canadian province of Quebec. The 
friction and heat involved in the formation of the Appalachians chem-
ically reconstituted the serpentine rock at this particular site, and in its 
re- crystallisation, the chemical composition was changed and veins of 
asbestos fibre formed.2 The asbestos located in this region is composed 
of magnesium, silicon and oxygen (Mg3Si2O5(OH)4) and is able to with-
stand temperatures in excess of 3,000°F.3
Although formed millions of years ago, the largescale human use 
of asbestos only really began in the late nineteenth century when rising 
population rates and the industrialisation of the Western world enabled 
the development of the technological systems required to process the 
mineral into marketable, fireproof goods. Surveyors for the Geological 
Survey of Canada first noted the presence of asbestos in the Eastern 
Townships in the 1840s and described it as a nuisance that ruined per-
fectly marketable slate.4 Indeed, it wasn’t until the 1870s that the fire-
proof qualities of the mineral became more widely known and market 
demand began to grow. With this came a technological revolution of the 
landscape, as farms and forests began to be replaced by massive open pit 
asbestos mines in the Eastern Townships of Quebec.
Examining the path asbestos took from local mine to global market, 
from Canadian mines to Manchester factories and homes, informs us of 
the different ways society has interpreted risk, blame and the legacies 
of environmental contamination and justice. Environmental contamin-
ation rarely, if ever, respects artificial borders: wind, water and species 
transport toxic resources and waste beyond seemingly contained sites, 
and result in different forms of exposure and contamination.5 What’s 
more, these different forms of exposure often result in different diseases, 
and this chapter examines the impact history of asbestos as a techno-
logical artefact impacting health and safety in a multitude of ways within 
different environments.
Asbestos exposure causes three main diseases:  asbestosis, lung 
cancer and mesothelioma. Asbestosis is the hardening of the fluid lining 
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of the lungs due to the inhalation of large amounts of asbestos fibre 
over a number of years, resulting in death by suffocation, when lungs 
can no longer expand and contract with each breath. This was particu-
larly common in factory workers in places like Manchester, where large 
amounts of asbestos dust would be raised in the process of manufacturing 
marketable goods. Lung cancer and mesothelioma were more difficult for 
medical researchers to diagnose because they usually occur after fairly 
limited exposure to asbestos – a carcinogenic mineral – and so the causal 
factor in these cases was often overlooked, although mesothelioma is 
only caused by exposure to asbestos.
In this chapter, I analyse the different ways Canadian miners and the 
people of Manchester, England became exposed to asbestos at different 
stages along its contamination chain. Left untouched, deep within the 
Earth’s crust, asbestos is a benign substance. It was only when humans 
decided to extract the mineral and apply it to modern technologies that 
the issue of contamination arose, but it did so differently along the com-
modity chain, at place- specific stages of exposure. While there can be 
end points for extracted natural resources, the method of processing 
and moving large quantities of the environment through technological 
systems creates legacies of contamination and disease far beyond a single 
resource community or end destination. Thus, this chapter examines the 
significance of how locality works to define resource toxicity along trans-
national commodity chains of natural resources.
Canada’s asbestos culture
The first site of exposure to Canadian asbestos was in the mining com-
munities of the Eastern Townships of Quebec, where citizens lived (and 
breathed) the industry on their doorsteps.6 The residents of these com-
munities were the French Canadian Catholic ‘worker bees’ and their fam-
ilies who were disconnected from the information and resources of their 
American or British counterparts due to language barriers and access 
issues. Foreign companies like Britain’s Turner & Newall and America’s 
Johns- Manville supplied wages, housing and medical care to these 
workers, and the Catholic Church supplied the union.
Asbestos was mined in these communities in large, open cast pits 
that allowed for maximum fibre extraction without the risk of collapsing 
tunnels underground. Geological engineers at the turn of the twentieth 
century saw open cast asbestos mining as a real advantage long before 
anyone was aware of the hazards the mineral posed to human health, as 
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it allowed workers access to fresh air throughout the extraction process, 
which was significantly different from other mining industries like coal.7 
This was a ‘healthy’ way to mine.
Indeed, once the dangers of the mineral started to become known 
in places like Manchester, industry officials and doctors used Canadian 
miners as evidence to prove that asbestos was not dangerous to human 
health, and their open air exposure to the mineral was a key factor in this 
campaign. Because of the open pits in these communities, the level of 
hazardous dust exposure in the mines themselves was fairly low in com-
parison with the factory- based exposure in places like Manchester. While 
there were factories in the Canadian mining communities, they were 
mostly for light processing of the mineral before shipping it to larger- 
scale operations located along the transnational commodity chain.
This does not mean Canadian asbestos workers were not adversely 
affected by their exposure to asbestos, but rather that their diseases 
often differed from those of other workers at other stages in the techno-
logical process of making asbestos marketable, resulting in lung cancer 
and mesothelioma, which occurred around 30 years after first exposure. 
What’s more, the companies that owned these mines kept the workers 
away from independent medical researchers, and much of their disease 
realities were obscured by a sophisticated and deliberate corporate effort 
to hide the hazards of asbestos.8 As long as those exposed to the min-
eral in its purest form remained healthy, the companies invested in the 
industry could claim the diseases that occurred in Manchester factory 
workers, for example, were caused by other materials added along the 
technological process.
Company doctors did not inform these isolated Canadian workers 
when they contracted asbestos- related disease. The French Canadian 
workers themselves did not have access to literature on the hazards of 
the mineral written in their own language. Union leaders were primarily 
interested in showcasing the mild temperament of their members to make 
the industry appealing to foreign investors, especially in comparison to 
the more radical socialist movements sweeping Britain and the United 
States in the first decades of the twentieth century. This culminated in 
an intense local pride in Canadian asbestos communities, rooted in the 
mistaken belief that their work was helping make the world safe, and 
their product was not what was causing workers at other sites along the 
commodity chain harm. Once we follow shipments of raw asbestos out of 
the Canadian mines and mining communities, however, it becomes clear 
how site- specific exposure during the technological process of making 
the mineral marketable changes understandings of risk and toxicity.
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Manchester’s asbestos culture
While Manchester may be more widely known historically as 
‘Cottonopolis’ and a birthplace of the Industrial Revolution,9 it is this 
city’s history with the cotton industry that made it an ideal place for an 
asbestos processing industry to develop.10 Because it is a fibrous min-
eral, asbestos is broken apart during the technological process it requires 
to become a marketable good. In many cases, the mineral’s fibres are 
initially carded and woven much in the same way as cotton, and the 
two were often blended to create asbestos cloth for a variety of goods, 
including firefighting and military uniforms, as well as aprons, ironing 
board covers and oven mitts.
While the fireproof qualities of asbestos had been known for cen-
turies, with Charlemagne even having an asbestos table cloth for 
party tricks,11 it is a natural resource particularly suited to modern, 
industrialised societies. The intense industrialisation process undertaken 
during the World Wars, combined with the fact that Britain owned sev-
eral of the Canadian asbestos mines, meant that it was one of the only 
European countries importing this valuable material, which the American 
Minerals Yearbook termed ‘indispensable to modern life’ in 1939.12
Over the span of the first half of the twentieth century, asbestos 
became part of the culture in Manchester. Not only was the cotton industry 
particularly suited for an asbestos transition, but so too were the people. 
Manchester shared this ‘asbestos culture’ with those in the mining com-
munities of Canada, although it had important, site-specific differences 
as well, rooted in the different forms of exposure that occurred on the 
factory floor, compared with the open mine.
The context in which British factory workers experienced and 
accessed information on industrial disease also differed from that of their 
Canadian counterparts. Britain had a much longer history of a strong 
labour movement, workers generally went to doctors who weren’t paid by 
the companies they worked for, and the asbestos workers in Manchester 
spun, wove and processed the mineral in a way that created much more 
dust in a confined space compared with the Canadian miners who worked 
in an open pit.13 These British factories were a new ‘site of contamination’ 
for Canadian asbestos and they fostered a disease awareness that was 
simply non- existent in Canada at this time.
Although Britain had no domestic asbestos mines, it is where the 
first recorded death from asbestos- related disease in the world occurred 
in 1907.14 This death of a British textile worker was subject to an inquest, 
which discovered the victim’s lungs had hardened due to the inhalation 
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of asbestos fibres, but no action against the resource or the industry 
followed, and market demand for the mineral continued to grow. The 
fact that the first recorded asbestos- related death occurred in Britain, 
rather than in any of the mining communities that interacted with the 
mineral in its rawest form, is indicative of the impact of technological 
processing on the resource, bringing it into contact with humans in a way 
that had never been experienced before.
After the textile worker’s death in 1907, the British medical com-
munity was tuned into the asbestos situation. When asbestos textile fac-
tory worker Nellie Kershaw died in 1924, her cause of death was quickly 
determined as being asbestos, and her family was the first to successfully 
sue an asbestos company for wrongful death.15 Kershaw had worked as 
a spinner for British asbestos magnates Turner & Newall in Rochdale, 
Greater Manchester. Turner & Newall owned and operated mines in both 
Canada and what is now Zimbabwe, and used a mixture of asbestos fibres 
in their operations.16
Kershaw had worked for Turner & Newall from 1903, when she 
was 12, until 1922, when she was unable to work due to her increasingly 
severe disease, and obtained a National Health Insurance certificate of ill 
health due to ‘asbestos poisoning’. She would have been exposed to large 
amounts of raw asbestos at work, and would have taken it home in her 
hair and on her clothing at the end of each shift.17 Despite this obvious 
connection, Turner & Newall refused to assist the Kershaw family when 
she became unable to work.
Dr W.E. Cooke investigated Kerhsaw’s death for the British Medical 
Journal in 1924 and discovered that her lungs were hardened beyond the 
ability to function due to being packed full of asbestos fibre. Two years 
later, American asbestos giant, the Johns- Manville Co., faced its first 
claim for compensation from textile workers in New Jersey, although 
there remained no claims from Canadian miners, again supporting the 
corporate lie that Canadian asbestos was benign.18 Cooke coined the 
term ‘asbestosis’ in 1927 to describe the fatal disease that Kershaw and 
others had developed.19 This was the first asbestos- related disease to be 
named, and textile factory workers were particularly vulnerable to it due 
to the high amount of fibre they were exposed to in an enclosed space.
Asbestosis resembled another industrial lung disease rooted in 
a natural resource that British factory workers were quite familiar 
with:  byssinosis. Especially common in the textile factories located 
in and around Manchester, byssinosis occurs when lungs fill up with 
microscopic cotton fibre, resulting in a hardening of the lining and suf-
focation.20 Thus it appeared that while a different natural fibre caused 
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asbestosis, its symptoms and progression were similar to other industrial 
diseases British textile workers were all too familiar with. The British 
state had shown little inclination to prevent byssinosis, and the same was 
true for asbestosis. As long as the disease remained within the factory 
walls, it was not of prime concern to legislators, especially when regu-
lating dust exposure in workers would likely result in slower production 
rates and lower profits.
By comparison, at this point Canadian asbestos miners had very 
little information about the state of their bodies, nor did they have any 
legal recourse if and when they did get ill: asbestos- related disease was not 
eligible for workers’ compensation claims in Canada, and most Canadian 
asbestos workers were not even unionised by the time of Kershaw’s 
death.21 While asbestosis grew to be particularly common in British fac-
tories, only a fraction of Canadian asbestos miners were diagnosed with 
the disease, largely because their exposure to the mineral occurred in a 
completely different site of contamination, with open pit mining being 
the majority worker activity, rather than indoor processing.22
Industrial vs domestic exposure
While Cooke’s identification of asbestosis made both local and national 
news in Britain,23 it seemed to be simply yet another industrial disease 
that the working class was vulnerable to, not the general public, so there 
was no immediate risk prevention regulation to address this problem. 
Dust was simply a fact of life for many factory workers in Britain at the 
time,24 and it was not seen as something that could  – or should  – be 
changed. Throughout this period, reporting on dust exposure and dis-
ease was common practice for the British press, especially the local 
newspapers in the north- west of England. Knowledge about this risk to 
workers’ health was very public, yet action to prevent it was very slow. 
A public acknowledgement and discussion of asbestosis was almost non-
existent in Canada at this time, with the first newspaper article on asbes-
tosis only appearing in 1949.25 There were research articles in Canadian 
medical journals prior to this, but these were inaccessible to French 
Canadian asbestos miners, and they were largely edited by the British 
and American companies that operated the mines.26
Despite a general awareness of the dangers asbestos posed to 
human health in Britain, the problem appeared to be in the dust that 
was raised while processing asbestos, not in the actual material that was 
becoming increasingly embedded in so many homes and businesses. This 
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was a problem with the technological system the natural resource was 
processed through on its way to becoming home insulation, an additive 
to paint, shingles and cement or even brake pad linings for the growing 
automobile- reliant population. In fact, it wasn’t until asbestos- related 
disease began appearing outside the factory walls that public awareness 
morphed into public fear.
Indeed, early twentieth- century newspaper advertisements from 
Manchester indicate how all- pervasive the mineral was in the everyday 
life of the region’s residents. A  large advertisement published in the 
Manchester Guardian in 1919 claimed that asbestos was ‘the most per-
fect scientific building material … fire- resisting, economical, weather- 
proof and durable’, and would allow homes to be built faster and better 
than wooden houses.27 Another ad, published one year later, boasted 
about how ‘ideal’ asbestos cement was for bungalows and schools in the 
Manchester region.28 Because of the manufacturing tradition of north- 
west England, the factories of the region were particularly adaptable 
to all types of asbestos processing, whether it be for fabric or building 
materials. Furthermore, companies like Turner & Newall, as well as Bell’s 
Asbestos, were active in the Manchester community. Although Turner & 
Newall did not assist Nellie Kershaw’s family when she became too ill to 
work due to her occupational exposure to asbestos, in 1923, they proudly 
donated to the hospitals and infirmaries of Manchester and Salford, 
helping raise two million shillings and appearing on the Roll of Honour 
given to the Duke of York on 6 November 1923, less than a year before 
Kershaw’s death.29
Homes and hospitals were other ‘sites of contamination’ along the 
transnational asbestos commodity chain. Because the asbestos in these 
sites was usually contained behind walls or underneath flooring, exposure 
to the mineral was significantly less than occurred in factories. It took 
much longer for awareness of this contamination to develop because it 
took longer for the diseases caused by this sort of slow exposure to mani-
fest in the families who lived in these homes, or to catch the attention of 
the medical professionals who worked in these hospitals. In fact, hospitals 
often used asbestos in the treatment of other diseases. In 1935, the min-
eral was used to line baths used by patients suffering from rheumatoid 
arthritis and was deemed a ‘versatile ally of medicine’, along with tech-
nologies such as the X- ray.30 Despite rising disease rates in factory workers, 
it appeared as though Britain could not get enough asbestos.
As an industrial hub, Manchester was a main target during the 
Second World War, which brought the local population an appreciation 
for fireproof homes, as well as an urgent need for new ones.31 Thousands 
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of homes were destroyed by German bombing in Manchester, as well as 
other urban industrial centres like London, Liverpool and Birmingham. 
Children were evacuated to the countryside, factories were destroyed 
and entire neighbourhoods were erased. Realising this was a growing 
crisis, especially as the displaced population continued to increase, the 
British government passed the Temporary Housing Act in 1944, which 
saw over 100,000 prefabricated asbestos homes assembled all over 
Britain, including in Manchester. The  Canadian Parliament discussed 
these pre fabricated homes, as many of them were constructed with the 
mineral mined in Canada’s asbestos belt.
After much of Manchester’s city centre and industrial zone was 
destroyed by German bombing campaigns, the town council saw an 
opportunity.32 The people who lived in these parts of Manchester were 
typically poor working- class families, and there were a lot of them: over-
population was a serious problem. When their homes were destroyed, 
Manchester City Council attempted to influence or change the social 
standing of its displaced residents while rebuilding the town so it had 
a modern urban centre. At the time, even though there was a general 
awareness about the health risks of the mineral in the UK, the need for 
fireproof, durable homes was too great to omit one of the most important 
natural resources of the modern era.
While these pre fabricated houses were purchased under the ‘tem-
porary homes’ programme, many of the small prefabricated asbestos 
bungalows remained on Britain’s urban landscape for decades following 
the war, and many still remain today.33 Asbestos was a fundamental part 
of these pre fabricated homes, as sheet after sheet of asbestos cement 
were used as walls, floors and ceilings to ensure the families who lived 
in these structures would be safe from the dangers of fire.34 By the end 
of the Second World War, medical and newspaper reports of asbestos- 
related disease still only focused on those who developed it through fac-
tory exposure. As far as regulators were concerned, the general public 
was safe once housed in structures that had indoor plumbing, electri-
city and state of the art insulation: these homes offered modernity to an 
urban working class previously stuck in city centre slums.
From the factory to the home: changing sites of 
exposure and contamination
Medical knowledge of asbestos- related disease beyond asbestosis and 
beyond the factory walls took decades to develop, and even longer for 
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this knowledge to spread further than confidential industry memos. 
However, the slow exposure to asbestos that occurred in domestic sites of 
contamination, as well as in schools, hospitals and government buildings, 
was eventually the mineral’s undoing.
Asbestos causes cancer. Asbestos- related cancers, such as lung 
cancer and mesothelioma, largely occur in people who are exposed to 
smaller levels of asbestos fibre. This is the type of exposure that occurs 
in home renovations, or simply through interacting with asbestos- based 
products in the home, including aprons and oven gloves. It also widely 
occurred in Canadian asbestos miners working in an open pit, where dust 
levels were relatively low.
While the industry used the apparently low rates of asbestosis in 
Canadian asbestos workers as evidence that the mineral was safe, they 
also secretly studied the health of these workers because they knew this 
was untrue. The studies took a variety of forms, but culminated in the 
secret autopsy of deceased Canadian miners’ lungs, which were then 
transported across the international border to Saranac Laboratory in 
upstate New York, where they were studied without any public knowl-
edge or repercussion in the 1940s and 1950s.35 It was at this lab in 1943 
that chief researcher Dr Leroy Gardner ‘unintentionally’ discovered that 
asbestos caused cancer.36 Saranac researchers discovered 70 cases of 
unreported asbestos- caused lung cancer in these lungs by 1958.37 The 
families of these deceased miners were never notified, and the risk of 
cancer to those with low exposure to asbestos was covered up by industry 
leaders.
As with the case of asbestosis, it was more difficult to hide asbestos- 
related disease from workers and the public in Britain because of an 
engaged labour movement and independent medical researchers who 
had access to those working with the mineral. The low exposure that led 
to cancer developing in Canadian miners was also the type of exposure 
factory workers were vulnerable to once regulation had reduced the 
amount of fibre dust in the workplace. Manchester’s asbestos workers 
were among the first to be publicly diagnosed with asbestos- related 
cancer.
In an article published in a 1960 edition of the Lancet, Dr E.E. Keal 
examined the causes of death of men and women suffering from asbes-
tosis in British processing and manufacturing plants over a prolonged 
period of time. Keal found that while the majority of male subjects 
with asbestosis died of carcinoma of the lung, the bulk of the female 
asbestos- related deaths were caused by carcinoma of the ovary and 
breast, suggesting that the interaction between asbestos and the female 
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body was unique.38 While the asbestos industry did not want the dangers 
asbestos posed to human health to become general knowledge, it espe-
cially wanted to avoid any connection between low exposure to asbestos 
and cancer, which was a disease workers and the general public under-
stood much more than they did asbestosis.
As reports on the connection between asbestos and cancer spread 
through British society, Liverpool dockworkers refused to unload 
shipments of asbestos in 1967 unless they were packaged in dust- proof 
containers, and in March 1968, the British government banned imports 
of crocidolite asbestos because of the risk it posed to both workers and the 
general public.39 Britain continued to import chrysotile asbestos beyond 
this point, however, as the health realities of Canadian miners remained 
hidden, and thus the mineral was still understood to be safe. However, 
low exposure disease rates remained threatening to the industry because 
it meant that the domestic and public realm could also be vulnerable to 
industrial – and environmental – contamination.
Houses in Manchester were a prime location of this contamination. 
In 1931, Manchester purchased a neighbouring part of Cheshire, on the 
southern border of the city, in order to address the rising crisis of urban 
overpopulation. The city had been developing this land since the 1920s, 
and following the devastation of the Second World War the council fully 
developed the suburb of Wythenshawe to rehome displaced families.40 In 
her examinations of the South African asbestos industry, historian Nancy 
Jacobs explains that, ‘it is necessary to recognize that environmental and 
social justice are linked and that power imbalances will determine the 
ways men and women, rich and poor, and blacks and whites live with 
each other and the natural world’.41 While asbestos was used in most 
post- war homes and other buildings because of its remarkable ability to 
prevent the spread of fire, once the threat of domestic asbestos exposure 
became public, this was a low- income community that was forgotten by 
the city when it was arranging asbestos- removal plans, despite the homes 
largely being owned by the council.
From its beginning, urban planners saw Wythenshawe as the ideal 
location to house underprivileged families from Manchester’s city centre, 
because it was more or less a blank, green, and leafy canvas. Tree-lined 
streets, grassy parks and asbestos- filled homes soon came to define 
Wythenshawe, and it was part of ‘the Garden City’ movement that began 
in Britain at the start of the twentieth century, which emphasised the 
importance of green spaces.42
Wythenshawe quickly went from open farmland to one of the lar-
gest social housing communities in Europe. Asbestos was fundamental to 
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this community project, as well as many others like it. This all sounded 
ideal, and as though asbestos and Manchester were a perfect match, not 
only in the region’s factories, but also in its homes.
The illusions of Wythenshawe’s modernity can be seen as a social 
experiment designed to elevate the status of the urban poor through 
Victorian notions of the benefits of green space. In fact, the motivation 
for this project was similar to the sentiment expressed in early asbestos 
building material advertisements relating to the speed and perfection it 
would add when building family homes:  governments and businesses 
looked to the natural environment to shape the behaviours of its 
population.
In reality, moving poor working- class families out of the urban 
centre where their jobs were based, and into a distant suburb that didn’t 
have access to reliable public transport, shops or other community infra-
structure, eventually became a major problem. Parents were home late 
from work, the leafy streets and parks offered good cover for criminals, 
and the asbestos- containing materials and products in these homes posed 
a serious threat to the health of local underprivileged families, which has 
yet to be addressed.
Conclusion
Despite the corporate interest in keeping contamination in factories, 
asbestos was used in new housing and public buildings in Britain for 
much of the twentieth century, not just those inhabited by the working 
class. This was a domestic toxic time bomb just waiting to go off. Once 
the public realised the threat of non- industrial contamination, however, 
middle- and upper- class homeowners had the disposable income to get 
rid of the asbestos in their homes.
Residents of communities like Wythenshawe, however, were 
less able to make these changes. A  pamphlet sent to residents of 
Wythenshawe by the council’s Community Housing Group in the 2000s 
acknowledged the threat of asbestos in the community’s homes, but 
emphasised that residents should not panic, stating that as long as they 
did not do any renovations or other activities that could disturb the fibre, 
they would be fine.43 Access to safe homes and reliable knowledge about 
asbestos contamination remains limited for Manchester’s working- class 
residents, and these limitations have deep historical roots.
Asbestos as a technological and environmental artefact has 
impacted human health in different ways depending on the locality 
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in which people were exposed to the mineral. This varied from open 
air exposure in Canada’s asbestos mines, intense dust exposure in 
Manchester’s factories, and limited, yet still harmful exposure in com-
munities like Wythenshawe. Social class has been a significant factor 
in the degree to which people were exposed to the mineral, as well as 
the speed by which government regulators managed  – and continue 
to manage – the risk. Understanding the different ways asbestos was 
deemed to be toxic in different localities along its transnational com-
modity chain informs us of the ways in which techno- environmental 
artefacts are manipulated and managed, and the human repercussions 
of these processes.
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A machine in the garden: the 
compressed air bath and the 
nineteenth- century health resort
Jennifer Wallis
All the luxurious comforts of life … are as nothing, and not worthy 
to be compared with a good supply of pure air … and at last science 
has laid hold of it.1
In the mid-nineteenth century visitors to hydropathic establishments, 
‘aerotherapy’ institutes and other health resorts  – both in Britain and 
elsewhere  – may have found themselves sitting inside a metal ‘room’ 
into which was pumped compressed air. This compressed air bath 
aimed to increase the amount of oxygen circulating in the body and – 
via the greater ‘weight’ of the air introduced  – clear any obstructions 
of the air passages. In taking the pure air of the health resort and 
compressing it, bath proprietors were able to draw upon established 
discourses of climatic medicine – emphasising the naturally occurring 
health benefits of an environment – while simultaneously altering that 
atmosphere to deliver a hybrid form of air to their clients. As phys-
ical objects, compressed air baths were striking additions to the land-
scape of resorts, often positioned outdoors to capitalise upon their 
picturesque surroundings and fresh air. At first sight, then, they are a 
striking example of the unwelcome ‘machine in the garden’ of nine-
teenth- century literature2  – machines intrusive and incongruent with 
their surroundings. This chapter will demonstrate, however, that in 
commodifying the atmosphere and delivering it to people via mech-
anical apparatus, compressed air baths were understood by those who 
marketed and used them as machines that were part of a ‘mechanical 
pastoral’  – relying upon a harmonious relationship between modern 
machinery and ‘natural’ landscape.
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Nineteenth- century landscapes of technology
The compressed air bath highlights how the tendency to pitch ‘envir-
onment’ and ‘technology’ against one another as opposing forces – one 
‘natural’ and one ‘unnatural’ – is a rather simplistic and reductive one. 
‘Environment’, ‘nature’ and ‘landscape’, as well as ‘technology’, are his-
torically specific. In this chapter ‘landscape’ is appealed to repeatedly 
because it was also something appealed to by contemporaries in their 
discussions of compressed air baths and resorts. As Nan Fairbrother writes 
in New Lives, New Landscapes (1970), ‘Landscape … is not a static back-
ground which we inhabit, but the interaction of a society and the habitat 
it lives in.’3 The landscape is changeable, and it may be constructed and 
categorised according to prevailing social, political or scientific mores.4 
‘Landscape’ may also refer to the built, as well as the rural, pastoral or 
‘natural’ environment. William Cronon has argued that the transform-
ation of previously ‘worthless’ landscapes into ‘wildernesses’ imbued 
with sacred value demonstrates that human encounters with ‘nature’ 
are often far from ‘natural’.5 Indeed, for many seekers after wilderness 
the obvious visual differences from more urban environments ‘came to 
reflect the very civilization [they] sought to escape’ by highlighting that 
civilization’s absence.6
Language surrounding technology is equally historically contin-
gent, changeable and contested. ‘Technology’, when referring to the 
nineteenth century, is our own useful epistemological shorthand. For 
the nineteenth- century commentator ‘technology’ was something that 
denoted technique or a facet of technical education. In referring to a piece 
of apparatus such as the compressed air bath, a commentator would likely 
instead have spoken in terms of ‘machinery’.7 ‘Technology’, however, has 
a certain utility, and when considering technology in the nineteenth cen-
tury this chapter takes its cue from Joel D. Howell. In Technology in the 
Hospital (1995), Howell imbues medical ‘technology’ with three layers of 
meaning: a physical machine, an activity and ‘what people know’.8 The 
compressed air bath was undeniably a physical machine, but it was also 
active in structuring relationships between individuals and their envir-
onment, and could be a place of knowledge- making when serving as an 
observational and experimental space, as this chapter will show.
In considering technology in the nineteenth century, it is all too easy 
to construct a picture of contemporaries as technophobic – struggling with 
the expansion of industrial society and suspicious of any and all mechan-
ical innovation.9 Yet many early- to mid- century observers did not neces-
sarily perceive any ideological conflict between admiration of modern 
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engineering and enjoyment of the landscape. In his discussion of early 
nineteenth- century train travellers in Pennsylvania, Will B. Mackintosh 
writes that, rather than experiencing ‘a tension between modern tech-
nology and landscape appreciation’, passengers ‘found that together the 
two created novel and pleasurable aesthetic experiences’.10 Riding on 
mechanised transport could ‘heighten and dramatize the beautiful and 
sublime aspects of the landscape’, while at the same time allow the trav-
eller to view that landscape, from afar, in ‘luxurious contemplation’.11
The contemplative observation of new landscapes was not the sole 
rationale for travel in the nineteenth century, of course. Travel for health 
was another compelling reason for many people to journey to new places, 
both at home and abroad. The typical historical image of the nineteenth- 
century environment is one of cities shrouded in smog, slums marred 
by malodorous drains and rural hamlets choking on the smoke of fac-
tory chimneys. Yet this growing awareness of atmospheric pollution was 
accompanied by a corresponding appreciation of the potential healing 
properties of air, and a desire to seek out ‘healthful’ environments. The 
notion that the external atmosphere could have an impact on health was 
not new to the nineteenth century. In the first half of the century, though, 
traditional recourse to the seaside or mountainous areas in times of ill 
health became increasingly codified. Medical climatologists paid a great 
deal of attention to the specific features of natural environments, such as 
the salt content of waters or the moistness of soils, matching these to their 
patient’s needs. Thus, the sea voyage might be prescribed to the nervous 
and withdrawn patient, who would be reinvigorated and restored by the 
bracing sea air, as well as the extended break from the worries of home.
Just as the nineteenth- century spa goer might visit resorts both in 
their own and in other countries, this  chapter – while focusing primarily 
on British  examples  – draws upon work from American and European 
commentators. As will become clear from many of the examples used, 
the dialogue between doctors across continents, the supply of hydro-
pathic appliances across national borders and the often prolific travelling 
of resort clients themselves, meant that knowledge about the compressed 
air bath travelled widely. Indeed, a global outlook was (and is) unavoid-
able as doctors and clients compared their knowledge of baths, resorts 
and climates in their quest to discover the perfect environment that 
would cure their particular ills.
One of the most popular means of exploiting the healing properties 
of the natural world in this period was hydropathy. Unlike spa treatments 
of the eighteenth century, hydropathy was relatively unconcerned with 
the specifics of the water used, such as whether it came from mineral 
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or salt springs. Introduced to Britain in the 1840s, hydropathy quickly 
gained in popularity:  by 1861, Malvern’s hydropathic establishments 
were receiving around six thousand patients each year.12 They were 
tightly swaddled in wet sheets, doused with buckets of water and 
immersed in a variety of baths. The clients of such establishments might 
be imagined as modern fugitives, fleeing their own immediate toxic and 
debilitating environments to enjoy the healing benefits of the resort. 
Indeed, a nineteenth- century visitor to the Ben Rhydding Hydropathic 
Establishment, situated on the edge of a moor just outside the Yorkshire 
town of Ilkley (see Figure 5.1), constructed the immediate environment 
as something of a utopia:
The sun was bright, the air balmy. On the deciduous trees and 
shrubs the buds were sprouting, while the evergreens, rhododen-
dron, laurel, yew, box, fir, &c., looked fresh and glistening. The 
enclosures everywhere echoed the melody of the birds hailing the 
spring, and portly, well- to- do- looking humble bees, with shining 
black coats, variegated by yellow stripes, plied their labours on the 
pink flowers of the wild currant.13
Figure 5.1 The Hydropathic Establishment at Ben Rhydding.
Source: Wellcome Collection, London.
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It does not follow, though, that hydropathy represented a wholesale 
rejection of modernity and its trappings. Indeed, as this chapter will dis-
cuss, the compressed air bath is a prime example of how hydropathic 
establishments could successfully combine recourse to nature with mech-
anical novelty in their appeal to clients. In the use of powerful shower 
baths, for example, hydropathy was evidently not averse to incorporating 
mechanical appliances into its therapeutic armoury. James Baird, an 
enthusiastic supporter of Ben Rhydding, distinguished between ‘hydro- 
therapeutic appliances’ used in hydropathy and ‘the every- day use of 
water and air for purposes of health and cleanliness’ – an important dis-
tinction when advertising the virtues of costly hydropathic establishments 
to potential clients.14 As an ‘entire medical system’,15 hydropathy readily 
incorporated mechanical apparatus in a holistic approach to health – and 
not only apparatus that utilised water. ‘Aerotherapy’ or ‘aerotherapeutics’ 
capitalised on the healing potential of air, encompassing everything from 
sending patients to breathe the rarefied air of the Alps to prescribing 
inhalations of arsenic for the relief of asthma. At Ben Rhydding from the 
mid- 1850s, visitors could enjoy an entirely new form of treatment that 
drew its healing powers not from water, but from air.
The compressed air bath and its uses
The Ben Rhydding Hydropathic Establishment had been founded in 
1844 by a local man, impressed by the European spas he had visited and 
wishing to make such treatment available in his native Ilkley. A few years 
later, one William Macleod took over as manager of Ben Rhydding: an 
Edinburgh man who had studied medicine at St Andrews, and whose pri-
mary interests lay in the fields of hydropathy and homoeopathy. Soon 
after taking over as head of the establishment, Macleod introduced a 
Turkish bath, but also something rather more novel. This new treatment 
came in the form of a compressed air bath, constructed in Ben Rhydding’s 
grounds in 1856 and allowing the establishment to claim the honour of 
being the first resort in Britain to have such an apparatus. Compressed 
air had been noted for its physiological effects for many years, but 
industrial expansion during the early nineteenth century had provided 
more opportunities to observe these effects at first hand among mine, 
bridge and tunnel workers. As well as negative reactions to compression 
such as breathlessness and headache, it seemed that in some cases the 
compressed environment had a positive impact on a range of conditions 
including hearing problems, asthma and emphysema. Emile Tabarié, 
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a French engineer, was likely the first to design a compressed air bath 
for therapeutic purposes, which was put into operation in France in the 
1830s under the direction of a physician.16 The bath is testament to the 
often close relationship between medicine and engineering in the earlier 
nineteenth century, as doctors attended building sites to observe the 
effects of compression and engineers’ reports were incorporated into 
medical accounts.17 A  number of medical observations were made of 
bridge builders, for example, with building sites such as that surrounding 
the Rhine bridge at Kehl converted into sites of experiment.18
Tabarié’s bath was a circular construction consisting of iron plates 
riveted together ‘like those of the boiler of a steam- engine’, with an air-
tight door and porthole windows glazed with strong glass.19 The floor, 
boarded over, contained small apertures to allow the entry of the air, 
which was forced in via pipes connected to a steam engine. Once a 
patient was seated inside the bath the first half hour was spent gradually 
increasing the pressure, an hour spent in the pressurised atmosphere and 
then a final half hour to reduce the pressure back to normal. A valve in the 
top of the chamber could be adjusted by those inside to allow the escape 
of air and avoid the creation of a stagnant atmosphere. The pressure 
deemed appropriate for treatment was anywhere between half and two- 
thirds of an atmosphere (in addition to normal atmospheric pressure of 
14.7lb/ in2, thus taking the pressure to between 22 and 25lbs/ in2) with 
a pressurisation rate of 1lb every three minutes; this is a pressure range 
that falls within currently accepted safe limits for hyperbaric medicine. 
Various modifications could be made to increase the comfort of sitters or 
enhance the air’s therapeutic effect. As air temperature increased during 
compression, the pipes carrying the air were often directed through 
baths of iced water, especially during the summer months. Conversely, in 
winter, it was noted by one of Ben Rhydding’s visitors that the tempera-
ture inside the bath sometimes necessitated the wearing of furs and great 
coats.20 Filtering air through cotton wool soaked with various substances 
also allowed the air being inspired to be medicated if appropriate. The 
most basic and important rationale of the air bath, though, was to deliver 
a greater proportion  – or ‘weight’  – of oxygen into the body than that 
available in the normal atmosphere. By the 1880s there were over 50 
baths across Europe and the United States, many of them in established 
health resorts and spa towns.
The immediate physical effect of the bath was usually a slight 
pain or discomfort in the ears, which was said to disappear after one 
or two sittings. S. Solis- Cohen, an American physician and advocate of 
aerotherapy, had visited a compressed air bath in Brussels and found it 
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a less than enjoyable experience: ‘I went into the cabinet myself, but did 
not remain long; the noise in the ears and the sense of fullness in the 
head were sufficiently unpleasant to make one wish to get out as soon 
as possible.’21 For those willing to persevere beyond this initial discom-
fort, repeated compressed- air inhalation provided a useful course of 
respiratory gymnastics:  respiration apparently became easier and the 
capacity of the lungs increased. Its application extended beyond mere 
respiratory conditions and it was touted as curing deafness, chronic 
headache caused by overwork, loss of the voice, whooping cough and 
menstrual complications. In stimulating the flow of saliva compressed 
air was also said to stimulate the digestion and increase the appetite, 
something of especial service when rallying convalescents. It was even 
touted as a cure for sterility by some of its more zealous supporters, who 
confidently claimed that it encouraged the ‘secretion’ of the generative 
organs.22 Contemporary literature presented several cases in which the 
bath appeared to have effected wondrous cures. A baritone of the Lyons 
theatre, who had lost his voice to bronchitis, was said to have recovered 
his voice entirely after several baths at Joannis Milliet’s institution in 
Lyons.23
The number of treatments needed to effect a cure varied from 
person to person; one physician recommended at least 24 spread over one 
to two months,24 but some patients took up to 100 before being declared 
cured. Not all were convinced of the bath’s beneficial effects, however. 
Responding to a letter to the Medical Times and Gazette in 1860, in which 
a reader had asked about the value of the compressed air bath in pul-
monary conditions, ‘Chirurgus’ warded them off the idea in strong terms. 
A patient of his had (against his medical advice) used a bath and ‘on the 
second day, while sitting in the little room breathing the compressed 
air, he suddenly felt something coming into his mouth, and, putting up 
his handkerchief, he found he was spitting blood’.25 Certainly it wasn’t a 
treatment to be employed frivolously: it was specifically advised against 
in patients suffering from any cardiac affliction or in the late stages of 
tuberculosis.
The tuberculous patient would not, in any case, have been espe-
cially welcome at Ben Rhydding; the establishment catered to the 
invalided and ‘worried well’ rather than the clearly infectious or ser-
iously ill. Macleod had long touted the establishment as a luxurious 
health resort/ hotel hybrid that offered hot water and vapour baths, 
an outdoor gymnasium and traditional amusements such as a bowling 
green. Like many hydropathic establishments it performed an important 
social function, being a noted centre for the meeting of radical liberal 
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Quakers and Unitarians. Most visitors to Ben Rhydding came from the 
professional and middling classes and it was one of many nineteenth- 
century arenas that acted as a marriage market for high society.26 The vis-
itor might find themselves in the company of officers invalided out of the 
army following the Indian ‘Mutiny’, MPs seeking to recover their strength 
before the re- opening of Parliament, or notable personalities of the day 
such as Harriet Martineau.27 Despite its pretensions to society, hydrop-
athy came to be linked to a growing, more democratised, domestic 
tourist trade in the second half of the century. A correspondent for the 
Liverpool Mercury of 1874, discussing health resorts, noted that they 
had chosen the Llandudno Hydropathic Establishment (which boasted 
a compressed air bath) for their annual sojourn as ‘Ilkley was stale; Ben 
Rhydding had lost its charms; Buxton was too near, and Torquay too 
far’.28 Ben Rhydding was, by that time, one of several such resorts in a 
competitive market. By the end of the century many hydropathic resorts 
had passed into the hands of companies who made them more explicitly 
part of the commercial holiday sector, a move that sounded the death 
knell for the ‘spa side’ of many resorts.29 This would be the fate of Ben 
Rhydding, taken over by the Wharfedale Company that also had business 
interests in cabs and coaches.30 (It would finally be transformed into a 
golf hotel with the addition of a golf course to the site in the 1880s and, 
although the building itself was demolished in the mid- twentieth cen-
tury, the golf course remains today.)
The final quarter of the nineteenth century, then, saw compressed 
air baths become more widely available to those beyond the elite Ben 
Rhydding set  – and beyond resorts. Brompton Consumption Hospital 
in London had opened in 1842, admitting consumptive patients who 
were not generally permitted at other hospitals due to concerns about 
contagiousness. The Hospital was dependent upon charity donations, 
fundraising and wealthy benefactors to support its treatment of both 
in- and out- patients. In 1879– 80, the Hospital acquired two compressed 
air baths, which were used to treat a variety of respiratory conditions 
and employed as a preventative measure for those with a ‘consump-
tive’ tendency or in the early stages of tuberculosis. Brompton extended 
compressed air treatment to the hospital patient. Their baths, contained 
in a basement alongside three Turkish baths, offered a rather less pic-
turesque experience than the bath at Ben Rhydding, although the baths 
at the latter were formative in the Hospital’s decision to obtain its own. 
Staff from Brompton had investigated both the Ben Rhydding and 
Malvern compressed air baths before committing to installing any them-
selves.31 The patient’s encounter with the bath at Brompton was a rather 
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medicalised and industrialised one, during which they would find little 
to connect them with the outside world. Indeed, Brompton’s Compressed 
Air Bath Sub Committee expressed concern that one of their baths had 
no means of communication with the outside at all and suggested that, 
‘If nothing better can be arranged the whistle attached to the air escape 
could be used for the purpose [of attracting attention] and a code of 
signals arranged accordingly.’32
Despite the rather medical, and isolating, encounter with the 
machine in the Brompton Hospital basement, the quality of the air that 
was pumped into the bath remained important, with the emphasis on 
clean and ‘natural’ air. Brompton’s regulations specified that air was to 
be pumped in ‘from the outside of the building and not from the heated 
passages or engine room’ where the bath was situated.33 In this sense, 
we might view the architecture of the hospital itself as a component of 
medical technology, interacting with the immediate environment – and 
indeed hospitals for respiratory illness are often explicitly located and 
designed with this environmental interaction in mind.34 The compressed 
air bath was imagined by its advocates as a machine that enhanced the 
natural atmosphere by offering a controlled microcosm of it. Charles 
F.  Taylor, in advertising his compressed   air apparatus in New  York, 
described his baths as extensions of the ordinary atmosphere: ‘We move 
about at the bottom of an immense sea of air … In fact, we are in a never- 
ending bath.’35 The compressed air bath was inextricably bound to the 
external environment, as was the sitter within it who was encouraged to 
consider their interaction with the environment outside as well as inside 
the bath. Compressed air treatment did not effect change on its own, but 
was to be used in combination with hydropathic treatments, prescribed 
diets and gymnastics. At Ben Rhydding, for instance, a short course of 
exercise on the surrounding moor was recommended as a vital part of 
the patient’s treatment.36 The bath was not a machine in stark contrast to 
nature, but something dependent upon it and used in conjunction with it.
Encounters physical and spiritual
In the present day, golfers on Ben Rhydding’s neatly manicured course 
will find themselves in close proximity to the rugged outline of Ilkley’s 
‘Cow and Calf rocks’, much the same view that the nineteenth- century vis-
itor to the hydropathic hotel would have encountered. The geographical 
placement of compressed air baths reflected the conviction that the air in 
the bath had not only to be compressed, but taken from as wholesome an 
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environment as possible. Baths appeared across Europe at resorts already 
renowned for their naturally healing properties: near Reichenhall’s salt 
springs or in the historic spa town of Malvern. By the end of the century 
several city centre baths existed, many of them part of ‘aerotherapeutic’ 
institutions such as J.A. Fontaine’s Établissement Médico- Pneumatique 
on the Rue de Châteaudun in Paris (which also provided a detailed quote 
for supplying and transporting a bath to the Brompton Hospital).37 These 
city centre establishments often had a more industrial flavour than their 
resort counterparts. Maurice Dupont’s Paris establishment, for example, 
drew its air from the street mains that sourced air from the ‘heights of 
Belleville’ and distributed it to various mechanical apparatus in the area 
including pneumatic street clocks.38 Although city centre aerotherapeutic 
institutes reduced the opportunity for contemplating the landscape – an 
illustration of Fontaine’s establishment depicts something resembling a 
factory, with multiple baths in one large room (see Figure 5.2) – they did 
not dispense entirely with the appeal to the surrounding environment.39 
J.L. Stone’s air- cure establishment in New York installed an observatory 
at the top of the building that allowed visitors to survey the city, com-
bining their medical treatment with a round of sightseeing.40
In looking at the illustration of Fontaine’s establishment, one 
imagines that it was an intriguing sight for the visitor. As John Kasson 
notes in Civilizing the Machine (1977), the contemporary view of 
machinery was not necessarily negative. Spectators could take great 
Figure 5.2 J.A. Fontaine’s Parisian Établissement 
Médico- Pneumatique.
Source: BIU Santé, Paris. www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/ histmed/ 
image?09374.
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pleasure in watching machines at work as material representations of pro-
gress, industry and vigour.41 Rather than depicting trains, for example, 
as ‘sudden, shocking intruder[s] upon a fantasy of idyllic satisfaction’,42 
Aileen Fyfe argues that industry was as much an attraction for the sight-
seer as was the scenic, pastoral landscape. Travellers descended down 
mine shafts to view workings underground, or perused the interiors of 
factories in the ‘industrial visit’:
The industrial visit was supposed to be a rational inquiry into 
modern economic processes and technologies, but it could com-
bine more visceral attractions: the heat, light, and smoke of blast 
furnaces could be seen as a sublime spectacle, while a descent into 
a Cornish tin mine provided a thrill of excitement.43
Although such ‘industrial tourism’ would decline over the course of 
the nineteenth century  – discouraged by evolving health and safety 
legislation and owners reluctant to have their production schedules 
interrupted by gawping onlookers – industry was still a compelling spec-
tacle for many people. The compressed air bath offered the sitter the 
novel opportunity of experiencing the machine from the inside, but also 
the chance to restructure and reframe their engagement with the nat-
ural landscape.
The bath was unusual in its potential for viewing nature:  the 
prevailing fashion for such encounters in the nineteenth century was 
to do so in buildings made of glass. Glasshouses allowed visitors to 
immerse themselves in a somewhat artificial and scaled- down version 
of the ‘vital landscape’.44 Rather like the glasshouse, the compressed 
air bath contained and privatised the external environment. Bath 
proprietors were keen to emphasise that the air introduced was ‘the 
ordinary atmospheric air’:45 it was essentially unchanged yet at the 
same time was enhanced by its mode of delivery. ‘The air of heaven, 
without any change in it, is forced into the apartment,’ wrote one enthu-
siastic compressed air bath user.46 Thus, the compressed air bath 
worked on a similar principle to the glasshouse filled with plants and 
animals:  the visitor was immersed within an artificial landscape to 
undergo a mediated encounter with nature. This idea of a mediated 
encounter is often identified in relation to the nineteenth- century train 
journey. Seated within a marvel of modern engineering, the train pas-
senger was able to enjoy novel views of nature, with the passing land-
scape presented as numerous tableaux through the window.47 Like the 
train window – or, later, the car window as discussed by Tim Cole in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87A mAChinE in thE gArdEn
87
Chapter 7 of this volume – some compressed air baths offered the sitter 
the opportunity to indulge in a novel form of sightseeing by presenting 
new views to them through the small bath windows. Milliet, describing 
his Lyons baths (both housed in ‘elegant cases’), boasted that from 
inside patients could look out over ‘the plains of Dauphiny, between 
the Rhone and the Alps’.48 Just as the window of the train re- framed the 
landscape, Milliet’s baths offered a way of viewing natural beauty while 
seated inside a product of modern engineering prowess. ‘Like a divining 
rod, the machine … unearth[ed] the hidden graces of landscape’,49 as 
the sitter sat in quiet contemplation, breathing in the concentrated 
essence of the vista that was laid out before them. Many bath sitters, 
though, were just as interested in the mechanical encounter, like Fyfe’s 
‘industrial visitors’. Compressed air baths were a novelty as well as a 
serious medical treatment, incorporated into touring schedules and 
sightseeing lists. Margaret Dyne Jeune, an Oxford lady visiting Malvern 
in 1860, went with her friends to experience the compressed air bath 
at Townshend House, which held between 10 and 12 people. She 
pronounced it an ‘unpleasant’ and underwhelming experience, and 
noted of the operation that ‘The scene altogether was ludicrous and 
its recital caused much amusement in the circle, which the paucity of 
events caused to be very easily amused.’50
Whether experienced as ludicrous or more edifying, new forms of 
interaction with nature and technology were bound up with new iden-
tities. Like the glasshouse, the compressed air bath could provoke reflec-
tion not only on nature but also on the self. While it is easy to imagine the 
bath as an unnerving experience for sitters (and this was the experience 
of many, as the next section discusses), a good number saw the apparatus 
in more positive terms. For these individuals, the thrill of being within 
the belly of a working, breathing, machine outweighed their anxiety. The 
bath was frequently said to arouse a ‘feeling of spiritual wellbeing, levity 
and liberty’.51 A  testimonial apparently from one Emma E.  Bailey who 
had used a compressed air bath in New York said: ‘Next to the Gospel, this 
subject stirs my soul, for, as spiritually I found my new life with the Gospel 
of Christ, so physically I  became all new by means of the Condensed 
Air Treatment.’52 Although we should approach such testimonials with 
caution – often included in pamphlets that were designed to advertise an 
institution – it would not be surprising if clients spoke of the bath in such 
reverential terms: the hydropathic resorts where most baths were situated 
often had strong evangelical leanings (particularly in America), on the 
part of both proprietors and their clients. The ‘conversion narrative’ was 
also a common motif in nineteenth- century alternative medicine, with 
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patients and doctors describing their frustration with ‘allopathic’ medi-
cine before chancing upon a new and life- changing treatment.53
A particularly striking account of the compressed air bath comes 
from Amanda T.  Jones, an American author, inventor and psychic. In 
her Psychic Autobiography (1910), Jones recounted her stays at Buffalo’s 
aerotherapy institute in the 1860s and 70s. In describing her experiences 
in the air bath, she associated it with an enhancement of perception, both 
sensory and extra- sensory:
I used to sleep in [the] air bath, waking with all my senses clari-
fied, – the Psychic with the rest. And so it came about one day in 
April that I  awoke and saw what proved to have for me momen-
tous meaning. There stood, within my reach, a large and very heavy 
wooden cross – unlovely yet illuminated of itself, as though from 
inner light.54
This led to the vision of a home for abandoned children and a subse-
quent drive for fundraising, and was not the only time that Jones linked 
her use of the air bath to personal enlightenment. The second instance 
was less religious in tone, but relied on the clearing of the head that 
the air bath was said to facilitate as well as inspiration from the prac-
tical workings of the bath itself:  ‘Waking … out of my usual air- bath 
slumber … I  said … “I see how fruit can be canned without cooking 
it. The air must be exhausted from the cells and fluid made to take its 
place.” ’55 This was the birth of her patented vacuum canning method, 
the ‘Jones Process’. For Jones, the compressed air bath represented that 
technology– environment interaction that Jon Agar identifies in the 
opening chapter of this volume: environment as a source of inspiration 
for new technologies. The virtues of salubrious environments like the 
Alps had led doctors to look towards a technological alternative, which 
they had found in the compressed air bath. Once this atmosphere was 
contained, however, the bath was transformed into an environment in 
and of itself, offering renewed inspiration and fuelling further techno-
logical development. The microcosm of the healthful atmosphere 
that was contained within the bath at Buffalo worked on Jones’ scien-
tific imagination to inform her conception of vacuum canning. And, 
although historically the spa visit had been aligned with sociability, the 
existence of a compressed air bath at health resorts could allow for a 
very personal and solitary ‘dialogue with nature’ – and higher realms – 
as Jones’ reminiscences suggest.56
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Decorating the compressed air bath
Some compressed air- bath users, like Jones, seemed completely at ease 
with their position inside the machine, and others enjoyed passing the 
time by admiring the surrounding landscape. But how, as large mechan-
ical objects in that landscape, were baths presented? The compressed air 
bath was a rather formidable piece of machinery. As the Dundee Evening 
Post put it: ‘The outside resembles more than anything else the turret of a 
modern man- of- war.’57 Entering this large metal chamber, within which 
they were to be enclosed for two hours, could be an unnerving experi-
ence for sitters, many of whom had to be reassured by bath operators as 
to the safety of the treatment.58 Although the Evening Post mocked the 
apparatus – ‘One step further and the fashionable cure will be taken in 
the Greathead compressed air shield at the “working face” of the newest 
Thames tunnel’ – it also discussed the bath in more positive terms as the 
‘newest’ invention and ‘latest thing’.59 The bath was both impressive and 
frightening, progressive and primitive.
As the Evening Post suggested in its reference to industrial 
endeavours like the Thames tunnel, compressed air had attendant 
dangers. Placing people within an airtight metal room and subjecting 
them to changes in air pressure was a risky exercise. (Some seemed to 
relish this and viewed the bath as a form of endurance test: a medical stu-
dent of the 1850s boasted of how long he had stayed in a bath at his own 
request.60) Ralph Grindrod, describing his Malvern bath, appealed to the 
bulk of the apparatus itself as reassuring: ‘The strength of the machinery 
prevents any mischief from mechanical causes.’61 Doctors made much of 
the soothing properties of the bath, which could induce blissful slumber 
due to the ‘perfect stillness and absence of noise’.62 Most baths were 
placed at a distance from the engine that powered them, removing the 
noise of the machinery, but in cases where this was not possible it could 
be a less than relaxing experience. In A Corner of Spain (1898), American 
novelist Miriam Coles Harris described her trip to an aerotherapy estab-
lishment in Málaga where she was prescribed regular sittings in the 
compressed air bath:
After you have entered, a horrid clanking noise accompanies the 
screwing up of the door, which is done by two attendants; you 
feel that you are past help … While in the cage the sound of the 
machinery by which the air is forced in is most unpleasant; you 
have a feeling that your head is being blown off.63
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The physical isolation of the bath (here imagined as a ‘cage’) was 
worsened for the author by the knowledge that she was inside an elab-
orate and potentially dangerous piece of machinery: ‘A pencil and paper 
are given to you by which to communicate with the outer world. If you 
are very ill and want to be let out, you must write your request on the 
paper and hold it up against a sort of port- hole.’64
It was partly to minimise anxieties like those experienced by Harris 
that proprietors furnished the interiors of their baths. Adding carpets, 
chairs and tables and lining interior walls with wood panelling, draped 
silk and pictures served to avoid the impression of confinement within 
an unfamiliar metal contraption. The bath at Ben Rhydding included 
a couch for weak patients and ‘a contrivance for passing in and out 
small articles, such as letters, without disturbing the pressure of the 
air inside’.65 Most baths were large enough only for a single person, but 
larger ones – like Malvern’s – could seat up to 12 people at once, who 
were provided with chess and other games to pass the time together, cre-
ating the illusion of ‘a pleasant and agreeable conversational gathering 
in an ordinary room’66 (nevertheless, one suspects that the illustration 
provided in Grindrod’s Malvern (1871) – reproduced in Figure 5.3 – was 
rather optimistic regarding the bath’s spaciousness).67 As Charles Lee 
of Buffalo’s aerotherapy institute put it:  ‘If I have decorated with a cer-
tain degree of elegance these apartments … it has not been so much for 
the purpose of concealing the nakedness of the metal, as for the sake of 
surrounding those who resign themselves to this temporary sequestra-
tion with cheerful objects.’68 Furnishing bath interiors was a kindness 
for those who had to sit within them, but it was also an essential part of 
treatment that could contribute to the bath’s efficacy. Grindrod suggested 
that many of the symptoms reported by patients after their first bath – 
oppressed breathing and a feeling of heat – were largely due to the simple 
idea of being confined in a small space.69 In imitating a drawing room, it 
was thought that patients would be put at ease and less cognisant of their 
position inside a working machine.
Yet it was important that patients were not entirely tricked by this 
staging: they still needed to be observed by an attendant and to behave in 
a way that would maximise the benefits of treatment. The windows that 
allowed the patient to gaze out at a beautiful landscape served another 
practical purpose:  they allowed a doctor or attendant to monitor the 
person inside. The porthole- style windows made clear the bath’s role 
as a multiple observational space: the sitter who gazed out at the land-
scape of Ben Rhydding from one side of the bath might turn around to 
see an attendant peering in at them from the other. Within the eyeline 
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of doctors looking through the windows hung thermometers and other 
equipment that provided vital readings of the atmosphere inside. Sitters 
thus had to balance their ease within this uncanny domestic space with 
strict medical requirements that militated against any full absorption 
into the fantasy. They were to sit upright whenever possible and to take 
Figure 5.3 The interior of Malvern’s compressed air bath as depicted 
in Ralph Barnes Grindrod’s Malvern: Its Claims as a Health Resort (1871).
Source: Wellcome Library, London.
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full, deep inspirations; any reading or other activity was to be done care-
fully, with attention continually paid to the breathing and posture. In 
stark contrast to the gas experiments of Humphry Davy and his circle 
in the late eighteenth century, the bath was not a place for levity. At 
Ben Rhydding a sign apparently reminded sitters that they were ‘not to 
laugh … in the Air- bath!’70 At many establishments, the lung capacity of 
patients was measured before and after baths, their blood pressure tested 
and pulse taken. When not occupied by patients, baths could function 
as more explicitly experimental spaces:  clinical assistants at Brompton 
carried out observations on each other, also administering bleedings to 
observe the quality of the blood in a compressed environment.71
The exterior design of compressed air baths was just as crucial as their 
interior dressing. In placing baths at existing health resorts, proprietors 
like Macleod and Grindrod did not wish to erase or replace the established 
virtues of their institutions, but rather to augment them. An engraving of 
the small building that housed Ben Rhydding’s bath depicts an elaborate 
and rather decorative affair (see Figure 5.4).72 Situated a short walk from 
the main building, it was set back from the path and framed by trees and 
plants (similarly, the bath at Malvern’s Townshend House was located 
just off the ‘winter promenade’73). Its wooden exterior recalled a Swiss 
chalet, with the addition of some small turrets and arches. Elsewhere in 
the grounds of Ben Rhydding was a ‘gothic shrine’ in honour of Vincent 
Priessnitz – revered as the ‘founder’ of hydropathy – that connected the 
establishment to hydropathic traditions in Europe.74 The exterior view of 
Malvern’s compressed air bath was rather different (see Figure 5.5).75 In 
a rear view of the building, the metal body of the bath was not disguised 
but remained open to view, looking much like a silo attached to a farm 
building. Yet there was also some attempt to ornament the apparatus, 
with a neat roof and decorative eaves added. As Kasson notes, machinery 
offered possibilities as well as challenges to the nineteenth- century 
builder or engineer. Although decorative embellishments to appar-
atus could be seen as an attempt to make ‘acceptable’ something that 
was incongruous with the natural environment, they also signalled the 
assimilation of the machine into contemporary culture.76 Adding elab-
orate gothic arches to railway yards, for example, made the industrial 
aesthetically appealing, often drawing attention to rather than disguising 
it. In the case of the compressed air bath such embellishment also served 
to associate the apparatus with longer- standing traditions of travel for 
health. In housing Ben Rhydding’s compressed air bath within a faux 
Swiss chalet, the establishment was demonstrating a keen awareness of 
the other resorts to which their wealthy clients might take themselves. 
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Why make an arduous journey abroad when you could immerse your-
self in an equally salubrious climate on the moors of Yorkshire? In some 
cases, however, the compressed air bath was something to be used in 
conjunction with travel for health. Julian J. Hovent, a Belgian enthusiast 
of aerotherapy, advised a course of both rarefied and compressed air via 
mechanical means ‘when a doubt exists as to whether a patient should 
be sent to the mountains or to the seaside’.77 The bath was not always a 
simple replacement for a journey abroad, but for those who found them-
selves too weak or financially stretched to do so it was a promising alter-
native that drew upon the natural resources of the British environment.
Figure 5.4 The building that housed Ben Rhydding’s compressed 
air bath, from R. Wodrow Thomson’s Ben Rhydding: The Asclepion of 
England (1862).
Source: author’s own collection.
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the compressed air bath’s position in health 
resorts and hospitals of the nineteenth century:  its geographical loca-
tion, its relationship to traditions of medical climatology and its place 
in the contemporary cultural imagination. Within the bath sitters were 
able to undergo a mediated encounter with an element of the natural 
Figure 5.5 The exterior of Malvern’s compressed air bath, from Ralph 
Barnes Grindrod’s Malvern: Its Claims as a Health Resort (1871).
Source: Wellcome Library, London.
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environment  – either breathing an ‘enhanced’ version of the external 
atmosphere while viewing its source through a window or undertaking 
a more recognisably medical treatment in the basement of a hospital. In 
both cases, sitters would have been acutely aware of their own bodily 
relationship with the air as the weight of compression altered their 
breathing, doctors monitored them through windows or – if they were 
lucky enough to be undertaking the treatment at an expensive resort – 
they looked out on to the rolling hills of Ben Rhydding or the valleys of 
the Alps.
The compressed air bath has clear historical descendants (most 
obviously the decompression chamber) and continued to be used well 
into the twentieth century:  Brompton Hospital’s bath was still in use 
in the 1920s.78 It is likely that the collection of metal for the war effort 
in the 1940s put an end to those baths still in operation (this was the 
fate, for example, of the stunning ‘Steel Ball Sanatorium’ in Cleveland, 
Ohio, which accommodated multiple patients undergoing hyperbaric 
treatment79). The large amount of space required to house a bath had 
long been a barrier to their implementation:  Brompton quickly found 
that in placing theirs adjacent to three Turkish baths, the two types could 
not be operated at the same time as the hot air of the Turkish affected the 
compressed.80 Several attempts to introduce portable apparatus for the 
inhalation of compressed air were made, but these still took up signifi-
cant space and were costly pieces of equipment beyond the reach of most 
patients.81
The compressed air bath demonstrates that  – despite the dele-
terious atmosphere of many areas in the nineteenth century, marred 
by factory smoke or coal smuts  – air could still be a healing element 
that held the potential for relief from a range of medical conditions. 
Christopher Hamlin suggests that air and its therapeutic use in the nine-
teenth century ‘defies conventions’ of the medical past:  it sits uneasily 
with lesion- based medicine and complicates, rather than refines, cause– 
effect relationships.82 Indeed, in placing compressed air baths in health 
resorts already renowned for their healing properties, it was difficult 
to say whether improvements in health were a result of the bath or of 
the resort more generally. This chapter has not sought to determine the 
bath’s therapeutic efficacy, however, but to use it to think about machine- 
mediated contact with the environment in the nineteenth century. The 
bath, by offering such an encounter with the environment, collapsed 
boundaries between the natural and the cultural. By situating baths in 
established resorts, prescribing them as one element of a broader hydro-
pathic or aerotherapeutic regime, and explicitly drawing upon airs that 
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were considered more ‘healthful’ than others, it was difficult to object-
ively assess the therapeutic impact of the machine itself. Indeed, the way 
in which doctors spoke of the treatment – something to be undertaken 
in combination with exercise on the moors, one part of a broader hydro-
pathic regime – suggests that they saw the bath not so much as a panacea, 
but rather as a modification of the natural environment.
The immediate external environment was an integral part of the 
compressed air- bath system. As such the bath is an example of theme 
(1) as elaborated in Agar’s opening chapter to this volume: ‘Environment 
as an input into a technological system’. ‘Healthy’ atmospheric air 
provided the rationale for the bath’s existence and played an integral 
part in its functioning: the bath was a means of concentrating and enhan-
cing the air’s ‘natural’ efficacy. By taking the air of the Yorkshire moors 
and compressing it, baths like that at Ben Rhydding also illustrate Agar’s 
theme (2):  ‘Environment as something natural made into, or a compo-
nent within, a technological system’. Doctors and resort owners repeat-
edly emphasised the naturalness of the air introduced into their baths, 
while taking pains to note that this was air simultaneously altered by its 
mode of delivery. Without the air, the bath was merely a metal chamber, 
and without the compression, one could have achieved the same thera-
peutic effect by taking a walk. The air of the surrounding area was a vital 
component of the machine, channelled through tubes, pumped into 
chambers and, finally, released once again into the external atmosphere. 
In this way, we might see the bath as something assimilated into the 
environment – becoming part of a circular process as it took in, altered 
and expelled air  – just as we may view the environment as something 
assimilated into the machine.
The compressed air bath, though primarily a piece of medical tech-
nology, could also offer non- medical benefits: the spiritual awakening of 
Amanda Jones, the novel sightseeing experience of Margaret Dyne Jeune 
and the new views of the landscape that several resorts appealed to in 
their advertising. Baths offered a slightly different experience according 
to their size, set- up and location. When placed at resorts like Ben 
Rhydding that already capitalised on their picturesque surroundings, the 
compressed air bath could serve to ‘unearth the hidden graces of land-
scape’.83 Looking out of the bath’s windows on to the Yorkshire moors 
while breathing in the concentrated air that was being drawn directly 
from them, sitters forged new contacts with their surrounding envir-
onment, appreciating and experiencing it in new ways. In this respect, 
the compressed air bath highlights Agar’s theme (4):  ‘Environment as 
something alongside an artificial world’. Seated inside a metal chamber 
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that was – despite doctors’ best efforts at ‘dressing’ these spaces – quite 
clearly a man- made and rather industrial contrivance, the scene beyond 
the bath windows was collapsed and framed. Small port- holes formed 
windows on to a landscape that was both immediately present (in the 
air pumped into the machine) and out of reach (beyond a thick metal 
door that could only be opened once depressurised). Separated from the 
landscape before them, the sitter was compelled to look at that land-
scape anew. Thus the bath, beyond its medical effects, could transform 
one’s access to, and personal relationship with, the external environ-
ment. The compressed air bath was a literal example of a ‘machine in 
the garden’ and yet, ‘Sometimes, the machine made the garden better.’84
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The Agriculture Gallery: 
displaying modern farming in the 
Science Museum
David Matless
Hand sowing to helicopter
Until January 2017, visitors to the Science Museum’s Agriculture Gallery 
could look up to view agricultural progress wrought in iron. In 1952, 
the year after the gallery opened, curator William O’Dea described new 
exhibits in the Museums Journal:
Above the cases on the long wall of the gallery there is a novel dec-
orative feature, 100 ft long … Scenes from Egyptian, medieval 
and modern agriculture were made in wrought iron to drawings 
by Ralph Lavers, ARIBA, and are displayed against a curved fibrous 
plaster background illuminated by fluorescent lamps. The tech-
nique is akin to that of the cyclorama and the effect is quite lively. 
The wrought- iron work, executed by J.  Starkie Gardiner, Ltd., 
Merton Road, SW18, is a remarkable piece of craftsmanship.1
Designer and architect Lavers, who had strong interests in classical 
archaeology and Egyptology, had in 1947 designed the aluminium 
and steel Olympic torch used at the 1948 London Olympic Games. 
For the Science Museum metal was turned to another ancient- 
modern spectacle, the cyclorama moving from a right- hand end of 
silhouettes of human and oxen- drawn ploughs, and seed broadcasting 
in ancient Egyptian agriculture (the scenes based on Egyptian tomb 
drawings), through the flailing, hand sowing, scything, harrowing 
and bird- scaring of medieval English husbandry, humans and horse in 
harness (the scenes based on illustrations from the British Museum’s 
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fourteenth- century Luttrell Psalter), to a modern left- hand end of 
tractor ploughing, willow pollarding and helicopter crop spraying. 
Eyes moving right to left, technology would proceed, from ancient to 
modern, hand sowing to helicopter. A clean- lined, vividly silhouetted, 
strikingly modern deployment of wrought iron marked a new display 
of farming.
The Agriculture Gallery of the Science Museum in London opened 
in 1951 to display the history and present condition of farming, pre-
dominantly English farming. New technologies were then transforming 
agriculture in what would be termed at the time a ‘second agricultural 
revolution’. While subject to some discussion by Jane Insley, notably in 
relation to its use of dioramas, and by Andrew Nahum and David Rooney 
in terms of the history of the Science Museum, the Agriculture Gallery 
deserves fuller scrutiny than it has received. Indeed Rooney noted in 
2010 that the gallery had ushered in ‘a new paradigm of museum dis-
play and lighting technique that is still fresh today’.2 Until its removal 
in 2017, the gallery was a surviving relic of a powerful conjunction of 
science, landscape and modernity, and as with other Science Museum 
galleries provides insight into the exhibition of the modern in the post- 
war decades.3 This chapter seeks to convey the institutional and cultural 
context of the Agriculture Gallery’s development, and the nature of its 
displays, which offered museum visitors a progressive story of the past 
and a vivid display of present and future.
The modern agricultural narratives presented in the gallery carried 
an environmental patriotism. If later critiques of modern farming could 
themselves mobilise patriotism, as when in 1980 Marion Shoard’s influ-
ential The Theft of the Countryside identified the farmer as the ‘exe-
cutioner’ of ‘a vital part of our national identity’,4 visions of modern 
agricultural landscape were also often explicitly national and patri-
otic, post- war developments presented as extending national wartime 
achievement, tapping into an English tradition of improvement, and 
linked to a national capacity for science and technology. Agricultural 
landscape imagery, far from being a symptom of nostalgia and national 
decline,5 could articulate a vision of a dynamic and technological 
country; ‘country’ in the sense of both countryside and nation.6 The 
recent UK decision to leave the European Union, and the consequent 
debate over agricultural policy, makes it especially pertinent to examine 
narratives of English farming in the period before EEC accession in 1973, 
and the Agriculture Gallery gives one route into the place of agriculture 
in the post- war English imagination. Given the prominence of questions 
of national identity in recent political debate, the resurgence of concern 
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over and for Englishness, and the likely debates to come over agricultural 
policy, the post- war story becomes newly resonant.
Establishing a new Agriculture Gallery
The Agriculture Gallery was a product of the post- war settlement, in 
terms of museum funding and intellectual outlook. The gallery was 
established in 1951 in the Museum’s new Centre Block, and was until 
2017 the last display curated in the post- war period to remain in the 
Museum, a unique survival of, at the time, modern and innovative cura-
torial practices. Windowless, and ‘incorporating the latest techniques in 
artificial lighting’,7 the gallery offered a confident statement of a mid- 
twentieth- century vision of the modern, following the wartime trans-
formation of farming, and survived as a valuable historical artefact of the 
post- war period, a time when agricultural modernity was celebrated, in 
terms of both food production and landscape enhancement. The gallery 
stood for 65 years as a record, and indeed a relic, of the public communi-
cation of such technological optimism.
The initial Agriculture Gallery had a predominantly arable focus, 
but this was extended in 1965 with a full- size dairying display, described 
in Assistant Keeper of Agricultural Machinery and Implements Lesley 
West’s 1967 account of ‘An Agricultural History Museum’, in the US 
Agricultural History Society’s journal Agricultural History. The dairy 
exhibits, including ‘a full- size reproduction of an early nineteenth- 
century dairy complete with dairymaid, and in direct contrast … a full- 
size working demonstration of a modern milking parlour and dairy’, 
complete with milking cow (‘it is mechanized, giving movement to the 
head and tail’),8 were later removed as part of wider museum alterations 
and reorganisation,9 and the discussion of exhibits in this chapter pri-
marily concerns those arable displays that survived into the twenty- first 
century.
O’Dea’s 1952 account of ‘The Science Museum’s Agricultural 
Gallery’ explained the gallery’s beginnings after wartime storage, and its 
initially restricted coverage:
The collection of agricultural implements and machinery at 
the Science Museum, South Kensington, had been crated away 
in store for ten years when it was decided, early in 1950, that it 
should have 5,000 sq. ft. in the rejuvenated and extended galleries 
of the museum that were to be available in 1951. Restrictions 
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have again postponed the completion of the museum extensions 
so that the decision then taken only to show arable farming until 
new space became available is one that might not be so easy to 
justify now.10
In 1967 West also accounted for the arable focus, and explained the ini-
tial gallery organisation (1965 had brought a ‘complete facelift’, with 
new displays, models and labelling, though with the ‘basic case layout’ 
the same):
It was felt that within the space available only arable farming could 
be treated properly, and in view of the importance of agriculture 
to the economic position of this country and the potential export 
market for agricultural machinery, that the excellent historical 
material available should serve as an introduction to a contrasting 
section illustrating modern developments on the farm. On this 
basis the gallery was divided into three bays: the first dealing with 
the development of methods of tillage, the second with sowing, 
reaping, threshing, binding, winnowing, and milling, and the third 
depicting work on the modern farm.11
Gallery displays included models, wrought-iron friezes, technical 
implements and machinery, with ‘a number of fibrous plaster figures of 
full and quarter scale’ made by ‘Norman Cornish, Battersea High Street, 
SW11’, and other improvised features:  ‘The bristles from broom heads 
provided the raw material for cornfields.’12 Dioramas showed contem-
porary and historical agricultural practices, varying according to seasons 
and agricultural sectors; these were the first major deployment of this 
display technique in the Science Museum. O’Dea described the ‘scenic 
backgrounds, prepared for us by contractors (A.E.L. Mash and Associates, 
St James’s Place, SW1)’, who also ‘made most of the models’.13
Displays drew in part on pre- existing Museum agricultural 
collections of objects and models, accumulated since the late nineteenth 
century, for example, showing model carts, and plough models acquired 
during the 1920s; A.J. Spencer and J.A. Passmore’s 1930 guide to the 
Science Museum’s Agricultural Implements and Machinery holdings had 
traced developments from the ‘primitive tool’ through ‘intermediate 
types’ to ‘modern machinery’ in arable and dairy farming, and milling.14 
The establishment of the gallery also allowed the Museum to solicit 
donations of new machines and models from agricultural engineering 
companies, indicating a close relationship between the Museum as a 
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state cultural institution, and a modernising agricultural industry. O’Dea 
commented:
The agricultural collections had been due for attention in 1939, but 
immense strides were made in mechanization during and just after 
the war and it was clear that it would have been unwise to reopen 
the collections without a major degree of modernization. One- third 
of the space available was therefore reserved for modern exhibits – 
and that before a single item had been promised.15
In agriculture, as in other sectors, the Museum could serve as a point 
of conjunction for state, scientific, artistic, commercial and engin-
eering interests. The Museum worked with the Agricultural Engineering 
Association, O’Dea describing recruiting agricultural firms to provide 
models on a uniform scale of 1:12, circulating a persuasive brochure:
The brochure was made an awkward size and the two pages were 
dry- mounted on boards so stiff that they could not easily be torn 
up or even got rid of. We circulated a dozen or more of these 
intimidating documents to selected firms and the result was quite 
amazingly good.
The Museum put firms in touch with model makers, and ‘In the end we 
obtained about 100 models, all to the same scale, from nearly a score of 
firms.’16
Models often displayed their maker’s name, dioramas fore-
grounding engineering firms as names of scientific progress, effect-
ively advertising their product. Thus a diorama of threshing was 
fronted by labels noting the donated models: Taskers Trailer, Ransomes 
Straw Baler, Avery Sack Scales, Ransomes Threshing Machines (see 
Figure 6.1). Lists dated 1962 in the Museum archive show 17 firms that 
had already donated models, including major companies such as Ford, 
Ransomes, David Brown, Massey Ferguson and International Harvester. 
New exhibits are also specified that ‘may be required afresh from AEA 
members’:
Pre- harvesting:  potato planter, transplanter, knapsack sprayer, 
drainage and ditching machinery, water and organic irrigation 
equipment, helical digger.
Harvesting:  baler, combine harvester, potato harvester, hay condi-
tioner, hay mower and crimper.
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Crop handling: grain dryer, bulk grain hopper.
Digging machinery: post hole borer, post driver.
Shearing machinery: sheep shearing machine.
Dairying: milking parlour – full scale, the farm dairy – full scale.17
West noted in 1967 that the renewal of displays after an expansion of 
gallery space in 1961 included replacement of many modern models, 
with ‘enthusiastic cooperation on the part of the agricultural machinery 
manufacturers’.18 In April 1963 the Museum followed up requests for the 
new with a letter from West to Farmers Weekly asking if readers might 
have old dairy equipment for the new dairy display; historic milking 
units, churns, pails and cheese moulds:  ‘Should any of your readers be 
Figure 6.1 Detail of ‘Threshing’ diorama.
Source: photograph by the author, May 2010.
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able to assist the Museum regarding the whereabouts of any of the above 
equipment, I would be most grateful if they would write to me.’19
Time for modern farming
The Agriculture Gallery makes sense within, and gives an insight into, the 
cultural framing of farming in the post- war period. The wartime modern-
isation of agriculture through mechanisation, scientific application, the 
use of chemicals for fertilisers and pest control, and state support and 
regulation, was sustained in peace time.20 The post- war decades saw the 
farmer cast as a modern technological custodian of the country, guided 
by the state to ensure food supply, with the relationship between govern-
ment and farming set by the 1947 Agriculture Act, guaranteeing prices, 
enhancing the protection of farm tenancies, giving subsidy and pro-
moting efficient production.21 Agricultural modernity was celebrated for 
its food output, scientific method and landscape enhancement.
This ‘second agricultural revolution’ has received little cultural 
historical scrutiny. Agricultural histories tend, with few exceptions, to 
stop at the Second World War, those studies addressing the post- war 
decades focusing on assessments of productivity and the mechanisms 
of farm management.22 The work of Abigail Woods, however, sets post- 
war agricultural change in animal husbandry within broader debate over 
the nature of modernity, and the modern outlook on nature; Matthew 
Holmes’ chapter in this volume indicates parallel themes around plant 
biotechnology.23 Woods discusses indoor and outdoor ‘progressive’ pig 
production, and the role of scientific expertise, arguing for ‘a more his-
torically situated understanding of agricultural modernity’, including 
attention to its own ‘romantic’ ideals.24 Philip Conford’s The Development 
of the Organic Network: Linking People and Themes, 1945– 95 also contains 
insightful cultural analysis of the vision of ‘agricultural efficiency and 
industrial food’, which the organic movement set itself against:  ‘the 
visions of the age to come at times verged on the realms of science fiction 
(though these visions have since been reduced to the prosaic by reality)’.25
Mid- twentieth- century visions of agricultural technological pro-
gress have also been overlooked in popular accounts produced since 
the late 1960s, where the emphasis has been on modern agriculture as 
a source of environmental degradation, as ecologically destructive and 
essentially utilitarian.26 Such accounts, however, downplay the cultural 
and indeed aesthetic appeal of agricultural modernisation, and it is 
important to recover narratives of agricultural modernisation in order 
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to appreciate their cultural power, and thereby help understand how 
an agricultural revolution was able to proceed with, at first, relatively 
little public contest. Change could be presented as in harmony with 
longstanding traditions of agrarian improvement, indeed as a successor 
to the ‘first’ agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century, yet the 
English countryside could also become the site for a modern environ-
mental version of what David Nye, in the US context, terms a ‘techno-
logical sublime’.27 Whatever retrospective view is taken on the productive 
or destructive effects of agricultural modernity, it is important to under-
stand the power of its transformative visions.
The romantic ideals of agricultural modernity are manifest in the 
Agriculture Gallery, with its combines and tractors, model and full scale. 
Indeed, in its content and style of presentation the gallery echoes the 
narratives and imagery found in a wide range of media in the period, 
whether in popular literature, industry publications or broadcasting. 
Academic voices could also generate imaginative narrative, as when, 
in his 1945 book Problems of the Countryside, C.S. Orwin concluded by 
imagining a Rip van Winkle figure waking up ‘a generation later’, i.e. in 
the late 1960s, to find a country transformed by agricultural progress. 
Orwin’s figure encountered ‘a spaciousness and order … which was new’, 
shaped by new crops and mechanisation:  ‘Everywhere there was the 
suggestion of technical changes, all of which seemed to promote a greater 
activity on the land’.28 Orwin, Director of the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute at the University of Oxford, celebrated the potential 
of agricultural modernisation, envisaging wartime improvements in 
agricultural production being extended in peacetime through planning. 
A new spacious order would characterise many of the Agriculture Gallery 
displays.
Agriculture in mid- twentieth- century Britain moved to the 
modern. The Future of Agriculture, as a 1943 collection introduced 
by Minister of Agriculture R.S. Hudson outlined, was one of mechan-
isation and scientific application, of tractors in harness and machine 
milking. Advertisements within The Future of Agriculture anticipated the 
Science Museum displays in presenting Ransomes ploughs ‘behind  the 
tractor’, straight furrows progressing, and all- electric model dairies, 
the farmworker a new technician.29 There is a parallel here with Ralph 
Harrington’s discussion in Chapter 3 of this volume of the bulldozer as a 
technology of environmental modernity. The agricultural future was also 
set out as advancing from the past, whether in industry publications or 
popular literature, including that aimed at children. Thus on the covers 
of Margaret and Alexander Potter’s 1944 Puffin children’s book A History 
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of the Countryside, back cover tractors succeed front cover old manual 
labour, and, inside, a pre- war landscape of ‘tumble down farms’ is 
succeeded by wartime mechanical revitalisation and reclamation: ‘From 
gorse bracken thistles to potatoes oats and rape.’30 Weeds are subdued, 
productive order comes.
The Agriculture Gallery carries specific connection to a wider 
children’s culture of agricultural landscape. The extensive use of 
dioramas in the gallery followed on from the museum’s use of this dis-
play technique in its Children’s Gallery, established in 1931, which, 
due to its popularity with adult visitors, was also referred to as the 
‘Introductory Collections’, featuring dioramas of transport, domestic 
lighting and power alongside mechanical models. Mining dioramas 
were added after the war.31 It is notable that many of the Agriculture 
Gallery diorama cases were low to the ground, and would have been 
visible to a young child unaided. West noted further appeal to children 
in animal models: ‘The realistically modelled plastic horse incorporated 
into the display is a great favourite with the many young visitors to the 
Museum. So much so that his nose has to be painted at regular intervals, 
as with constant patting the surface coat wears thin.’32 If the Museum 
tapped into the expertise and resources of engineering companies, 
there was also an echo of the developing British production of toy model 
farm vehicles, reaching its peak in the 1950s and 1960s to dominate the 
world market, and comprehensively documented in the rich volumes on 
Farming in Miniature produced by Robert Newson, Peter Wade- Martins 
and Adrian Little.33 A  child might have looked into the agricultural 
dioramas and been reminded of their toys at home. The resonances 
between the visual culture of the museum, and that of child’s play, are 
strong, suggestive of landscapes of novelty, wonder and control, mini-
ature spaces fostering an ordered imaginative geography.
A celebratory popular children’s visual culture of farming was 
also evident in magazines and broadcasting. Thus the children’s edu-
cational magazine Look and Learn’s special March 1964  ‘Focus on the 
Farmer’s Year’ showed cover and inside imagery of arable and live-
stock farming that would not have been out of place in the gallery. On 
the cover a boy and girl walk with their dog across fresh stubble to see 
a combine harvesting wheat; the dog spies a foreground rabbit fleeing 
the machine. The centre spread shows a main image of ‘a typical farm 
of the eighteenth century’, its colour and content echoing the gallery’s 
historic dioramas, surrounded by vignettes of the new technologies 
of today:  tractor ploughing, seed drills, mechanical milking, muck 
moving, beet harvesting, hedge trimming, harrowing, pea vining, baling, 
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combine harvesting. The densely populated eighteenth- century field 
contrasts with contemporary solo operatives working ‘the indispensable 
machinery, all colours, shapes and sizes’.34 Labour is saved, production 
smoothed. Children’s television could also bring the modern farm into 
the urban, rural or suburban home, with programmes such as the BBC’s 
Camberwick Green, broadcast from 1966, enrolling new farming into 
an English landscape ideal. Camberwick Green presented the ‘modern 
mechanical farm’ of ‘go- ahead farmer’ Jonathan Bell as at one with a pas-
toral vision of the country, narrator Brian Cant singing as Bell moved his 
machinery:
A go ahead farmer is Jonathan Bell
Who works his farm and works it well
He doesn’t hold much with the good old days
In modern times use modern ways
Electric mechanical all that is new
Which does the work that men used to do
He swears by it all and he proves it too
On his modern mechanical farm.
The modernity in such representations of the country is often overlooked 
in nostalgic retrospect; when Camberwick Green series creator Gordon 
Murray died in June 2016, an obituary, referring to Murray’s series of 
‘Trumptonshire’ programmes (Camberwick Green, Trumpton, Chigley), 
noted that ‘It was not immediately clear when these dramas were set’, and 
on the basis of a doctor driving a vintage car suggested ‘it was probably 
before the first world war’.35 Camberwick Green’s traditionalist Windy 
Miller, himself devoted to topical 1960s concerns of free-range chickens 
and home- made cider (and thereby subject to jokes from the modern 
farmer), achieves retrospective prominence ahead of progressive Bell. 
The communication of agricultural modernity (and its alternatives) to 
children could, however, help make new farming an accepted part of the 
scenery for the wider public. Children (and parents) at the Agriculture 
Gallery might view the dioramas, and recall their favourite shows.
History for the modern
The Agriculture Gallery combined displays of modern farming with 
presentations of agricultural history, in dioramas and historic machinery. 
The Agriculture Gallery put historic narratives into public display, 
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offering the metropolitan adult or child museum visitor a modern 
country, a landscape of new science and bright order, yet one where his-
tory underpinned the present in a story of technological progress. Rather 
than display the past as the out- of- date, the Science Museum showed the 
historic modern, anticipating the now.
High on the gallery walls, above the diorama cases and at the same 
level as the cyclorama, murals by A.R. Thomson, RA, pictured the his-
toric progress of farm machinery. The 1948 Olympics again intrudes 
into gallery formation; if Ralph Lavers had designed the Olympic torch, 
Alfred Thomson (1894– 1979), known primarily as a portrait artist, 
muralist and war artist for the RAF, had won a gold medal for painting 
at the Games, the last time such medals were awarded. In the mid- 
1950s Thomson pictured ‘Jethro Tull 1674– 1740 Inventor of a Seed 
Drill & Pioneer of Rowcrop Farming’.36 The mural shows Tull with his 
new machine, watched by people of varying social classes curious as to 
modern novelty, as in the background distance seed is hand broadcast in 
a manner destined to become obsolete. In 1964 Thomson added a second 
mural, showing the late nineteenth- century advance of a reaper- thresher 
as a precursor to the modern combine harvester (a full- size example of 
which stood nearby); 24 horses pull the machine as a side arm reaps ripe 
corn. Thomson also registered gallery staff, a later label noting:  ‘The 
lady in red in the left- hand corner … is based on Mrs Lesley West, then 
Curator of Agriculture.’
Scale models of carts and wagons and threshing machines 
populated display cases, the models themselves sometimes marking 
histories of progress. A case of nineteenth- century threshing machines 
included:  ‘Garratt’s Portable Horse- Driven Threshing Machine. This 
model was shown at the Great Exhibition in 1851 and embodies patents 
taken out in 1843, ’44 and ’50.’ The model, ‘Lent by Messrs. Garrett & 
Sons’, with an acquisition date of 1894, offered a direct link between 
the new Agriculture Gallery and the display of technological progress 
one hundred years earlier at the Great Exhibition. An extensive display 
of model ‘Primitive Hoe Ploughs’, representing examples from around 
the world, lent to the Museum by Major A.S.B. Steinmetz in 1926, also 
brought the ancient to the modern.37 The plough models were given a 
distinctly modern display setting, in brightly lit display cases with plain, 
light backgrounds, put in harness to silhouette animals. O’Dea described 
a display economical in both design style and cost, ploughs pulled by 
‘cheaply made, bent, soldered and black enamelled wire outline fig-
ures of draught animals’, including horse, ox and elephant, made in the 
Museum workshop.38
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History was also set in progressive harness in dioramas from medi-
eval to Victorian; medieval oxen ploughing, horse ploughing, steam 
ploughing, progress in technology vividly rendered. A  diorama of 
‘Manuring and Potato Planting, 1850’ (see Figure 6.2) showed women, 
backs bent, facing away from the viewer, hand- planting in a just-
ploughed and manured field, a farmhouse, barn and church beyond on 
the painted backdrop. The full diorama label gives a precise narrative 
of socio- technological history, and enrols the scene into the broader 
narrative of gallery displays:
This exhibit is followed by a series of dioramas devoted to 
mechanised methods in agriculture. By contrast this scene shows 
the amount of field labour required to plant a potato field in 1850.
One man is ploughing while two others cut and load manure. 
A woman leads the manure cart from which a man forks a heap at 
intervals into the middle furrow of three. A  woman follows, div-
iding each heap among three furrows. Three other women then 
spread each small heap along the furrow length. Three more women 
carry baskets of seed potatoes and lay sets along the manured rows. 
Figure 6.2 Detail of ‘Manuring and Potato Planting, 1850’ diorama.
Source: photograph by the author, November 2015.
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Another three women are refilling their baskets from a load of 
seed potatoes, and will replace the first three when their baskets 
are empty. Finally a ploughman divides the ridges to cover in the 
seeded furrows.
Contrast this with the manure loader/ distributor in the next 
scene and the mechanical potato planters, both full size and in 
model form, shown elsewhere in the gallery. The two drivers and 
three loaders can cover as much area as the 14 workers of 1850, 
and in a much shorter working day.
Some 14 figures populate the 1850 field. The diorama of modern potato 
harvesting, shown in the ‘autumn’ section of a display on ‘Mechanised 
Arable Farming’, featured a reduced, entirely male workforce, the only 
female figure in the scene painted sitting at leisure on a background fence, 
the label noting that ‘much of the harder manual labour has been taken 
out of farming’. The ‘next scene’ referred to in the 1850 label showed a 
‘Massey- Ferguson Tractor With Front End Loader’, a single male operator 
shifting manure into a vividly varnished heap. The hard labour of the 
past, the aching backs of female Victorian planters or medieval peasant 
ox ploughers, eases into the modern world.
Exhibits of more recent history showed the entry of new machines 
to the British agricultural field. A  full- size Fordson tractor, of the type 
supplied by the US to boost food production late in the First World War, 
was displayed in the gallery, ‘Lent by the Ford Motor Co.’, the label stating:
The world’s first mass- produced tractor rolled off the assembly 
line in Dearborn, Michigan, USA, on 8th October, 1917. This par-
ticular example is numbered 1857 and was probably one of the first 
batch to be delivered to this country. Within six months of initiating 
production, the entire British order of 7,000 tractors had been 
delivered.
A diorama of ‘Tractor Ploughing, 1917’ (see Figure  6.3) featuring a 
model Fordson prompts a further social narrative, a female tractor driver 
watched over a gate by a male soldier, perhaps returned from conflict, 
roles reversed for the duration:  ‘The introduction of these machines, 
most of which were driven by women, gave a tremendous impetus to 
the progress of farm mechanization in this country.’ A painted backdrop 
showed telegraphic connection, a church spire and oast houses behind. 
The field carved by machines, the mud carefully modelled, the diorama 
could also call to mind other less optimistic images of wartime mud, 
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such as Paul Nash’s 1918 Western Front painting ‘We Are Making a New 
World’, held in the Imperial War Museum. Nash’s mordant title could 
lend an un- ironic label to ‘Tractor Ploughing, 1917’.
In its presentation of past progress the Agriculture Gallery echoed 
wider initiatives in the field of farming history. The gallery was indeed 
established in the same period as the academic discipline of agricultural 
history, with the British Agricultural History Society (BAHS) and its 
journal the Agricultural History Review established in 1953. The BAHS 
held its preliminary meeting, attended by 420 people, at the Science 
Museum in 1952; a visit to the Agriculture Gallery would have been a 
likely part of the meeting.39 The gallery also sits alongside other agri-
cultural displays inaugurated in 1951. The 1951 Festival of Britain on 
the South Bank in London featured agricultural displays in the ‘Land 
and People’ exhibition, including modern machinery, and the Science 
Museum gallery echoes the ethos of the Festival in presenting a modern 
country building on past achievement; the Museum would itself host 
an Exhibition of Science as part of the Festival.40 However, 1951 also 
saw the establishment of the Museum of English Rural Life (MERL) in 
Reading, opened to the public in April 1955, a predominantly  historical 
collection of agricultural artefacts offering a different presentation of 
farming, focusing on the past rather than the present, unlike the Science 
Museum’s emphasis on progress from past through present to future. 
Figure 6.3 ‘Tractor Ploughing, 1917’ diorama.
Source: photograph by the author, March 2013.
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Keeper John Higgs, also a key organising figure in the BAHS, presented 
MERL as in part an exercise in salvage:  ‘the rapid technical advances 
of the past few years have made it more than ever necessary to save 
examples of the equipment of the past before it is too late’.41 MERL 
remains an important institution, for both its displays and its archival 
and library resources. Agriculture also featured in folklife museums 
such as the Welsh Folk Museum at St Fagans, opened in 1948, where 
the emphasis, as in parallel early twentieth- century European museums, 
notably in Scandinavia, was on tradition and folklore, rather than mod-
ernisation; Higgs cited such museums as an inspiration to MERL.42 
Unlike other agricultural and rural life museums, then, the Science 
Museum’s Agriculture Gallery was distinctive in presenting a story of 
ongoing progress rather than a lost past, and in telling a farming story to 
museum visitors in London.
Vividly new
In the Agriculture Gallery modern farming became a metropolitan public 
spectacle. The gallery displayed new farming in various forms, including 
full- size machinery such as the Fordson tractor noted above, and a red 
Massey Ferguson combine harvester, elements of whose machinery 
could be set in motion. A similar red combine featured in model form in 
an adjacent ‘Summer’ corn harvest diorama, a McCormick International 
rather than Massey Ferguson, accompanied by red tractors, trailers and 
balers (see Figure 6.4). The farm labourer becomes machine operative, 
harvest taken in with ease. Visitors moved from full scale to model in 
a few paces, viewing harvest operations, with labels explaining various 
tractor specifications for visitors so inclined.
Other dioramas took in farmyard and barn, or showed operations 
varying by season. In one scene of ‘Early Summer’ haymaking, four 
men worked to store and dry baled hay, aided by the Lister Multi- Level 
Elevator (carrying bales to a higher level for stacking in a corrugated iron 
barn), the Lister Moisture Extraction Unit (‘A mobile crop drier consisting 
of an air- cooled 40 h.p. diesel engine driving a large axial flow fan’), and 
the John Deere Baler (‘Will bale and load up to 7 tons of straw or 9 tons 
of hay per hour’). Several dioramas showed a Kent landscape, with signa-
ture oasthouses, modern machines working the garden of England, land-
scape thereby enhanced rather than diminished. A diorama of ‘Tillage’ 
allowed push- button interaction, one press of a central button making 
four tractors circle a central island, each performing a different operation 
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(ploughing, cultivating, harrowing, rolling), grooves and dust made and 
overridden in movement, into a tunnel and out again:
This demonstration is intended to give some idea of what happens 
to the earth under some of the various processes to which it is 
subjected. As it has been necessary to find a material that could be 
made to return quickly to its original state each time the tractors 
revolve, and as small- scale operations are difficult to manage, the 
demonstration is only intended as a general guide.
Colour and lighting made the dioramas of contemporary agriculture 
present farming as vividly new, a bright order of modern practice, the 
typical adult visitor’s eye level making the scene prospective in both 
commanding overview and projected future. Varnish gave a shine even to 
the dung shovelled by new tractors. If the tractor was by the early 1950s 
a not unfamiliar sight for many visitors, some operations on display were 
distinctly novel, most notably in the diorama showing crop spraying. If the 
cyclorama helicopter gave one wrought- iron evocation of this element of 
the agricultural future, a grounded, vividly detailed version appeared in 
Figure 6.4 Detail of ‘Summer’ diorama.
Source: photograph by the author, November 2015.
 
 
117thE AgriCulturE gAllEry
17
Figure 6.5 Detail of crop spraying diorama showing the ‘Allman High/ 
Low Volume Sprayer’.
Source: photograph by the author, December 2016.
a diorama showing the tractor- pulled ‘Allman High/ Low Volume Sprayer’ 
(see Figure 6.5). The styling of modern chemical farming in the English 
landscape in this 1951 display is striking, with no contradiction appearing 
between the most modern farming techniques and an idyllic English 
scene, and little sense of any risk to labour. John Sheail notes how the 
deaths of seven agricultural workers from Dinitro- ortho- cresol (DNOC) 
poisoning between 1946 and 1950 helped prompt the 1952 Agriculture 
(Poisonous Substances) Act, with regulations requiring operatives 
applying dangerous chemicals to wear protective clothing.43 The chem-
ical being applied in the gallery diorama is unspecified, but the impli-
cation is that chemical farming need do no harm to either operative or 
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environment. A man is seated, entirely  unprotected, on an open Massey 
Ferguson tractor, trees in blossom nearby, cottages beyond, and two 
figures watching from an arched stone bridge. Technology becomes 
novel spectacle in traditional landscape:  ‘Allman High/ Low Volume 
Sprayer. This tractor mounted sprayer is for the application of selective 
weed killers, insecticides or fugicides [sic]. The drift guard on the boom 
prevents damage to surrounding orchards, etc. Capacity 120 gallons; 
operating pressure 0– 600 lb. per sq. in.’ The tractor model is noted as 
donated by Massey Ferguson (United Kingdom) Ltd, the sprayer model 
by E. Allman & Co., Ltd.
In the 1960s the gallery could become a focus not only for the display 
and celebration of the new, but for critiques of agricultural modernity. 
The use of pesticides and herbicides became a focus of public concern 
following the 1963 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,44 while 
Carson provided a foreword to Ruth Harrison’s 1964 Animal Machines, a 
key British text criticising ‘the new factory farming industry’, highlighting 
the conditions of battery and broiler chickens, and intensively reared beef 
cattle, pigs and veal calves.45 Further research is required here to ascertain 
the extent and nature of any public criticism of the gallery displays, and 
the dairy industry featured from this period was indeed not a focus for 
criticism in Animal Machines, but criticism could certainly occur. A letter 
dated 18 January 1970 from P.H. Reeve, secretary of the London- based 
Union of Animal Societies, devoted to ‘farm animal welfare’, addressed to 
Keeper Lesley West, reported that four Union representatives had visited 
the Museum’s animal agricultural displays and found them ‘no longer up 
to date’ and ‘seriously misleading’. Reeve asked for an impartial display 
(and thereby by implication an exposure) of factory farming:
Over 90% of laying poultry are nowadays kept in intensive indoor 
conditions; virtually 100% of broiler chickens produced in this 
country are kept in battery cages. This industry is very large. 
Yet, you have no display of poultry units or of battery cages. The 
majority of pigs are kept in conditions very much more intensive 
than those shown in your display. You show no veal calf units at all.
We make it clear that we think you should impartially 
represent modern farming techniques. At the moment, we consider 
your displays more like a public relations exercise on behalf of ideal 
farmers. You show the conditions of a horse in the last century. Do 
the chickens justice by showing the conditions of them in the latter 
part of this century. I  should be pleased to come and discuss the 
matter with you.46
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Reeve suggested an expanded coverage to show the agricultural truth, 
implying the Museum might be cautious over showing agricultural mod-
ernity in its more contested guises. Reeve’s comment on public relations 
indeed finds an echo in West’s 1967 account of the gallery:
Soon after the gallery was opened a representative of the Farmers 
Union, which at the time had just spent the equivalent of $100,000 
in an attempt at educating the British public to the fact that farming 
was no longer a business that technologists might hesitate to enter, 
on seeing the new gallery, flatteringly expressed the view that the 
Science Museum had succeeded better on a smaller budget.47
1951– 2017
The Agriculture Gallery represented a particular conjunction of tech-
nology and environment: displaying the capacities of new technology to 
transform environments, using new techniques to create a new display 
environment, prompting public debate around technology and environ-
ment. The gallery was a documentation and celebration of technological 
and scientific capability, reflecting connections between a national 
museum and a vital national sector. Wartime experience and post- war 
planning shaped British farming and its representation in the gallery. 
New farming was presented in model form, ‘model’ here denoting both 
the miniature and the ideal.48
After the Agriculture Gallery’s opening in 1951, regular additions 
were made in the first two decades, but after 1970 the gallery received 
very few additional exhibits, with the dairying display removed for the 
development of other galleries. Insley notes a minor revamp of the dis-
play in 2003,49 but the arable parts of the gallery, shaped in the 1950s 
and 1960s, survived into the twenty- first century, an old modernity 
hanging on, a fascinating snapshot from just before that key shift in the 
public image of agriculture under environmental critique.
In its later years the Agriculture Gallery offered modern landscape 
in suspension, and this suspended quality could make the gallery a pecu-
liarly compelling space, a modern that was not modern any more, which 
had clung on un- updated, yet which marked a moment when curation 
and farming and fine- detailed modelling of mud and manure, figures 
and machines, met, and made a show of the new. O’Dea noted of the 
gallery that ‘The reactions of the public, including the farmers who visit 
the museum, have been most gratifying.’50 Here, for the 1950s museum 
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curator, for the casual passer- by or the visiting agriculturalist, was a 
space for today. With the gallery’s passing, we lose memory of a signifi-
cant past landscape of modernity.
This chapter is one attempt at a record of the gallery, but before 
its closure the Science Museum made a short film on the gallery’s his-
tory, and its plans for a future display on twenty- first- century farming. 
The film was presented by broadcaster Tom Heap, known for his reports 
on contemporary farming and countryside issues on the BBC’s popular 
Countryfile programme. I acted as an ‘expert’ commentator in the film, 
along with former Science Museum curator John Liffen, who gave mem-
ories of the gallery, and Mary Cavanagh of the Museum’s exhibitions 
team, responsible for developing content for a new gallery on modern 
agriculture. The resulting short film, made by Stuart Reeves, is available 
on the Museum’s website, and on YouTube.51 The process of film-making, 
and conveying the past visitor experience to present and future online 
viewers, gave new insights into the gallery space: the low level of the 
dioramas making them visible to children, the effect of the combine in 
operation after the relevant button was pressed. Recording the displays, 
especially the dioramas, for posterity, underlined the ways in which they 
had become effective time capsules, miniatures of an older modern.
The dismantling of the gallery closes the exhibits for direct experi-
ence, though the object displays will survive in store, with some poten-
tially re- exhibited, and a few dioramas will be preserved, including the 
1850 potato field and the 1917 tractor ploughing. Otherwise, aside from 
the film, a significant mid- twentieth- century display of modern and his-
torical agricultural technologies, which captured notable dimensions 
of the relationship between technology and environment in modern 
Britain, will be gone.
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About Britain: driving the landscape 
of Britain (at speed?)
Tim Cole
In 1951, the Festival of Britain office published a series of 13 guidebooks 
that purposefully took motorists away from the main exhibition on 
London’s South Bank, About Britain.1 The fifth volume, covering the 
Chilterns to Black Country, began – like all the other guidebooks – with 
a lengthy ‘verbal portrait’ written, in this case, by the historian W.G. 
Hoskins. Introducing the area, Hoskins explained to both the domestic 
and foreign visitor that it was a relatively small patch of England 
stretching from north Staffordshire to south Berkshire, which was ‘a 
distance of 130 miles: only three to four hours in a car driven by a man 
determined to see nothing but the hard road in front of him’.2 In order to 
see more than simply the road ahead, however, Hoskins urged his readers 
to leave their car in a region where
The miles are few, the hills are low, the horizons often restricted, to 
those accustomed to the greater scale of other countries. … walking 
is the best way to enjoy such landscapes: but if this is too arduous, 
and a car must be used, it should be used with great restraint. 
England is so small, and its detail, especially in the Midlands, so 
intricately woven, that the traveller in a hurry will see nothing.3
This was typical Hoskins. In his earlier volume on Midland England in the 
Batsford Face of Britain Series, he was quick to claim that the ‘quality of 
the Midland counties cannot be apprehended from a speeding train or 
a car’, hence the need to ‘walk, or cycle, or use a car with great restraint 
if at all, to enjoy what Midland England has to offer’, although he made 
it perfectly clear that his own preference was to walk.4 As David Matless 
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notes, Hoskins advocated slow travel, ‘preferably on foot or bicycle, and if 
a car is used … it should be to potter around rather than to drive through 
the landscape’.5
Hoskins’ admonition to drive sparingly and slowly echoed 
sentiments more widely shared in mid- twentieth-century Britain.6 To 
give just one example, John Prioleau  – the long- serving motoring cor-
respondent for the Spectator  – informed those following his ‘week- 
end signposts to the open road’ that the road along the river Taw from 
Eggesford to Barnstaple afforded the chance to see ‘one of the most 
beautiful valleys in the south’. ‘It is all peaceful country with that warm 
look which gladdens the heart of the Devonshire lover,’ Prioleau gushed, 
before alerting his readers that, ‘any temptation to drive fast must be 
most sternly repressed’. He thought it ‘not likely that the occasion will 
arise’, but advised them to ‘be on your guard against it for you will miss 
countless treasures unless you keep to a positive crawl’.7 Both Prioleau 
and Hoskins can be seen as part of a broader move by writers in inter- war 
Britain to construct what Catherine Brace has dubbed, ‘a moral  geography 
of speed’. This set up an opposition between the ‘morally repugnant’ act 
of rushing through Britain at speed and the superior experience of a 
‘slow, considered, lingering encounter with the countryside’.8 This binary 
was one among several that sought to frame not simply better and worse 
ways of encountering natural landscapes, but ultimately good and bad 
citizenship.9
The ‘moral geography of speed’ created in the pages of travel litera-
ture was an act of informal regulation (and self- regulation) in a context of 
both state liberalisation of motoring speeds and the development of ever 
more powerful engines. In 1903, the Motor Cars Act increased the max-
imum speed limit on British roads to 20 miles per hour. Although widely 
flouted, this speed limit persisted throughout the 1910s and 1920s until 
it was abolished in the 1930 Road Traffic Act. A brief period of formal 
deregulation ended with the 1934 Road Traffic Act that introduced a 
maximum speed limit of 30 miles per hour in ‘built- up areas’. However, 
once out of the towns and cities, drivers could put their foot to the floor. 
It was only ‘moral geographies’ that were stopping them.
There is plenty of evidence that ‘moral geographies’ of speed were 
constructed in inter- war and early post- war British topographical litera-
ture and I do not set out here to dismiss this useful categorisation that 
points to the importance of considering class as central to constructions of 
the environment, which is a theme I briefly return to at the end. However, 
I  do want to suggest the need to nuance our thinking. Rather than 
assuming that Britain was seen as a homogenous whole, I point to some 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125driving thE lAndsCApE of britAin
125
of the ways that contemporaries imagined Britain as a series of micro- 
landscapes with varied topographies and at different scales. This should 
come as no surprise. Someone like Hoskins represented a much broader 
movement in mid- twentieth-century British topographical writing that 
emphasised – as Catherine Brace herself has pointed out – the import-
ance of regionalism.10 In this chapter I bring this recognition that place 
mattered to nuance overly monolithic readings of ‘moral geographies’ of 
speed. Rather than all landscapes being seen as best approached slowly 
and on foot, contemporaries developed more complex micro- geog-
raphies that imagined landscapes differing in both scale and nature and 
so, therefore also, varying speeds of encounter. However, as I  show in 
closing when I turn from driving Britain to the Quantocks, there was not 
always agreement over the scale of a particular landscape and therefore 
nor was there consensus over the means and speed of encounter.
Focusing attention on the links between scale, topography and 
speed brings this chapter into conversation with a number of typologies 
that frame the volume as whole.11 Thinking about cars and roads is per-
haps immediately suggestive of the most obvious of typologies that the 
volume introduces – that of the relationship between technology and the 
environment being primarily one marked by environmental change and 
damage by outputs of technological process. There were certainly critics 
of both driving at speed and new road- building, not simply in inter-war 
and post- war travel literature, but also – as I  show in the Quantocks – 
on the ground. However, there were counter-voices that saw cars – and 
road-building  – as offering new means of encounter through the tech-
nology of the windscreen. And here the chapter engages primarily with 
two of the other typologies introduced and examined across this volume.
First, and perhaps more significantly, I  seek to add to 
understandings of the environment as something represented through 
technology. In part my chapter draws on texts like the About Britain 
guides that deployed media technologies of printed text, photographs 
and maps, to navigate the motorist. But at a more fundamental level 
I am interested in considering the car windscreen as a mediating tech-
nology that afforded a particular way of seeing and experiencing the 
environment. Cars opened up not only new areas, but also new ways 
of seeing:  what Lynda Nead has dubbed ‘motorised vision’.12 The 
car was a travel technology that afforded freedom not only to go off 
timetable and off track, but also to choose whether – and where and 
when  – to speed, slow down, or stop. This led, Wolfgang Sachs has 
suggested, to a breaking of ‘the rigid perspective as seen through the 
train window because, freed from the tracks, it could change direction 
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and speed at the driver’s will’.13 Pointing to the recollections of one 
of the early writers on motoring, James Hissey, that he would ‘dally 
where the scenery, places and people pleased me, and, by grace of the 
speedy car, I would hasten over comparatively uninteresting stretches 
of country’, Nead suggests that, ‘it was the capacity for both styles of 
motion that was the special charm of the motor car in these years’.14 
In what is very much initial thinking, I seek to pick up Gillian Rose’s 
call for scholars to explore ‘the potentialities of specific technologies 
for representing landscapes differently’, and to ask where (and why) 
the windscreen – especially the windscreen at speed – offered a kind of 
cinematic screen on and through which landscapes were constructed 
as visual spectacle.15
However, it is not simply the case that technologies represented 
landscapes differently, but as I  argue here, different landscapes were 
seen as requiring different (speeds of) technologies. Here the chapter 
meshes with another of the typologies that this volume addresses. As the 
editors argue, the idea of the environment as something untouched by 
artifice makes little sense in the British context. However, imagining a 
landscape as ‘wild’ lay, in part at least, behind the decisions over where 
to speed up or slow down. Rather than a monolithic preference for slow 
travel, a number of different landscapes were seen as ones that could 
and should be sped through. These included those that were imagined 
at scale and seen to be ‘wild’. Ideas of what has been memorably called in 
the American context ‘windscreen wilderness’ can be seen emerging (as 
well as being contested) in inter- war and post- war Britain.16
Speed, scale and topography: driving About Britain
As he advised his readers that central England was best approached on 
foot, Hoskins worked from the starting point that this landscape was one 
that operated at an intimate scale. No doubt with at least half an eye on 
American tourists in Britain during its Festival year, Hoskins informed 
those visiting ‘from more spacious lands’ that they needed to ‘acquire a 
new scale of measurement in England’ and ‘look for depth, rather than 
grandeur of height or breadth of scene’, because ‘in the main the beauty 
and interest of the English scene – town or country – lies in its quality 
rather than in its size’.17 This sense that Britain was an island that played 
out at a different scale from the vast North American continent was 
one articulated by others. J.B. Priestley suggested that one of Britain’s 
‘charms’
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is that it is immensely varied within a small compass. We have here 
no vast mountain ranges, no illimitable plains, no leagues of forest, 
and are deprived of the grandeur that may accompany these things. 
But we have superb variety. A great deal of everything is packed into 
little space. I suspect that we are always faintly conscious of the fact 
that this is a smallish island, with the sea always round the corner. 
We know that everything has to be neatly packed into a small space. 
Nature, we feel, has carefully adjusted things – mountains, plains, 
rivers, lakes – to the scale of the island itself.18
In this world in miniature, Priestley argued that North American topo-
graphical features – a 12,000 foot high mountain, 400 mile long plain, or 
‘a river as broad as the Mississippi’ – would be monstrously out of place. 
But it was not simply that landscapes at such a scale would not fit within 
the British context. They did not fit anywhere. Priestley was dismissive of 
America, where ‘the whole scale is too big, except for aviators’. America 
was a country, he claimed, where
There is always too much of everything. There you find yourself in 
a region that is all mountains, then in another region that is merely 
part of one colossal plain. You can spend a long, hard day in the 
Rockies simply travelling up or down one valley. You can wander 
across prairie country that has the desolating immensity of the 
ocean. Everything is too big; there is too much of it.19
In contrast to the continental scale of the United States, which 
demanded exploration from the air by plane, Britain was a country that 
played out at a much smaller scale and therefore a day’s travel by car or 
on foot could – and did – offer up considerable variety. As an example of 
experiencing this ‘country of happy surprises’ on the ground, Priestley 
described a journey ‘down into the West Country, among rounded hills 
and soft pastures’, through ‘the queer bit of Fen country you have found 
in the neighbourhood of Glastonbury’ before ‘you suddenly arrive at 
the bleak tablelands of Dartmoor and Exmoor, genuine high moors, as 
if the North had left a piece of itself down there’.20 Hoskins offered an 
experience of variety on an even smaller scale. ‘Except on the loneliest 
moors – and even there quite often,’ he wrote in the introduction to the 
About Britain guide to the Chilterns to Black Country, ‘there are hardly ten 
square miles in England where one could not spend a whole day in leis-
urely exploration, provided only that one knows where to look and goes 
prepared beforehand.’21 To ground this claim, he took his readers to the 
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‘ruined Gothic tower’ on Mow Cop, which was the birthplace of Primitive 
Methodism, and then on to the canal tunnel at Kidsgrove before finishing 
up in the town of Biddulph with its fantastical gardens at Biddulph 
Grange.22 ‘At this point we are still within four miles of Brindley’s canal- 
tunnel at Kidsgrove, where we began this modest and rather uninviting 
tour,’ Hoskins noted.
We have moved within a tiny radius indeed, at no point … as 
much as four miles from the summit of Mow Cop, which would 
have dominated the skyline the whole day long; and it would take 
the interested traveller a whole day to see this piece of country 
properly.23
Although it is clear that Hoskins tended to prefer slow encounter on 
foot at an intimate scale, he was not completely opposed to making use 
of a car. Indeed, when he directed his reader to explore ‘ten square miles’ 
he advocated their selective use of a car for more than simply pragmatic 
reasons. The sights around Mow Cop were set within an industrial and 
urban landscape that was – he asserted – best navigated at speed. ‘Before 
we reach Mow Cop,’ Hoskins wrote, ‘we enter the dreary little colliery 
town of Kidsgrove, destined, if ever a town was, to be passed through 
rapidly.’24 It was only ‘once one is away from the debris of industry’, that 
Hoskins pronounced walking to be ‘the best way to enjoy’ rural England.25
While urban Britain was best driven, Hoskins suggested that this 
was done for different reasons in different places. In the case of a ‘dreary 
little colliery town’ like Kidsgrove, this was because ‘small industrial 
towns are depressing spectacles: they have all the aridity and ugliness of 
the large cities without their titanic vitality and scale to redeem them’.26 
But while Kidsgrove, and its counterparts, were ‘dreary’ and ‘depressing’ 
enough to be sped through, large cities like Birmingham and Stoke- on- 
Trent were best experienced from the car because of their scale, which 
rendered them visual spectacles to be witnessed from and through the 
car windscreen. In direct contrast to his rendering of ‘ten square miles’ of 
rural middle England, ‘the Birmingham- Black Country mass’ was ‘about 
270 square miles in area’. Rather than encouraging his readers to either 
avoid this ‘urban mass’ altogether, or leave their cars and explore it on 
foot, Hoskins directed motorists to take in the ‘superb general view of this 
industrial concentration from the main roads slightly to the west of it’. 
From their elevated viewpoint – which came close to creating their own 
aerial photograph of industrial urbanism  – they were offered a visual 
spectacle through their car windscreen of
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factory- chimneys and cooling- towers, gasometers and pylons, 
naked roads with trolley- bus wires everywhere, canals and railway- 
tracks, greyhound racecourses and gigantic cinemas; wide stretches 
of cindery waste- land, or a thin grass where the hawthorns bloom 
in May and June – the only touch of the natural world in the whole 
vast scene; plumes of steam rising all over the landscape, the 
pulsing sounds of industrial power coming across the dark waste; 
and the gaunt Victorian church- spires rising above the general 
level, or completely blackened towers receding into the smoky dis-
tance. This is the Black Country, well and truly named.27
Drivers were also encouraged to visit Stoke- on- Trent and its ‘seven miles 
of concentrated ugliness and dirt’, whose ‘ugliness is so demonic that it 
is fascinating to look down upon … from the marginal hills’. From here 
was a view of
hundreds of bottle- shaped kilns, black with their own dirt of 
generations, massed in groups mostly on or near the hidden canal, 
with square miles of blackened streets of little brick houses, and 
chapels, churches, spires and towers, tall chimneys of iron and steel 
works, steam from innumerable railway lines that thread their way 
through the incredible tangle of junctions: as a spectacle it should 
never be missed. Whatever the time of day or night, winter or 
summer, it is worth seeing. The Potteries at night are a show- piece. 
But any time or day will do: each season has its own special value 
in this spectacle.28
‘What impresses one about the whole spectacle is its satanic ugliness, but 
no less its terrific vitality,’ Hoskins concluded.29 His rendering of these 
large industrial cities as terrible spectacles of what Matless terms ‘the 
industrial sublime’ made them into visual experiences best appreciated 
from behind (the safety of) the windscreen.30
But this offering up of certain landscapes at the scale of visual spec-
tacle was not solely limited to the urban. There was a hint at least that 
some parts of the rural landscape – what Hoskins dubbed ‘some of the 
loneliest moors’ – were landscape at a scale that demanded a different 
speed and means of motion. This comes through in another volume in 
the About Britain series – the eighth volume, to the East Midlands and 
the Peak  – where Hoskins also wrote the introductory verbal portrait. 
Pointing to the radically different geology found within this region, 
Hoskins took his readers on a virtual tour of the bedrock found across 
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this region. As he did, he at least hinted that different areas should be 
experienced at different speeds of motion. Thus the ‘wide clay vale’ to 
the east of Lincoln was ‘good solid farmland, satisfying to contemplate, 
better by leaning over a gate than from a moving car’.31 Once into the 
chalk Wolds, however, it seemed that he – and his readers – picked up the 
pace in a landscape that he admitted was ‘an acquired taste in scenery’. 
‘Those who like the dramatic and colourful in landscapes, and nothing 
else, will find it dull,’ Hoskins warned, ‘but it is capable of showing some 
pleasant changes of detail to the observant eye,’ he reassured his readers, 
specifically this time from the moving motor car. Here Hoskins’ readers 
would discover a landscape:
Much of it, where the chalk is exposed, resembles the Chiltern 
country and the southern chalklands generally:  those long deli-
cate curves along the skyline, the huge fields with their pale pastel 
colours, the flattened ‘tumps’ of beech- trees at intervals on the 
highest ground, otherwise and an almost treeless landscape and 
one that looks quite empty of human life. One can travel by car for 
miles and see nobody in the fields, and hardly a single house in the 
biggest view.32
Reaching the southern edge of the Wolds, however, his readers needed to 
leave their cars once again as ‘more trees appear, the views close in and 
become more intimate, the ground rather more tumbled and the streams 
more frequent’.33
Rather than Hoskins being resolutely opposed to viewing land-
scape in motion, he differentiated between landscapes that were to be 
driven through, and those that were to be walked in. Although there was 
a broad rural– urban split to his thinking, it is also clear that he saw the 
possibility of exploring different rural landscapes at different speeds of 
motion, working with different understandings of scale and topography. 
Granted Hoskins was, as David Matless points out, more at home in a 
railway carriage on a branch- line than he was in a speeding motor car, 
but a striking passage of Hoskins’ view of the landscape through the 
carriage window shares much with other writers who saw the possibil-
ities offered by the technology of the car windscreen.34 Writing of seeing 
Rutland from the train, Hoskins noted how
[t] he railway has been absorbed into the landscape, and one can 
enjoy the consequent pleasure of trundling through Rutland in a 
stopping- train on a fine summer morning: the barley fields shaking 
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in the wind, the slow sedgy streams with their willows shading 
meditative cattle … the warm brown roofs of the villages half 
buried in the trees, and the summer light flashing everywhere. True 
that the railway did not invent much of this beauty, but it gave us 
new vistas of it.35
His sense of the picturesque possibilities of travel technologies is some-
thing that was more widely shared, and also extended to the motor car. 
For J.B. Priestly, there was the potential for a kind of transformation 
wrought through motoring at speed that could awaken hidden beauty. 
Writing in his introduction to The Beauty of Britain, Priestley defended 
driving through the British landscape, and specifically the potential of 
driving at speed, against his imagined critics. ‘I shall be told that the 
newer generations care nothing for the beauty of the countryside, that all 
they want is to go rushing about on motor- cycles or in fast cars,’ Priestley 
noted, before reassuring his readers that, ‘Speed is not one of my gods; 
rather one of my devils.’ However, this particular ‘devil’ – speed – was one 
that he argued must be given ‘its due’. As he went on to explain,
I believe that a swift motion across a countryside does not neces-
sarily take away all appreciation of its charm. It depends on the 
nature of the country. With some types of landscape there is a def-
inite gain simply because you are moving so swiftly across the face 
of the country. There is a certain kind of pleasant but dullish, rolling 
country, not very attractive to the walker or slow traveller, that 
becomes alive if you go quickly across it, for it is turned into a kind 
of sculptured landscape. As your car rushes along the rolling roads, 
it is as if you were passing a hand over a relief map. Here, obviously, 
there has been a gain, not a loss, and this is worth remembering. 
The newer generations, with their passion for speed, are probably 
far more sensitive than they are thought to be. Probably they are all 
enjoying aesthetic experiences that so far they have been unable 
to communicate to the rest of us. We must not be too pessimistic 
about young people if they prefer driving and gulping to walking 
and tasting.36
In contrast to Nead’s claims that ‘speed did not suit the picturesque; the 
tempo of the modern pastoral was more leisurely and required seeing 
the landscape as a sequence of moving pictures … indistinct impressions 
that rendered the picturesque redundant’, it would seem that for at least 
some, speed created a new picturesque  – what Brace suggests ‘might 
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even constitute an entirely new aesthetic experience’.37 Priestly saw 
speed offering the opportunity to either transform landscapes or enable 
them to be seen anew through the windscreen.
What that experience of driving at speed was like was something 
that James Hissey  – writing in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury – sought to convey. Although dismissive of the mere ‘hurrygraphs’ 
glimpsed by motorists who ‘rush at full speed from town to town, from 
hotel to hotel’, Hissey confessed that he could not resist the temptation 
to speed on one memorable occasion.38 In Untravelled England, he wrote 
of throwing caution to the wind and speeding through the Cotswolds. 
‘One horizon succeeded the other in rapid, bewildering succession,’ 
Hissey recalled. ‘Our eyes were on the distance – only that could we dis-
cern clearly  – the wonderful distance that ceaselessly came rushing to 
us. For a time a strange illusion took place; it was as though the car were 
standing still, and the country it was that went hurtling past.’ This was 
presumably the experience of the ‘hurrygraph’ that Hissey was so crit-
ical of, and yet he retained fond memories of this journey, informing his 
readers that, ‘A rush at full speed in a motor car over a lonely road, and 
through a deserted country, wide and open, is an experience to be ever 
afterwards remembered.’39
Although Nead describes this journey as ‘more akin to the phantom 
ride’ and therefore in a sense removed from its topographical context, 
I would place it as an experience very much rooted in a more widely shared 
understanding of landscape.40 Hissey’s memorable journey ‘through a 
deserted country, wide and open’  – or what he described elsewhere as 
‘the wild, sweeping wolds’  – points to the way that he drew upon, and 
replicated, more widely shared distinctions between the upland Cotswolds 
and the valleys.41 The former were landscapes that could be navigated at 
speed.42 As Hissey’s language of ‘wild’ Wolds and Hoskins’ rendering of 
‘loneliest moors’ suggests, upland landscapes were imagined at a scale 
and character that invited different speeds and means of motion. When 
Christopher Trent differentiated between ‘most of England’ that was ‘like 
a garden laid out on a vast scale’ and the ‘relatively small parts of the north 
and west’ that ‘remain as nature designed them’, he suggested that both 
should be accessed by different kinds of roads driven at different kinds of 
speed. In the case of ‘garden’ England in the south and east,
the influence of man on nature over many hundreds of years and 
the consequent density of the rural population by comparison with 
many other countries, has resulted in many thousands of byways 
being available for motorists with adequate surfaces and modest 
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gradients. Byways link farmhouse with farmhouse and village with 
village (and there are nearly 20,000 villages in England). They are 
the perfect medium for exploring the English countryside.
While generally critical that ‘the vast majority of motorists know only the 
high roads’, Trent did admit that some of these roads, ‘especially in 
the west country, are beautiful and throw a vivid light on the nature of 
the countryside’.43
Rather than seeing a monolithic application of ‘moral geographies’ 
of speed to British landscapes in the mid- twentieth century, there is a 
need to nuance our thinking and recognise that contemporaries worked 
with – and constructed – micro- geographies of scale and topography that 
informed their decisions about how, and at what speed, to access rural 
and urban space. Even someone like Hoskins, who clearly expressed his 
preference for slowly walking the landscape, saw some urban and rural 
landscapes as best experienced from behind the car windscreen. In par-
ticular notions of scale were critical here. Those areas in the Lincolnshire 
Wolds that were to be driven through – at some speed – were areas, as 
Hoskins was himself well aware and so was quick to point out to his 
readers, which had been transformed at the time of the eighteenth- 
century enclosures into large fields, some of which were now almost on 
an American scale, reaching ‘an immense size, sometimes sweeping out 
of sight over a distant horizon, big enough to impress even an American 
farmer’.44
But it was not simply that Hoskins acknowledged scale. The 
guidebooks he wrote a ‘verbal portrait’ for were influential in creating 
a new sense of scale. Alongside Hoskins’ verbal portrait, these guides 
mapped out day journeys ‘by car or coach’ of anything between 84 
(Stafford– Stoke–Buxton– Uttoxeter–Stafford) and 119 miles (Oxford–
Aylesbury–Bedford–Warwick).45 Hoskins himself had undertaken three 
of the routes offered up in the About Britain guides in July 1950 as he 
checked those proposed on the ground and sketched out the captions to 
accompany the strip maps that enabled motorists to experience Britain 
at scale.46 But more significantly, these guides also included aerial 
photographs that sought to stretch the ‘distant horizon’ for the reader 
and so offer up visualisations – and imaginings – of the landscape at a 
different scale.
The insertion of aerial photographs into these texts was some-
thing that the CEO of the Festival Tours, Colonel Penrose Angwin, had 
suggested early on in the planning of these ‘new’ kind of guides. ‘Some 
oblique air- photographs are likely to be particularly desirable,’ he argued, 
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in helping to convey the ‘characteristics and functions of the Area’ at the 
regional scale.47 The use of aerial photographs in the guides meshed 
with their wider use across the Festival of Britain in creating what 
Harriet Atkinson describes as a ‘double vision’ – ‘both vertical and hori-
zontal’ – that ‘offered readers, or visitors, the opportunity simultaneously 
to experience Britain from a single point on the ground and also from 
an authoritative, elevated point above it, as powerful and all seeing’.48 
The inclusion of aerial photographs was a dramatic intervention into 
topographical literature. Comparing Hoskins’ 1939 Batsford guide to 
Midland England with his 1951 About Britain guides to the Chilterns to 
Black Country and East Midlands and the Peak, the visual shift is striking. 
Rather than seeing the landscape at the scale of the individual building 
or field as the earlier guide did, aerial photography opened up the land-
scape not simply from a radically different viewpoint, but also at a mark-
edly different scale – a scale to be flown over, and driven through.49
The rubber hits the road: contesting the speed, scale 
and topography of the Quantocks
Within the variegated geography of England that I have suggested was 
developed across the twentieth century, the Quantocks was something of 
a liminal – and therefore contested – space. Although upland moorland 
in Somerset in the south- west of Britain, it was far smaller than nearby 
areas like Exmoor or Dartmoor. Whether this was a landscape of wild 
spectacle to be seen from a car or a more intimate and human landscape 
to be explored on foot was an ongoing point of debate. This can be seen 
in the ways that the area was variously imagined and constructed across 
travel literature in the twentieth century. In part this reflects the shifting 
technologies of travel, from the train and bicycle to the car. But these 
imaginings were also constitutive of what was deemed the appropriate 
technology by which to access these landscapes.
That the Quantocks meant different things to different travel 
writers comes through clearly in three inter- war publications. In his 
Quantock Life and Rambles published on the eve the Second World 
War, Edward Smith described the Quantocks as upland moorland on 
the grandest of scales. This ridge of hills was nothing less than ‘a bit of 
Scotland transplanted into Somersetshire’.50 Imagined in such terms, it is 
no surprise that this was landscape to be driven through. Readers were 
encouraged to take ‘the road from Kingston to Enmore’ that ‘has more to 
offer, in every season of the year’ than any other road Smith could recall. 
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Although this was driving country, motorists were instructed to pause at 
the gateways to enjoy far- reaching views of the coast, the mountains of 
South Wales and Glastonbury Tor.51
A radically different imagining of this landscape can be seen in 
Somerset Ways published by the Great Western Railway a decade earlier 
and the fifth edition of Beatrice Cresswell’s Homeland Handbook to The 
Quantock Hills published a decade and a half before Smith’s guide. Rather 
than this being a slice of Scotland in Somerset, Cresswell saw this ridge 
of hills as the ‘gentle west country’ rather than ‘the rugged north’.52 The 
author of Somerset Ways was in agreement that this was a landscape on 
a small scale. ‘There are those who think that when the earth was made 
this little corner was reserved for all that was small and perfect,’ they 
wrote, adding that,
Colour too vivid for the great wastes of Exmoor was set here; 
shapes softer even than the soft South Downs; woodland dells, the 
only ones left to us in England where a common man may still see 
fairies; long tree- clad combes; rivers and streamlets a joy alike to 
eye and ear.53
In a remarkable passage, Cresswell offered a similar rendering of 
the nature of this place,
in truth the wildness of the region is but the playfulness of a 
charming child making pretence to be something extremely ter-
rible, and betraying the jest by its laughter. In the Quantocks there 
is nothing of that vast wildness which gives almost a touch of terror 
to some of our English moors. Here Dame Nature is all tenderness. 
The wind fluttering through the trees seems to fill the leaves with 
laughter:  the wide views from the healthy summits extend over 
scenes of culture and prosperity. Only in winter, when the trees are 
bare, do the hills become grey and saddened, but even then when-
ever possible they become astir with horse and hounds, and the 
voices of the streamlets are never silent.54
Given such a construction of place it comes as no surprise that this was 
not primarily a landscape to be encountered by motor car, or even bicycle, 
but on foot.55 For Cresswell, the Quantocks was a place where ‘Nature 
reveals herself slowly, she will not draw aside her veil too soon, we must 
know her intimately before we can declare that we have seen her, face 
to face.’56 Such a face- to- face encounter was unimaginable through the 
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windscreen of the motor car, especially the glimpse or glance unfolding 
at speed. It necessitated ‘rambles among the combes’ if anyone was to 
‘know something about the hills … have … a glimpse of their beauties, a 
taste of their delights’.57
These different constructions of the scale of the Quantocks – and 
hence their mode of access  – that were developed across the first half 
of the twentieth century, persisted into late twentieth- century debates 
over whether to make up the ridge track running across the hills into a 
spine road. Elsewhere I have written of the ways that these debates in 
the 1960s and 1970s were tinged with questions of class – particularly 
whether road-building would bring more of the wrong kind of people 
into the Quantocks.58 This was certainly an aspect of these debates – and 
one that links with the ideas of moral geographies of speed that I have 
discussed at the outset. They can also be seen as a more parochial battle 
between two rival local organisations – the Friends of the Quantocks who 
were firmly opposed to such plans, and the Quantock Right Association 
that threw itself behind the idea of a spine road up over the hills. For the 
former, the designation of the area as an Area of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty in 1957 was reason to restrict vehicle access to the hills.59 For 
the latter, there was little point in such designation if people – and they 
picked out ‘invalids and convalescents’ – could not get ‘on the hills by car 
to see this outstanding beauty’.60 During the 1960s and 1970s these two 
rival organisations clashed, with the Friends of the Quantocks balancing 
the twin concerns of preservation and access, while the Quantock Right 
Association was solely interested in safeguarding and extending access.61
But as plans rumbled on and were debated by a wider public in 
the press and at parish meetings in 1972 and 1973, different ways of 
imaging the scale of this landscape can be seen. Just as Cresswell and 
Smith constructed two different ‘Quantocks’, the same can be seen in 
public debates over plans to build a spine road. For advocates of the spine 
road, the Quantocks was a landscape of visual spectacle at the same kind 
of scale as the neighbouring upland area of Exmoor. Such landscapes 
could – and should – be viewed from within – or just outside – the car. 
Thus Alderman Archie Clarke called for the creation of ‘circular routes 
for the hills with provision for children and the elderly who would arrive 
by car’, allowing drivers to ‘picnic on the sunny side of the hill, taking 
their old people, children and those who cannot walk any distance with 
them, and have a viewing point’.62 For Clarke, ‘the days of walkers in 
tweeds being the main users of the hills were over, and … the motor 
would have to be accepted and provided for in future policy’ and ‘the car 
has come here to stay and you have got to cater for it. They’re catering 
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for cars in the Exmoor National Park but we don’t seem to have any idea 
on the Quantocks. The whole place is bunged up and congested.’63
Opponents also picked up on Exmoor, but as a warning. Writing to 
the Observer, Auberon Waugh expressed his fears that a spine road along 
the Quantocks would turn ‘one of the few places in Southern England 
where people can get away from the motor car in conditions of out-
standing natural beauty … into the sort of Driverama one already sees 
in Exmoor, where cars are bumper to bumper in summer’, or as another 
phrased it, ‘a promenade for carborne sightseeers’.64 But it was not just 
that opponents of the scheme did not want the Quantocks to become like 
Exmoor. They also imagined it as a place at a different scale. As one put 
it, the ‘relatively small Quantock territory’ was a landscape to be walked 
in, and not driven through.65 A  landscape imagined at this scale was a 
place ‘where the horse or a pair of legs and a walking stick’ – rather than 
a car – should ‘remain supreme’.66
Those who opposed the scheme did not simply construct the 
Quantocks as a landscape in miniature. They also imagined it as a cul-
tural landscape of the romantic poets, supremely Coleridge. As one 
writer to the press noted, ‘I often walk on the Quantocks for the exer-
cise, the views, and that special “something” that Coleridge found and 
by which he was so inspired.’ Writing at the height of the conflict, he 
concluded his polemical charge against off- roaders, ‘Coleridge composed 
some of his best poetry whilst walking on the Quantocks. If he were 
alive now, I wonder how “The Rapacious Motorist” would read? I have a 
feeling that it would be banned for obscenity.’67 In contrast to advocates 
of the car who saw it as a means of expanding the ‘touring radius’, and 
bringing ‘every village and hamlet, every farmhouse and cottage, within 
easy reach … of everyone who owns a motor- car’ and not simply those 
‘hardy’, Victorian ‘pedestrians’ who ‘thought nothing of walking thirty 
miles or more in a day’, there were those who emphasised the importance 
of the pedestrian encounter with the Quantocks, which was a landscape 
imagined not simply at a particular scale, but also through a distinctive 
historical- cultural lens.68
In his Portrait of the Quantocks published in 1964, Vincent Waite 
reasserted the primacy of rambling and took a side swipe at those ‘whose 
senses are … blunted by the modern craze for motoring speed’.69 Drawing 
an analogy with an earlier moment of mass access to the countryside 
during another transport revolution, Waite reflected that
Some seventy- five years ago the author of Thomas Poole and His 
Friends wrote of the Quantocks: ‘Far be it from the present writer 
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not to rejoice, as in a great and signal benefit, that railways have 
thrown open so much of the beauty of hill and moor and sea to the 
foot of the cheap excursionist, thus enriching the lives of thousands 
with new possibilities of enjoyment. Nevertheless there is, and 
ever must be, a special charm in untroddenness, which we cannot 
but lose with some regret.’ This ‘present writer’ wonders what the 
‘present writer’ of that generation would think of the car- cluttered 
roads of today which have thrown open so much to the wheel of the 
motorist. If more metalled roads are made over the hills there is no 
doubt that a great deal of their charm will be lost.70
Waite’s desire for ‘untroddenness’ came close to an elitism that sought to 
keep the Quantocks for the few rather than the many through his privil-
eging of middle- class notions of solitary experiences of nature.71
But while class conflict is part of the story of the battle over the 
Quantocks as well as broader notions of ‘moral geographies’ of speed, 
I have argued in this chapter that we do well to nuance these renderings 
and to take seriously the ways that writers and publics imagined Britain 
as a variegated landscape. As I have suggested, behind thinking about 
speed and technologies of accessing landscape lay ways of thinking 
about the nature and scale of those landscapes. While many places in 
Britain were seen as best accessed on foot, there were other landscapes 
that could – and should – be driven through, including at speed. Rather 
than simply being rejected outright, the car windscreen was a medi-
ating technology that constructed a new aesthetics of some landscapes 
in the twentieth century. Driving, particularly at speed, was challenged 
both in print and on the ground. However, there were also advocates for 
‘motorised vision’. Writing in the German context, Sachs argues that, 
‘Around the automobile … grew new standards as to what is beautiful 
and important and worthy of effort in life  – a construction of reality, 
so to speak, that casts nature as well as space in a new light and allows 
experiences and pleasures scarcely known before.’72 His conclusion that 
motoring portrayed ‘nature … in a new light’ is one that historians of 
technology and environment do well to consider playing out in culturally 
specific and nuanced ways in the British case also. As I have suggested in 
this chapter, talking about the motor car does not simply mean thinking 
about the obvious relationship between technologies and environments 
being primarily stories of environmental damage wreaked by new tech-
nologies. Rather, there are also stories of how shifting understandings 
and visions of the environment have been represented through new 
technologies.
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Crops in a machine: industrialising 
barley breeding in twentieth- century 
Britain
Matthew Holmes
From the 1950s to the 1980s, agricultural production in Britain boomed, 
heralding what has been termed the ‘modern’ or ‘silent’ revolution in 
agriculture.1 The rise of industrialised agriculture in the decades after 
the Second World War owed much to the mechanical and chemical 
tools traditionally associated with industrialisation:  farm machinery, 
pesticides and improvements in food processing.2 Genetics and breeding 
were also of vital importance in increasing the  yields of fundamental 
crop plants.3 These improvements were partially the result of traditional 
methods of plant selection and crossing. Yet the range of tools avail-
able to plant breeders at state- funded agricultural institutes and private 
seed companies expanded to include such techniques as industrial- scale 
hybridisation, artificial chromosome doubling, induced mutation and 
plant tissue culture.
By the mid- twentieth century, barley had long been an integral 
part of farming, subject to domestication and artificial selection. The 
plant was, in itself, a vital piece of agricultural technology.4 This chapter 
focuses upon two leading barley varieties, Proctor barley and Golden 
Promise, which were produced using two seemingly new tools: industrial 
hybridisation and radiation- induced mutation. Barley is an example of 
what has been termed an ‘industrial plant’, an organism tied to ‘mech-
anical processes, modern science and the capitalist goals of industrial 
society’.5 As such, the development, and even reception, of new plant 
breeding technologies for barley in Britain was intimately bound to 
existing technological systems. Barley was engineered both to suit the 
needs of the brewing industry and to exploit the by- products of atomic 
energy.
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Harnessing previously unexamined archival material held at the 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany and the John Innes Centre, this 
chapter offers a new take on the history of plant breeding and agricul-
ture in modern Britain.6 The history of barley since the 1950s leads us 
to two conclusions: first, that plant breeding technologies are intrinsic-
ally connected with existing industries and technological systems, and 
second, that the modern revolution in British agriculture is something 
of a misnomer.7 Although significant new crop varieties were bred, these 
results were more often than not due to the improvement or industrial-
isation of existing plant breeding technologies.
Industrial hybridisation: Proctor barley
Changing attitudes to hybrid plants
Hybridisation was by no means a new plant breeding technique by the 
mid- twentieth century, having provided both a source of intellectual con-
tention for the educated and income for florists back in the nineteenth 
century. Hybrid crop plants, especially cereals, were generally unpopular 
with farmers: their tendency to produce sterile or inferior seed did not 
endear them to those who wished to save the seed from each year’s har-
vest.8 Scepticism towards hybrid crops began to change at the dawn of 
the twentieth century, as between 1910 and 1935, traditionally bred – 
either by inbreeding or open pollination – maize varieties in the United 
States were gradually replaced by hybrids. Hybrid corn faced little oppos-
ition during the era of the Great Depression. The principal concern of 
the American public was to obtain ‘ample and affordable supplies of 
food, clothing and shelter’, while farmers used hybrid corn to benefit 
from the policies of the New Deal and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration.9 Between 1930 and 1965, the volume of corn produc-
tion in the United States rose by some 2.3 billion bushels.10 By this time, 
hybridisation was also an established technique in British plant breeding. 
In fact, the renowned barley breeder for Guinness Brewers, Edwin Sloper 
Beaven, did not see a renewed emphasis placed upon hybridisation by 
geneticists as ‘at all novel’.11
Yet if you were a barley grower in 1950s Britain, you might well 
be forgiven for thinking that you were on the receiving end of a radical 
development in plant breeding. Under the Directorship of George Douglas 
Hutton Bell (1905– 93), the Cambridge- based Plant Breeding Institute 
had just released a game- changing hybrid plant: Proctor barley. The new 
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hybrid had outcompeted all comparable varieties in crop trials at the 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany, which highly recommended 
the variety for farmers in 1952, and in 1953 awarded Proctor its coveted 
Cereal Award.12 Combining high yield and malting quality, Proctor barley 
occupied approximately 70 per cent of barley acreage in the United 
Kingdom by 1960. Executive Secretary of the Royal Society D.C. Martin 
wrote that production of barley in the UK had doubled over a six- year 
period,  on the basis of which the Royal Society named Bell the first 
recipient of the prestigious Mullard Award in 1967.13 Official accolades 
heaped upon Bell by the National Institute of Agricultural Botany and the 
Royal Society were joined by unofficial accolades from admiring farmers. 
Some wrote to Bell to personally express their gratitude for his ‘wonderful 
work’.14 Such acclaim left Bell visibly uncomfortable. In a letter to one 
such admirer, Bell morosely remarked, ‘All I can hope is that the variety 
[Proctor] lives up to the reputation which it has so quickly acquired.’15 In 
a 1954 letter to a member of a Somerset brewing firm, Bell stated that he 
thought Proctor had been ‘taken up’ too quickly. Moreover, he recalled 
doing ‘[his] best to damp things with Proctor before it had been put on 
the market’.16 It is truly extraordinary to find a crop plant so popular that 
it made its own creator uneasy.
Engineering the industrial hybrid
The high yields that made Proctor popular with growers were the end 
result of something new: Britain’s first industrialised hybridisation pro-
gramme. In 1933 an attempt was made to cross tough Scandinavian 
barley varieties with established British barley varieties. This programme 
involved ‘several departures from the then accepted practice of devising 
and handling hybridisation programmes’. These departures from the 
norm included a larger number of hybrid crosses than were usually 
performed, longer crop trials and a harsh selection procedure based on 
the conformity of hybrids to a preconceived and idealised morphological 
model. Five years of crop trials resulted in five hybrid varieties, one of 
which was Proctor.17 In other words, the traditional hybridisation process 
had been extended, intensified and launched with a specific goal in mind.
Producing hybrids like Proctor now involved a whole new level of 
technical difficulty, expense and labour. In 1957, Dr J.H. Oliver of the 
Briant and Harman Brewing Company described the complexities of the 
new ‘hybridisation process’, which was in many ways testing the endur-
ance of the barley breeder. Hybridisation of barley involved the removal 
of the plant’s anther (to prevent self- fertilisation), followed by the 
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delicate task of artificial introduction of pollen from the desired cross. 
With this complete, the de- anthered and pollinated plant had to be fur-
ther protected from pollination by insects. All in all, Oliver proclaimed, 
‘what might be termed the process of fertilisation is simple, but the 
trouble started is considerable’.18 With this process being conducted on 
a far larger scale than before, it is little wonder that farmers lacked the 
time and resources to carry out the hybridisation. The task was instead 
left in the hands of specialist research centres like the Plant Breeding 
Institute or, to a lesser extent, private firms.
Industrialisation moved hybridisation several degrees further away 
from the traditional tools of selection and crossing. Traditional breeding 
could potentially be carried out by farmers, or by small private breeders, 
whose individual experience and skill were vital to grow distinctive 
crop varieties in diverse growing conditions.19 Hybrids were completely 
different: they degenerated over time, different varieties were practically 
indistinguishable from each other and their outward appearance gave no 
clues as to how they would grow. Expert input was already important to 
successfully breed and grow hybrids.20 Investment and labour on a vast 
scale was now equally vital to grow hybrid barley on an industrial scale. 
It was such changes that could lead President of the National Farmers’ 
Union Henry Plumb to declare that ‘We have experienced since the War 
a silent revolution in British agriculture from a craft- based industry to 
one based on science and high productivity.’21 Similarly, in 1970 seed 
merchant T.  Martin Clucas described how the modern plant breeder, 
while ‘still an artist, like his predecessor’, was now ‘aided by science and 
technology’.22
Crosstalk with the brewing industry
Part of the rationale behind developing a new hybridisation programme 
during the 1930s was to blend the malting characteristics of British 
barley – which made it ideal for the brewing industry – with the hardi-
ness of Scandinavian varieties.23 Throughout the twentieth century, 
British agriculture and food processing had become more and more 
integrated. Thus, when structural changes to the brewing industry 
occurred, which favoured ‘cheaper and larger supplies of sub- optimal 
feeding barley’ for malting, barley breeders responded.24 The idealised 
model barley developed by hybridisers in the 1930s was one ideally 
suited to the needs of the brewing industry. As one of the outcomes of 
this programme, Proctor combined high yields with the ability to be used 
as a malting barley.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin146
146
Acclaim from the brewing industry for Bell and Proctor barley 
even outshone that from farmers. In February of 1955, the Director 
of the Norfolk Agricultural Station wrote directly to Bell, delightedly 
informing him that the Malting Barley Competition at the Stalham 
Farmers’ Club had been decisively won by Proctor.25 At a meeting of the 
Yorkshire Section of the Brewers’ Guild in 1957, J.H. Oliver declared 
‘that Proctor was the most remarkable hybrid barley for brewing 
purposes that had ever been bred’.26 Proctor slotted seamlessly into the 
British brewing industry, as a biological component of that industry 
overtly engineered to suit its needs. Other, complicating factors were 
also at play in the widespread uptake of Proctor, including the growing 
profitability of livestock fattened on barley and a fall in oat (a rival 
animal feed) acreage.27
Proctor barley, and the industrial hybridisation system that 
produced it, in part enjoyed its success due to the targeted attempt by 
Bell and the Plant Breeding Institute to meet the utilitarian needs of 
the brewing industry. The planned and hands- on production of Proctor 
also appealed to some members of the brewing community on another 
level. Some in the industry, like J.H. Oliver, did not put much stock 
in laboratory scientists, particularly geneticists, as suitable experts on 
hybrid varieties. After all, respected barley breeder Edwin S. Beaven 
had declared that ‘the geneticist will generally offer an explanation of 
the plant breeder’s results after they have been ascertained’.28 By 1957 
it was not Beaven’s scepticism of hybridisation that had endured, but 
his mistrust of scientific experts.29 Following in this tradition, Oliver 
therefore put the decision of whether Proctor was a useful develop-
ment or not in the hands of British brewers and maltsters. ‘It would 
be unwise, indeed unfair,’ he wrote, ‘to think that it [Proctor] can be 
left to Lyttel Hall [The Brewing Research Foundation laboratory in 
Nutfield].’30
A favourable perception of hybrids within the brewing industry 
was important in ensuring Proctor barley’s commercial success. It was 
an advantage for Proctor to be a large- scale, field- tested, industrial tech-
nology: precisely because such an approach, and the organisms produced 
by it, fitted with the existing beliefs of those in the brewing industry. 
Laboratory science, and the belated explanation of the heredity phe-
nomenon by geneticists, did not pass muster with either British barley 
breeders or brewers. By contrast, the hands- on and planned production 
of hybrid barley to meet certain specifications was far more appealing, on 
both utilitarian and intellectual grounds.
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hybrid crops and population growth
Enthusiasm for hybrid crop varieties of all types became increasingly evi-
dent as Proctor barley dominated the British barley market for much of 
the 1950s and 1960s. When the National Institute of Agricultural Botany 
held its annual Crop Conference in 1970, hybrids came top of the agenda. 
Their primary advocate was one of the Institute’s Field Officers, K.E. 
Haine, who led proceedings by stating that the ‘outstanding development 
resulting from basic research [in plant breeding] has been the use of F1 
(first- generation) hybrids’. In front of an audience of farmers, breeders 
and representatives of the food industry, Haine was delighted to report 
that hybridisation had been applied to the vegetable kingdom, with a 
large number of brassica F1 hybrids undergoing trials at the Institute’s test 
sites, including 50 varieties of that holiday favourite, Brussel sprouts.31
Yet in a following discussion, representatives of the wider agricul-
tural community voiced concerns about hybrids. A  representative of a 
food company, Mr How of Ross Foods, argued that seasonal fluctuations 
in the performance of hybrid varieties were a matter of concern for 
growers. A  member of the National Agricultural Advisory Service, Mr 
Brown, announced that he preferred the consistency of older crop var-
ieties. This remark was presumably intended as a rebuke against the ten-
dency of hybrid crops to degenerate into parental types over successive 
generations. Faced with this backlash, Haine admitted that hybrid var-
ieties had their faults. However, he was certain that these would be 
ironed out in the future.32 Attempting to roll out hybrid crops across 
British agriculture was clearly not a straightforward matter, especially 
when there was no pressing demand from an established industry for a 
crop plant with specific characteristics tailored to their needs.
Calls for hybridisation to revolutionise agriculture continued 
throughout the 1970s. In an era marked by neo- Malthusian fears of an 
unsustainable growth in world population, high- yielding hybrids were 
viewed as a means to feed a hungry world.33 It is perhaps no coincidence 
that a key bastion of support for hybridisation, the National Institute 
of Agricultural Botany, had been on the receiving end of Malthusian 
prophecies from the late 1960s. In what was not an uncommon event, 
Vice President of the National Farmers’ Union, David H.  Darbishire, 
addressed members of the Institute in 1972, announcing the onset of 
a global population crisis that threatened the very survival of human-
kind.34 Similar voices were heard elsewhere. At the 1977 meeting of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, Professor Bleasdale 
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of the National Vegetable Research Station joined a chorus of voices 
that urged industrialised countries to use their own progress in agri-
cultural production to supply the Third World. Hybrid crops were a key 
part of Bleasdale’s plan to kick- start what he termed Britain’s own ‘Green 
Revolution’.35 Contemporary fears and technological ambition had 
combined to support the continued production of hybrid crops.
Ecological consequences
The pursuit of industry- led goals by the breeders of Proctor barley had 
consequences beyond the malting floor or conference room. Even the 
most carefully engineered crop plants were still subject to environmental 
and evolutionary forces. From the mid- 1950s, overwhelmingly popular 
crop varieties like Proctor altered the makeup of Britain’s arable farms. 
Smaller seed merchants complained that they could no longer keep 
up with the demand for the small number of varieties that dominated 
Britain’s cereal acreage.36 The transition to industrialised monocultures, 
many of which were made up of hybrids, had begun to generate serious 
concern within the British agricultural community by the 1970s.
At the National Institute of Agricultural Botany’s 1970 Crop 
Conference, K.E Haine recognised that ‘If a disease … severely affects an 
F1 hybrid, the result may be disastrous, with every single plant showing 
symptoms of the disease.’37 A lack of genetic variation between individual 
plants made fields of hybrid crops extremely vulnerable to disease: a fact 
painfully brought home to hybrid corn growers in the United States, who 
lost 15 per cent of their crop to an outbreak of southern leaf corn blight 
in 1970.38 D.R. Marshall, a member of the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation, described how the ‘major techno-
logical revolution in farming’ had left important crop groups genetically 
uniform and ‘markedly vulnerable to disease and pest epidemics’.39 By 
1981, previously unknown plant diseases were reported by the National 
Institute of Agricultural Botany’s Plant Pathology Branch, including ‘net 
blotch of barley’.40
Two solutions were pursued to counter the growing deluge of new 
diseases in industrialised monocultures: one low- tech, one high- tech. The 
low- tech solution recommended by the National Institute of Agricultural 
Botany involved a return to old farming practices, growing a wide variety 
of cereals on arable farms and avoiding vulnerable monocultures.41 This 
approach was preferable, some claimed, to attempting to breed new crop 
plants and entering into a genetic arms race with pathogens.42 This atti-
tude was not shared by a private seed firm, Milns Seeds of Chester, which 
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favoured a high- tech solution to counter the rise of new diseases. In its 
1969 Seed Catalogue, the firm promised its customers that pathogens 
would be defeated by the application of the latest plant breeding tech-
nologies:  not just hybridisation, but artificial mutations induced by 
gamma radiation.43
Barley goes nuclear: Golden Promise
power over nature
A distinctive, albeit overlapping, pathway to the manipulation of barley 
was the use of mutation breeding. As with hybridisation, creating new crop 
plants by artificially inducing mutation was by no means a new idea. The 
Dutch botanist and founder of mutation theory, Hugo de Vries, articulated 
the ambition of manipulating mutation for human benefit in a lecture 
series delivered at the University of California in 1904: ‘Indeed, if it once 
should become possible to bring plants to mutate at our will and perhaps 
even in arbitrarily chosen directions, there is no limit to the power we may 
finally hope to gain over nature.’44 New tools soon became available to fulfil 
this ambition, including X- rays and colchicine.45 Yet practical results were 
few and far between. When the General Electric Research Laboratory in 
New York attempted to use X- rays to induce beneficial mutations in plants 
during the 1920s and 1930s, the only marketable product to emerge from 
the laboratory was a single variety of ornamental lily.46
A long history of poor practical returns did not deter British biologists 
from embarking upon their own investigations into the possibilities of 
mutation breeding. The John Innes Horticultural Institute, a leading 
centre of genetics and plant breeding based in Norwich, played host to 
a 1952 symposium on the uses of ‘Chromosome Breakage’. Addressing 
attendees, Director of the Institute Cyril Dean Darlington announced 
that ‘experimental gene mutation and chromosome breakage’ were ‘com-
parable with … the discoveries of Mendelian experiment … they have 
created a new branch of technology and are in the process of creating 
a new branch of science’.47 The symposium appeared to represent just 
that, with speakers on agriculture, horticulture, animal genetics and 
medicine. Yet in 1953 Darlington left the JIHI for the Sherardian Chair of 
Botany at Oxford University. A significant factor in his move was Watson 
and Crick’s 1953 discovery of the structure of DNA. Darlington could 
sense a ‘molecular revolution sweeping across the biological world’, 
which would not favour researchers based in horticultural institutions.48
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At the 1955 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science, a session on ‘Genetics and plant breeding’ was addressed 
by Dan Lewis, Head of the Genetics Department at the John Innes 
Horticultural Institute. Although genetics could not ‘produce plants to 
order’, Lewis saw great potential in the use of X- rays to release hitherto 
unrealised variability in crop plants.49 At the 1957 British Association 
meeting, radiation and its agricultural applications were also the focus of 
a member of the Plant Breeding Institute, R.N.K. Whitehouse. Although 
‘few mutation- bred strains [of crop plants] have yet reached the market’, 
Whitehouse declared, this was simply ‘because insufficient time has 
elapsed’.50 If anything, British plant breeders had fallen behind on the 
international stage. Mutation- bred barley had been released on  to the 
Swedish market; barley with improved straw- strength and mildew resist-
ance had been developed in Germany and Austria; in the United States, 
mutation breeding had been applied to wheat, oats, peas and peanuts.51
gamma ray breeding
Despite Whitehouse’s optimism, one of the main tools of chromosome 
manipulations, X- rays, had proved to be largely ineffective at producing 
large numbers of useful mutations in plants. Moreover, with the departure 
of Darlington from the JIHI, ambitions for a new science of chromosome 
breakage seemed to be dead in the water. Salvation seemed to beckon 
for mutation breeders with the development of atomic technology. 
Radioactive isotopes, produced as a by- product of nuclear fission, formed 
the raw material of atomic age mutation breeding programmes. On 8 
December 1953 at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, US 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech. 
Speaking ‘against the dark background of the atomic bomb’, Eisenhower 
claimed that ‘experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the 
needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities’.52
In the wake of the atomic bomb had come the realisation that radi-
ation must adopt a publicly acceptable face: agriculture and medicine were 
two means of making atomic research palatable to the general public.53 For 
its post- war advocates, nuclear power possessed the potential to ‘return 
mankind to an idyllic, prelapsarian bliss’.54 In Britain, none endorsed this 
potential with more enthusiasm than Muriel Howorth (1886– 1971). An 
acolyte of Nobel laureate Frederick Soddy, Howorth sought to promote 
the atom at every opportunity, founding the Atomic Gardening Society in 
1959.55 On a more practical level, isotopes were made available for plant 
breeders through the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell. 
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By 1949 the Establishment had gained a reputation as the world’s ‘leading 
isotope exporter’.56 The powerful gamma rays emitted by these isotopes 
seemed to promise a far more effective means of altering chromosomes 
and inducing mutation in plants than X- rays.
Faith in the power of gamma rays was clearly held at Milns Seeds, 
which as early as 1957 began a breeding programme using gamma radi-
ation at its Plant Breeding Station in Chester. The respected and long- 
established firm did not seek to hide the means used to accomplish this 
marvel, openly stating in its Seed Catalogue that grains from an existing 
barley variety, Maythorpe, had been ‘exposed to gamma- rays and the 
resulting material carefully screened’.57 The most promising mutant 
plants were then multiplied and placed in field trials, where variety 
759/ 4 – later to be known as Golden Promise – proved to be the most 
successful.58 Two years after the release of Golden Promise on to the com-
mercial market in 1965, Milns could boast that its performance ‘in all 
parts of the country has led to increasing demand and widespread popu-
larity’.59 The reign of Proctor barley suddenly appeared to be in jeopardy 
when, in 1967, Milns Seeds reported that Golden Promise gave growers 
an even higher yield per acre.60 Golden Promise was especially popular 
with brewers in Scotland, comprising some 10 per cent of barley seed 
sales from 1973 to 1984.61
The positive reception of Golden Promise by the brewing industry 
encouraged Milns Seeds to pursue ‘exciting possibilities’ using a com-
bination of irradiation and hybridisation. Milns did admit that its var-
ietal improvement programmes ‘may result in the use of cereals that 
are somewhat unorthodox in appearance’.62 The unorthodox cereal, 
another barley variety named Midas, was released in 1971. According 
to the company’s Seed Catalogue of that year, Midas was the result of ‘a 
cross involving a very short strawed mutation, produced by irradiation, 
together with Proctor and North American selections with Mildew 
resistance’. The barley was described as a ‘variety with very unusual 
and distinct characteristics and all the essential factors’.63 On the face 
of it, mutation breeding at Milns had proved a remarkable success. In 
little over a decade, a private breeding firm had successfully applied 
gamma radiation to barley breeding and produced two highly popular 
varieties.
Competition from hybrids
Not all were impressed by the newfound interest in mutation breeding. 
The driving force behind Proctor barley, George Douglas Hutton Bell, 
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had been a longstanding sceptic. During the late 1940s, Bell noted that 
contemporary efforts to use chemicals, X- rays and other techniques to 
produce mutations lacked practical value:  ‘the general experience has 
so far been that the new forms induced by the various treatments have 
little or no economic value as far as the improvement of crop plants is 
concerned’.64 Some 20 years later, in the midst of the Atomic Age, Bell’s 
attitudes towards mutation breeding remained dismissive. Although he 
was not opposed to the concept of manipulating chromosomes to breed 
better plants, his vision of how this should be achieved was very different 
to that of Milns Seeds.
Bell used an address delivered to the Royal Society in March of 1968 
to explain his vision of plant breeding through ‘artificially controlled 
hybridisation’. Chromosome manipulation could be used to overcome 
barriers to hybridisation, although Bell preferred established techniques 
over the use of gamma radiation; for instance, the chemical colchicine. 
Complex hybridisation programmes and extensive backcrosses could 
also be used as a form of ‘chromosome substitution’.65 There was little 
need for gamma radiation, as variation and chromosome manipulating 
could both be accomplished using existing tools. In its 1969 seed cata-
logue, Milns Seeds announced its intention to develop ‘new hybrids’, 
which would incorporate the ‘dwarf material [referring to the short 
straws of Golden Promise] obtained by induced mutation’.66 New barley 
varieties like Midas were therefore produced by a combination of muta-
tion breeding and hybridisation.
Despite the efforts of Milns Seeds, barley varieties produced by 
traditional breeding and hybridisation continued to dominate British 
agriculture, even when new plants altered through radiation were 
readily available. Proctor barley continued to appear alongside both 
Golden Promise and Midas in Milns Seeds catalogues throughout the 
1960s. The firm’s 1969 catalogue described the then- ageing Proctor as 
‘a well tried variety’.67 As late as 1971, the sister firm of Milns, Marsters 
Seeds, informed its customers that Proctor barley was sold out: Golden 
Promise, however, remained in stock.68 The continuing popularity of the 
hybrid may simply have been a vestige of its overwhelming uptake during 
the 1950s. Barley growers may have felt more comfortable and confident 
managing a field of Proctor.
It seems that Golden Promise did not achieve widespread success 
with growers and brewers in virtue of superior genetics alone. The 
barley was more of an effective ‘all- rounder’, with reasonable malting 
quality, good yields and tolerance of adverse weather.69 During a 1978 
Conference at the National Institute of Agricultural Botany, an afternoon 
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discussion turned to the subject of ‘why Golden Promise had done so well 
commercially, but had not done so in NIAB trials’. One of the Institute’s 
field officers recalled that the characteristics of Golden Promise had been 
so well documented that ‘farmers were able to treat the variety accord-
ingly, and thus grow it successfully’.70 The commercial success of Golden 
Promise may have been down to farmers being provided with useful 
information on how to grow it, rather than the application of a novel 
form of Atomic Age biotechnology.
measuring fallout on the farm
Mutation- bred crops like Golden Promise were intimately tied to atomic 
technology, which provided the radioactive isotopes necessary for their 
existence. The crossover between atomic technology and biology was 
readily apparent in government- funded institutions like the Agricultural 
Research Council Radiobiological Laboratory in Wantage, Berkshire and 
the Medical Research Council Radiobiology Unit at Harwell, Berkshire. 
We have already seen how the latter provided isotopes to plant breeders 
on an international scale.71 At Wantage, researchers carried out their own 
mutation breeding programmes on ornamental plants during the early 
1960s. Their efforts even resulted in new variety of chrysanthemum, 
named Cream Sweetheart.72
Other experiments at Wantage focused on crop plants, including 
the irradiation of rye samples contributed by the Birmingham University 
Genetics Department in 1963.73 Yet by the closing years of the 1960s, 
research priorities had changed. In 1968 the first in a new series of 
research papers produced by Wantage Laboratory appeared in the journal 
Radiation Botany. These papers reported upon large- scale experiments 
conducted by the Laboratory, which were designed to assess the impact 
of radioactive fallout on British agriculture. Crop plants, including 
barley, wheat, oats, potatoes and legumes, were subjected to high levels 
of gamma radiation to ‘assess possible effects of environmental contam-
ination, for example near- in fallout from atomic weapons’.74 The main 
objective of these investigations was ‘to provide information which 
would assist in civil defence assessments of the possible consequences of 
catastrophic discharges of radioactivity onto agricultural land’.75
To accurately gauge the potential impact of nuclear fallout across 
Britain, Wantage conducted its irradiation experiments on a nation-
wide scale. Strontium- 90 was sprayed on  to pastures on test sites at 
Rothamsted Experimental Station and the University of Reading.76 In 
1974, cereals and potatoes exposed to radiation at Wantage were grown 
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at the National Institute of Agricultural Botany’s regional crop trials 
centres, Headley Hall in Yorkshire and the Norfolk Agricultural Station.77 
These tests were representative of a wider concern surrounding the long- 
term consequences of radioactive fallout for the environment. Only a 
year before tests began, high levels of Strontium- 90 had been discovered 
in milk following the Windscale fire.78 Such concerns were, however, 
international. The Brookhaven National Laboratory in the United States 
published its own analysis of how maize and common fruit and vegetables 
would react to nuclear fallout in 1970.79
Gamma radiation had moved from being viewed as a powerful 
plant breeding tool to a serious risk to agriculture, whether delivered 
by nuclear war or nuclear accident. This is not to say that crop breeding 
using gamma radiation simply halted during the late 1960s. Quantifying 
the extent to which mutation breeding has continued into recent times 
is fraught with difficulty. Fearful of entanglement with the divisive 
debate over genetically modified foods, many mutation breeders are now 
disinclined to even articulate the techniques by which their varieties are 
produced. There is no longer a clear picture of how many agricultural 
and horticultural plant varieties are bred using radiation.80 It is likely that 
since the 1960s a ‘burgeoning interest in other means of genetic manipu-
lation’ has led biologists and breeders alike to abandon radiation- induced 
mutation as a plant breeding technology.81
Conclusion
Barley, like many other crops, clearly displayed all the characteristics 
of an ‘industrial plant’ during the mid- twentieth century. Changes to 
the biology of barley went hand- in- hand with changes to industry, or 
the emergence of new technological systems. The restructuring of the 
brewing industry to favour high- yielding hybrid barley was seized upon 
by breeders, who endeavoured to meet the demand of brewers through 
the transformation of hybridisation into an industrial process. The fruit 
of this labour emerged in the form of Proctor barley, whose creators made 
use of a long- existing technique, industrialising hybridisation to closely 
integrate barley with the needs of brewers. Mutation- bred varieties like 
Golden Promise and Midas were also tailored to the needs of the brewing 
industry, but were also reliant upon the development and availability of 
atomic technology.
Controversy and the promotional activities of barley breeders in 
twentieth-century Britain also demonstrate the importance of attitudes 
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and ideology. It is hard to imagine a hybrid barley like Proctor being 
received with such enthusiasm if moral outrage at the very concept 
of hybridisation had existed, or if brewers had condemned mediocre 
malting barleys in favour of higher quality varieties. Larger, politicised 
forces were also at work in the development and use of new plant 
breeding technologies. The hybrid benefited from a long association 
with Mendelian principles, a history that took on new meanings during 
the Cold War. Hybrids became symbols of Western science and genetics, 
standing against the pseudo- science of Lysenko and the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, mutation breeding possessed clear political dimensions, its 
advocates seeking to ally the field with advances in medicine and the 
success of the Green Revolution to ensure a positive reception.82
Yet ideology will only get a new plant breeding technology so far, as 
demonstrated by the case of hybrid varieties during the 1970s. Lacking 
a purpose beyond that of general crop improvement, hybrids were 
contested by both agricultural scientists and those in the food industry. 
Moreover, others remained unconvinced of their superiority to trad-
itional varieties.83 Ideological or political support for a plant breeding 
technology could easily dissipate, or be quickly transferred to a more 
promising technique. Hence the utopian rhetoric of mutation breeding 
and the desire to ‘grind genes in a mortar and cook them in a beaker’ was 
usurped by the rise of new genetic biotechnologies, including cell fusion 
and recombinant DNA technology.84 Ideology or political convictions did 
not necessarily determine the actions of plant breeders.85
Just as it would be an incomplete picture to explain the uptake of 
crop plants or plant breeding technologies in terms of soulless industrial 
processes or automated systems, so it would be equally incomplete to 
ascribe their success or failure purely to political or ideological leanings. 
Proctor barley was able to achieve such a remarkable level of success 
partly due to the increasingly favourable reception of hybrid plants, and 
partly thanks to its careful incorporation into the existing industrial pro-
cess of brewing. Similarly, Golden Promise emerged in an age more or 
less favourable to the use of radiation in agriculture, while seeking to 
fulfil the same economic criteria that had ensured the success of Proctor. 
In both cases, plant breeding innovations chimed with existing attitudes 
and technological systems.
To what extent Proctor barley, Golden Promise and the technolo-
gies behind their creation were truly innovative is open to question. 
Both were bred using existing techniques, namely hybridisation and 
mutation breeding. It seems that the modern revolution in British agri-
culture is a misnomer, as the revolution was not exactly revolutionary. 
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Instead, it consisted of reforming and refining existing technologies. 
What changed is that plant breeding altered to either meet the needs 
of, or benefit from, existing technological systems. Hybridisation was 
conducted on a huge scale and with an existing end- point in mind, 
to better meet the needs of a restructured British brewing industry. 
Meanwhile, mutation breeding received a much- needed boost from the 
availability of radioactive isotopes. These were not necessarily radical 
transformations, but did help bring both plant breeding technologies 
into alignment with Britain’s technological systems. These new bio-
logical innovations were well received as they were closely integrated 
with existing industry and technology: in terms of both material needs 
and attitudes.
The history of barley breeding in twentieth- century Britain fur-
ther illustrates the difficulties of translating biological innovation into 
practical products for agriculture. In light of the case studies presented 
in this chapter, it becomes clear that forcing a major paradigm shift in 
how plant breeding is conducted is even more problematic than we 
might already imagine. This chapter has addressed the development of 
new varieties of crop plants and their uptake in agriculture. The inter-
action between technology and environment covered in this chapter 
roughly falls under the second of the combinations identified by Jon 
Agar in Chapter 1, as environment – in this case, barley – as something 
natural made into, or a component within, a technological system. 
Yet as a cultivated crop plant, barley had long been manipulated by 
humankind. Barley had started upon the road to an industrial com-
ponent, a trend accelerated by the arrival of new plant breeding tech-
nologies. As plant breeding and the crop varieties it produces are part 
of an interconnected network of both ecological and technological 
systems, significant material and ideological barriers exist to attempts 
to change how we produce our food. It can be tentatively suggested 
that such barriers, twinned with the challenge of integration into 
existing systems, have played a role in the turbulent reception of gen-
etic biotechnology in Britain.
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Plants are technologies
Dominic J. Berry
Introduction
As the opening chapter of this volume makes clear, historians of tech-
nology and the environment have already shifted towards seeing nature 
and technology as complexly integrated. My chapter concerns the 
extent of that integration. I  tackle one issue in particular, that of how 
to understand the organism as technology. This question is a source 
of lingering uneasiness. For example, the recent and provocative The 
Illusory Boundary is dedicated to integrating technological and envir-
onmental history. However, the authors of its final survey chapter, Hugh 
S.  Gorman and Betsy Mendelsohn, while emphasising the above shift 
also highlight an attendant ambiguity, that in this new scholarship ‘it is 
not always clear where the machine ends and nature starts’.1 Meanwhile 
co- editor of that volume, Martin Reuss, does not address organisms dir-
ectly, but concludes that as a result of this work the ‘Imagined bound-
aries between technology and environment shift, splinter, and dissolve 
into meaninglessness’.2 Given his misgivings about the organism as tech-
nology, as articulated in a 2001 email list discussion that many historians 
have considered important for building the ‘envirotech’ space, does 
his conclusion indeed hold for biological things?3 I argue that when it 
comes to organisms, historians have not reached meaninglessness, that 
rendering such a distinction ‘meaningless’ is not really the aim, but that 
we can and should analyse organisms as technologies. Doing so expands 
the scope of historical enquiry by revising unhelpful assumptions while 
also making historical discussions relevant to a wider (non- historical) 
readership.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin162
162
Writing of organisms and environments as though comparable to, 
or analogically related to, or essentially the same as, technological things 
and systems, is not inherently reductive or impoverished in comparison 
with other forms of analysis and writing. It absolutely can be, of course, 
but not out of necessity. Prejudices towards this analytical perspective 
are born of assumptions about the consequences of defining something 
as a technology. Defining something as a technology does not erase its 
other identities, or make it fundamentally easier to understand, other 
than to open up the kinds of question that might be asked and the par-
allel cases that might be explored. Again, that people do often define 
organic things as technologies in order to achieve precisely such a simpli-
fication is also true. In sum, at the same time as I am addressing concerns 
about understanding organisms as technologies, I  am also challenging 
the idea that technology cannot or should not inspire the same kinds of 
writing, analysis or reflexivity that is more commonly directed to envir-
onmental things.4 I would not expect any of the latter to come as a sur-
prise to historians of technology, but for the person approaching this 
volume with a primary interest in the environment, I hope my unpacking 
is of use. Conversely, for the reader more heavily invested in the history 
of science and technology, I want to directly connect this volume to the 
social, political and scientific context in which it is published.
That plants are technologies is today a widely held position by 
economists, scientists, lawyers, companies and biological engineers.5 It 
is also very widely held by historians, though what these different people 
are trying to achieve when making the case that plants are technologies 
rarely aligns. Even within historical scholarship there is considerable 
diversity in how such an argument can or should be made, and little effort 
to compare or synthesise accounts.6 In part this problem is caused by the 
multiple ways in which technology has been defined by actors in the past 
and can be defined by historians and philosophers in the present.7 When 
it comes to organisms, for different historians it is sometimes the case 
that only certain plants become technologies (by being technologised), 
other times plants are integrated into a technological system (leaving 
the plant’s status unaccounted for), other times plants or animals are 
nature’s technologies8 (wheat as a solar- powered explosive, cows as 
turbo- charged milk makers9). Matthew Holmes in the present volume 
(Chapter 8) develops yet another sense of plants as technologies, looking 
at breeding methods and emphasising how some scientists and breeders 
responded to the expectations of broader industrial systems in ways 
that ensured their plants incorporated that same industrial ideal. Most 
 commonly plants are made technologies simply and straightforwardly 
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by the fact of human intervention. The latter approach is suggested in the 
opening chapter of this volume, channelling Edmund Russell: technolo-
gies are ‘modified’ environments just as ‘nature has, to varying extents, 
been engineered … Likewise, organisms have “become tools when 
human beings use them to serve human ends”’.10
Without further clarification of what this statement is intended to 
mean we risk being read as supporting a narrower range of social, eco-
nomic and political positions than research at the intersection of tech-
nology and environment might actually inspire. Historians cannot ignore 
the fact that ‘plants are technologies’ has not only  emerged from the 
pursuit of their own scholarly agendas, but is also deeply bound up with 
political, economic and scientific developments in our times. ‘Plants are 
technologies’, or a  similar sentiment, is repeated in almost ritualistic 
fashion within an ever expanding range of public and policy debates, be 
they on genetically modified organisms, agricultural industrialisation, 
biodiversity, biotechnology, intellectual property or the environment. 
Indeed for at least one section of contemporary bioscience the conces-
sion that organisms are technologies has been a founding principle, 
provoking reactions from ethicists, social scientists, innovation policy 
makers, philosophers, governments and everyone in   between.11 My 
chapter directly addresses the position that plants are technologies out 
of frustration with its ubiquity.
I will demonstrate what ‘plants are technologies’ can do for the 
intersection of technology and environment by adopting it, while also 
making my meaning explicit. I  mean that, as with any technology, 
plants: (1)  constitute suitable subject matter for broad debate as to 
their adequacy in meeting a range of social, economic and political 
goals; (2)  are used to accrue different forms of expertise and a con-
comitant social status by different experts; and (3)  are social and 
cultural artefacts. Many more specific meanings of technology could 
be included, these are merely the three tackled here. Do these three 
meanings belong only to technology, or do they apply to almost any-
thing?12 Perhaps they do, but then, as I  am already committed to 
techno- environmental history- making, the breadth follows quite nat-
urally. If one wishes to set themselves the challenge of finding ‘what 
and only what’ they can learn from study of ‘the environment’ or ‘the 
technology’ they are free to do so, and no doubt much of interest awaits 
to be discovered. But these makings of environment and technology 
independent of one another will still remain co- optable in a range of 
different social and political debates. The role of history and histor-
ical scholarship in these contemporary discussions is of immediate 
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importance. My primary aim is to raise the game regarding ‘biology 
as technology’ and the chapter can be used as such, to be compared 
and contrasted with other accounts, so that vacuous gestures towards 
‘biology as technology’ as somehow inherently meaningful are more 
easily spotted, so that nobody can say ‘wheat is a 10,000-year-old 
technology’ again without also having to consider all that statement’s 
implications, and so that different political, economic and social 
loadings of ‘biology as technology’ become all the easier to identify.
The history I  have selected concerns the potato in Britain at the 
turn of the twentieth century in the hands of farmers, breeders, state-
funded investigators and a Mendelian. This study informs how different 
organisms found in modern Britain relate to one another, and their sig-
nificance as part of the environment as totems of progress, or degen-
eracy, or something otherwise (on competing visions for agricultural 
modernity, see David Matless, Chapter 6 this volume). There are three 
sections dedicated to three technological themes. First, the potato’s sig-
nificance as a site of governance, just as other technologies are. This 
section is dedicated to what kinds of organism are considered suitable for 
inclusion in British fields and how such decisions are made. One payoff 
in our own time is that organic things are found to invite social, legal and 
regulatory intervention regardless of any designation as high technology 
(or ‘biotechnology’), while the case also demonstrates how specific plant 
technology negotiations come to matter broadly by intruding on more 
fundamental social and political arrangements. Second, the potato’s sig-
nificance as a tool for making expertise, just as other technologies are. 
This section concerns how the environment is known and by whom. Here 
our historical plant technology case helps emphasise the need to open up 
the governance and investigation of social, technical and environmental 
issues.13 Third and finally, that their significance as technical artefacts 
did not and does not alter their status as social and cultural artefacts, just 
as being a technology does not alter that status for other technologies. 
Here I focus on the techno- cultural significances of potatoes in terms of 
their commercial breeding. By the end I hope to have diminished uneasi-
ness, or at the very least, sufficiently sabotaged the position that ‘plants 
are technologies’ for those with more narrow social, economic and 
political goals.
We are about to transition into the case study. Numerous reviewers 
warned me that it comes as something of a shift in tone following the 
introduction. I  have not found a satisfactory solution. Perhaps then, 
another way to prepare you for what follows would be to say:  ‘So you 
think biology is technology? OK. Good. Let’s see what that means.’
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Potato governance
Plants have been recognised and dealt with as technologies suitable for 
the attention of the modern state for well over a century. Here I lean on 
Esa Ruuskanen (Chapter  2) and also build by recognising the need to 
look simultaneously at numerous progressive agendas, be they for the 
improvement of the land, or methods and tools or organisms. If we look 
at the UK government’s primary agricultural publication, the Journal 
of the Board of Agriculture, at the turn of the twentieth century, we find 
that the potato, its nature and capacities were being tested by agricul-
tural investigators working in a wide range of sites in the UK and abroad. 
Reports include the experimental efforts of the Agricultural Department 
of the Irish Land Commission spraying a mixture of copper sulphate and 
lime (most widely referred to as Bordeaux mixture) on potato plants as 
a preventive to disease, the French authority M. Girard looking into the 
potato’s ‘meat- producing value’ as feed for livestock, and local reports of 
tests of varieties and planting methods.14 ‘The objects in view’, explained 
a report on work undertaken by Cheshire County Council in 1898, ‘were 
to test the productiveness, character, and yield of a number of varieties; 
to test the advantages of planting whole sets, cut sets, and sets of different 
sizes; and to try the effect of artificial manures when applied with farm-
yard manures.’15 These articles are indicative of the culture of agricul-
tural research in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century, with little 
in the way of nationally funded research, and in which multiple small 
and locally oriented sites pursued independent investigations. The Board 
of Agriculture (BoA), formed in 1889, played a role in disseminating 
the results of such initiatives, and was soon able to offer small amounts 
of sponsorship, awarding newly available funds to County Councils to 
pursue agricultural investigations and improve education.16 Further 
growth in support of a system for British agricultural development 
followed in the coming decades, and was seized upon by those looking to 
institutionalise agricultural science.17
Around 1900 the annual potato crop in England covered some-
where between 380,000 and 400,000 acres, 27,000 to 30,000 in 
Wales, which when combined with Scotland amounted to a total of 
around 500,000 acres throughout Britain.18 Producers could be found 
all across these countries, though high levels of potato farming were 
concentrated in England in the eastern counties, East Anglia, Yorkshire 
and Lancashire, while Scotland was also an essential producer of seed 
potatoes. As we shall see, investigations into the potato pursued by 
cooperative organisations, colleges and local authorities commonly 
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addressed diseases and their outbreaks, eventually resulting in legis-
lation dealing with the zoning and containment of organisms within 
infected regions, and restrictions on their sale.19 In the case of potato 
wart disease, the state came to build on and eventually take over activ-
ities begun in private. Wart, sometimes referred to as Black Scab, 
drastically reduced potato yield, sometimes to nothing. Some of the 
best-recognised commercial varieties were susceptible, including the 
King Edward. The most important example of private initiative, and 
one that helps demonstrate that plants are technical levers by which 
different forms of governance can be applied, is that of the Ormskirk 
Poor Law Institution (workhouse), whose trials were eventually taken 
over by the BoA, expanded and reconstituted as the responsibility of a 
new Ormskirk Potato Testing Station. In this section plants are tech-
nologies because they are material points upon which communities, 
experts and the state can exert pressure, in the process redistributing 
power and renegotiating the environment.
The fullest available account of the origins and early work on 
wart at Ormskirk is an article published in 1919 by George C.  Gough 
in the Journal of the Royal Horticultural Society. Some 10  years earlier 
Gough had visited Ormskirk as an Inspector of the Board, having been 
made responsible for conducting a national survey of potato wart dis-
ease. On reporting to the BoA that the disease was indeed widespread 
and particularly prevalent in areas such as Lancashire and Cheshire, the 
BoA sponsored some official trials.20 These included variety trials, as it 
had already been recognised by farmers and breeders that certain var-
ieties were immune to the disease. Indeed Gough acknowledges the role 
played by local farmers and breeders in organising early investigations 
into wart disease, as they had done at Ormskirk in partnership with 
the Lancashire Farmers’ Association. The workhouse setting is also sig-
nificant as the inmates (some ill and temporarily admitted, others itin-
erant and passing through) were required to perform duties around the 
building and grounds, including working on the farm. The farm super-
visor and gardener, Preece, had around 8 acres to manage including field 
strips used for potato testing. For the inmates, working on the farm was 
just one of a number of ways in which they were expected to pay for the 
food and lodging they received.21
Cooperation between growers, breeders and representatives of 
the Board was characteristic of the governance of potato diseases at the 
outset. This locally focused and voluntarist approach would continue 
to matter greatly even as it came under increased pressure from two 
interrelated influences:  the threat and eventual outbreak of the Great 
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War and the institutionalisation of genetics, addressed in the second 
section of this chapter. Building on these initial trials, steps were taken 
towards greater levels of state intervention regarding safe and proper 
potato growth, though it was immediately recognised that such legis-
lation could be highly controversial. Decisions as to how best to deal 
with wart disease incorporated decisions as to proper farming, where 
authority might lie between individuals, County Councils and the BoA, 
the administration of different countries (England, Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland) as part of the empire or something otherwise, and ultimately 
of course what kinds of plant were acceptable for inclusion in the Great 
British landscape. Such questions of governance are already explored in 
historical and social scientific research into science, and can motivate 
historical investigation of the environment, looking at changes in 
understandings and valuations of nature as embodied in legislation and 
any attempted ameliorative measures.22
The first Wart Disease of Potatoes Order was issued in 1912, and 
would be regularly reissued or updated throughout the period to the end 
of the Second World War. In the first instance it required that notices be 
placed throughout potato growing regions through the public press, sent 
to allotment holders and smaller growers, explaining that it was their 
responsibility to report all cases of wart. With the help of BoA Inspectors, 
and in some cases the police, potato growing districts were subject to 
inspection. As the BoA described, ‘This led to the discovery of a very large 
number of cases in allotments and cottage gardens.’ They go on to write 
that:  ‘In two instances only was it necessary to take legal proceedings. 
In one case a workman at Perry Barr, Staffordshire, was convicted and 
ordered to pay costs. In another an occupier of a garden in Worcestershire 
was fined ten shillings and costs.’23 That so much time and attention was 
directed to small growers working in their home gardens might evidence 
what were considered to be the necessary minimum steps to ensure wart 
did not spread outward from infected regions, but also perhaps the extent 
to which the Board sought to demonstrate to farmers that they were not 
the only ones who this legislation inconvenienced. Further measures then 
focused on ensuring that within infected regions only varieties that had 
been determined immune (by tests verified at Ormskirk, Harper Adams 
and in some cases the laboratories at Kew Gardens) were planted.24 Here 
we can see how plant technologies are used to consolidate or redistribute 
state powers and institutional responsibilities.
In this new governmental arrangement proven immune var-
ieties would rapidly increase in popularity in those zones scheduled 
as wart infected, and the process of deciding which varieties were 
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immune  – including those novel varieties annually introduced to the 
marketplace – ceased to be of only local interest, but became an obviously 
powerful gatekeeping process, one that could determine whose varieties 
had access to these captive consumers. From 1913 onwards then, the 
breeders and farmers at Ormskirk, in collaboration with a Mr John Snell 
(BoA Inspector stationed in Lancashire), took on the responsibility of 
trialling and issuing reports on immunity, organising an annual varietal 
showcase. We can better understand what the latter was like through a 
detailed newspaper report published in the Preston Guardian in 1920.
This week Ormskirk has been the Mecca of men from all parts of 
Britain interested in the scientific as well as the commercial aspects of 
potato culture … to see the Ormskirk Potato Society’s annual exhib-
ition, which is held under the joint auspices of the Lancashire and 
South Westmorland Farmers’ Association (who have supported this 
work from the inception of the trials), the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and the National Institute of Agricultural Botany. The show is not 
only increasing in magnitude, but arousing wider interests, which 
occasions no surprise in view of the recurrent outbreaks of wart 
disease and the significant remark of Sir Arthur Griffith- Boscawen, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry, at the opening ceremony, 
on Wednesday, that before many years had elapsed nothing but 
immune varieties would be grown in the country. There were over 
300 entries of immune varieties sent for competition in the 27 
classes, but, as in past years, the great educational feature of the 
exhibition was the display of over 500 varieties grown in the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s trials at Ormskirk showing new seedlings or old var-
ieties not previously tested which have matured in the infected soil 
and been lifted without a blemish, and indicating very plainly by the 
offensive- looking fungoid growths the ‘susceptibles’ that will have 
no legal right to be found in the scheduled areas.25
That the significance of Griffith- Boscawen’s prediction was seized upon is 
indicative of the close watch given to the potential for government inter-
vention. It is also clear from the general description of the event, and the 
accompanying photograph of organisers (Figure 9.1), representing trade, 
farming, government and scientific institutions, that Ormskirk’s success 
as a recognised and reliable site for varietal trialling was dependent on 
maintaining cooperation across all social and industrial levels of potato 
interest. Less clear is the extent to which any of these actors interpreted 
zoning legislation in terms we might recognise as environmental. Zoning 
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measures remain to be placed in context of the longer history of environ-
mental regulation.26
Pictured among the organisers of that year’s show (Figure  9.1) 
are four people whose significance will be dealt with in the next section 
thanks to what they can tell us about the potato as a technical object. In 
truth I will be focusing mainly on the first of these, R.N. Salaman (back 
Figure 9.1 Ormskirk show organisers, 1920. Group photograph 
of the Ormskirk show organisers for the year 1920, published in 
the Preston Guardian, 30 October 1920. Some of those identified 
include: front row, seated (left to right): Messrs J. Wood, Chief 
Inspector of Scottish Board of Agriculture (Ormskirk judge), S.T. 
Rosbotham, JP, CC (Chairman of the Ormskirk Potato Society), Sir 
Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, MP, Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Alderman W. Fitzherbert- Brockholmes, CBE (Chairman 
of the Lancashire Agricultural Committee and the Lancashire and 
South Westmorland Farmers’ Association) and Mr F.J. Chittenden, 
Director of the Royal Horticultural Society’s Gardens, Wisley (Ormskirk 
judge). Back row, standing (left to right): Miss N. Whitehead (hon. 
show secretary), Messrs H. Bryan, BSc, Director of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s immunity trials, W. Parker, director of the National 
Institute of Agricultural Botany, Dr Salaman, MD, W. Cuthbertson, JP 
(Messrs Dobbie & Co.), A.C. Cole, General Inspector in charge of the 
exhibition department.
Source: reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge 
University Library. Box 18, MS Add. 8171, Salaman Archive.
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row, fourth from left), thanks to a wealth of archival material associated 
with him. The others, W.H. Parker (back row, third from left), H. Bryan 
(back row, second from left), and N. Whitehead (back row, first on the 
left), have the potential to be all the more revealing, though they will be 
dealt with only briefly. Incidentally, these four people are all standing 
together for a reason.
Potato knowing
Along with changes in governance, the early twentieth century was 
characterised by newly invigorated debates as to what constituted a 
proper potato variety. As we see in Mat Paskins’ argument regarding 
modern British forestry (Chapter 12), different imaginaries of the state 
were exhibited in different practices of knowledge and calculation, 
occurring at both local and national levels. In this section, rather than 
beginning with institutions for the poor, we instead find a Mendelian 
working at home in his own private gardens in Barley, Hertfordshire. 
There, Dr Redcliffe Nathan Salaman, MD, began in the early 1900s (at 
almost exactly the same time as Ormskirk began to pursue its first variety 
trials) investigations into potato varieties, diseases and breeding. He 
had no botanical training, initially having trained as a medical doctor. 
Soon after earning this qualification, however, he contracted tubercu-
losis, moving out of London to the countryside for the benefit of the 
country air (see Jennifer Wallis, Chapter 5, for the history of the garden 
in the medical machine). In the process he switched to investigations 
of breeding. What Salaman might tell us about the early history of gen-
etics and the environment has not yet been explored, though some 
time ago Paolo Palladino noted the uniqueness of his 1949 The History 
and Social Influence of the Potato, which contains a number of different 
arguments and theories as to the relations between humans, food 
supply and their surroundings (including theories about the potato as 
a means for keeping Ireland in a state of peasantry).27 He is a prime 
candidate for examination in histories of UK agriculture thanks to his 
prodigious output, the positions that he came to adopt in key agricul-
tural science institutes (including the National Institute of Agricultural 
Botany and the Potato Virus Research Station), his arguments on race 
and eugenicism, and because through him we can reach agricultural 
development and its meanings across the British Empire and at other 
crucial sites, particularly the Middle East and the state of Israel at its 
founding. None of this can be covered here. It is simply enough to say 
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that thanks to his work on the potato Salaman entered into correspond-
ence with people invested in different kinds of agricultural improve-
ment all around the world, and took on particular responsibilities in 
the Middle East through the Hebrew University, the laying of the foun-
dation stone for which he personally witnessed as an enlisted man in 
the British 39th (Labour) Battalion  – or 2nd Battalion of Judeans  – 
shipped to Palestine in 1918. Techno- environmental histories of Britain 
can therefore also be of other places. In this section I instead focus on 
Salaman’s broad interests in genetics. Aside from being among the first 
six people to be published in the new Journal of Genetics upon its estab-
lishment in 1910, Salaman was also its first author to write on human 
genetics, on a Mendelian view of Jewish heredity. Through claims to 
this kind of expertise over heredity and breeding – claims that were by 
no means exclusive to geneticists – the potato was remade as a newly 
technical object.
According to Salaman, he first contacted William Bateson around 
1905 after a couple of years convalescing in Barley, 30 miles or so from 
Cambridge.28 Initially Bateson recommended he use animals for breeding 
and genetic study, including mice, guinea- pigs and double- combed 
fowls, before eventually Salaman approached his own gardener, ‘a man 
of stately mien who, looking down on me from his 6 ft 2 ins said that if a 
gentleman in my position must use his spare time in playing about with 
vegetables, he would advise the POTATO’. Some of his surviving breeding 
notebooks are available for 1910 onward. By putting these records in dia-
logue with stocks of potatoes grown at his house and in field sites across 
England, Scotland and Ireland, circulating these potatoes among those 
in the know, Salaman built his reputation as a potato expert.
Rather than moving towards any particular potato end it seems 
Salaman simply focused on the systematic production of novelty, per-
petuating anything unusual that appeared in his garden and selecting 
multiple plants for cross-breeding. Of this work the best- known result 
is his discovery of potatoes resistant to blight.29 Aspects of his method 
are encapsulated in Figure 9.2, including the dependence on potato var-
ieties acquired from countries around the world, as seen in the ‘Congo’ 
potato included at bottom right. This is just one example of many 
dozens of photographs that are affixed to the pages of his notebooks, 
photographs that also provide an example of Agar’s sixth and seventh 
tech- enviro forms in combination (Chapter  1). Photographs allowed 
Salaman to switch back and forth between the tabulated information 
about individual plants and the tubers they produced over time. In the 
tables he records their names, such as H19 (pictured near the centre of 
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Figure 9.2 Example of a potato experiment photograph from 
Salaman’s 1910 notebook. Photograph taken of potatoes grown by 
Salaman in his genetical research.
Source: reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge 
University Library, and thanks to Jane Miller and Nina Wedderburn 
for agreeing copyright permissions for its publication. ‘Potato Harvest 
1910’, Brown Folder, Folders and Volumes 1, MS Add. 8171.
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Figure  9.2), alongside the colour tuber produced (red, white, black), 
shape (long or round) and the number of eyes found on it. These are pre-
cisely the kinds of characteristics that were being investigated by eager 
Mendelians around the world at this time, and we can see evidence of 
Salaman thinking through his productions in Mendelian terms as he 
evaluates them. Against H24, for example, he records the shape as round 
but places a question mark alongside it, noting ‘Shapes are fairly close 
rounds but not typical. The no. of eyes is against round.’ Here ‘against’ 
meant that the high number of eyes (in this case 11) would suggest the 
hereditary unit characteristics were those of something other than a 
round variety. He is playing with the notion that a high number of eyes is 
correlated with long-shaped tubers.
Over the years, the extent of his variation making and the com-
plexity of his crosses expanded. He also sought out opportunities to share 
his productions with interested parties, including owners of farming 
estates, such as Walter Wooll West of Needham Hall, Wisbech and 
proprietors of the UK’s most influential seed businesses, such as Martin 
Sutton of Suttons Seeds, along with official representatives of state-
managed trialling stations, such as M. Caffrey of the Cereal Station in 
Ballinacurra, Ireland. Remarkably, given the relationship between trial-
ling and convalescence described earlier at the Ormskirk workhouse, 
a second though vastly more lavish medical site played an important 
role in Salaman’s own work. Presumably thanks to connections made 
through his medical training, Salaman had convinced Dr Charles 
Easterbrook, Physician Superintendent at the Crichton Royal Institution 
in Dumfries, to grow on stocks of his varieties in Scotland. The Crichton 
was a world-famous asylum for lunacy, run according to new principles 
described by medical historians as ‘moral treatment, under medical con-
trol’, with large gardens and considerable air.30 Salaman had around 
three hundred distinct varieties grown on and under observation at 
the Crichton, making that hospital a resource of considerable impor-
tance. Through places like the Ormskirk workhouse and the Crichton 
Royal our account of plant technologies bolsters themes covered else-
where in this volume while drawing in starkly different social contexts. 
The differences between these contexts will come to matter in the third 
section of this chapter.
A quick look at Salaman’s correspondence reveals how he circulated 
potato crosses among influential agriculturalists, potatoes that were 
named and organised according to his own record- keeping schemes, at 
the same time retaining control (or at least asserting control) over the 
uses to which they could be put. In this respect his technical knowledge 
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of the plant was at one and the same time a means of establishing intel-
lectual property and organising social relations.31 In a letter to Sutton he 
writes:
I think on the whole, the plan you suggest would be best, that 
I should let you have 7lbs of each of the varieties to test and then, if 
you think anything of any of them you will be able to say so and offer 
a price next year. At the same time they will be grown in Scotland 
under measured conditions, and I shall, of course, naturally retain 
the right of showing them to anybody else.32
If we look at the list of materials that Salaman then arranged to have sent 
to Sutton, these included the products of crosses such as ‘M5B32 x fb2’, 
‘H2 x ER2’ and ‘M5B18 x Wat.24’.33 Even if Salaman had sent his complete 
records it would have been a job of work to understand what any of these 
crosses meant or the varieties from which they descended. Throughout 
the 1910s he continued to organise and manage these disparate stocks 
by letter, all the while becoming ever more embroiled in war work, ini-
tially as a medical officer signing off men as fit to fight before eventu-
ally joining the Royal Army Medical Corps. In 1917 he wrote to West of 
Wisbech that the varieties then being sent to him ‘are the result of eleven 
years experimental breeding during which time I have raised well over a 
quarter of a million seedlings’.34 Of course not all of these seedlings had 
been raised by Salaman directly; he had had considerable help from Will 
at the Crichton, and his own assistants at home.
Either side of the Great War, which had placed increased signifi-
cance on domestic agricultural production, the credit that Salaman 
and other geneticists like him had accrued through their research and 
promises of agricultural improvement was rewarded with an expansion 
of funds available for the institutionalisation of agricultural science and 
genetics, primarily accomplished through grants from the Development 
Commission (DC).35 This brings us to the other three persons highlighted 
in the Ormskirk show photograph: Parker, Bryan and Whitehead.
All were stood together with Salaman thanks to their being 
involved with Cambridge-based agricultural botany:  Salaman through 
his early work with Cambridge University geneticists and eventually, 
from 1927, as Director of the Potato Virus Research Station established 
in Cambridge on DC funds; Wilfred H. Parker as the first Director of the 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB), established in 1919 in 
Cambridge on DC funds; Harold Bryan, the Superintendent who took 
over from John Snell when the Ormskirk trials were taken over by NIAB 
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in 1919 resulting in the establishment of the Ormskirk Potato Testing 
Station; and Nora Whitehead, assistant to Bryan at Ormskirk and a sig-
nificant potato authority who would later author (among other things) 
the widely used and repeatedly reprinted Key for the Identification of 
Commercial Potato Varieties and Rogues in the Field.36 It is important to 
stress how significant the initial research and commercial trialling begun 
at Ormskirk had been in gathering support for such nationally funded 
agricultural science institutes in the first place. What I  argued and 
explained above for Salaman can be extrapolated and expanded many 
times over for the collective community of breeders (some Mendelian, 
many not), who each through the manipulation, analysis, circulation and 
sale of plants had built a number of different overlapping communities of 
expertise, each ostensibly dedicated to plant improvement.37 Recognising 
how linked their expertise was to control of physical plant material is one 
result of exploring plants as technical artefacts embodying knowledge. 
If one were to trace the working practices of persons such as Bryan, who 
died shortly before the Potato Testing Station was closed in 1940, or even 
more importantly that of Whitehead, one of a number of women who 
made successful scientific careers through agricultural plants, we would 
get a sense of how and in what ways the understanding and management 
of the British environment has developed in techno- environmentalist 
mode.38
Potato culture
Having established the range of persons and interests in the potato, 
both as a means of governance and as a technical artefact, this section 
turns to demonstrate that being a technology does not place an object 
outside society and culture. Again, this will not come as a surprise 
to historians of technology, though few of them have extended their 
arguments thus far to encompass biological things (see my note 6 for a 
list of exceptions). The work of Barbara Hahn in Making Tobacco Bright 
is an important exception, explaining how different kinds of produc-
tion methods, and different kinds of division of labour throughout 
tobacco growing, harvesting, preparing, packaging and trading – often 
depending on the use of different kinds of technology and technique – 
were constitutive of the plant product. Different kinds of society and 
culture are made through and with tobacco plants and potatoes, just 
as commodity historians might focus on how different kinds of tobacco 
plants and potatoes make up societies and cultures. We have already 
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glimpsed this with regard to people being fined for not growing 
the correct potatoes, making them criminals, and people building ana-
lytical schemes and reference systems around the potato, making them 
experts. This can all be brought together by attending to the relations 
between our two most important sites, Ormskirk and Cambridge, and 
the societies and cultures of breeding that they represented.
From the outset, Ormskirk was considered a problematic kind of 
research site by geneticists in Cambridge, including Rowland Biffen of 
the PBI, Salaman and towards the end of the interwar period, even its 
new owner NIAB. In part these complaints were about geographies of 
power, and the desire to have as much as possible centralised around the 
various different headquarters in Cambridge. In addition, Ormskirk was 
not considered the most sophisticated research site (it was equipped only 
with an ‘Elsan closet’ toilet that was not replaced until the 1960s).39 Most 
importantly, complaints were also about how potato breeding should 
be organised, according to whose expertise and on what principles the 
potato growing industry should be taken forward. In pulling this story 
together it becomes impossible to distinguish between when the potato is 
technology, environment or culture.
The earliest evidence that not all was well with relations between 
Cambridge and Ormskirk comes from a letter from Rowland Biffen to 
Lawrence Weaver, two people central to the founding of NIAB.40 Biffen 
mentions ‘I must manage Ormskirk somehow or other this time – if only 
to carry wart disease spores back on my boots & so start a fresh centre 
here.’41 Where this is said in passing, much more pointed was Salaman 
in a letter to Sutton, explaining that he finds the role played by Ormskirk 
to be galling.
I will certainly keep H2 x E2 B2 for a fortnight till you come back 
and I don’t want to deal with the man I spoke to you of till I know 
who he is. If I seemed to be disappointed it really is not so much 
that, as I felt a little irritated about this seedling. I do not think 
there is any doubt – and it was the general opinion at Ormskirk 
that it is probably one of the very best Earlies that have ever been 
seen, it has been going nine years now, not only you have seen it 
but Matthew Wallace and heaps of practical people have seen it 
in Scotland year after year, said it is nice, etc. and it is only when 
it receives official recognition at Ormskirk and is incidentally 
declared to be susceptible, that its real virtues are recognised. 
As a mere scientific worker I recognised its merits seven or eight 
years ago.42
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In Salaman’s own self- representation there is a clear distinction between 
scientific work and whatever goes on at Ormskirk, with implications 
for the who and how of potato assessment. Ormskirk coming under the 
operation of NIAB in 1919 did not necessarily settle Salaman’s difficult 
relations with the rest of the trade as represented here, or indeed with 
NIAB’s own enterprises, as the following two episodes reveal.
One of the first challenges that Salaman set himself once he had 
the full resources of NIAB at his disposal was what he considered to be 
the problem of synonyms. As much as it may have perplexed the likes 
of Salaman, the problem of synonymity has been of considerable use to 
historians. Synonymity is the identifying or selling of a plant of one var-
iety under the name of another variety. The practice was common and 
represents aspects of a culture of innovation that recognised multiple 
ways in which value could be added, often collectively, to a variety.43 For 
Salaman though, the problem of synonymity was an ideal way in which 
to assert his status as a potato- identifying centre of power, and also the 
primacy of a genetic interpretation of plants. Establishing the Potato 
Synonym Committee at NIAB, Salaman set about creating the infrastruc-
ture for the annual assessment of potato varieties and their comparison 
with one another, to determine (at least to his own satisfaction) when a 
novel variety sent to NIAB was truly novel and when it was simply the 
same as another. While no legislation followed to intervene, Salaman 
did arrange for the state-funded and National Institute of Agricultural 
Botany to circulate notices in national newspapers when seed traders 
and breeders were stocking what his Committee had declared to be a 
synonym. These activities were not received well by established growers, 
the evidence for which is both remarkable and enjoyable.
In a series of articles and letters sent to the Nurseryman and 
Seedsman correspondents and authors complained, got angry and 
mocked Salaman for his intervention on behalf of true potatoes. Their 
displeasure became acute following the 1922 Ormskirk show, when 
Salaman was given the podium. ‘It is all very well for Mr R.N. Salaman, 
JP, MD, to get up on his legs at Ormskirk’, wrote the author of the 
Nurseryman ‘By the Way’ segment, ‘and lecture the seed trade upon its 
“deplorable and dishonest practices”, but if he were in the seed trade 
and not in the medical profession, he would very probably sing quite a 
different song.’44 In the following issue another author, W. Cuthbertson, 
lamented how Salaman’s whole approach undermined the cooperative 
foundations of Ormskirk. He reminded readers that it was traders and 
farmers who began the early trials with John Snell, which when later 
taken over by NIAB, continued to be assisted by the trade who lent the 
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Station their finest potato experts.45 In the next issue Salaman had a 
poem dedicated to him, ‘Do Tell’, which made fun of his performance at 
Ormskirk and ended by again stressing his merely medical credentials. 
The culmination though came in the Christmas issue, in the form of a 
one-act play titled ‘Synonyms’. In the play a gardener, Will Orange, is 
down the pub boasting about his line of work and his knowledge of pota-
toes. After a little back and forth about synonyms, his companions, the 
grocer, landlord, butcher and tailor, entice him to explain:
‘A Potato is a Potato, and a synonym is another one morpho- , er- 
wait a bit while I look that up. Yes, here it is – morphologically and 
physiologically identical with it. That’s what a synonym is, and as 
nearly everybody grows synonyms, it stands to reason that they are 
much cheaper than the real thing’.
‘But how do you know which is the real thing?’ said Harry.
‘Ah! That’s where art comes in. It’s an art that’s a cut above the 
ordinary – in fact, I would venture to say there are only two people 
who can speak with authority on the subject. One’s a celebrated 
London doctor, and the other’s myself. The doctor’s made a lifelong 
study of Potatoes, and he knows so much more about them than 
any- body else, that there’s nobody can tell him when he’s right or 
wrong. Consequently he’s always right’.
‘And how about yourself?’ said Dicky.
‘Well, I know so much more about the subject than anybody 
else in this locality, that what I says here abouts “goes” too. See!’ 
responded Will.46
These sources evidence an internally coherent society of breeding with 
its own standards of best practice and expectations as to what kind of 
relationship with fellow breeders and traders is necessary in order to 
imbue a person or institution with authority. They also capture that these 
arrangements as they had been understood were now becoming subject 
to change. This play even evidences the remaking of national or localised 
centres of authority, as between ‘London’ and what ‘goes’ in any given 
place. Lastly, their incredulity at how one could even tell the difference 
between potatoes that look the same in every respect (beyond the skills of 
any normally trained farmer or breeder) also highlights the importance 
of the technical component of the argument being made by geneticists. 
Salaman, approaching the issue of synonyms away from the kinds of 
society that invested in Ormskirk, and working from the perspective of 
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the new Mendelians based in Cambridge, had intruded upon that culture 
on behalf of his own potato technologies and culture.
Lest potato identification and assessment be taken as too classic 
an example of an emerging rational modernity imposing itself on a pre- 
existing ‘natural’ order, my final example demonstrates that Salaman 
did, on at least one occasion, also throw over that same rationalising pro-
cess either out of carelessness, or in pursuit of an even larger demonstra-
tion of his authority and technical skill, or perhaps out of ignorance of 
the social aspects of technical knowledge. At some time during the early 
years of the first Ormskirk trials, while John Snell was still involved in 
their coordination, the Lord Derby Gold Medal competition was begun. 
Awarding of the Medal became part of the annual show. It was organised 
by a local committee of breeders and farmers, though eventually also 
became the responsibility of NIAB. In 1928 Salaman caused a major 
embarrassment. That year the Gold Medal Committee decided to award 
the medal to ‘520’, a variety bred by Donald MacKelvie, famed breeder of 
the Arran varieties. Unbeknownst to the rest of the Committee (of which 
Salaman was a member), Salaman had a few weeks earlier written to 
MacKelvie telling him to drop the variety. On hearing about Salaman’s 
letter Bryan wrote to the NIAB’s secretary F.C. Hawkes. ‘To my mind it is 
an incredible happening,’ Bryan wrote. ‘Salaman is a member of the Gold 
Medal Committee, he is Chairman of the Committee responsible for the 
Institute’s potato work and he is also Chairman of the Institute itself: you 
may therefore imagine the importance MacKelvie attaches to any letters 
from Salaman.’ It was not only, or even mainly, Salaman’s authority that 
agitated Bryan, rather how it all looked to MacKelvie who he called ‘the 
most important man in potato world’. He closed his letter by stating:
The reputation of the Institute, even for sanity, and the future con-
duct of the trials are surely involved. In view of the gravity (unless 
my judgement is completely at fault) of this note, I should be very 
glad to know what Parker [NIAB Director] intends to do as soon 
as possible. If the award goes through, then MacKelvie must have 
some explanation of the extraordinary position … The more I think 
of this the more mad it seems. The Gold Medal Committee bestow 
on 520 a Gold Medal for outstanding merit, and the Chairman of 
the Institute’s Potato Committee advises the owner to scrap it.47
Technical knowledge has to be shown to work, and is shown to work 
through social organisation. Bryan feared a collapse. Salaman’s potatoes 
were very different from MacKelvie’s, circulating in two very different 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin180
180
social worlds, each producing different kinds of agricultural governance 
(Salaman’s more technocratic and individualist, as seen in the newspaper 
notices shaming synonym growers, MacKelvie’s and other breeders’ more 
voluntarist and communal) and different kinds of expertise. Salaman and 
other geneticist breeders were also different from the rest of the ‘potato 
world’ thanks to their broader biological interests. Salaman did, for 
instance, consider knowledge of potato heredity as of a piece with human 
heredity in ways that commercial breeders might have speculated on but 
rarely turned into the subject of writing. Recognising this offers one final 
insight as to how analysis of plants as technologies helps produce his-
tories of the techno- environment.
As with the majority of the first geneticists, Salaman saw in gen-
etics answers to societal problems well beyond the agricultural. As I have 
explored elsewhere, emergent views of heredity in the early twentieth 
century sat extremely comfortably with – and fed off – a range of other 
goals and values, whether they be in architecture, design, industrial 
manufacture or public health.48 Eugenics was part and parcel of British 
culture and in this much Salaman was no different, giving talks on the 
subjects of eugenics and public health and writing for publications such as 
the Eugenics Review. This observation is worth including so that we know 
such themes will permeate histories of British environmental change, 
either through policy and governance, through the biological objects that 
make up the environment and industry, or through social worlds of agri-
culture and environmental management, right up to the present day.
Conclusion
I bring this chapter to a close with a passage that brings us full circle to 
the argument that plants are technologies. While farmers and breeders 
had had to make do with the pages of Gardeners’ Chronicle, in 1930 
Salaman was given the full weight of the BBC. Broadcast on 14 January, 
radio listeners heard some of the earliest material from what would later 
become his full- length historical treatment of the potato, here titled ‘The 
History and Economic Influence of the Potato’.
The chipped flint, the potter’s sherd, the invaluable evidence of mass 
progress before the days of the sculptured stone or the inscribed 
word, are not the only records of our ancestors’ victory over their 
environment. Man has stamped the impress of his genius no less on 
the living than on the inanimate. The records are scanty, the gaps 
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therein are many and great, but the end results – the bending of 
the plant and animal world to his own uses – are the outstanding 
achievement of prehistoric man.49
This is by no means the earliest example of this kind of statement, 
though it is doubtless among the first to be broadcast on the BBC. It has 
contributed to a formula of representation and understanding that is 
today widespread and seemingly inescapable. How much of the meaning 
of his talk as understood by his audience in 1930 would match that of 
audiences today? Is it disquieting that scientists and other experts have 
been saying much the same thing for nearly a century? Does bending 
nature to man’s will, making biology into a technology, carry all that 
much significance in and of itself? Instead of allowing the suggestion of 
parity between the animate and inanimate to shock, excite or perplex 
us, perhaps we should shrug off claims to novelty and control, and get 
on with negotiating the who, when and why of potato growing. From a 
study of Salaman’s career we can at least recognise that the extent of any 
bending of plants and animals to human will has always first and fore-
most required the bending of persons.
There are many ways that one might tell environmental history, 
and ways in which environments can be historicised with and through 
technology. In this chapter I  have addressed the techno- environments 
of spore- filled fields in Ormskirk, of  well- recorded gardens in Barley 
and of circulating potatoes themselves. Breaking out of analytical tropes 
regarding the natural historical and the synthetic, the biological and 
technological, does not have to be done in response to contemporary 
biological engineering, though I have written this chapter with such an 
audience directly in mind. Here I have attempted to provide part of the 
platform for new techno- environmental histories of Britain in the form 
of suggestions and recommendations regarding how to conceptualise 
organisms in fields, streams, forests and the air, by refusing to look for only 
certain kinds of qualities in plants and animals and other kinds of qualities 
in fences, bridges, paths and pylons.50 All of the unparseable organic and 
technological are full to the brim with social and cultural meaning, the 
sum total of which will make up techno- environmental history.
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Oceanscapes and spacescapes in 
North Atlantic communications
Jacob Ward
The decades following the Second World War saw significant advances 
for international telecommunications. In 1956, TAT- 1, the first ocean- 
spanning telephone cable, crossed the Atlantic, linking the USA, Canada 
and Britain. Six years later, in 1962, Telstar, one of the first active 
communications satellites, was launched by NASA, linking earth stations 
in the USA, Britain and France. The decades that followed saw the pro-
liferation of two global telecommunication infrastructures:  telephone 
cables in the ocean and communication satellites in orbit. In this chapter 
I  focus on these two environmentally situated infrastructures through 
the activities of several organisations:  AT&T, the British Post Office, 
British Telecom and INTELSAT. AT&T and the British Post Office, as their 
states’ respective telecommunication monopolies, collaborated on TAT- 1 
and Telstar in the 1950s and 1960s. This collaboration continued with 
undersea cables through the 1970s and into the 1980s, when the British 
telephone service was transferred from the Post Office to British Telecom 
(BT) in 1981. AT&T and BT collaborated on TAT- 8, the first fibre- optic 
transoceanic cable, laid in 1988. Meanwhile, communication satellites 
after Telstar were largely handled by one organisation:  INTELSAT, the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation. Formed 
in 1964 as an international consortium owned by member nations, 
INTELSAT sought to create a single global satellite system, and rapidly 
expanded through the 1970s, competing with submarine cables for inter-
national communications market share.
I address the relationship between these two infrastructures in this 
chapter. I show how these infrastructures were environmentally situated 
and shaped by their environments, and, moreover, how the landscapes of 
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these infrastructures – the oceanscape and spacescape – were deployed 
to publicise international communication links. Infrastructure and the 
environment has increasingly gathered historical attention, although 
perhaps not as much as it ought. Jeffrey Stine and Joel Tarr’s landmark 
essay on technology and the environment notably neglects infrastruc-
ture, addressing it only in the context of urban environmental history and 
elsewhere implicitly relegating it to a secondary role, such as pipelines 
in the oil industry.1 However, others have explicitly addressed the rela-
tionship between infrastructure and environment. Per Högselius, Arne 
Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten have expansively demonstrated the 
imbrication of nature and infrastructure in nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century Europe.2 Of direct relevance to this chapter, Nicole Starosielski 
has recently drawn attention to the undersea lives of telecommunication 
cables, and Lisa Ruth Rand has highlighted environmental fears about 
satellites in the 1970s as falling ‘space junk’ hazards.3 Starosielski and 
Rand draw attention to environments usually neglected in predominantly 
terrestrial histories of infrastructure; Steve Pyne attributes this neglect to 
the near- total absence of human life from these ‘extreme’ environments 
and calls for greater historical attention to extreme environments.4 
Helen Rozwadowski and Roger Launius take up the calls for ocean and 
space history respectively.5 Rozwadowski accepts the broader category 
of extreme history but maintains that the ocean’s distinctive physical 
characteristics merit distinctive treatment, and, indeed, ocean history 
has had a distinctive niche carved out within environmental  history.6 On 
the other hand, as Launius notes, space historians have largely neglected 
the space environment altogether and so he echoes Pyne’s call.
This chapter thus draws attention to the extreme environ-
ments of ocean depths and orbital space, and shows that they are not 
wildernesses into which cables and satellites intrude, but landscapes 
that shape and are shaped by technology, and are presented to the 
public as fusions of nature and technology. John Brinckerhoff Jackson 
defines landscape as ‘a composition of man- made spaces on the land’, 
and David Nye underscores that landscapes are ‘inseparable from 
the technologies that people have used to shape the land and their 
vision’.7 Coincidental to this chapter, Jackson points out that even 
extreme environments such as the moon and the ocean floor have 
been referred to as landscapes, and this has been expanded upon else-
where: Rozwadowski uses the term ‘ocean- scape’ in her study of mid- 
nineteenth- century Atlantic hydrography, while Alice Gorman has 
called for a cultural landscape approach to recognise the mutual consti-
tution of technology, human activity and the space environment.8 Karl 
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Benediktsson has also argued for greater attention to the political sig-
nificance of landscape, contending that the aesthetic values attributed 
to landscape are crucial to the political processes through which the 
environment is constructed and transformed.9 In an age where global 
communications are marketed as instantaneous, dematerialised and 
omnipresent, I  think it thus important to address not only  the ocean 
and space environments of North Atlantic communications, but the 
oceanscapes and spacescapes, from TAT- 1 in 1956 and Telstar in 1962, 
through the proliferation of transatlantic telephone cables and devel-
opment of the INTELSAT satellite system in the 1960s and 1970s, to 
the laying of the first fibre- optic transatlantic cable, TAT- 8, in 1988.
The categorisation provided by Jon Agar in this volume’s opening 
chapter helps to lend a more synthetic terminology to this analysis.10 
Agar outlines eight categories of technology– environment combination, 
and several of those are relevant to the oceanscapes and spacescapes of 
North Atlantic communications. The second combination – environment 
as something natural made into (a component within) a technological 
system – is a natural starting point, as I shall demonstrate with the ways 
that cablelayers sought to use the seabed itself to protect cables and came 
into territorial conflict with the trawling industry over dominion of the 
ocean floor. The fourth combination – environment as something along-
side the natural world  – is another obvious category, as I  explore the 
lengths that cable and satellite manufacturers went to in order to divorce 
technology from its environment, both practically and rhetorically. 
However, there are other, less obvious combinations that are also rele-
vant. The fifth combination – environment as something untouched by 
artifice – features in 1950s Cold War discourses about the Atlantic, while 
the sixth combination – environment as something represented through 
technology  – appears in various promotional films and adverts made 
about transatlantic communications. Finally, the seventh combination – 
environmental knowledge registered through technology – reveals itself 
as a crucial element through the ways cable operators searched for new 
techniques and technologies to mediate and access cables and their 
environments. A broader point that all of these combinations touch upon 
is the way in which these environments are transformed or mediated at 
great distances from the institutions responsible for these combinations; 
technology here extends far beyond the conventional borders of the 
nation, and so, as other chapters in this book also touch upon, these com-
binations of technology and the environment highlight how the spatial 
borders, extensions and projections of modern Britain extend far beyond 
the British Isles.11
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These combinations shall be explored in three sections:  first, 
I explore the laying of telephone cables in the post- war period, starting 
with TAT- 1 in 1956. Second, I address the launching of communication 
satellites, starting with Telstar in 1962 and continuing with INTELSAT, 
and highlight the influence of satellites and spacescape on the inaugur-
ation of TAT- 8, the first transoceanic fibre- optic cable. Finally, I conclude 
by addressing the place of business history at the intersection of tech-
nology and the environment.
Laying cables
TAT- 1, the first transoceanic telephone cable, jointly developed by AT&T 
in the USA and the Post Office in the UK, opened on 25 September 1956. 
The cable was the first wired telephonic link between Europe and America 
and involved multiple transformations of technology and the environ-
ment. These transformations occurred along two lines:  protecting the 
cable and routing the cable.
The protections for TAT- 1 showcase the ways in which a boundary 
was created between the natural and the technological, and yet  also 
highlight the contradictions of such boundary- making. The protection of 
undersea cables has a long ecological history: John Tully has shown how 
gutta- percha, a natural plastic ‘gum’ used to protect undersea telegraph 
cables and sourced from tropical plantations in the British Empire, was 
over- extracted to the point of ‘ecological disaster’ in the nineteenth cen-
tury.12 However, in contrast to the naturally sourced gutta-percha coatings 
of Victorian telegraph cables, TAT- 1 was the first transoceanic cable to use 
a new synthetic coating, polyethylene.13 However, despite polyethylene’s 
synthetic nature, its status as a plastic, and thus an oil derivative, surfaces 
the material as, like gutta-percha, another artificial transformation of 
the environment. Unlike previous polyvinyl chloride coatings and gutta-
percha, which  – despite acting as an effective insulator  – had proved 
attractive to groups of molluscs and insects known as ‘submarine borers’, 
polyethylene was impervious to attack from marine bacteria.14 The use of 
polyethylene thus highlights a progressive separation of technology from 
the environment in protecting submarine cables, from the insulation from 
water alone to insulation from both water and organisms.
TAT- 1’s repeater design, on the other hand, shows how environment 
was also used as an input. The repeaters, which amplified and extended 
telephone signals, were the crucial innovation that had enabled TAT- 1’s 
creation, but to be viable, they needed three features: reliable operation at 
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the bottom of the Atlantic, resistance to physical damage and the immense 
pressure at the ocean floor, and flexible construction so that they could be 
spooled up with the cable length on the cable ships. The flexible repeater 
units were composed of several sub- sections, arranged in a series, that 
were then attached by helical springs, allowing them to be coiled up. 
The repeater was then enclosed in two layers of steel rings, surrounded 
by a copper drum. The crucial feature here is how the extremity of the 
Atlantic ocean floor environment was used as an input: as the cable was 
laid out by ship, it would be bent by the laying process, which would sep-
arate out the steel rings and stretch the copper beyond its elastic limit. 
However, the hydraulic pressure at the bottom of the Atlantic would then 
return the steel rings together and reform the copper tube into its original 
state. Rather than purely separating technology from its environment, the 
repeater cladding used the Atlantic as an input to work as intended.15
The routing of TAT- 1 highlights the ways different sciences 
and techniques were drawn upon by the Post Office and AT&T as 
registers of environmental knowledge. There is historical precedent 
here: Rozwadowski has shown how the first transatlantic telegraph cable 
spurred oceanographic inquiry, and how hydrographers’ apparent dis-
covery of a mid- Atlantic ‘Telegraph Plateau’ transformed the Atlantic 
floor from a hazardous environment to a peaceful zone for cable- laying. 
The irony to modern eyes is that the ‘Telegraph Plateau’ never existed, 
and Victorian hydrography had missed the mountainous mid- Atlantic 
ridge.16 By the time of TAT- 1, cable- layers at AT&T and the Post Office 
were well  aware of the dangers of the Atlantic floor – in 1929 the Grand 
Banks region of the Atlantic, near Newfoundland, had experienced an 
earthquake. The earthquake caused a turbidity current  – a sediment- 
laden flow of water along the ocean floor – which had snapped 12 tele-
graph cables. Contrary to the Victorian hydrographers’ view of a peaceful 
‘Telegraph Plateau’ Atlantic, by the time of TAT- 1, cable-layers were 
aware of the ocean floor’s hazards, and as I will show later, this played a 
role both in the cable- laying and in AT&T and the Post Office’s corporate 
discourses about transatlantic communications.17
The topography and dangers of the Atlantic floor were not the 
only factors that influenced the routing of TAT- 1:  the location of 
undersea telegraph cables also played a role. Prior to TAT- 1, 15 cables 
had been laid directly across the North Atlantic, and a further 5 via 
the Azores islands. This proved problematic:  the most attractive route, 
from Cornwall to Newfoundland, was so congested that the cables were 
hazards to one another. This meant that a longer route, from Oban, 
Scotland, to Newfoundland was selected instead. The route selection 
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shows how these cables came with their own environmental territories, 
which were important in planning new trans- atlantic communication 
infrastructures, but it should also be noted that there were political con-
siderations as well:  one proposed route, between Newfoundland and 
Ireland, was rejected because of the risks in laying an onwards connection 
across Ireland to London; three further routes via the Azores were all also 
rejected because of the issues involved in staffing cable stations in foreign 
territory.18
However, considering the various combinations of technology and 
environment involved in the protection and routing of TAT- 1, it becomes 
clear that the Atlantic was not only something distinct from TAT- 1, nor 
was it only a space to be registered through oceanographic science and 
technique:  it was also a natural space made into a component within 
the TAT- 1 system. The Atlantic environment was unavoidable, from the 
threat of biological and physical attack to the topology and pressures of 
the ocean floor. These features were transformed into components most 
visibly in the way that water pressure was used to reform the repeater 
housings into effective cladding, but it is apparent that, even in the form 
of resistance, avoidance and separation, Post Office and AT&T engineers 
incorporated many other features of the Atlantic environment into the 
design of TAT- 1.
The Atlantic environment was not only incorporated into the TAT- 
1 technological system, but also into corporate discourses about trans-
atlantic communications. However, rather than present the Atlantic 
oceanscape as a fusion of environment and technology, AT&T and the 
Post Office instead presented it as untamed wilderness that technology 
had to merely survive. Adverts in American popular science and youth 
magazines such as Science World and Boys’ Life told of how the sea ‘could 
make a “meal” of telephone cables’ and publicised AT&T’s ‘experimental 
ocean’, used to test cable specimens.19 Adverts in business publications, 
including American Banker, The Wall Street Journal and Fortune, 
explained how the ‘stormproof’ TAT- 1 would enable the expansion of 
American business interests into Europe.20 A  militaristic rhetoric also 
appeared in many of these features: one series of adverts portrayed TAT- 
1 and AT&T as ‘conquering the Atlantic’, while others spoke of TAT- 1’s 
‘far- reaching value in national defense’ and compared the cable to US 
Cold War defence projects such as the Distant Early Warning Line and 
the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.21
An AT&T publicity film for TAT- 2, TAT- 1’s successor, made in 1959, 
captures this discourse while also demonstrating how technological 
mediations of the environment – in this case one of the first films made 
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about transoceanic cable- laying  – played a crucial role in constructing 
the struggle between transatlantic cables and the Atlantic.22 The film, 
Cable to the Continent, opens with scenes of powerful waves battering 
shorelines and emphasises the cable’s victories over the ‘many- mooded 
sea’; icebergs, which posed a threat to the cable ships and the cables, 
are called ‘great white deceivers’. The film goes on to conclude that the 
cable ‘should do much to bring many nations together, both politically 
and economically, and contribute significantly to the defence needs of 
the free world’. The film captures how, for a discourse emphasising the 
importance of extending America’s military and economic influence into 
Europe, the environment was depicted not as a partner or feature of the 
transatlantic cable system, but as an unruly subject.
The Post Office presented the Atlantic as a wilderness to empha-
sise British contributions to the project. At the cable’s opening ceremony, 
Charles Hill, the Postmaster General, highlighted the British research that 
made the cable possible, while the Post Office’s official souvenir booklet 
emphasised British oceanographic knowledge.23 A talk for the BBC Home 
Service radio show ‘Science Survey’ by Sir Gordon Radley, Director 
General of the Post Office, portrayed the Atlantic oceanscape as an alien 
environment into which the cable had encroached. Radley described the 
cable resting in ‘the perpetual darkness and ooze of the sea- bed’, a turn of 
phrase that evokes Rudyard Kipling’s poem The Deep- Sea Cables: ‘There is 
no sound, no echo of sound, in the deserts of the deep / Or the great grey 
level plains of ooze where the shell- burred cables creep.’24 However, where 
Kipling breathed life into the seabed, describing the ‘shell- burred’ cable 
that itself ‘creeps’ along the ocean floor, which resonated with his broader 
theme of telegraph cables drawing humankind together, Radley instead 
emphasised the extremity and lifelessness of the Atlantic environment.
TAT- 1 was followed by many more transatlantic telephone 
cables: TAT- 2 was laid in 1959, and TAT- 3 through to TAT- 7 were laid 
in 1963, 1965, 1970, 1976, and 1978. This criss- crossing of the Atlantic 
necessitated further strategies of prophylaxis and maintenance for this 
transatlantic infrastructure. I  shall first deal with strategies of prophy-
laxis, taken to prevent damage to cables, and then strategies of mainten-
ance, which were utilised when prevention failed.
One of the most significant risks to cables was the  intersection 
of their environmental territory with the trawling industry. This 
had long been a problematic area:  the first international submarine 
communications cable, laid between England and France in 1850, 
was severed by a French fisherman after only three days, and from 
1965 to 1966, TAT- 3 and TAT- 4 were severed on four separate occasions 
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by trawlers scouring a newly discovered bed of scallops off the New 
Jersey coast.25 The primary strategy taken to prevent such damage was 
to bury the cable using a ‘sea plough’ developed by AT&T, which by 
1969 had buried nearly 400 miles of cable in the North Atlantic and 
Mediterranean. The sea plough was a tractor- like vehicle, remotely con-
trolled from a cable ship, which proceeded along the ocean floor using 
caterpillar tracks, digging a trench and burying cable in the trench. The 
sea plough proved hugely successful and the Post Office soon under-
took its own trials using a modified sugar- cane plough in the North Sea. 
However, the sea plough not only transformed the environment physic-
ally, but also symbolically: the agricultural envirotechnological system 
of tractors and ploughs served as inspiration for the transformation of 
the oceanscape, surfaced in metaphors such as ‘sea plough’ and ‘tilling 
the ocean floor’.26 Here, there are parallels with the bulldozer in Ralph 
Harrington’s chapter earlier in this book, in which the bulldozer not 
only transformed the environment, but took on a symbolic status in the 
process.27
Alongside the sea plough, efforts were also made to educate and 
deter the trawling industry from the cables’ territories. The UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) released a report in 1970, Trawling 
and Submarine Cables, which acknowledged the long history and terri-
torial claims of submarine communication cables, as well as the significant 
lengths and expenses that cable companies like AT&T and the Post Office 
had gone to in order to protect these cables. This included not only the 
sea plough, but also the re- drawing of hydrographic and fishing charts to 
include cables, the commissioning of multi- language radio announcements 
by the BBC, adverts in fishing magazines and even a research programme 
by the Post Office to develop new, safer, trawling gear for fishermen.28 That 
the UN FAO circulated this report to all government fishery departments 
highlights the significance that communication cables  – not ordinarily 
under their purview – were seen to have. AT&T and the Post Office also 
undertook cable patrols in the North Atlantic, using their cable ships to 
patrol the cable territories and warn off trawlers.29 These strategies further 
underscore how swathes of the Atlantic environment were rendered into 
disputed territories within competing industrial and technological systems.
If cables were damaged, maintenance procedures were needed 
to repair them, and these procedures highlight the ways in which the 
extreme Atlantic environment was registered and transformed to make 
it more accessible. Two strategies that were explored and practised, 
but never formalised, were diving units and underwater habitats. 
Diving units had been used in the early years of the sea plough in case 
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it jammed, and so in 1970 the Post Office commissioned a report on 
the viability of also using divers to repair cables on the seabed itself.30 
The Post Office also collaborated with the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority’s Marine Technology Support Unit on developing 
underwater habitats into which cables could be pulled for repairs.31 
The diving unit and submersible habitats were not deployed, in part 
because of two more successful alternatives for accessing the deep 
Atlantic: mini- subs and grapnels.
A mini- submarine, like divers, had also proved effective in early 
sea- plough trials, where it was used to dive to the seabed and locate 
the cable. In the 1970s, the Post Office used mini- submarines called 
‘Pisces’ to bury and repair cable and later in the 1970s a consortium 
of North Atlantic telecommunications companies, the North Atlantic 
Cable Maintenance Agreement, pooled funds to purchase two remote- 
controlled unmanned submersibles, called SCARABS, to undertake 
submarine maintenance work.32 Grapnel development was also a 
significant area of research for the Post Office, and by 1979, the Post 
Office had developed the ‘cut- and- hold grapnel’, which could simul-
taneously cut a cable and lift it for repairs. The grapnel also innova-
tively mediated the Atlantic, using a sonar surveillance system that 
could be used to locate the damaged cable. The ‘cut- and- hold’ grapnel 
reduced grappling time by a third and total repair time by a fifth, and 
was marketed and sold internationally by the Post Office to other cable 
companies.33 These developments were about removing the need for 
humans to enter the ocean environment, further extending the div-
ision between nature and technology; as Agar notes in the opening 
chapter to this volume, maintenance is an area in which the boundary 
between nature and technology is heavily policed. However, as some 
of these developments show, in extreme environments such as the 
ocean floor, methods like sonar and remote control are also needed 
to mediate those environments that humans can rarely access. It is 
another of those environments, and the communications technologies 
that were situated within it, to which I now turn, as I explore the com-
binations of technology and environment involved in the installation 
of satellites in the remote and difficult-to-access orbital space of Earth.
Launching satellites
In the early 1960s, space- based communications took off as an alternative 
transmission method to submarine telephony. Telstar, the first satellite to 
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relay telephony and television across the Atlantic, was designed by AT&T 
and launched in July 1962. Telstar relayed signals between AT&T’s earth 
station in Andover, Maine, and the British and French earth stations in 
Goonhilly, Cornwall and Pleumeur- Bodou, Brittany. After Telstar, inter-
national satellite communications were reorganised into a single entity 
through the creation of INTELSAT, the international satellite consortium, 
in 1964. In this section, I  will draw attention to combinations of tech-
nology and the environment in satellite communications in two distinct 
phases: first, with Telstar, in which the extremities of the space environ-
ment were visibly surfaced, and second, with INTELSAT, in which the 
extreme space environment was obscured in comparison with the envir-
onment of submarine communications.
Telstar’s combinations of technology and environment highlight it 
as an artefact that was not only a communications satellite, but also a way 
of registering environmental knowledge. AT&T publicity explained how 
Telstar was a ‘space laboratory’, ‘operating in the unknown environment 
of hostile radiation and micrometeorite dust’.34 Telstar was used by Bell 
Labs and NASA to gain a greater understanding of the Van Allen radiation 
belt surrounding Earth, which had been discovered in 1958 by James 
Van Allen at the University of Iowa, using data from the Explorer 1 and 
Explorer 3 satellites.35 Telstar thus fits into a history not only of satellites 
as communications technologies, but also of  satellites as methods for 
registering environmental knowledge, as was the case with early satellites, 
like Explorer 1, and as Hogselius, Kaijser and van der Vleuten have shown, 
with later satellites used for meteorology and land surveying.36
Telstar also shared a common feature with practically every other 
satellite: the use of environment as an input, through solar panels, along-
side a contradictory division of technology and environment, through 
radiation shielding. Telstar was covered in sixty solar cells used to power 
the satellite, and radiation shielding was achieved by packaging Telstar’s 
electronics into an inner, hermetically sealed, container within the satel-
lite structure. The hermetically sealed container contained normal Earth 
atmosphere, in which the components were known to work reliably. This 
was not unusual for satellites of the time, but is uncommon in modern 
satellites, which usually operate in the vacuum of space, and so, while 
Telstar itself was situated in the space environment, its electronics can, 
in a sense, be thought of as working in a small pocket of Earth taken up 
into space by satellite.37
This radiation shielding, however, was insufficient, and in November 
1962, Telstar fell silent due to radiation damage to a transistor. Telstar’s 
silence was not merely evidence of the hazardous space environment, but 
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also of human damage to the space environment. The day before Telstar 
was launched, the USA detonated Starfish Prime, the largest man- made 
nuclear explosion in outer space, and part of a series of high- altitude 
nuclear weapons tests conducted by the USA called Operation Fishbowl. 
This detonation energised the Van Allen belt, and the additional radiation 
damaged Telstar, causing it to fail. The failure of Telstar and seven other 
satellites, including Ariel I, Britain’s first satellite, caused by Starfish Prime, 
fed into what Lisa Ruth Rand has labelled a ‘proto- environmentalist’ 
moment in the Cold War, which interlinks international communications, 
the space environment and the militarisation of space.38
The relationship between the Cold War and the growth of envir-
onmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s has been recognised previously. 
John McNeill and Corinna Unger call environmentalism ‘among other 
things, a child of the Cold War’, noting the link between antinuclear 
protests in the early Cold War and the development of environmen-
talism.39 Jacob Hamblin explores a similar link, attributing ‘catastrophic 
environmentalism’ in the latter half of the twentieth century to a growing 
environmental awareness during the Cold War and the parallel growth 
of modern science.40 Toshihiro Higuchi particularly draws attention to 
nuclear testing and Operation Fishbowl as a stimulus for environmental 
insecurity in the Cold War.41 These tests, however, did not unintentionally 
damage the space environment as a side-effect, but rather had the envir-
onment firmly in their sights:  Hamblin highlights the American physi-
cist Edward Teller’s remarks about nuclear weapons testing in space: ‘We 
know how we can modify the ionosphere. We have already done it.’42 
Telstar’s failure was linked in newspaper articles to Operation Fishbowl, 
showing that Telstar was not only a communications satellite or register 
of environmental knowledge, but also one of the first friendly- fire victims 
in the militarisation of the space environment.43 Telstar’s failure, and the 
public attention to the possible consequences of Starfish Prime, highlight 
how space communications in the early 1960s was entangled with the 
concept of orbital space as a natural environment.
It is also important to note that the space environment was not the 
only environment of satellite communications, which consists not only 
of satellites in space, but also a vast, material, terrestrial infrastructure 
composed of, by now, hundreds of earth stations around the world. Earth 
stations are important nodes in communications satellite infrastructure, 
yet relatively neglected in satellite histories, which tend to focus on the 
cosmic and not the terrestrial.44 I shall focus on the British Post Office’s 
earth station, Goonhilly, to explore the combinations of technology and 
environment at work in earth stations.
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The Post Office pursued a unique design direction for Goonhilly, 
which surfaces the interlinkage of national prestige with different 
approaches to technology and the environment. Goonhilly, built by the 
Post Office in 1962 to communicate with Telstar, was situated on an 
isolated, elevated plateau on the Cornish peninsula, which gave good 
sightlines for satellite tracking and horizon- to- horizon communications. 
Goonhilly’s first antenna, Antenna One, was the world’s first satellite 
communication antenna with a parabolic design (i.e. a satellite ‘dish’), 
and here was influenced by British precedent in antenna design: Charles 
Husband, the engineer responsible for Antenna One, had also designed 
Jodrell Bank’s Lovell Telescope, which had earned prestige through its 
unique, world- first, ‘dish’ design.45 The Post Office proclaimed this para-
bolic design as a uniquely British design concept, which did not need 
to be protected from the environment. It was explicitly contrasted with 
AT&T’s earth station at Andover, Maine, which utilised a ‘horn’ antenna 
that was protected from the elements – wind, rain and snow – by a dis-
tinctive ‘golf ball’ protective radome. Goonhilly’s dish was mobilised as 
part of Post Office publicity, highlighting the technological sophistication 
of the Post Office, which would later proudly tout how the British para-
bolic design became the template for subsequent earth stations around 
the world.46
Goonhilly thus shows an interesting combination of technology and 
the environment, where, in contrast to other earth stations with radomes, 
it was not the physical separation of environment from technology that 
was deemed significant, but rather the capability of the earth station to 
embrace ‘wilderness’ without being changed by it. More broadly, how-
ever, Goonhilly for the Post Office and Telstar for AT&T show how, in the 
early years of space communications, combinations of technology and 
the environment were significant features of corporate discourses about 
satellite communications.
After Telstar, a new satellite order was created in the form of 
INTELSAT. INTELSAT surfaced the space environment in a very different 
manner to AT&T and the Post Office, and I argue that this resulted from 
INTELSAT’s different views, compared with organisations like AT&T 
and the Post Office, on the relationship between satellite and sub-
marine communications. INTELSAT was spearheaded by the USA as a 
satellite system which would be globally accessible, but also had clear 
Cold War objectives:  transmitting television and propaganda from the 
USA through a global satellite system was seen as a powerful weapon 
of American foreign policy. The USA started negotiations with foreign 
governments in the early 1960s to gather a consortium of nations to 
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invest in and support the global system. Nigel Wright and Hugh Slotten 
have both previously pointed out the tensions between the commitments 
of potential European partners – particularly Britain and France – to their 
existing submarine cable networks and the US desire for a single satellite 
system to realise foreign policy objectives.47 In the end, the INTELSAT 
vision won out, although caveats were made for interworking between 
satellites and submarine cables. In 1964, INTELSAT was created, with 
61 per cent owned by the USA via COMSAT, its domestic satellite cor-
poration, and the remainder owned by partners from around the world.
The tension between satellites and submarine cables informed pub-
licity about INTELSAT, which presented satellites and cables as differing 
significantly on technical and environmental grounds. The greater 
communications capacity of satellites was heralded as a breakthrough in 
international communications. A brochure entitled New Communications 
Era created by COMSAT, the US partner in INTELSAT, explained how 
‘archaic’ cable systems were no longer necessary, and that INTELSAT’s 
first satellite, nicknamed Early Bird, had almost double the capacity of 
a transatlantic cable at under a fifth of the cost.48 In 1971, an article for 
Popular Science by Werhner von Braun, the famed German- American 
aerospace engineer, touted the superior capacity of INTELSAT’s fourth 
series of satellites, INTELSAT IV, compared with the ‘puny’ capacity of 
even the ‘most sophisticated transatlantic cable’.49 
The fragility of undersea cables was also emphasised: in June 1965, 
COMSAT publicised Early Bird’s rescue of transatlantic communications 
after it offered a temporary replacement service for the failure of CANTAT, 
the Anglo- Canadian transatlantic cable.50 A  similar episode occurred 
three years later, when COMSAT publicised how INTELSAT satellites had 
carried their heaviest ever load of Atlantic traffic after two transatlantic 
cables had been damaged.51 A particular feature of this rhetoric was the 
notion that satellites were able to escape the environment in a way that 
terrestrial communications could not:  INTELSAT publicity presented 
communication satellites as surpassing the ‘inherent limitations’ of ter-
restrial communications, unlike the intrinsic, fragile, materiality of 
cables.52 Another INTELSAT publicity feature, in TV Guide magazine, 
collapsed these technical and environmental differences into one with 
the rhetorical question, ‘Meet that demand with undersea cables? They’d 
drown in an ocean of words. But satellites can handle it.’53 The INTELSAT 
discourse submerged cables, literally and figuratively, while presenting 
satellites as environmentally transcendent.
However, this rhetoric was not quite accurate, and from the early 
days of the INTELSAT system, the British Post Office had researched 
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and monitored the proficiency of both satellites and submarine cables as 
international links, including the various combinations of technology and 
environment that might influence performance.54 Post Office research 
drew attention to the susceptibility of satellite communications to rain 
and atmospheric conditions that could cause bursts of noise, while other 
research addressed the environmental vulnerability of earth stations, 
noting that a satellite TV broadcast from Germany had been cancelled 
because the German earth station’s radome had been covered in snow, 
and that radome repairs had also been responsible for putting Andover 
and Pleumeur- Bodou out of action for extended periods. Satellites 
were seen as less susceptible to malicious and electrical interference, 
although it was also pointed out that, in the event of damage, cables 
could be repaired, whereas satellites could not. Overall, the Post Office’s 
conclusions on submarine cables and satellites were clear:  the reports 
emphasised that cables held numerous advantages over satellites, which 
included the more adept handling of the interfaces between environment 
and technology outlined above.
INTELSAT’s articulation of the spacescape, however, was clearly 
victorious over the oceanscape of submarine cables. In 1988, the first 
transoceanic fibre- optic cable, TAT- 8, was laid across the Atlantic. 
TAT- 8 was a leap forward in transatlantic communications capacity, 
carrying almost 10 times more calls than its predecessor, TAT- 7, and 
over three times more calls than its satellite competitor, INTELSAT V.55 
However, rather than draw attention to this significant expansion in 
capacity, AT&T and British Telecom, the privatised successor to the 
Post Office, instead chose to use satellites and the spacescape for their 
marketing. A 1988 BT advert – the same year TAT- 8 was laid – opens 
with a shot of an empty business office.56 A  businessman appears, 
picking up his address book and dialling his telephone. Echoing the 
famous documentary shorts Powers of Ten by Charles and Ray Eames, 
the camera slowly zooms out, revealing that the shot is coming from 
outside the office window, and carries on pulling out:  London, the 
UK, Europe, until, finally, Earth, floating in space. A communications 
satellite orbits the Earth, before the camera quickly zooms back in to 
an office in New  York City. Another businessman picks up his phone 
and answers the call. In 1989, AT&T ran their own advert about 
international communications:  in contrast to BT’s, this advert expli-
citly mentioned TAT- 8, but using similar imagery, the advert opened 
and closed with shots of the Earth from space and went on to deploy 
space- age motifs, from satellites and earth stations to NASA- style 
communications and telemetry control centres, in support of AT&T’s 
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‘worldwide intelligent network’.57 Another AT&T advert, in 1991, par-
ticularly highlights the choice of spacescape over oceanscape to market 
international communications. The advert bore the slogan ‘We’d like 
to be the first to say hello’, and depicted a message in a bottle (see 
Figure 10.1). However, highlighting the influence that the spacescape 
Figure 10.1 ‘We’d like to be the first to say hello.’ AT&T/ N.W. Ayer.
Source: courtesy of the National Museum of American History Archives 
Center.
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had over communications discourses, the bottle was not afloat on the 
ocean, but instead in space.58
Conclusion
Paul Edwards points out that constructing infrastructure also constructs 
a specific nature in which it is situated.59 In this chapter I have outlined 
numerous combinations of technology and the environment in the con-
struction of submarine and satellite communications infrastructure: TAT- 
1 was separated from the Atlantic and yet also used it as an input; cable 
protection and maintenance strategies transformed, mediated and 
registered the Atlantic in various ways; Telstar registered knowledge 
about outer space while surfacing space as a vulnerable environment; 
and INTELSAT articulated a countervailing view that downplayed the 
extremity of the space environment. It is thus also clear that the con-
struction of these infrastructures, which were not purely technological 
but fusions of technology and the environment, was used by their cor-
porate builders to articulate specific visions of these extreme environ-
ments. AT&T and the British Post Office composed TAT- 1’s oceanscape as 
an untamed Atlantic environment, which was used by AT&T to empha-
sise the cable’s contribution to US economic and military interests and 
by the Post Office to highlight British scientific and engineering skill. 
Telstar’s spacescape was an unknown and potentially hazardous space 
environment, which was unwelcomely surfaced by US nuclear weapons 
testing, while Goonhilly’s landscape was a wild opponent, again used by 
the Post Office to emphasise national engineering ingenuity. INTELSAT’s 
spacescape was environmentally transcendent, while INTELSAT also 
further emphasised the hazardous oceanscape of undersea cables to 
promote satellite communications. The dematerialised, instantaneous 
aesthetic of modern telecommunications may thus owe this image to the 
commercial contests between satellite operators and cable-layers, and 
associated marketing of spacescape and oceanscape, from the 1950s to 
the 1980s.
The interplay between national and business histories is thus also 
a significant influence on this history of transatlantic communications. 
Modern British history is particularly apparent in the Post Office’s dis-
course about TAT- 1 and Goonhilly, which could be well captured by 
Robert Bud’s concept of ‘defiant modernism’: Bud draws attention to the 
British pursuit of high- profile ‘world- first’ projects after the Second World 
War, such as Comet, the first civilian jet airliner, and Calder Hall, the first 
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commercial nuclear power station.60 TAT- 1 and Goonhilly, as combin-
ations of technology and environment, were deployed by the Post Office 
in a similar vein. Likewise, AT&T’s presentation of TAT- 1 and INTELSAT’s 
rhetoric of satellites over cables could be positioned in John Krige’s his-
torical concept of ‘consensual hegemony’: the USA’s use of scientific and 
technological projects in the Cold War to aid European reconstruction 
and also serve US Cold War interests.61 However, while national history 
is important, the fact that it was businesses that reified and articulated 
these combinations of technology and the environment should not be 
overlooked. Business history and history of technology have long gone 
hand in hand, but stronger links could perhaps be forged between envir-
onmental and business history. Christine Meisner Rosen has been a 
staunch advocate here, and there are further signs of change.62 David 
Nye has described landscape as ‘a process embedded in narrative’,63 
and businesses, as organisations with both national and transnational 
contexts, are thus crucial narrators of the landscapes of technology 
and environment. The oceanscapes and spacescapes of international 
communications thus owe as much to modern national histories as they 
do to the histories of AT&T, the British Post Office, British Telecom and 
INTELSAT.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Jon Agar, Jessica van Horssen and Thomas Turnbull for dis-
cussion on this chapter and responses to an earlier draft and to audiences 
at the National Museum of American History and the National Air and 
Space Museum for their comments.
Notes
 1 Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr, ‘At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the 
Environment’, Technology and Culture 39, no. 4 (1998): 630.
 2 Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: 
Economy, War, Nature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
 3 Nicole Starosielski, The Undersea Network (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Lisa 
Ruth Rand, ‘Orbital Decay: Space Junk and the Environmental History of Earth’s Planetary 
Borderlands’ (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2016).
 4 Steve Pyne, ‘Extreme Environments’, Environmental History 15, no. 3 (2010): 509– 13.
 5 Helen M. Rozwadowski, ‘Ocean’s Depths’, Environmental History 15, no. 3 (2010): 520– 5; 
Roger D. Launius, ‘Writing the History of Space’s Extreme Environment’, Environmental 
History 15, no. 3 (2010): 526– 32.
 6 Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. Van Keuren, The Machine in Neptune’s Garden: 
Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment (Sagamore Beach, MA: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203oCEAnsCApEs And spACEsCApEs
203
Science History Publications, 2004); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Oceanographers and the 
Cold War: Disciples of Marine Science (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); 
Helen M. Rozwadowski, Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep 
Sea (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap, 2005); Jennifer M. Hubbard, A Science on the 
Scales: The Rise of Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Biology, 1898– 1939 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the 
Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University 
Press, 2008).
 7 John Brinckerhoff Jackson, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1984), 7; David E. Nye, ‘Technologies of Landscape’, in Technologies of 
Landscape: From Reaping to Recycling, ed. David E. Nye (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1999), 6.
 8 Helen M. Rozwadowski, ‘Technology and Ocean- Scape: Defining the Deep Sea in Mid- 
Nineteenth Century’, History and Technology 17, no. 3 (2001): 217– 47; Alice Gorman, 
‘Cultural Landscape of Space’, in Handbook of Space Engineering, Archaeology, and 
Heritage, ed. Ann Garrison Darrin and Beth Laura O’Leary (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009), 
335– 46.
 9 Karl Benediktsson, ‘ “Scenophobia”, Geography and the Aesthetic Politics of Landscape’, 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 89, no. 3 (2007): 203– 17.
 10 Jon Agar, ‘Historiography and Intersections’, Chapter 1 this volume.
 11 Esa Ruuskanen, ‘Encroaching Irish Bogland Frontiers: Science, Policy and Aspirations from 
the 1770s to the 1840s’, Chapter 2 this volume; Simone Turchetti, ‘HMG’s Environmentalism: 
Britain, NATO and the Origins of Environmental Diplomacy’, Chapter 13 this volume.
 12 John Tully, ‘A Victorian Ecological Disaster: Imperialism, the Telegraph, and Gutta- Percha’, 
Journal of World History 20, no. 4 (2009): 559– 79.
 13 L.R. Snoke, ‘Resistance of Organic Materials and Cable Structures to Marine Biological Attack’, 
The Bell System Technical Journal 36, no. 5 (September 1957): 1095– 27.
 14 Charles Bright, Submarine Telegraphs: Their History, Construction and Working (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1898/ 2014), 381.
 15 T.F. Gleichmann et al., ‘Repeater Design for the North Atlantic Link’, The Bell System Technical 
Journal 36, no. 1 (January 1957): 91.
 16 Rozwadowski, ‘Technology and Ocean- Scape’, 243.
 17 C.H. Elmendorf and B.C. Heezen, ‘Oceanographic Information for Engineering Submarine 
Cable Systems’, The Bell System Technical Journal 36, no. 5 (September 1957): 1035– 94.
 18 J.S. Jack, C.W.H. Leech and H.A. Lewis, ‘Route Selection and Cable Laying for the Transatlantic 
Cable System’, The Bell System Technical Journal 36, no. 1 (January 1957): 293– 326.
 19 AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘The Sea Could Make A  “Meal” of Telephone Cables’ 1958, Folder 1, 
Box 32, Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, National Museum of 
American History Archives Center [hereafter NMAH]; AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘Why We Have 
Our Own “Ocean” ’ 1959, Folder 1, Box 32, Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising 
Agency Records, NMAH.
 20 AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘Beneath the Broad Atlantic’ 1954, Folder 3, Box 13, Series 3, Collection 
59: N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, NMAH; AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘You Can Telephone 
Britain Over New Stormproof Cables’ 1956, Folder 2, Box 24, Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. 
Ayer Advertising Agency Records, NMAH.
 21 AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘Tele- Facts: Laying the First Atlantic Telephone Cable’ 1955, Folder 2, 
Box 32, Series 3, Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, NMAH; Cleo F. Craig, 
‘Equipping Ourselves for Today’s Responsibilities’, Bell Telephone Magazine 34, no. 4 (Winter 
1955): 217– 24; C.C. Duncan, ‘Communications and Defense’, Bell Telephone Magazine 37, no. 
1 (Spring 1958): 15– 24.
 22 Cable to the Continent (AT&T, 1959).
 23 ‘Speeches at the Opening of the Transatlantic Telephone Cable’ 1956, HIC W04/ 03 Network/ 
Cable/ Submarine Cables/ Trans- Atlantic, BT Archives [hereafter BTA].
 24 ‘The Transatlantic Telephone Cable’, Science Survey (BBC Home Service, 27 September 1956), 
HIC W04/ 03 Network/ Cable/ Submarine Cables/ Trans- Atlantic, BTA; Rudyard Kipling, ‘The 
Deep Sea Cables’, in The Seven Seas (London: Methuen & Co., 1896).
 25 ‘Tilling the Ocean Floor’, Post Office Telecommunications Journal 20, no. 2 (1968): 12– 15.
 26 ‘Tilling the Ocean Floor’; Captain O. Bates, ‘Ploughing the Seabed’, Post Office 
Telecommunications Journal 22, no. 4 (1970): 2– 4.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin204
204
 27 Ralph Harrington, ‘Landscape with Bulldozer: Machines, Modernity and Environment in Post- 
War Britain’, Chapter 3 this volume.
 28 ‘Trawling and Submarine Cables’, FAO Fisheries Circular (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, November 1970).
 29 ‘Ice- Cold in Alert’, Post Office Telecommunications Journal 20, no. 1 (1968): 17.
 30 ‘The State of the Art of Diving at the Present Time and in the Foreseeable Future, with 
Particular Reference to the Repair of Buried Submarine Cable’ 1970, TCB 711/ 30/ 5, BTA.
 31 I.R. Finlayson to F.A. Hough, ‘Proposed Organisation of R&D by the Underwater Engineering 
Group, CIRIA’, 19 November 1969, TCB 711/ 30/ 5, BTA.
 32 Edward Fennessy, ‘Submarine Recovery’ 13 September 1973, TCB 711/ 30/ 5, BTA; ‘Purchase 
of Submersible Vehicles for North Atlantic Cable Maintenance’ 28 January 1975, TCB 711/ 30/ 
5, BTA.
 33 The British Post Office, ‘Cut & Hold Grapnel’ 1979, TCB 711/ 35/ 3, BT Archives; J.E.H. Cosier, 
‘Getting to Grips with Undersea Cables’, Post Office Telecommunications Journal 30, no. 1 
(Spring 1978): 7– 8.
 34 ‘Facts from Space via Telstar’, Bell Telephone Magazine 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1962): 38– 39.
 35 A.B. Crawford et  al., ‘The Research Background of the Telstar Experiment’, The Bell System 
Technical Journal 42, no. 4 (July 1963): 747– 51; AT&T, ‘Project Telstar’ 1962, HIC W04/ 02 
Network/ Transmission Systems/ Satellites 2, BTA.
 36 Högselius, Kaijser and van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition, 241, 319.
 37 R.H. Shennum and P.T. Haury, ‘A General Description of the Telstar Spacecraft’, The Bell System 
Technical Journal 42, no. 4 (July 1963): 820– 1.
 38 Rand, ‘Orbital Decay’, 127.
 39 J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, ‘Introduction: The Big Picture’, in Environmental Histories 
of the Cold War, ed. J.R. McNeill and Corinna R.  Unger (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 11.
 40 Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 8.
 41 Toshihiro Higuchi, ‘Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Debate on Risk Knowledge 
in Cold War America, 1945– 1963’, in Environmental Histories of the Cold War, ed. J.R. McNeill 
and Corinna R. Unger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 319.
 42 Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature, 12.
 43 ‘AT&T Sets Telstar II Launch for Spring; Lessening of Radiation Damage a Main Goal’, Wall 
Street Journal, 2 January 1963.
 44 An earth station- oriented history can be found in Craig B. Waff, ‘Project Echo, Goldstone, 
and Holmdel: Satellite Communications as Viewed from the Ground Station’, in Beyond the 
Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication, ed. Andrew J.  Butrica (Washington, DC: 
NASA History Office, 1997), 41– 50.
 45 Jon Agar, ‘Making a Meal of the Big Dish: The Construction of the Jodrell Bank Mark 1 Radio 
Telescope as a Stable Edifice, 1946– 57’, The British Journal for the History of Science 27, no. 1 
(1994): 3– 21.
 46 ‘Ten Years of Technological Progress’ 1972, HIC W04/ 02 Network/ Transmission Systems/ 
Satellites 2, BTA; ‘Progress’ 1962, TCB 420/ IRP (PR) 1, BTA.
 47 Nigel Wright, ‘The Formulation of British and European Policy Toward an International 
Satellite Telecommunications System: The Role of the British Foreign Office’, in Beyond the 
Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication, ed. Andrew J.  Butrica (Washington, DC: 
NASA History Office, 1997), 157– 70; Hugh Richard Slotten, ‘Satellite Communications, 
Globalization, and the Cold War’, Technology and Culture 43, no. 2 (2002): 315– 50; Hugh 
Richard Slotten, ‘International Governance, Organizational Standards, and the First Global 
Satellite Communication System’, Journal of Policy History 27, no. 3 (2015): 521– 49.
 48 COMSAT, ‘New Communications Era’ 1967, Folder 5, Box 58, Acc. No. 1987- 0125, National 
Air and Space Museum Archives Center [hereafter NASM].
 49 Wernher von Braun, ‘Now at Your Service  – The World’s Most Talkative Satellite’, Popular 
Science, May 1971, 56– 57, 138.
 50 COMSAT, ‘Early Bird to Provide Emergency Service after Transatlantic Cable Break’ 18 June 
1965, OE- 037000- 03, NASM.
 51 COMSAT, ‘Interruption of Service on Two Transatlantic Cables’ 15 February 1968, 
OI- 435000- 01, NASM.
 52 TRW, ‘INTELSAT III Press Handbook’ 1969, OI- 435100- 01, NASM.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
205oCEAnsCApEs And spACEsCApEs
205
 53 ‘Switchboard in Orbit’, TV Guide (4 December 1971).
 54 ‘Long Distance Cable and Satellite Systems’ (6 May 1968) TCB 711/ 2/ 5, BTA.
 55 Roger Smith, ‘BT Bites Back … New Cable More than a Match for “Jaws” ’, BT Journal 8, no. 2 
(1987): 38– 41; ‘INTELSAT V Facts’ 1981, OI- 435400- 01, NASM.
 56 British Telecom International … It’s You We Answer to (BT, 1988).
 57 AT&T’s Universal Telephone Service (AT&T, 1989).
 58 AT&T and N.W. Ayer, ‘We’d Like to Be the First to Say Hello’ 1991, Folder 13, Box 33, Series 4, 
Collection 59: N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, NMAH.
 59 Paul N. Edwards, ‘Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organisation in the 
History of Sociotechnical Systems’, in Modernity and Technology, ed. Thomas J. Misa, Philip 
Brey and Andrew Feenberg (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2003), 189.
 60 Robert Bud, ‘Penicillin and the New Elizabethans’, The British Journal for the History of Science 
31, no. 3 (1998): 305– 33.
 61 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe 
(Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2008).
 62 Christine Meisner Rosen, ‘Industrial Ecology and the Greening of Business History’, Business 
and Economic History 26, no. 1 (1997): 123– 37; Christine Meisner Rosen and Christopher C. 
Sellers, ‘The Nature of the Firm: Towards an Ecocultural History of Business’, The Business 
History Review 73, no. 4 (1999): 577– 600; Christine Meisner Rosen, ‘The Business– 
Environment Connection’, Environmental History 10, no. 1 (2005): 77– 9; Hartmut Berghoff 
and Adam Romem (eds), Green Capitalism?: Business and the Environment in the Twentieth 
Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
 63 Nye, ‘Technologies of Landscape’, 7.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206
206
11
The Thames Barrier: climate change, 
shipping and the transition to a new 
envirotechnical regime
Matthew Kelly
The process that led the British government to build the Thames Barrier 
resembled the trajectory of many infrastructural projects in post- war 
Britain. A  generally accepted need generated proposals, counter- 
proposals and the concomitant weakening of vested interests, until 
under growing public pressure the government decided to push enab-
ling legislation through the Parliament. This decision departed from this 
norm, however, because the government did not seek to improve living 
standards or economic effectiveness, but to counter the existential threat 
nature posed to London, as intimated by the devastating tidal flood of 
1953.1 As this chapter will show, by the 1950s the government accepted 
the scientific consensus that climate change was causing glacial ablation, 
or melt, and rising sea levels and increased storminess threatened all 
North Sea coastal terrains. London was made peculiarly vulnerable by 
the added effect of north– south ‘tilt’, by which the south- east of England 
was gradually sinking. The Waverley Report, the official response to the 
1953 flood, identified the flood not as a unique weather event, despite 
the unusual concatenation of factors that caused it, but as an episode in a 
series whose ultimate origins were geological and climatic, against which 
human beings could only mount a defence. In this respect, to adapt the 
distinction Braudel drew between the longue durée and the ‘conspicuous’ 
events that usually preoccupy historians, the 1953 flood was a moment 
when the longue durée became conspicuous.2
Whitehall accepted Waverley’s recommendation that improved 
coastal and estuarial flood defences be augmented with a retractable bar-
rier across the Thames, and the long policy- making process that followed 
left little meaningful distinction between technological and political 
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questions. Although the most decisive politicking occurred in private 
meetings between representatives of various public bodies, the public 
debate was periodically enlivened by the Thames barrage lobby, which 
hoped to transform the existing estuarial regime upstream of Gravesend 
or Woolwich into a slow- moving fresh water lake, ‘liberating’ the city from 
the tide. This revived a Victorian agenda but was promoted in terms of 
improving the river’s ‘amenity’ value, one of the key governing concepts 
in post- war Britain. Although able to mobilise influential backers, the 
barrage lobby achieved little traction in Whitehall; the agenda seemed 
the stuff of outmoded visionaries, an extravagant alternative to the rela-
tively simple technological fix represented by a retractable barrier. That 
this was so did not make the eventual decision to build the barrier or 
its location predetermined. To avoid ‘naturalizing technological change’, 
this chapter will consider the case made for the barrage and trace the fate 
of the different barrier schemes proposed.3
Moreover, the case made for a barrage threw into sharp relief how 
the barrier sought to protect London against a potentially devastating 
flood while preserving the existing estuarial regime. For much of the 
1950s and 1960s, discussion concerned how the tidal energies of the 
Thames were harnessed by shipping, washed away the city’s waste and 
prevented a build- up of silt. In the late 1960s, a new consideration entered 
the discussion. Improved sewage plants had begun to restore some-
thing of the river’s pre- industrial condition and the return of migrating 
fish relied on levels of oxygenation and salinity partly created by tidal 
action. The failure of the barrage lobby should not, therefore, obscure 
the degree to which the River Thames was already, in William Cronon’s 
influential formulation, ‘second nature’, or, to follow Thomas P. Hughes, 
an ‘ecotechnological system’, or, indeed, an example of Richard White’s 
‘organic machine’.4 Note, for example, how in the nineteenth century 
the upstream limit of the Thames tideway was lowered from Kingston- 
Upon- Thames by the construction of Teddington Lock, while Richmond 
Lock (1894), technically a half- tide lock and barrage, was necessary to 
maintain a navigable depth of water between the two locks following 
the dismantling of Old London Bridge. And this is to say nothing of the 
significant implications banking, flood defences and London’s complex 
system of docks and harbours had for water flow and riverine ecology. 
Nonetheless, if the ‘high modernist’ desire of the barrage lobby to trans-
form and control nature more closely resembles today’s climate engin-
eers than yesterday’s pragmatic technocrats, the retractable barrier was 
contrastingly of tremendous anthropic importance but of relatively low 
environmental impact.
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That said, in her history of the post- 1945 development of the 
Rhône, Sara B.  Pritchard argues that histories of technology tend to 
treat the environment as ‘an unproblematic, ahistorical backdrop to 
studies of technological change, implying that nature and technology 
are entirely distinct, and that environmental and ecological process play 
no role in technological development’.5 Whether this critique still holds 
is questionable, but certainly no meaningful history of the development 
of the Thames Barrier could sustain this distinction. Pritchard’s argu-
ment that the Rhône is best understood as an ‘envirotechnical regime’ 
in which nature is an actant chimes with the argument made here. 
Given contemporary debates about climate change, it seems remark-
able that during the protracted political process preceding the passage 
of the 1972 Act, the case made for greater flood protection attracted 
little opposition. Even the Port of London Authority, which contested 
specific proposals, did not fundamentally challenge official thinking. It 
can be supposed that this was because rising water levels were thought 
symptomatic of the interglacial cycle rather than human actions, but 
this explanation should not obscure how the politics of the Thames 
Barrier complicates the claim that ‘climate change did not emerge as a 
political issue until the 1990s’ and helps contextualise the responses of 
the British government to evidence of anthropogenic climate change in 
the early 1970s.6
It seems equally telling that the recommendations of the Waverley 
Report, which urged extensive improvements to downstream and 
coastal flood defences, including the development of an early warning 
system, retained authority within government over the whole period.7 
This reflected the quality of the scientific data underpinning the report 
and the dire prognosis that data heralded, but it also suggested much 
about the governing ethos of the time. A distinguished peer was given a 
responsibility – few were more distinguished than Sir John Anderson – 
and his recommendations behoved the government to respond accord-
ingly, however ill- thought through that response proved in practice. As 
such, the progress of the issue was conditioned by the peculiar alchemy 
of deference, the authority of the Establishment  – that nebulous but 
palpable presence in post- war Britain  – and the confidence placed in 
state- led technological and engineering infrastructure projects. That the 
final decision was so delayed also makes the history of the barrier a sug-
gestive case study in the history of post- war industrial design and engin-
eering and, more particularly, London’s historic decline as a port city. 
In the event, the construction of the Thames Barrier did not help sus-
tain a threatened envirotechnical regime, but helped create a new one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209thE thAmEs bArriEr
209
And when placed in its proper global context, the history of the Thames 
Barrier raises far- reaching questions about environmental justice in the 
context of anthropogenic climate change.
The Waverley Committee and climate science
The first of the Waverley committee’s terms of reference was ‘to examine 
the causes of the recent floods and the possibilities of a recurrence 
in Great Britain’.8 The committee sought submissions from a range 
of scientific authorities, including sundry academics, the Council of 
the Institution of Water Engineers, the Hydraulic Research Station 
at Wallingford in Oxfordshire, the Observatory and Tidal Institute 
at Liverpool and the Royal Navy, the last a considerable source of 
expertise. The immediate causes were rather straightforward to estab-
lish. A relatively high tide combined with a surge, the latter caused by 
record- breaking northerly winds, channeled an atypically large quantity 
of water down the narrowing north– south axis of the North Sea to the 
bottleneck at the Straits of Dover. The rotation of the Earth ensured that 
the water was deflected to the west of the tidal currents, making the east 
coast of England south of Flamborough Head in Yorkshire one of the 
most vulnerable coastal regions in the North Sea. A significant quantity 
of the excess water was forced up the Thames Estuary.9
Expert opinion emphasised that the tide and the surge were dis-
tinct phenomena, the surge being the exceptional event. Neither was 
dependent on the other. Higher surges caused by fierce northerlies were 
on record but they had occurred in conjunction with low tides. On 1 
January 1922, for example, a surge caused the sea level at Southend to 
rise 11 feet above the expected level, but because the peak occurred two 
hours after low water there were no serious consequences. By contrast, 
on the night of 6– 7 January 1928, the surge had a height of only 5 feet 
at Southend but coincided with the high water of spring tides, causing 
serious flooding and loss of life in the Thames Estuary. To top London’s 
flood defences, the peak of the surge had to occur within an hour or two 
of high water and within a day or two of spring tides.10
The effect of the 1953 surge could have been worse but for 
another factor. Rainfall had been below average, leading to low fluvial 
discharge into most east coast rivers; had the peak fluvial discharge of 
1947 coincided with the tidal surge, the flood effect of the surge would 
have been greater.11 Although the probability of a recurrence was low, 
the 1953 tidal surge was the greatest on record and consistent with a 
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trajectory of increasingly threatening and unpredictable weather events. 
Diagrams prepared by London County Council showed that the highest 
recent tidal surges – depicted in relation to London’s flood defences – had 
in each case been up to 9 feet higher than expected; in one exceptional 
case – the night of 7– 8 April 1943 – that figure reached 18 feet.12 The 
surges of November 1897, January 1928 and February 1938 confirmed 
the upward trend, while water levels of 11, 12 or 13 feet above Ordnance 
Datum Newlyn at Sheerness or Southend were becoming increasingly 
frequent.13 The general trend seemed incontrovertible. Higher tides and 
stronger tidal surges were to be expected. As Waverley observed, how-
ever, the scientists did not argue that this was caused by ‘any appreciable 
change in the tides themselves’, but was ‘due to a steady rise of mean sea 
level relative to the land along the coasts of southern and south- eastern 
England’.14
How could this be explained? Several factors were thought instru-
mental. First, rising sea levels were a consequence of glacial ablation or 
melt, a symptom of climate warming. In 1939, the research of the Dutch 
geologist François E. Matthes into glacier regrowth in the Sierra Nevada, 
California, following its melting away in the Hypsithermal of the early 
Holocene, led him to coin the phrase the ‘Little Ice Age’ to describe the 
period 1300– 1850.15 Although the phrase was not common currency, 
scientists considered the climate to have ‘improved’ over the previous 
century. Second, the phenomenon of tilt:  the north- west and north of 
England was gradually rising and, correspondingly, the south- east was 
gradually sinking – or downwarping – a notion that had some cultural 
traction at the time, particularly in East Anglia.16 Third, and this was 
less well understood, a shift in wind pattern meant that southerlies and 
sou’westerlies were becoming marginally less predominant and norther-
lies marginally more common, making the North Sea stormier and tidal 
surges more likely.
Research conducted in the 1920s and 1930s on the extent of 
Norwegian glaciers by H.W. Ahlmann showed that glacier ablation 
had occurred at a rapid rate. These results echoed the findings of the 
Leningrad Arctic Institute with respect to the North- East Passage and 
observations of the limits of the ice edge between Denmark Strait and 
Novaya Zemlya made during the war by British Coastal Command. 
Arctic fauna had followed suit, both fish and fowl now found fur-
ther north than was previously the case. This gave, as Ahlmann put 
it, ‘proofs of climatic improvement’, noting that R.  Scherhag had 
suggested that this trend was of such significance that it could be 
termed ‘the warming of the Arctic’.17 A survey of the existing literature 
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published in 1940 confirmed that glacial ablation had occurred concur-
rently throughout the world since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
leading to an increase in sea levels of about 0.05cm per year, approxi-
mately 5cm a century. The evidence did not suggest that the interior 
parts of Greenland or the  Antarctic were melting, though scientists 
recognised the danger this would pose.18 As L.C.W. Bonacina and E.L. 
Hawkes observed in 1947, ‘If the polar inland ice- sheet were to melt as 
rapidly as the glaciers, the rise in sea- level would become a far- reaching 
phenomenon of great practical importance.’19 In its submission to the 
Waverley committee, the Hydraulics Research Station echoed these 
arguments, but offered more dramatic figures, suggesting that the sea 
level was rising 1– 2mm per annum, a calculation confirmed by current 
thinking. They also cited an alarmist paper that suggested the rate of 
rise could be as much as 3.5mm per year.20 Historical records, current 
measurement and predicted future trends thus informed Waverley’s 
recommendations.
Tilt was also linked to warming. At the end of the last ice age, 
some 20,000 years ago, glaciation had reached as far south as the line 
from the Bristol Channel to the Wash. With the weight of the ice no 
longer acting on northern Britain, a correction – post- glacial isostatic 
uplift – had been long in train and this accentuated the effect of rising 
sea levels in the south- east. As Waverley explained, the academic evi-
dence suggested  – and he got quite exercised about this material  – 
that in Roman times the Thames had been tidal only as far as London 
Bridge;21 other evidence suggested the tide had overtopped Teddington 
Weir on 20 March 1874.22 Dr Harry Godwin, University Reader on 
Quaternary Research at Cambridge, explained to Waverley that the evi-
dence of the past 50 years demonstrated that in recent times the degree 
of tilt had been two feet per century, though that level of subsidence 
could not have been maintained since Roman times. Godwin thought 
they could probably count on between one and two feet of further sub-
sidence in the south- east over the next 50 to 100 years. A decade or so 
later Dr Anthony Michaelis, prominent science journalist and friend of 
Dr Hermann Bondi, later significant to our story, claimed the south- east 
of England was sinking an inch every 10 years,23 predictions that wildly 
exceed current thinking.
Scientific papers circulated in Whitehall in 1970 once Solly 
Zuckerman, the government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, put his weight 
behind the barrier scheme did not offer a fundamentally different inter-
pretation of overall geophysical trends. J.R. Rossiter of the Institute of 
Coastal Oceanography and Tides confirmed that sea levels were rising 
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and that south- east England was probably continuing to sink, causing 
a relative rise in sea level of about a foot a century. Although wary of 
making firm predictions, Rossiter hypothesised that the river’s increased 
depth should mean a larger surface area, smaller velocities and, cru-
cially, less bed friction. This would lead to faster propagation of the tide 
between Southend and Tower Pier, which had already enjoyed a mean 
interval decrease of about 16 minutes over the course of the previous 
century. The effect of this in the upper reaches of the Thames was a rise 
in high water levels of two feet.24
A radical paper by Hubert Lamb, the meteorologist and pioneering 
climate change scientist, was excitedly received by Rossiter. Lamb 
attributed the increased frequency of great wave height observed by 
the German Navy in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea to the higher 
incidence of northerlies or nor’westerlies with a long sea fetch. These 
conditions, originating in the Atlantic Ocean, funnelled large quan-
tities of water into the North Sea, and were the cause of the abnormally 
high frequency of slow- moving cyclonic centres in the region 50– 60°N 
10°W– 10°E responsible for the prolonged rains and flooding seen in 
southern Britain in 1968 and 1969. Lamb argued that these weather 
patterns were part of a long- term sequence that scientists were only just 
beginning to understand. Data stretching back to the medieval period, 
although imperfect, suggested a repeated oscillation with a period length 
of about two hundred years in which mean frequencies of sou’westerlies 
over London coincided with the thicknesses of annual snow layers at the 
South Pole. Consequently, the increased frequency of nor’westerlies in 
the North Sea was likely to persist for much of the next century, con-
tinuing to generate the slow- moving weather fronts that increased the 
likelihood of tidal surges.
Lamb’s argument then developed a distinctly sceptical discussion 
of theories posited by American and Soviet meteorologists  – and since 
exploited by anthropogenic climate change deniers  – that the Earth 
had entered a period of cooling. Short- term temperature trends did 
indeed suggest this, and Lamb was apparently comfortable with the 
idea that the increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere that might have 
accentuated warming could now offset the increase of particulates and 
other pollutants in the atmosphere, but evidence of long- term weather 
patterns saw him ultimately reject the cooling thesis. Either way, he 
insisted, whether the trend was towards warming or cooling, a continued 
increase in North Sea nor’westerlies or northerlies was likely, leading to 
continuing storminess.25
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Whitehall deliberations: technocrats, civil engineers 
and the PLA
From the perspective of Whitehall, the scientific consensus and the broad 
case for a barrier was clear. The positioning of the barrier was more 
contentious. The more upstream the barrier’s position, the greater the 
cost of improving downstream flood defences; the more downstream 
the barrier’s position, the greater the engineering challenge and cost 
associated with the design and construction of the barrier as the river 
widened. These cost– benefit calculations had implications for London’s 
spatial politics:  riverine communities upstream of the barrier would 
be relatively privileged by the consequent need for lower- impact flood 
defences, whereas the possible effect of a ‘reflected wave’ caused by the 
barrier on downstream estuarial communities and infrastructure might 
necessitate more substantial flood defences than those already planned, 
an issue repeatedly raised by Kent and Essex county councils. For much 
of the process, however, the Port of London Authority proved the most 
influential voice. Since the 1908 Thames Act gave the PLA sole statutory 
authority for the management of the Thames tideway it had resisted any 
intervention that might undermine the navigational capacity of the river 
or the shipping interest.26 In the 1950s and 1960s, the PLA enjoyed an 
Indian Summer as the weight of shipping and employment in London’s 
docks reached historic highs, but the creation of the Greater London 
Council in February 1968 and the rapid decline of London as a port city 
in the 1970s radically transformed the play of power with respect to the 
governance of the Thames. Ultimately, the positioning of the barrier 
reflected this fundamental change in what London was.
In June 1955, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
(HLG), the lead ministry on the barrier project, published an internal 
report arguing that the middle of Long Reach, a section of the Thames 20 
miles downstream of London Bridge, was the most suitable site for a bar-
rier. As an easily navigable long straight stretch of river relatively free of 
dense industrial or residential development, landward approaches were 
easy and the river bottom – gravel overlying chalk – offered a hard sub-
stratum, relatively resistant to scour, with a high load- bearing capacity. 
Should the engineering solution require a mid- stream pier, the needs 
of shipping could be met by allowing clear waterways of 500 feet either 
side and vertical clearance of 200 feet above Newlyn Ordnance Datum. 
Side spans of 250 feet with vertical clearance of 50 feet would be needed 
to allow barges and light river craft to pass unhindered.27 Once these 
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requirements were agreed in principle, the Treasury granted permission 
to appoint consultant engineers, though it insisted this did not constitute 
a commitment to finance the project and the riparian authorities were 
told that at best the Treasury might partner other authorities.28
The Institution of Civil Engineers recommended Messrs Rendel, 
Palmer and Tritton and Sir Bruce White, Wolfe Barry & Partners. Both 
firms were long established with SW1 addresses, had close contacts in 
government and much experience of major civil engineering projects. 
Brigadier Bruce White had overseen the construction of the ‘Mulberry’ 
piers used in the D- Day landings, while Rendel, Palmer and Tritton’s 
significant works included the Royal Albert Docks (1880), the West 
India and Millwall Docks Improvements (1929) and the Tilbury Docks 
Improvements (1930), as well as similar projects elsewhere in Britain 
and a host of imperial projects, including major undertakings in India 
and several significant commissions related to the development of the 
oil industry in the Middle East and Britain.29 Firms like these helped the 
British Empire function. The ministry intended that the two firms would 
work in friendly competition before coming together to produce a final 
plan; the Hydraulic Research Board and the Geological Survey of Great 
Britain would provide free advice and the PLA grudgingly agreed to hire 
out its large model of the Thames.30
Friendly competition did not see the two firms arrive at the best 
solution. They differed over the best time to close the barrier and the 
volume of water that should pass through it – controlling the level of flow 
rather than entirely blocking a tidal surge was the aim. Further research 
resolved these questions, but both firms proved obstinate with respect 
to their preferred engineering responses. Each proposed a structure 
that would lower gates into the river. Rendel et al. favoured the ‘vertical 
lifting type’, comprising steel spans raised and lowered between towers 
built in the river, with hinged frames attached to the underside of the 
spans that carried vertical lifting gates. When the barrier was open, it 
would constitute a huge rectangular arch over the river. By contrast, 
White et al. advocated the ‘horizontal swing type’, comprising two 670 
foot piers lying longitudinally in the river mounted with long arms 
carrying vertical lifting gates. Closing the barrier would mean swinging 
the arms into place across the river and then lowering the gates. Rendel 
et al. maintained that their proposals were preferable because the barrier 
could be closed by gravity in the event of a power failure, plus the ‘vertical 
lifting type’ would be significantly more expensive to build and maintain. 
A retractable barrier, whereby a huge cantilever girder would be housed 
in dry dock on either side of the river and then launched along tracks 
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across the riverbed, was judged by both firms to be outside of engineering 
experience and, as such, too risky to pursue.31 Still, attractive drawings 
of the scheme were produced, evidence of the speculative nature of the 
proposals at this stage.32
The Ministry of Transport was concerned that the plans suggested 
the horizontal clearances proposed for the centre and side spans were 
narrower than the terms of reference had stipulated and it objected to 
the placement of ‘an obstruction in tidal waters in the main navigable 
channel of the greatest port in the world and of vital economic import-
ance to the country’.33 Despite this, HLG published ‘Technical Possibilities 
of a Thames Barrier’ as a Blue Book in March 1960 (Cmnd. 956). Local 
authorities downstream of the proposed barrier immediately raised some 
concerns. They asked about the effect massive piers would have on river 
flow, the risk of an oil spillage should a tanker strike a pier and whether a 
reflected wave caused by the barrier might worsen the downstream effect 
of a tidal surge, threatening civilian populations and industry alike. As 
Essex River Authority observed, there was ‘no exact community of interest 
between those above and below the proposed barrier’ and the down-
stream consensus was that the consequential costs of improving flood 
defence downstream of the barrier should be met by those upstream.34 
Still, a conference of the Thames estuary authorities that December 
approved the plans on the assumption that substantial funding would 
be forthcoming from central government. The only significant objection 
was made by a PLA engineer who explained that the plans raised funda-
mental questions about how the Thames was navigated. Ships sailed in 
on the flood tide and out on the ebb tide, but the piers would create tur-
bulence and narrow the river, increasing the speed of the tide. Necessary 
speed restrictions during the construction period – and possibly there-
after – would be impossible to meet without reversing the pattern of navi-
gation, so that ‘ships were brought up against the stream’.35
In February, alarmed officials were reassured by Sir Leslie Ford of 
the PLA that the authority’s position was not as hostile as the engineer 
had suggested, but it was troubled by estimates that during construc-
tion the tideway would be reduced to a 500- foot gap and the tidal speed 
increased from 3.5 to 6 knots. That April, Commander Parminter made 
the PLA’s difficulty plain:
the principal difficulty was that of taking a big ship through the gap 
between the piers and the difficulties in handling a big ship at slow 
speed would be enhanced by the effects of the eddies which were 
to be expected near the piers. Big ships always went up river on a 
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flood tide but if the barrier were constructed it would be necessary 
for them to proceed up the River on Ebb tide and down on the Flood 
tide with consequent delay which would result in missing favour-
able tides elsewhere.36
Moreover, when the barrier was closed advance warning would be 
needed so anchorages could be found for ships, while placing the bar-
rier in the middle of Long Reach would not only bisect an industrial area 
of growing importance but also halve the last significant stretch of safe 
deep water anchorage for inward- bound ships. HLG acceded to PLA 
demands: it accepted there could be no permanent structure in the nav-
igable channel, that  a minimum gap of 1,400 feet was required when 
the barrier was open, and that it should be located at the western end of 
Long Reach. Cutting back the bank (and dredging) would be necessary to 
improve alignment and visibility. This meant a recourse to a retractable 
barrier housed in dry docks, costed at £20m.37
HLG’s report to the Home Affairs Committee in July 1962 reiterated 
Waverley’s assessment of the threat, placed the likely cost of a barrier 
at £30m, and requested £50,000 to finance further investigations. With 
its usual ritualised display of reluctance, the Treasury released £56,000, 
having sanctioned an additional £6,000 for on- site borehole testing; the 
original engineers began fresh hydraulic investigations and a complete 
redesign. What had been considered outside the realm of engineering 
possibility in the 1950s was now the basis for the new designs. Rendel 
proposed a ‘high- level’ type, in which the arms would be cantilevered out 
from dry docks and the gates lowered into the river; White went with 
a ‘low- level’ design, whereby the arms would be launched along a sill 
constructed across the river bed. Rendel argued silting might have an 
adverse effect on the ‘low- level’ design, and at £30m, it was some £9m 
more than the estimated cost of the ‘high- level’ design; the construction 
time for both was estimated to be six or seven years, a factor that would 
grow in importance as the process lengthened.38
In the meantime, consultations by HLG on the land requirements 
unearthed a difficulty peculiar to the time. The War Office intended to 
put Purfleet Camp and Magazine, a portion of which overlapped with 
the proposed barrier’s northern site, up for auction in March 1963. The 
War Office insisted the process could not be reversed, for undertakings 
had been made to an Italian oil company that the land was available 
for purchase; although the War Office allowed that the PLA could also 
bid, it suggested the barrier be shifted 200 feet westward, allowing the 
two installations to exist side by side. This was a characteristic move by 
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a ministry still struggling to come to terms with the reality of civilian 
power and priorities.39 Notwithstanding the ill- advised observation by a 
War Office official that the negotiations on behalf of the Italians had been 
handled by the stepson of Peter Thorneycroft, former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, HLG made it clear that the wants of a private company would 
not be placed above the public interest. War Office pressure on London 
County Council to buy the land also went unheeded. In 1964– 5, stroppy 
queries from the War Office and the Ministry of Defence were brushed off 
by HLG: they would just have to wait, though the land could be offered 
for sale to the newly formed Greater London Council.40
Orthodoxies challenged: the case for a barrage and the 
weakening of the Port of London Authority
In the mid-1960s, ministerial attention was roused by the revival of the 
old question of whether the Thames needed not a barrier but a barrage. 
Tom Driberg, Labour MP, raised the question in response to the award of 
the President’s Prize of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors to 
Michael Wand, a constituent, for his paper ‘A Town in the Thames – the 
New South- East Centre?’ Characteristic of the futurism that could cap-
ture the public’s imagination in the 1960s, it was but the latest attempt to 
imagine a re- engineered Thames, which, as Richard Crossman admitted, 
had never had a full public airing.41 Herbert Spencer had promoted the 
agenda in the mid- nineteenth century and it was revived in 1903 when 
a group of parliamentarians were inspired by the decision to barrage the 
Charles River in Boston. Frustrated by the refusal of the Royal Commission 
on the Port of London to hear evidence in favour of a barrage, they 
formed an informal parliamentary committee, commissioned a series of 
expert studies and promoted three bills to draw attention to the question. 
The case was made in The Port of London and the Thames Barrage: A Series 
of Expert Studies and Reports (1907), which scrutinised the conversion of 
‘the river from a highway into a dock’ and criticised legislative attempts 
to render the Thames more commercially efficient for giving the Port 
Authority monopolistic control over the estuary. Among the technical 
factors assessed were the suitability of the geological strata and the vexed 
question of silting and pollution, but the fundamental case was made in 
terms of improving the navigable capacity of the Thames and enhancing 
its ‘popular use’. To maintain upstream water permanently at high tide 
with a barrage and eight locks at Gravesend would provide sufficient 
depth for ships of increased tonnage, end hazardous tide- waiting, and 
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reduce the dues paid at dock entrances and the cost of barging, pilotage 
and labour. To make the full width of the river always available would 
ease congestion and allow obstructive floating piers to be dismantled and 
landing places to be built closer to the shores. To slow the water flow 
would allow reliable passenger services to be developed and more use 
by pleasure boats. Aesthetic improvements would follow too: supposedly 
ugly mudflats would not be exposed twice a day, fresh water would make 
for a more pleasant environment and the sewage system would be re- 
engineered so effluent was pumped out below Gravesend, making for a 
more fragrant river.42
Barrage enthusiasts like Lord Desborough, for 32 years the Chair of 
Thames Conservancy, were frustrated by what they took to be the PLA’s 
failure to make an objective assessment of the case. As J.H.O. Bunge 
explained in Tideless Thames in Future London (1944), the 1928 flooding 
put the idea back on to the agenda among those who recognised that the 
‘only radical solution’ was to keep the tides ‘out of London altogether’ 
by locating ‘a barrage well below the floodable area’. The decision of a 
public enquiry in July 1934 that the tide made river buses unworkable on 
the Thames prompted the formation of the Thames Barrier Association in 
1935.43 When the barrage question was debated in the House of Lords in 
May 1937, Lord Dudley directed his fire at the ‘complete dictatorship’ the 
1908 Act had given the ‘pig- headed’ Port of London Authority over the 
whole estuary below Teddington Lock. Under more enlightened direc-
tion, the Thames could become ‘a slow- moving lake’ and ‘the playground 
and the pathway of London’s citizens’, becoming, according to Lord 
Jessel, like the Charles River, where ‘there is a full river, which provides 
many amenities for the citizens – yachting clubs and every sort of thing 
of that kind’.44 Lord Richie, Chair of the PLA, emphasised the negative 
effect a barrage would have on sewage and shipping and insisted the PLA 
had considered the idea, just as it had the less transformative and the 
more fantastical schemes that came its way. Ritchie cannily suggested 
a barrage would be vulnerable to bombing in the event of war.45 Leslie 
Burgin, the Minister of Transport, when asked if he intended to establish 
a committee of inquiry, responded that this was a question for the PLA.46 
Under considerable political pressure, the PLA conceded an enquiry, 
but on its eve, 28 March 1938, Burgin urgently requested that the PLA 
halt its proceedings because the Committee of Imperial Defence feared 
that  to publicly air these issues would compromise national security.47 
Bunge lamented the preparation done and remained convinced the 
PLA, knowing it would lose the argument, had made its influence felt in 
Whitehall.48
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When the idea resurfaced in the post- war decades it was often 
considered in conjunction with the plan to link Britain and France with an 
underwater tunnel between Dover and Calais. A channel tunnel seemed 
imminently realisable and visionary planners re- imagined Britain’s 
north– south transport links as a new road and rail network firmly to the 
east of London and integrated into a barrage. Despite lobbying activity, 
the view in Whitehall remained resolutely sceptical. In 1955, when the 
consulting engineers were contracted for the first time, the Ministry of 
Transport made it clear to HLG that they should not be asked to inves-
tigate a barrage. It was simply too expensive and its implications were 
too significant. To remove the ‘scouring action of the tides’ would com-
pletely alter ‘the regime of the river’, leading to greater siltation and more 
pollution, while a permanent rise in ground water level risked flooding 
basements in low- lying riverside areas and interfering with drainage 
and underground services, including London’s underground railway. 
Engineering solutions could be found, of course, but at greater cost than 
the barrage itself.49
The barrage also got an outing in Professor Hermann Bondi’s 
catalysing report on the need for a barrier, though the report was 
mainly significant for questioning the underlying assumptions that 
had steered discussion so far. On Zuckerman’s recommendation, 
Bondi had been commissioned by Richard Crossman and Lord Kennet 
who, given the threatening water levels of 10 December 1965 and the 
engineering problems raised by the latest designs, agreed that a fresh 
look at the problem was needed by a scientist of ‘Nobel quality’. Bondi, 
then professor at King’s College London, clearly relished his task. He 
shared Waverley’s assessment of the risk and wrote in melodramatic 
terms of the threat a major tidal surge posed London and, particularly, 
the underground railway system, which he thought could be put out 
of action for a year. Bondi did not attempt to calculate the probability 
of a major flood, but simply argued that it was foreseeable and so the 
government must act.50 Although he was keen on a barrage, suggesting 
that at high tide the north bank of the Thames made London aesthet-
ically superior to Paris and the equal of Leningrad, he was convinced 
a barrage would lead to greater siltation, making increased dredging 
a permanent charge of the PLA. Ultimately, Bondi believed a barrage 
should be pursued only as part of a fundamental rethink of the south- 
east, which must include a willingness to diminish the utility of the 
docks in the upper part of the river, but the apparent absence of any 
enthusiasm for the idea among the public made the cause a dead 
letter.51
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Bondi found it absurd that the mariners had been allowed to dic-
tate the barrier’s requirements, and no attempt had been made to quan-
tify the cost of different approaches. If the 1400- foot requirement was 
determined by the location, asked Bondi, would not a change of loca-
tion make for more cost- effective or technologically viable solutions? 
How would the problem be approached if, for example, questions of cost 
meant the opening was limited to 800 feet? The wide opening needed 
at Long Reach reflected the large swing big ships needed to come along-
side various jetties and wharfs, but to position the barrier upstream of 
the Royal Docks at the Isle of Dogs where big ships did not go would 
make a smaller opening serviceable without disrupting shipping. The 
money saved could be spent on improving downstream flood defences. 
Alternatively, placing the barrier at Woolwich was possible, though 
it would be necessary to ‘sterilise’ the banks by buying up existing 
berths used by large ships needing big swings, which would then allow 
openings as small as 350 feet. Protecting Plumstead Marshes, site of the 
new Thamesmead residential development (first stage due to begin on 
1 March 1967), would mean additional costs. Other possible locations 
were just below either the Ford Motor Works or Dagenham Dock, where 
Bondi thought a minimum opening of 750 feet was needed.52
The significance of Bondi’s intervention stemmed from both his 
proposals, which proved influential, and his approach to the problem. 
When Anthony Greenwood, Crossman’s successor at HLG, took the report 
to the Cabinet’s Home Affairs Committee, it was clear that Bondi had 
galvanised ministers. The Treasury, irritated by the suggestion it would 
meet two- thirds of the eventual cost, conceded that Bondi had raised 
questions needing answers and it took HLG to task for not recognising 
that a barrage would have to be looked at again.53 Kennet, junior min-
ister at HLG, Chair of the Flood Protection Policy Committee and barrage 
enthusiast, became increasingly vocal on the question.54 More significant 
was the shift in responsibility away from HLG, which retained ultimate 
oversight for the project, to the newly constituted Greater London Council 
(the GLC) in February 1968. The Treasury agreed HLG should increase 
its share of these research costs from a third to a half and it allowed the 
overall cost to reach £539,000 by 1970.55
The transfer of responsibility affected the balance of power. It 
was less that London County Council had simply deferred to the PLA, 
than that it simply did not have the GLC’s broad responsibilities or its 
broad perspective on how the Thames might serve London’s citizens. 
A GLC working party examined the possibility of a barrage at Limehouse 
Reach, commissioning the Hydraulics Research Station to investigate 
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silting; with respect to a barrier, it examined the dangers of a reflected 
wave. Initially, the prospect of improving amenity loomed large in the 
GLC’s thinking, though this was tempered by its consciousness of how 
Battersea and Bankside power stations were dependent, respectively, on 
coal and oil supplied by coastal shipping.56 The PLA’s plaintive response 
to Bondi was that it had not been asked to consider sites other than Long 
Reach and it accepted that an 800-feet opening could be sufficient at the 
two Dagenham sites, though it considered Woolwich already too built- 
up. The authority privately admitted that Tilbury Docks, which had been 
adapted to containerisation, a development that loomed large in Bondi’s 
projections, would in time take an increasing proportion of shipping, 
relieving pressure on the Royal Docks, though there was not yet much 
talk about their future, despite the closure of Surrey Docks in 1969.57
In the event, the GLC came down against a barrage. Its report 
of January 1970 confirmed the risk to London identified by Waverley, 
duly recognised the advantages a barrage would confer on London, but 
equally recognised the challenge it would pose to shipping, the problem 
of increased siltation, the ecological effect of lower levels of oxygen satur-
ation caused by impounding the water, and the potential problem caused 
by the location of London’s sewages outlets. Much would be determined 
by where the barrage was positioned and the GLC feared it could take 
another 10 years to make that decision: ‘It is scarcely likely therefore that 
a decision now to build a barrage would result in London being protected 
against a surge tide before the 1980s.’58 The irony of the statement 
cannot be missed. As for the alternative of raising the walls along the 
Thames to the six feet needed, the cost would be little different to a bar-
rier but obscuring pedestrian views of the Thames would significantly 
damage the river’s amenity value.59 Moreover, the Hydraulic Research 
Centre had established that if the barrier was closed for six hours, it was 
hard to conceive of the circumstances when the fresh water flow would 
cause the water level to rise more than three feet; as for the risk of a 
reflected wave to land downstream of the barrier, tests demonstrated 
that if the barrier was closed at low tide and the sluices closed gradually, 
allowing some water through, the reflected wave could be reduced to no 
more than a few inches at Canvey Island or Southend.60 A barrier, then, 
it had to be, and the GLC expressed its preference for the low- level type, 
arguing that research showed it to be within the bounds of current engin-
eering capability, a claim that could not be confidently made of the more 
complicated high- level type.61
This, then, seemed clear enough, but that April Kennet felt bound 
to write to the prime minister, short circuiting ‘all proper channels’, to 
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express his concern at government inaction. ‘I have tried all I can think 
of’, he wrote, ‘and have now concluded it is only right to let you know 
personally and directly that this situation is now extremely grave.’ In a 
somewhat humiliating letter, Harold  Wilson replied that a HLG paper 
was due to be discussed at the highest levels of government, though the 
general election that June meant responsibility passed to the incoming 
Conservative government under Edward Heath.62 By July, the gov-
ernment had accepted the GLC’s recommendation that the barrier be 
located at Silvertown in Woolwich and was prepared to take on the 
vested interests of the PLA, which it had come to consider opposed a 
barrier tout court. Tasked to prepare a chair’s brief ahead of the crucial 
meeting, S.K. Gilbert at HLG was determined that discussion would not 
be dominated by the PLA’s ‘hobby horses’ of siltation and pollution or its 
increasingly dubious insistence that London’s docklands would remain in 
full use for another 20 years: a push must be made towards the consider-
ation of strictly practical questions.63
That dismissive reference to pollution is striking, for any tendency 
to dismiss the PLA as a purely reactionary force needs to be tempered by 
an awareness of its growing responsibility for managing pollution levels 
in the tideway and how these concerns were becoming part of the pol-
itical mainstream. In an account presenting a largely positive picture of 
the PLA, Leslie Wood explained how since the 1940s it engaged in an 
extensive programme of research into the extent and causes of riverine 
pollution, which led to a major report in 1964 and the passage in 1968 
of an Act giving the PLA the responsibility for pollution control in the 
Thames enjoyed by the other river authorities since 1951. If higher levels 
of oxygen saturation were achieved by treating sewage effluent more 
effectively and aerating the heated effluents released into the river from 
power stations and other industrial plant, migratory fish like salmon and 
trout would return to the Thames. A  significant upgrade of the storm 
sewage tanks and the sewage treatment works meant that by 1980 the 
river’s pollution load had been reduced by 90 per cent.64
In the event, the GLC’s case against the barrage did indeed reflect 
the likely effect impounding the Thames would have on oxygen satur-
ation and water temperature upstream. In October 1970, Zuckerman 
wrote to the prime minister advising that a barrier be built at Silvertown, 
financed at 50 per cent by central government, and investigations into 
all  other sites be  halted; in early November, the GLC was informed 
that Peter Walker, the first Secretary of State for the newly established 
Department of the Environment, agreed that a movable barrier was 
necessary and should cross the Thames at Silvertown.65 With this the 
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settled policy of both the government and the GLC, the type of barrier 
and the width of the openings once again became a source of contention. 
New solutions were prepared by the engineers, including a drum gate 
scheme which would involve deep excavation, until the idea of a ‘rising 
gate type’ was hit upon by Charles Draper. In this ingenious solution, the 
gates are attached to large wheel- like structures and sit on the bed of the 
river when open. Rotating the wheels lifts the gates into the closed pos-
ition between the piers.66
Things moved swiftly at a succession of meetings in December. 
The choice put by the GLC was between a ‘drop gate type’ with a main 
opening of 450 feet and auxiliary openings of 150 feet or a ‘rising gate 
type’ with three 200- feet openings, which would give an estimated cost 
saving of £9– 10 million. The PLA rejected the latter, explaining that tidal 
speeds and the angle of approach made it likely that large ships would hit 
the piers, but the response by the GLC’s consulting engineers was that the 
drop gate type was not practical and, in any case, fewer than two ships of 
over 10,000 tons per day now passed Silvertown for upriver berths and 
their navigational difficulties could be resolved if Voight Schnieder tugs 
were introduced.67 Allies of the PLA now gave way. The Department of 
Trade and Industry conceded that 450 feet was ideal, but 200 feet might 
work; the Chamber of Shipping and Trinity House insisted 450 feet was 
preferable, but an appropriate system of tugs would make 200 feet pos-
sible. Increasingly isolated, the PLA made a stand against a rising sector 
gate, insisting the risk of collision was high, but its offer to accept a 350- 
foot drop gate and two 200- foot rising gates was politely rejected by the 
Department of Environment. In a press release of 22 December, Peter 
Walker accepted the GLC’s recommendation of a rising sector type and 
expressed his hope that construction would begin in 1973. According 
to a scribbled note on a draft letter, the ‘clinching’ moment came when 
Trinity House broke ranks with the PLA.68
Although the River Thames (Barrier and Flood Prevention) Bill 
1972 had the backing of the Department of the Environment, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Department of Trade and Industry, 
it was, as befitted its statutory responsibility, a private bill promoted 
jointly by the GLC and the Kent and Essex river authorities. It was not, 
as such, a government bill, although in the end the Treasury footed 
most of the bill. In the months preceding the first reading, Whitehall 
was irritated by the PLA’s continuing attempt to undermine the deci-
sion and the failure of the GLC to deal effectively with the political 
fall out, which seemed of a piece with its earlier assumption that the 
Department of Environment would make the difficult decisions on 
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their behalf and force the PLA into submission.69 Nigel Spearing, 
Labour MP for Acton, proved particularly awkward. During the parlia-
mentary debate on the second reading he made it clear he did not wish 
to see the bill fail, but he questioned proceedings that had seen the 
navigational interest bullied into accepting the 200- foot opening at a 
‘murky’ meeting in the Department of the Environment in late 1970.70 
There was some truth to this, but only the most partisan of observers 
could suggest that the PLA had been the victim of a process outlined 
by one Whitehall civil servant in 1968 as the ‘History of the Thames 
Barrier Project. “The years the locusts ate.” ’71
A new envirotechnical regime
Waverley had urged the construction of a retractable barrier across the 
River Thames not simply as a response to the catastrophic events of 31 
January 1953 but as a necessary defence against a set of geophysical 
and climatic developments that could not be controlled or overcome any 
other way. Of all the official documentation generated by the question, it 
was perhaps a note by the Treasury that best captured the meaning of this 
intervention. When the PLA claimed that the state should cover the costs 
of pilotage, comparing passage through the barrier to passage through 
Tower Bridge, the Treasury responded:
It seems to us, however, to be dangerous to imply that the Barrier 
is in the same category as Tower Bridge. The Barrier is not 
simply an inconvenience:  it is something which changed physical 
characteristics of the river itself have made necessary. In these 
circumstances our general line on compensation etc. should surely 
be negotiating the Barrier will become part of the true cost of using 
the Thames for shipping purposes in much the same way as natural 
reefs and obstructions.72
Foregrounding the need to respond to the ‘changed characteristics of the 
river’ identified a distinct category of state activity. The solution chosen, 
and the navigable costs associated with it, should not obscure the singu-
larity of the problem: there was nothing whimsical about the proposed 
barrier. Consequently, it was plausible for the government to categorise 
its technological response to climate change as equivalent to ‘natural 
reefs and obstructions’: the specificity of the barrier made it no less inev-
itable. And by dissolving the distinction between technology and the 
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natural world, the Treasury effectively categorised the Thames Estuary 
as ‘second nature’.
But that ‘second nature’ had already been subject to change, as 
Leslie Wood’s account of the PLA’s successful attempt to restore the 
Thames tideway as a habitat for fishes made clear. This is part of a larger 
story that challenges the declensionist narrative that once dominated 
environmental history. De- industrialisation and improved sewage tech-
nologies have improved riverine habitats throughout the post- industrial 
world. To take one example, this is part of the story Leona Skelton tells 
in her history of the River Tyne.73 Writing on the eve of the barrier’s 
completion, Wood noted its environmental effects ‘are likely to be insig-
nificant’ but he warned that if it were used as a half- tide barrier, as oppor-
tunistic barrage enthusiasts had proposed, it would create a localised 
thermal barrier that would interrupt fish migration and keep mudflats 
covered, thereby impeding wildfowl access to tubificid worms, which in 
turn would be affected by the size of particulate matter in the substrate 
caused by silting.74 The ecological implications of the half- tide use of the 
barrier were understood in the early 1970s and the view in Whitehall 
appears to have been that this possible use of the barrier represented 
such a significant alteration to their intentions that it would need sep-
arate consideration by government and therefore need not be resolved 
in order for the primary legislation to go ahead.75
Although the Thames Barrier has not been used as a half- tide 
barrage, its meaning would nonetheless change, undermining the claim 
that its high- tech stainless steel structures were in some ontological 
sense ‘natural’. Originally intended to protect London against the cyc-
lical consequences of interglacial weather patterns, it is now regarded 
as the city’s first defence against the threat posed by anthropogenic cli-
mate change, a shift in historical sensibility as significant as any that has 
gone before. A second Thames Barrier, much larger and further down-
stream, has been proposed, but the Environment Agency says there is 
no need before 2070: the existing barrier is used more frequently than 
was anticipated, but remains fit for purpose. Jon Agar asks if there is a 
British equivalent to the ‘technological sublime’ identified by David Nye 
with respect to the awe generated by the human- built component of the 
territories of the United States.76 Does the Thames Barrier qualify? Its 
iconic design, particularly when the gates are raised, has inspired some 
magnificent photographs, but to visit its decaying visitor centre under 
more ordinary circumstances delivers a milder thrill. As a large- scale 
state project conceived at the height of post- war dirigisme but opened 
when under sustained ideological assault, the potential of the Thames 
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Barrier as spectacle has perhaps never been fully realised. The contrast 
with the highly commercialised redevelopment of London’s docklands 
in the 1980s and 1990s, a symbol first of Thatcherite hubris and now 
of Britain’s embrace of a post- industrial and neo- liberal economy, is 
striking. Aesthetically, the barrier is of a piece with docklands; politic-
ally, it is of a piece with Thamesmead. Either way, it was foundational 
to the transformation of an envirotechnical regime in a period of signifi-
cant political change. In this respect, the barrier is comparable to the 
equally iconic Intercity 125 locomotive (British Rail Class 43) of 1976, 
another engineering product of the mixed economy, which helped 
renew an equally significant envirotechnical regime and whose working 
life has also exceeded expectations: Class 43 was later privatised, a fate 
yet to befall the barrier.77
To observe that the barrier’s existence, and more particularly its 
possible supplement, helps protect private as well as public interests 
raises profound questions about environmental justice. Londoners are 
safe from the potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change 
not because they are blessed by geographical good fortune but because 
they live in a wealthy state capable of mobilising sufficient resources 
to mount an effective defence. People facing periodic coastal flooding 
elsewhere, whether it is in peripheral parts of the developed world, 
which include the north or south- west of England, or on a more cata-
strophic scale in the developing world, do so not because they are pecu-
liarly geographically vulnerable but because they are of low national 
priority or live in states incapable of developing the necessary defen-
sive infrastructure. Historians of climate change, and particularly 
historians of the technological solutions intended to mitigate its effect, 
should not lose sight of the global inequalities that give structures like 
the Thames Barrier meaning. Faced with the global consequences of 
the carbon economy’s long history, in no meaningful sense can it be 
said that the polluter pays.
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The woods for the state
Mat Paskins
Introduction
During the period and aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars longstanding 
fears about timber supply became an imminent risk throughout Europe 
as a result of an increased pace of ship- building for private as well as 
military purposes, increasing use of timber for non- naval purposes.1 
These years also saw a plethora of writing about trees in Britain that 
was strikingly literary, concerned with securing scientific knowledge, 
and highly critical of the state. In 1831, sixteen years after Napoleon 
had been defeated, the Scottish landowner Patrick Matthew published 
a book titled On Naval Timber, which discussed recent attempts by the 
government to plant timber trees in the Forest of Dean by depicting a 
scene of bucolic carnage. Matthew described how officials had ‘planted 
and replanted trees, persevering even to the fifth time’, but ‘the seeds did 
not vegetate, and the plants refused to grow’. Then,
the natural richness of the soil threw up such a flush of vegetation – 
of grass, and herbs, and shrubs, that most of these plants were 
buried under this luxuriance; and how the mice and the emmets, 
and other wayfarers, hearing, by the bruit of fame, of the wise men 
who had the governing of Dean, assembled from the uttermost 
ends of the island, expecting a millennium in the forest, and ate up 
almost every plant which had survived the smothering. Now, this is 
well; we rejoice over the natural justice of the native and legitimate 
inhabitants of the Royal Domain, the weeds mastering the invaders 
the plants, who, year after year, to the amount of many millions, 
made hostile entrance into the forest.2
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This chapter is about the context that gave birth to Matthew’s 
strange hybrid way of writing about trees and their meanings for the state. 
Its technologies are newly introduced species of tree, meant to be more 
productive than existing ones; new techniques meant to encourage the 
rapid growth of trees; systems of quantification that allow for the value 
of trees to be assessed; and the timber that was extracted, measured and 
tested. Talking about ‘technologies’ in the nineteenth century is somewhat 
anachronistic  – while the word was coined in the eigh teenth century, 
it was not widely used until the earlier twentieth. The eighteenth- and 
nineteenth- century term that did cover projects like tree planting or intro-
duction of novel crops, as well as engineering projects, was ‘improvement’. 
While it does not have quite the same connotations as ‘technology’ would 
gain during the twentieth century, improvement was a coverall term for 
enlightened and rationalising activity, natural and artificial.3
If we accept, however, the claim in the opening chapter of this 
volume that ‘Environments, when cast as means towards ends, are 
technological in form’, then technology can be treated as an analysts’ 
rather than an actors’ category.4 In this sense woodlands and their 
products are technological in four main ways. First, they involve 
attempts to apply formal regimes of calculation to processes that had 
previously been going on without quantification of this kind. Second, 
they foreground processes and practices that were claimed to be artifi-
cial – growing trees in soils that were thought not to suit them, introdu-
cing new species, deliberately planting rather than allowing woodlands 
to grow of their own accord  – against those that were claimed to be 
natural. Whether this division between the natural and the artificial 
really existed is not at issue:  the point is that tree writers believed it 
did, and generally lined up on one side of the artifice/ natural divide. 
In other words, the divide provided rhetorical resources through which 
different ideas about nature and artifice could be articulated. Third, 
timber played a major infrastructural role, as a major raw material of 
a wooden world.5 Trees and timber were assessed for naval purposes, 
but also for pit props, firewood, hop-poles, fencing, building materials, 
furniture making and so on. These various uses were a major concern 
of tree writers during this period but have often been overlooked by 
historians who have been more concerned with the noise of naval con-
troversies. Finally, this chapter emphasises the crooked roads that ran 
from woodlands to the use of timber: the technical activities of hacking, 
shaping, estimating, felling, squaring and hawing, which were involved 
in shaping timber out of trees.
Like other chapters in this book, in other words, this chapter is 
concerned with some of the ways in which plants might be considered 
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as technologies. The organisms discussed here are not quite like the 
‘industrial plants’ that Matthew Holmes discusses in Chapter  8 of this 
volume:  although attempts were made to speed the growth of slow- 
growing timber trees, this was not entirely connected either to capitalist 
goals or to mechanical processes, and did not involve interventions from 
formalised science. And as we will see, there was also no neat fit between 
attempts to improve the production of timber and the enterprises that 
made use of them. Like the potato experiments that Dominic Berry 
describes in Ormskirk (Chapter 9), experimental planting efforts raised 
questions about the geography of technical improvement, with sites far 
from the beaten track presenting themselves as having made transforma-
tive discoveries.
We cannot, however, see technologised organisms and environ-
ments as operating against the static backdrop of an unchanging state. 
Because of trees’ rich symbolic associations, woodland management has 
often been regarded as an allegory for state power. In James Scott’s book 
Seeing Like a State, for example, the rationalising approaches of German 
Scientific Forestry are used to identify the ways in which centralising 
states abstract from local conditions – a problem that in Scott’s view has 
run throughout schemes of modernisation in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries.6 This is close to the story that Esa Ruuskanen tells in his 
chapter of this volume (Chapter 2), about how ‘Imperial eyes’ came to 
regard Irish boglands as potentially exploitable resources, neglecting 
existing customary uses. Although woodland historians have seriously 
contested the view of the relationship between woodlands and the 
state upon which Scott drew, arguing that it mistakes the aspirations 
and rhetoric of scientific foresters for their achievements, his view 
remains a powerful lens for thinking about how the state relates to its 
environments.7
As we will see, however, the British state’s relation to timber was 
not centralising in the manner of Scott’s scientific foresters. To write ser-
iously about trees during this period, British authors had to re- assemble 
the varied users and producers of timber and their relations with the 
state. Natural historical information, political allegories, accounts of 
local customs and attempts to quantify different planting practices were 
inextricably linked in British works about forestry. The state appeared 
in a number of different aspects:  as a guarantor for future security 
of the land; as a contractor with timber merchants; as a (bad) man-
ager of its own lands; as an illegitimate incursion into the lives of the 
people and their rights to plant trees; as a collector of data and tester of 
materials. Rather than cohering into a central, domineering entity, the 
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state proliferated in a huge variety of local manifestations. Writers on 
plantation could not, so to speak, see the woods for the state.
The linked representation of the state and woodland management 
was also conditioned by two significant absences. The first was a lack of 
clear information about what private reserves of timber Britain actually 
possessed. Surveys of private timber were attempted without success. 
The Admiralty distrusted the timber merchants who supplied timber to 
its dockyards but did not know how to do without them. There was little 
foundation for general theories of plantation and the information that 
did circulate was highly partial and particular.
The second absence was that only a relatively small proportion 
of timber for naval purposes was produced within Britain itself. Most 
was imported  – from the Baltic, and increasingly from South Asia 
and North American colonial territories as well. These ‘ghost acres’ 
are of course a significant theme in British environmental history, 
because they allowed the kingdom to prosper on the basis of exploit-
ation of resources from elsewhere.8 But they had a strange effect on 
understandings of timber within Britain itself as well, intensifying the 
sense that woodlands might, potentially, be required in a situation of 
emergency, when imports were not available. Because of the long times 
that trees require to grow, this was a slow contingency, a delayed emer-
gency. And as a result, most of the proposals for planting were intensely 
speculative, seeking purchase on unknown future conditions. And 
because they were speculative, considering future possibilities rather 
than absolutely immediate concerns, they could be used to imagine 
quite radical changes.
These absences, I argue, were at the heart of all British tree- writing 
during this period. For this reason, we need to be cautious in evaluating 
the different schemes for indigenous timber production that proliferated 
between the mid- eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While 
planters might offer potent and persuasive views about the relationship 
between woodlands and the state, advancing their arguments required 
entanglements with the state’s existing ways of dealing with timber, 
and the two absences described above. For this reason, we should not 
see discussions of woodlands in Britain during this period as emerging 
from simple differences in attitude and policy between elite networks, as 
Fredrik Jonsson does in his book Enlightenment’s Frontier: The Scottish 
Highlands and the Origins of Environmentalism. According to Jonsson, 
networks of improving landowners in the highlands of Scotland were 
divided between those who advocated a ‘liberal ecology of commerce’ 
based on free trade, and ‘civic cameralists’, who supported autarkic 
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self- sufficiency and ‘argued for the prudence of long- term manage-
ment of forest resources by the government and eminent landowners’.9 
The division between these views was real enough, but in practice both 
points of view collided with existing state structures.
The second section of this chapter discusses the different aspects 
of the state that were relevant for woodlands, drawing on work by 
Martin Wilcox, Roger Knight and Joanna Innes. It then examines the 
state’s failed attempts to conduct surveys of private timber resources and 
attempts to deal directly with timber merchants and the shift towards 
increasing imports. The third section of the chapter describes attempts 
to treat private reports of tree planting as experimental knowledge, 
focusing on the plantation reports received by the London- based Society 
for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce. Although 
these reports could not provide the national overview for which their 
creators longed, they represented rich discussions of the perils and 
enthusiasms involved in plantation, and the connection between private 
planting and the activities of the state. The chapter then goes on to ana-
lyse radical works on plantation of William Cobbett, William Withers, 
which reconfigured speculative hopes about plantation into a vision of 
resistance to the state and a revivified national landscape. Finally, the 
chapter examines the conclusions that can be drawn from these rich, 
hybrid works about trees as visions of the environment, technology and 
the state in modern Britain.
Woodland surveys and the contractor state
Historians since Robert Albion’s 1926 book Forests and Sea Power: The 
Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652– 1862 have taken pains to show 
that timber supply was never simply about trees.10 Most timber for 
naval purposes was imported in any case; it was only for certain ‘knee’ 
timbers that British oak was deemed essential. Albion followed his 
sources in thinking that the real problem lay with corruption and mis-
management in the Royal Dockyards; later histories have queried this 
conclusion by suggesting that the dockyards were more effective than 
Albion suggested, and that naval officials used the question of potential 
shortages to press for the reforms that they desired. Clive Wilkinson, for 
example, concludes that there was not a lot of neglect at the dockyards 
during the eighteenth century: at the end of 1770, the Royal Navy was 
able to use 12,177 loads of oak timber and 1,315 loads of oak plank, all 
of British origin.11
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In dealing with timber and the question of its local availability, 
various agencies of the British state acted as what Martin Wilcox and 
Roger Knight term ‘the contractor state’.12 This was that aspect of state 
power devoted to dealing with private contractors that furnished the 
state with supplies:  Knight and Wilcox’s case is the Navy Victualling 
Board, which was responsible for providing provisions to the fleet.13 
They argue that working with a very large number of outside contractors 
offered four major advantages for the state. First, outsiders could buy 
in markets in which the government was unable to participate. Second, 
contractors had much greater knowledge of ‘complex and sophisticated 
markets’ – such as the international wheat market – than the govern-
ment possessed. Third, the ‘machinery of war was easier to dismantle’, 
because the state did not have to put capital into projects serviced by 
contractors. Fourth, established contractors were able to ‘expand when 
the state demand[ed] it with flexibility and with greater speed than 
[could] a state machine’. Wilcox and Knight conclude that ‘it was the 
strong industrial base outside the state establishments which gave the 
British government the means to overcome its enemies’.14
In relation to trees, the contractor state appeared in the dealings 
of timber merchants with dockyards. Part of the relationship between 
the state and its contractors was the use of the Royal Forests. In 
1706, Edward Wilcox  – the surveyor general of the forests south of 
the Trent – wrote that the timber of the New Forest ‘should not be cut 
except on extraordinary occasions, but should be preserved as a check 
upon the timber merchants, who, when it was gone, would impose 
what rates they pleased’.15 Among state agencies, too, there were many 
spaces for suspicion of collusion with the merchants, by accepting poor 
quality timber at too- high prices. The dockyards were overseen by the 
Navy Board, whose actions were often challenged by the Admiralty. 
Suspicion fell upon the Navy Board, the dockyards and the merchants 
themselves; the Board and dockyards blamed the Admiralty for insti-
tuting policies that made it more difficult to obtain timber from the 
merchants. As we will see, many discussions of private timber produc-
tion focused exclusively on the activities of landowners, but the con-
tractor state was always present as well. As with victuals, there were 
aspects of dealing with timber that the state struggled to broker with 
landlords directly.
A second aspect of the state’s activities that was important in 
dealing with timber was data collection and surveying exercises. The 
challenges that this involved can be seen from the county surveys of 
the Board of Agriculture, which were conducted from 1793 onwards.16 
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The Board was a hybrid of state agency and private concern. Its 
surveyors aimed to give a picture of the ways in which agriculture 
was conducted throughout the kingdom, and how it might best be 
improved. The Board’s surveys were hesitant to talk about the policies 
of individual landowners: one surveyor, in a discussion of the manage-
ment strategies of Joseph Banks, apologised as ‘many of my readers 
will probably censure me, for entering thus widely into calculations, 
concerning the private property of an individual’.17 Surveys of different 
counties varied tremendously as to the ways they collected data; 
where the Board’s reports did discuss woodlands, they did so in very 
general terms. The report for Essex contained what the agricultural 
writer William Marshall described as ‘an undigested mass of materials, 
giving the general idea that South Essex abounds in woodlands, but no 
estimate of aggregate extent’.18 That for the North Riding of Yorkshire 
contained a section on the Disposal of Timber, which claimed that ‘it 
is the practice in this Riding to sell the falls of wood to professional 
wood- buyers, who cut up the trees in the woods, according to the 
purposes for which they are best calculated, and the most valuable’.19 
Marshall thought this was nonsense, because timber merchants could 
not possibly possess expert knowledge of the shapes of timber which 
the navy would require:
when he says … ‘All the ship- timber grown in the Riding is thus cut 
up in the woods, into shapes ready for the builder to make use of,’ 
he is certainly wrong. It is not probable that in any part of the Riding 
such a practice prevails:  it being impossible for the woodman to 
know exactly the wants of the ship builder, unless the latter were to 
furnish him with molds.20
This was as close as any of the reports came to giving details of the 
interactions between the land on which timber grew and the people who 
dealt in it. The Board’s surveys, as rich and locally oriented as they were, 
gave no serious impression of the workings of the contractor state, or the 
holdings of private landowners.
Other surveys tried to grapple with the absence of knowledge of 
timber supplies. Looking back from 1810, Henry Dundas described the 
‘alarm in the public mind’ that had commenced in 1771, and how sub-
sequent years had seen greatly ‘increased consumption of oak timber for 
machinery for which fir cannot be substituted’, including ‘canals and wet 
docks, mill- work, engines, lighters, barges and other purposes’.21 Dundas 
had been treasurer to the Admiralty from 1782 until 1800, when he 
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resigned amid allegations of financial impropriety that finally led to his 
impeachment. He concluded that:
if the prosperity of this country should continue, the consump-
tion of oak timber, for its internal purposes, and for the shipping 
necessary for the whole of our Trade, including that of the East 
India Company, would, at no very distant period, furnish an ample 
demand for all that could be expected to be produced on private 
property in this kingdom.22
As a result, Dundas had decided in 1792 that ‘the state of Naval Timber 
… required an immediate and radical investigation’, under the auspices 
of the Commission of Naval Revision. The investigation, Dundas claimed, 
was far- reaching:
the enquiries … took a most extensive range, so as to enable them 
to bring together and methodize a mass of useful information, 
collected from almost every part of the United Kingdom, from a 
great variety of different sources; and from persons whose interests 
and objects were not only different, but whose character and situ-
ation must place them above the suspicion of giving erroneous 
information.23
Informants included the ‘most eminent land- surveyors and timber dealers 
in every part of the kingdom; the purveyors of His Majesty’s Dock- yard, 
and the gentlemen assembled at the Quarter Sessions of every county in 
England’, as well as ‘various noblemen and gentlemen, whose extensive 
possessions, and knowledge of the resources and management of timber, 
gave them advantages of information which could not fail to render the 
communications from such authorities, highly useful and instructive’.24 
Despite the value of this material, however, its publication had been 
prohibited, a censorship that appalled Dundas as (he claimed) earlier 
moments of crisis had been averted ‘by the publication of the state of 
timber in this kingdom and by looking at the danger of a scarcity boldly 
in the face’.25
At the time he wrote these observations on timber, Dundas 
was under investigation for corruption and his perspective was obvi-
ously partial. Heavily embroiled with the East India Company, he also 
argued for an increase in imports of teak as a substitute for oak. These 
other concerns guided his approach towards the question of local pro-
duction:  his ‘appreciation of domestic forestry was undermined by his 
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commitment to imperial rule in South Asia’.26 Jonsson regards this as 
a controversy with autarkic policies of self- sufficiency on one side and 
the ‘neo- mercantilist’ commitment to trade and use of colonial imports 
on the other. The Admiralty commissioned a large number of ships built 
from teak, ‘entrenching Dundas’s vision in the naval budget, although 
the Asian timber never came into widespread use’.27 In the longer term, 
British timber was increasingly imported from North America, and 
‘Pax Britannica underwrote the exploitation of ghost acres in the New 
World’.28 So Dundas was perhaps being disingenuous about the difficul-
ties in assessing local timber resources.
Whatever Dundas’ intentions were, though, the fact remained at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, naval authorities found them-
selves in an embarrassing situation in dealing with timber from British 
sources. Besides the lack of knowledge, one source of the embarrass-
ment was an attempt by the state to work around the timber merchants 
and to deal with landowners directly. According to a very angry corres-
pondence between the Admiralty and representatives of the Navy Board, 
supplies of oak timber had been in a state of uncertainty since 1802, 
when tightened restrictions in the dockyards had led to a significant 
reduction in the quantities of timber being accepted for naval use.29 The 
Admiralty blamed the Navy Board for collusion with the merchants; the 
Board claimed that the Admiralty had refused to acknowledge the risk 
of reduced supplies if the terms for merchants were made less favour-
able. The Admiralty had since 1792 also been seeking timber from the 
Royal Forests, but here again there was a strong sense that stocks had 
been wildly overestimated. Sir William Rule, the chief naval surveyor, 
was dispatched to obtain timber directly from landlords; advertisements 
were published inviting merchants directly to tree auctions; many of the 
merchants rebuffed the offer, saying there wasn’t enough time for them 
to make a fair estimation of the value of the timber, and the results were 
not the success for which the Admiralty had hoped. Where previously 
go- betweens had dealt with the processes of judging and transporting 
timber, authorities were now attempting to control the supply chain dir-
ectly to undermine the merchants. These efforts had failed, however. As 
the Navy Board gloomily noted in 1804:
Our late Advertisement, signifying the Navy Board was willing to 
treat for Oak Timber from the Growers, without the intervention 
of a Dealer, has not brought many offers; and the difficulty which 
attends the manufacturing of the Timber, namely, the felling, 
squaring and hawling to water- carriage, together with the sale of 
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the bark tops and lops is so great, that very few Gentlemen will give 
themselves the trouble to attend to it; and it is next to impossible for 
the Navy Board to undertake it, without running the risk of consid-
erable depredation and loss, and employing Purveyors all over the 
kingdom. In those instances where we have tried it, the Timber has 
cost the Public much more than by the usual means; and I hold it to 
be next to impossible that 30,000 Loads of Timber is to be procured 
but by Timber- dealers.30
As a result of the immense difficulty of dealing directly with landowners, 
the Admiralty’s increasing distrust of the timber merchants, and the 
increasing sense that underlying both was a genuine shortage of timber 
as a result of rising demand, the difficulties of dealing with indigenous 
sources appeared intractable.
Private accounts
If it was indelicate to publish calculations about landowners’ property, 
would they nevertheless be willing to vouch for themselves? Many land-
owners were enthusiastic tree planters, committed to new species that 
might be useful substitutes for oak. Jonsson discusses the example of 
the Duke of Atholl, who supported the widespread introduction of larch, 
and even built a vessel from larch to demonstrate its timber’s viability for 
naval construction.31 Although Atholl’s status enabled him to advance his 
claims further than others, however, his enthusiasm for larch was of a 
piece with excitable works published by other planters. Patrick Matthew 
regarded these enthusiasms with fond scorn:
almost every author has his own particular mania, which few 
common readers have sufficient knowledge of the subject to discrim-
inate from the saner matter: and as, from the nature of hobbies – 
from some shrewd enough guesses by the owner that they are his 
own undoubted property  – and, perhaps, from some misgivings, 
that what he advances on these is not perfectly self- evident, he is 
thence the more disposed to expatiate upon them, and embellish. 
The credulous and inexperienced, partly from this, and partly from 
the fascination of the very improbability, rush at once into the snare; 
bring the speculations or assertions to practical test; get quickly 
disenchanted by realities, and ever after are disposed to treat all 
written directions on material science with contempt.32
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Matthew was not dismissing all attempts to provide written directions for 
planting; only the tendency to focus on one approach over and against 
others. His metaphor of property for the planters’ sense of their own 
hobbies captured the link between local experience and general enthu-
siasm: the tendency to treat successes in planting that had been achieved 
privately as though they should be enforced throughout the whole 
kingdom.
From the 1750s, the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, 
Manufactures and Commerce in London had offered money and medals 
for reports of tree planting. The Society was founded by a group of nat-
ural philosophers and philanthropists; early on its membership swelled 
to include numerous members of Parliament and landowners as well.33 
Initially intended to encourage planting on a small scale, the Society’s 
scheme eventually rewarded correspondents from throughout the 
kingdom, who planted on scales that ranged from the great to the small.
In 1833 the Society’s secretary Arthur Aikin noted that it had spent 
the past 80 years collecting testimonials of landowners’ experiments on 
different ways of growing trees. What was needed, Aikin claimed, were 
‘histories of plantations sufficient in number and in their details to allow 
of a fair comparison to be made of different modes of management, 
modified by varieties of soil, of climate, and of exposure’.34 The reason 
this had not happened so far, Aikin claimed, was because of the peculiar 
ways in which reports of tree planting were unlike descriptions of other 
agricultural experiments. Most experimental crops would grow within 
one year; in consequence ‘all the particulars … of an agricultural experi-
ment, together with its final result, are easily observed and registered’.35 
Without difficulty, a single person could perform many experiments, 
‘with the reasonable hope of deciding in a few years the comparative 
advantages of different modes, either of general management, or of the 
culture of any particular crop’. But in general trees would not be ready 
for 50 years; oaks would take a century. As such, single experiments in 
planting could rarely be ‘conducted from beginning to end by the same 
person’.36 Moreover, memoranda recording effective practice were likely 
to be lost ‘in the course of time, or by transfer of the property from one 
owner to another’. This was the source, Aikin argued, of the ‘contrar-
iety … both in principle and in practice’37 between tree planters.
Aikin suggested that accounts of planting should be made com-
mensurate and comparable with each other. This did not happen, and 
may have been impossible. The accounts that the Society had received 
varied tremendously in their presentation and the amount of informa-
tion they contained. This does not mean they contained no quantitative 
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information:  far from it. But the most quantitative accounts tended to 
include considerable speculative matter, projecting the likely growth 
of trees into the future; those planters who did draw on each other’s 
accounts tried to base these future speculations on the experiments of 
others. Those experiments themselves, however, were often highly par-
ticularist and speculative. Mary Morgan has observed that the usual form 
for published agricultural experiments during this period was to present 
them in the form of profit and loss accounts. In this way the advantages 
of two different forms of management could be compared at a glance; 
with the self- evidence of a sum, one could be made to appear superior 
to another.38
When records of tree planting were given in the form of financial 
accounts, there was a neat fit between materiality and their accumu-
lating value:  trees were believed to grow in both size and value at a 
relatively steady rate, and  it was tempting to present their growth as 
a form of materialised compound interest. Some planters noted that 
the rate at which trees grew declined as they aged, and a few used 
each other’s accounts to calculate the optimal time for cutting by com-
paring likely rates of growth to likely increases of profit. As the natural 
philosopher and Bishop of Llandaff Richard Watson put it, ‘if profit is 
considered, every tree of every kind ought to be cut down, and sold, 
when the annual increase in value of the tree, but its growth, is less 
than the annual increase of the money it would sell for’.39 Watson used 
tables of tree growth that had been calculated by the landowner Robert 
Marsham and published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society during the 1750s; the Society subsequently rewarded other 
tables of tree growth as well.40 Their use did not become standard, 
though. Marshall, for example, was critical of the serenity of these 
calculations: they were marvellous for those with existing plantations, 
and an ‘eligible speculation’ for those who could expect their oaks to 
reach maturity ‘in ten, fifteen, or twenty years’. But for ‘proprietors of 
younger timber, to play so high a game’ entailed very significant risks, 
as he might hope for good return on the basis that the state might sud-
denly cut the price it was willing to pay.41
Young and Marshall argued about the meaning of interest in 
connection with forested land. Because land planted with slow- growing 
timber trees could not be let out for other purposes before the trees 
were mature, there was no hope of increasing rents on it on the basis 
of its increased productivity, as there might be for other improved land. 
Young argued that any understanding of ‘interest’ needed to interpret 
its value in national rather than private terms: an organisation like the 
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Society of Arts should consider how ‘such interest is made every day, and 
every hour nationally, though not individually’.42 That is, calculations of 
interest should not focus primarily on private profit. He contrasted timber 
trees, which produced nothing ‘of their principal crop for 150 years’, and 
corn, which
instantly circulates, and produces a national compound interest; 
and the prodigious difference in the account at the end of 140 years, 
would be infinitely more valuable to the kingdom, where in the 
light of money, or profit, or of defence even than any thing to be 
derived in speculation from the possession of oak.43
That is, the ability to increase the power and happiness of the kingdom 
by feeding people was of more value than the shady hopes that were held 
out for oak. Moreover, the association with naval timber meant that even 
the private growth of oak was never innocent of the wider purposes of 
the state. Young alluded to:
The trading system which makes the necessity of isles in the West 
manured with African blood; and conquests in the East acquired and 
kept, I will not say on what principles – creating the necessity of a 
navy to defend them – and, by re- action, rendering such possessions 
necessary to support the navy; a fine system, that has, in a single 
century, burthened us with a debt of 240 millions, and is in all its 
principles, bearings, and combinations, so abhorrent to what ought, 
and will sometimes or other be the feelings of country gentlemen, 
that they will plant plague, pestilence, and famine on their land, as 
readily as oak, the use of which they know, by cruel experience?44
Aikin hoped for an aggregation of local experience which could give 
a picture of the nation as the sum of richly different component parts. 
The private accounts of planters, however, saw the question of the rela-
tion between their woods and the state in different ways. For Young, 
woodlands connected landowners to the vicious system of imperial 
trade and sequestered the ‘interest’ of improvement in the present. For 
enthusiasts like Watson, young woods of mixed species symbolised 
rational inheritance; for others, they indicated the guarantees that the 
state would need to supply. And in their ardours these accounts were 
remote from the demands of timber merchants and the contractor state, 
instead imagining that timber was sold directly to supply the needs of 
the state.
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Radical planters
By the 1820s, the lack of reliable information about private woodlands, 
criticism of state planting policy and particularist reports of local 
plantations formed a matrix that the journalist and provocateur William 
Cobbett, together with his friend William Withers, used to deploy a pol-
itically radical vision of tree planting. While Cobbett’s advocacy of tree 
planting was as hobbyish as that of any of the authors who Matthew had 
condemned, it was different from what had come before because it delib-
erately challenged the presumptuous claims of large- scale landowners 
and the state. Through their publications and networks of correspond-
ence, Cobbett and Withers constructed alliances that were intended to 
challenge the workings and inertia of the state.
The forum for these projects of planting was the explosion of print 
periodicals of the early nineteenth century, including the learned reviews 
and the specialist gardening press, as well as short, privately printed 
pamphlets and more expansive books.45 The radical planters faced 
challenges in translating the rich combination of political symbolism and 
practical technique, their own ways of valuing timber, from their own 
networks to the world of print.
Part of Cobbett’s authorial persona was that  of a man who was 
always active in the landscape:  who could always judge where a tree 
should be planted, and was always able to reckon the rational increase 
and compounding value of woodlands and other agricultural activities. 
This intuitive grasp of what rural life and the rural landscape required 
was contrasted with the rampant wickedness of the state, whose out-
rageous taxation appeared in the landscape in the form of unwanted 
fortifications, mindless road improvement schemes, fields lying fallow 
and the other activities of ‘fund- holders, pensioners, soldiers, dead- 
weight, and other swarms of tax- eaters’.46 As Cobbett put it, ‘If I  write 
grammars; if I write on agriculture; if I sow, plant, or deal in seeds; what-
ever I do, has first in view the destruction of those infamous tyrants.’47
Cobbett claimed that the difficulty of obtaining accurate infor-
mation about timber production served as yet another example of the 
government’s negligent corruption. He noted darkly: ‘If I were a Member 
of Parliament, I would know what timber has been cut down, and what 
it has been sold for, since the year 1790.’48 In the early 1820s, Cobbett 
started to lobby in favour of the timber of a tree he had observed in North 
America, the locust. In 1817, when Cobbett was living in Long Island, he 
had seen locust trees and products made from their timbers, and become 
excited about their possibilities. Returning to England in 1819, he 
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brought a parcel of seeds, but (he claimed) had no means of sowing them 
until 1823. This he began on a very small scale, then ‘sold the plants; and 
since that time [had] sold altogether more than a million of them!’49
Through his weekly political journal, The Political Register, in a book 
about woodlands and through a nursery behind his house in London, 
Cobbett claimed to have distributed hundreds of thousands of locust trees, 
whose timber – he claimed – would amply substitute for oak. To support 
his campaign, he sought testimonials from eminent friends, including 
Radnor’s bailiff, Viscount Folkestone and various worthies he had known 
in Long Island. His book on woodlands incorporated multiple testimonials 
from these people, in which the durability of fence posts made of locust 
became something like relics, material proof of the tree’s virtues. As 
Withers noted, ‘Mr Cobbett proceeds to state his anxious desire to procure 
evidence, that might substantiate the facts he had witnessed: he adduces 
testimonials, signed by witnesses of credit, in proof of the durability of the 
timber in certain cases particularly related by him.’50
Cobbett’s locust was a relatively familiar tree (the ‘false acacia’) 
made new and exciting by his advocacy on its behalf. Cobbett distributed 
trees from his farm in Barnes and the nursery at his house in Kensington, 
and ‘[a] lthough hundreds of the Robinia pseudoacadia stood unasked 
for in the British nurseries, the “locust plants”, which everyone believed 
could only be had genuine from Mr Cobbett, could not be grown by him in 
sufficient quantities to supply the demand’.51 So, it was alleged, Cobbett 
imported seed and ‘procured others, as well as young plants, from the 
London nurseries, and passed them off as his own raising or impor-
tation’.52 For present purposes, the truth or falsity of these allegations 
is less important than the fact that people connected the locust with 
Cobbett’s name and his personal custody of the precious trees.
Cobbett restricted his testimonials to his friends and admirers: he 
did not consult with timber merchants or dockyard officials, or try to 
locate locust trees within the existing networks of the contractor state. It 
was on this basis that his claims were challenged in print. A reviewer in 
the Edinburgh Review noted that advocates of the locust tree had ‘incon-
siderately proposed a multiplicity of uses to which they conceived it 
might be applicable, and have urged its extended cultivation with a zeal 
unwarranted by the test of experience’.53 The influential horticultural 
writer J.C. Loudon was particularly dismissive of Cobbett’s claims about 
the properties of the locust – because
the uses which he has enumerated do not amount to a hundredth 
part of those to which timber is applied in this country. Hence, 
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were his predictions to be verified, and were the locust to become 
more prevalent than the oak, we should find its wood a miserable 
substitute, in the construction of ships and houses, for that of our 
ordinary timber trees.54
At the height of his locust- mania, Cobbett wrote:
The time will come, and it will not be very distant, when the locust- 
tree will be more common in England than the oak; when a man 
would be thought mad if he used anything but locust in the making 
of sills, posts, gates, joists, feet for rick- stands, stocks and axletrees 
for wheels, hop- poles, pales, or for anything where there is liability 
to rot.55
Then he added: ‘This time will not be distant, seeing that the locust grows 
so fast.’ This symbolism was at least as important as the practical uses 
of the tree:  Cobbett’s version of patriotic sturdiness would not decay; 
its profits would always be realised; and the reasons this foreshadowed 
vision of the durable countryside had not come to pass was because of 
the physical and financial corruption of the state.
In 1842 Cobbett’s friend William Withers, an attorney from Holt 
in Norfolk, also published a pamphlet on the locust tree, which collected 
information from French sources as well as Cobbett’s allies. It was a sin-
cere attempt to set Cobbett’s claims on a sounder natural historical foun-
dation, and to prolong the campaign beyond Cobbett’s own death. During 
the 1820s, Withers had engaged in his own noisy campaign on behalf of a 
system of oak planting that required trees to be heavily manured during 
their early years of growth.
Withers opposed his techniques to what he called the ‘Scottish 
system of planting’, which was publicised in books and articles by the 
Scottish landowners Sir Henry Steuart and Sir Walter Scott. Steuart had 
argued that the properties of timber could only be judged by a land-
owner of long experience, and that increasing the rate of growth and 
moving trees from their natural place would injure the quality of the 
timber they produced, for ‘whatever tends to increase the wood, in a 
greater degree than accords with the species when in its natural state, 
must injure the quality of the timber’ and ‘slowness of growth is essen-
tial to the closeness of texture and durability of all timber, but especially 
of the oak’.56 This notion of ‘phytological affinity’ – that plants had cer-
tain soils that they favoured above others – was received wisdom among 
landowners.
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The rhetorical strategy Withers adopted to support his claims 
resembled Cobbett’s relentless, splenetic enthusiasm  – with one major 
difference. Where Cobbett put his own actions and personal friendships 
front and centre of any account of the trees he supported, Withers 
corresponded with people from a number of different social situations 
and who worked in a range of official capacities. His correspondents 
included timber merchants, sawyers, surveyors, chemists, engineers and 
landowners. Withers incorporated their responses into his publications. 
Rather than simply raging against stockjobbers and tax- eaters, as Cobbett 
had, he emphasised how the specialisation of knowledge about the uses 
of timber in different parts of the kingdom had to be re- assembled for the 
real value of timber to be assessed. Where Cobbett had simply asserted 
the reliability of his allies, Withers attempted to insinuate his approach to 
planting and managing oak trees into the crevices of the contractor state. 
Withers quoted from timber merchants in East Grinstead, Lambeth and 
Uxbridge who all agreed that quick- grown oak timber could be as fine as 
any other timber provided. As one of his correspondents put it,
the various forests of the government do not produce, on an 
average, more than one sixteenth of the oak timber consumed in 
his Majesty’s yards; the remainder is collected in the various parts 
of the kingdom, without having regard as heretofore to the part of 
the kingdom in which it grows.57
This suggested that traditional prejudices in favour of oak from certain 
counties could be overcome.
Not all of the correspondence from which Withers quoted supported 
his claims about the indifference of timber to the conditions in which it 
was grown, however. Withers quoted from a letter he had received from 
Peter Barlow, an engineer at the Woolwich dockyard. At Woolwich, Barlow 
had pioneered new ways of testing the strengths of different materials. He 
reported there were significant differences between varieties of timber:
I had much conversation with the different officers of the dock- yard 
here, on these and other practical points; and I  know it was the 
decided opinion of those gentlemen, and I have proved it by experi-
ment, that different specimens of English oak vary in their compara-
tive strength in the proportion of five to four, and in some cases in 
the proportion of seven to five, and that they always considered the 
strongest and best to be the produce of the best soil. The grain was 
straighter, and more compact and dense, and of brighter colour.58
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Barlow admitted, however, that he had not made ‘particular enquiries 
as to the soil and circumstances of the growth of the trees’, and so could 
not match his conclusions with actual conditions of growth. Nonetheless, 
Withers used Barlow’s test as proof that it was possible that timbers’ virtues 
did not ultimately depend upon the soils in which they were grown.
In botanical, agricultural and literary journals, Withers’ system was 
reviewed much more respectfully than Cobbett’s campaign for the locust 
tree had been, though there were serious criticisms. Several reviewers 
claimed that Withers had not travelled widely enough beyond Norfolk 
to know the soils and situations of the kingdom as a whole. The Journal 
of Agriculture in 1830 gave an extended review to Withers’ work, from 
the perspective of a landed proprietor, which was nervous about the 
replacement of an existing system of plantation by one of greater cost. 
The reviewer censured Withers because ‘[h] is own experiments … seem 
to have been limited to a few acres’,59 contrasting such a limited outlook 
with that of a nobleman who had planted ‘ten to fifteen thousand acres’, 
and seen ‘the wood of his own planting fashioned into ships of war’.60
Patrick Matthew, meanwhile, admired the boldness of Withers’ 
political claims even if he was dubious about his system. He noted 
with evident pleasure that ‘the discomfiture of the knights had been 
wrought by simple hands’.61 Matthew also thought that Withers had 
insufficient experience of different soils and trees that had grown rap-
idly; he described a prodigal ‘Celtic’ oak on his own land. It was locally 
associated with ‘miraculous virtue’, but turned out to have ‘soft tender’ 
wood; Matthew speculated that this might be because it fed on slops and 
‘like an animal in similar circumstances’ was of ‘soft flabby consistency’.62 
Matthew also conducted his own experiments into the strength of timber, 
and criticised Barlow’s experiments on the pieces of wood that Withers 
had submitted, for not attending to the point of the tree from which the 
timber had been taken.63
In 1832, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge published 
a book by George Sinclair on Useful and Ornamental Planting, which gave 
a sympathetic account of Withers’ techniques. Even this, however, treated 
the question of the effect of early trenching and manuring on the growth 
of trees as unproved, dependent upon local circumstance and requiring 
more experimental observation. Like so many observers of experimental 
accounts of plantation before him, Sinclair noted that there were ‘no 
satisfactory records of the comparative rate of increase of timber, or of 
solid vegetable fibre, after the first twenty or thirty years’ growth of the 
different species of forest- trees, which had been planted on trenched and 
manured ground’.64
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It is tempting to associate Cobbett’s and Withers’ campaigns with 
resistance to an ethos of conservation in favour of more rapid production. 
Cobbett’s and Withers’ radicalism sits somewhat askance to this oppos-
ition. In their enthusiastic ardour they were neither advocates for free 
trade nor supporters of the existing landed order. Instead, their works 
of natural history created a drama in which continuous human activity 
could produce a more fecund and secure nation; the virtue of such 
activity was directly materialised in techniques for planting and man-
aging trees. Precisely because tree planting was so immediate and yet 
so intimately connected with future hopes and promises, and because it 
joined together the locality with the wider concerns of the state, it could 
perform the role of radical improvement for which Cobbett and Withers 
longed. And because timber trees were apparently tangible sources of 
value, about which rational expectations of profit could be entertained, 
planting stood in stark opposition to the vagaries and phantasmal nature 
of the state’s productions. For Withers, investigations into timber also 
provided a way, from a marginal location, to acquire knowledge of what 
was happening elsewhere in the kingdom and how its activities fitted 
together; this correspondence also allowed him to contribute to public 
discussions of natural history. Making natural knowledge about trees 
was also making knowledge of the state.
Conclusion
Up until around 1850 timber prices remained high, and the traditional 
associations between timber production and state power persisted and 
timber continued to be used for a multitude of different purposes. In 
this context, the practical, political account of planting described in this 
chapter proliferated. Thereafter, sales of oak coppice declined in the face 
of chemical substitutes derived from non- timber sources; imports from 
Scandinavia replaced timber from British sources; ships were increas-
ingly built of metal instead of wood; even hop- poles were replaced by 
string and wire.65 Although the intoxicating and miscellaneous blend of 
pastoral parody, political commentary and practical advice declined after 
this period, problems about lack of information regarding the extent of 
private woodlands persisted into the later nineteenth century  – and, 
indeed, into the present.66
What should we make of the hybrid works considered here with 
their bold speculations and varied representations of the state? I  think 
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it is worth drawing two conclusions. The first is that the technologies – 
meaning systems of management, tools, regimes of calculation and so 
on – involved in surveying and extracting raw materials can be invested 
with very potent meanings. This is true of all the technologies described 
in this chapter:  from surveys, to quantified financial accounts, to new 
species that appeared to burst forth from the soil and new systems of 
planting. The works of Henry Dundas, the planters recognised by the 
Society of Arts and the radical planters considered here all mapped to 
varying degrees on to the actual practice of timber extraction in Britain; 
of all of them, Dundas’ advocacy of teak was in the end by far the most sig-
nificant in environmental and economic terms. Yet all these technologies 
of planting, and the difficulties of securing knowledge about the existing 
state of timber in the kingdom, created a discursive space in which the 
local activity of planting trees and tending them could connect to much 
larger- scale political concerns. They could play this role, in part, because 
trees had to be imagined as growing for much longer time periods than 
other crops. The question of whether other technologies open horizons of 
temporal imagination in similar ways is beyond the scope of this chapter; 
for present purposes, what is most important is that all the tree writers 
considered here believed that thinking about the management of trees 
was a way to think about the relation between the relatively proximate 
and the relatively distant future.
From this follows a second conclusion: that the state is constructed 
in different ways by different technical projects that are also invested in 
shaping environments. For tree planters and naval officials in the period 
considered here, the state was variously a collector of information, an 
imposing enemy, a potential guarantor for maintaining plantations, 
a surveyor and a client that dealt with timber merchants. Knowledge 
about trees and timber was made in response to and in collision with 
these different aspects of the state. In the introduction to this chapter 
I  contrasted this with both James Scott’s panoptical view of the 
centralising abstracting state and Fredrik Jonsson’s view of the conflicts 
between liberal trading ecologies of nature and ‘cameralist’ attitudes 
towards self- sufficiency in timber production. While differences of policy 
were very significant, discussions of trees in Britain during this period 
were not abstract: they were embodied in particular trees, reports from 
specific sites and the great difficulties of negotiating with the knowledge 
and ignorance of the contractor state. Thus nineteenth- century tree 
writers invite us to take all three parts of the title of this collection ser-
iously: technology, the environment and modern Britain.
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The UK government’s 
environmentalism: Britain, NATO 
and the origins of environmental 
diplomacy
Simone Turchetti
The combined administration of technological change and ecological 
degradation demands the introduction of far- reaching environmental 
protection laws. But it is only during the second half of the twentieth 
century that most international agreements set out to counter envir-
onmental threats have been introduced. Thus only in the past 60 years 
have many countries, including Britain, adjusted to the creation of an 
international space for negotiations on environmental provisions by 
setting up new government agencies and, through the work of quali-
fied civil servants, setting the country’s terms for complying with new 
treaties.1
One would hope that this critical commitment to the well- being of 
our planet will continue in the twenty- first century, although the recent 
transfer of the eight- year- old Department of Energy and Climate Change 
to one devoted to Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy reveals that 
environmental ambitions can be rather short- lived in the UK’s corridors 
of power. As a number of civil servants relocate into a new government 
branch, one wonders if the government’s stances on environmental pro-
tection are inextricably linked to the whims of its decision makers and 
bureaucrats. Certainly the transfer does not seem to equip Britain in the 
best possible way to fulfil the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change; 
nor does Brexit, which could lead the country to disengage from more 
stringent EU environmental regulations.2
But has the UK government’s attitude towards international 
environmental affairs always been as aloof as in recent months? And 
at what point in the country’s history did its representatives elaborate 
a convincing agenda to deal with environmental threats at home and 
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internationally? An analysis of the current UK government’s posture on 
environmental matters could definitely benefit from a historical recon-
struction of past approaches, but there is a significant gap in the litera-
ture regarding Britain’s environmental affairs. Scholars interested in 
finding out about the intersections between contemporary British dip-
lomacy, technology and environment will struggle to retrieve enough on 
this subject. And although historians of science and technology like Bill 
Luckin have looked into environmental regulations at home, including 
those brought about by technological change, the twentieth century has 
never really come into focus.3 There are important exceptions of course, 
including the works of John Sheail and others on the history of environ-
mental policy- making, but international relations have been by and large 
overlooked.4
As this chapter shows, the British government’s attitude in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s provides a compelling historical narrative. 
This was a period when, as Andrew Jamison and Stephen Bocking have 
pointed out, the emergence of protest and environmental movements 
re- defined the interactions between activists, scientists and decision 
makers, something that was decisive in framing environmental debates 
in Britain.5 And talks on environmental affairs featured more in the inter-
national arena too, thus encouraging political leaders to elaborate a con-
structive approach. As Jacob Hamblin, Stephen Macekura and J. Brooks 
Flippen have shown, environmental diplomacy, intended as a space for 
negotiations on environmental sustainability, featured for the first time 
in the international arena at this juncture in the twentieth century, 
shaping relations of which the recent climate change talks can be seen 
as the main legacy.6
Of course, diplomats hardly ever embraced environmentalism 
solely to protect the environment. One transnational agency in par-
ticular, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), swiftly moved 
into the environmental diplomacy arena, in order to evade problems 
marring its cohesiveness. Since its establishment in 1949, this defence 
alliance has  continued to be perceived, especially in Western Europe, 
as an emanation of the US administration, something that encouraged 
US officials to enter more frequently into the diplomacy arena in order 
to persuade allies to retain membership.7 Furthermore, by the early 
1960s NATO had already approached the study of the environment by 
exploring the possibilities of environmental warfare.8 So by the end of 
that decade the alliance’s integration problems, including France’s exit 
from the alliance’s coordinated military structure, and the allies’ criti-
cism over the US conflict in Vietnam, convinced president Richard Nixon 
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to think innovatively about NATO’s circumstances, which is the reason 
for his rather bizarre proposition that a defence alliance focus on envir-
onmental concerns.
This chapter posits that the emergence of environmental diplo-
macy at NATO paved the way to the elaboration of British stances on 
international environmental politics. Initially Nixon’s initiative caught 
British officials off guard, but eventually it compelled them to pay 
greater attention to environmental matters. Yet, the archival documents 
discussing NATO’s activities reveal that environmental concerns often 
represented minor indentations in the agenda of British negotiators, 
even in the presence of major environmental catastrophes hitting the 
country (such as the SS Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster). More generally, 
these officials displayed a tendency to consider environmental threats 
as second rank with respect to other business and industrial priorities, 
especially when protecting large- scale technological projects such as 
oil tankers and supersonic jets like the Concorde. Finally, their environ-
mental propositions were rooted in diplomatic pragmatism; they were 
part and parcel of the specific diplomacy game that they were then busy 
playing.
What follows reveals the ambivalent position of the UK govern-
ment towards NATO’s environmental programme. Even when its officials 
warmed up to the alliance’s plans to protect the environment, projects 
undermining economic interests in Britain continued to stir resistance. 
A disaster or an opportunity? NATO’s environmental 
programme
The origins of NATO’s environmental diplomacy can be traced back 
to a discussion on the directions of the alliance’s scientific research 
programme that started in the mid- 1960s. By then a NATO Science 
Committee, comprising representatives from allied countries and elab-
orating schemes to assist scientists through fellowships and grants, 
had been in existence for 10  years. Its decline instigated a debate on 
a possible investment in environmental studies and these discussions 
informed the effort of making the alliance a champion of environmental 
actions.9
It was especially the UK’s worst ever oil spill disaster that 
persuaded officials at the US State Department that this was a sound 
proposition. On 18 March 1967, the tanker SS Torrey Canyon ran 
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aground on the Seven Stones reef between Cornwall and the Isles of 
Scilly and the oil it carried poured into the sea. The UK government’s 
chief science adviser Solly Zuckerman set up a task force to deal with 
the disaster, but Operation Oil Buster was far from successful. The 
adviser called in RAF bombers to use napalm and chlorate bombs 
over the slick, which only helped the pollutant to mix with water.10 
The follow- up Operation Mop Up involved the spreading of chemical 
detergents to get rid of the oil hitting the Cornish coasts. It slayed its 
fauna and was equally unsuccessful. Both operations were the sub-
ject of intense media scrutiny as £250,000 per week was spent in 
the rescue and management of specific tasks remained ‘awkwardly 
divided’ among ministries.11 Zuckerman also rebuffed an accusation 
that the amount of detergent used on beaches caused harm to marine 
life, naïvely claiming that ‘unless people go on pouring the stuff need-
lessly on some beaches, we no longer expect anything significant’.12
The UK government’s science adviser received numerous attacks 
because he appeared to be unprepared to deal with environmental 
disasters, and he presumably was not. ‘Sir Solly’ had built his career 
as adviser on the administration of defence research. A South African- 
born zoologist, at the outbreak of the Second World War, Zuckerman 
became involved in the scientific study of bombing campaigns (which 
might explain why bombing was the method of choice against the slick). 
Employed in a number of Whitehall’s science policy departments in the 
post- war years, from 1960 he became the Ministry of Defence’s science 
adviser. In 1964 the new PM Harold Wilson wanted Zuckerman to elab-
orate the UK government’s science policy.13
Zuckerman was also the UK representative at the NATO Science 
Committee. And if the handling of the disaster damaged his repu-
tation, it was actually viewed as an excellent opportunity at the 
US State Department. As one of its memoranda of January 1968 
claimed, it demonstrated that more research was needed in the envir-
onmental field, something that its officers linked to the trajectory of 
the NATO committee. Set up in 1957, the committee had just entered 
a crisis phase. Its mission had partly failed as it had not captured, 
according to the memo, ‘the real interest and concern of Delegations 
and Governments’.14 The way forward was to ‘take quick advantage 
of opportunities for constructive action presented by scientifically 
interesting events’. The Torrey Canyon incident, and its mismanage-
ment, was mentioned as a key example of the lack of scientific know-
ledge on environmental disasters.15
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That the environmental catastrophe could be an opportunity was 
openly stated three months later by the US representative at the Science 
Committee, the physicist Isidor Isaac Rabi, during the celebrations of the 
tenth anniversary of its foundation.16 He spoke just after Zuckerman, 
who, still embittered by the polemic on Torrey Canyon at home, recalled 
only the committee’s troubles. Instead his US counterpart put the envir-
onment at the centre of an optimistic portrayal. Rabi stressed that the 
problems of the alliance had grown increasingly complex: ‘I refer to such 
matters as pollution of the environment: air, water, soil, noise, conges-
tion.’ ‘Science and technology could offer solutions,’ Rabi argued, espe-
cially if more funding was invested in finding out about environmental 
threats.17
The other delegates of the NATO committee continued debating 
Rabi’s propositions for a few more years and in the early 1970s they 
agreed on the sponsorship of novel research on ecology and pollutants. 
By then, however, environmental protection had moved from the per-
iphery to the centre of NATO’s political debate partly thanks to the prop-
ositions of the newly elected US president Richard Nixon. In January 
1969, when Eisenhower’s former vice president moved into the White 
House, few thought that environmental protection would feature sig-
nificantly  in his programme. But Nixon understood that the environ-
ment now appealed more to the moderate US electorate and mobilised 
a growing number of activists, including the popular conservationist 
Russell Train.18 A  republican and lawyer by trade, Train had been 
involved in the nature conservation movement for more than a decade. 
Nixon thus wanted Train to lead his administration’s environmental 
initiatives.
By taking environmentalism in NATO’s stride, Nixon also hoped 
to instigate community- building, gain consensus for his (controversial) 
policies and especially allay criticism on the US conflict in Vietnam. On 
the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of NATO’s foundation, the new 
president urged his allies ‘to explore ways in which the experience and 
resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshalled 
toward improving the quality of life’.19 His proposition led to the cre-
ation of a new NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
(CCMS). The underlying principles of its programme underscored the 
committee’s practical goals.20 In contrast with the Science Committee, 
the new one would not carry out research, but promote environmental 
actions. National delegations would voluntarily take responsibility for 
pilot projects on key environmental issues and seek the collaboration of 
other delegations that could, if they wished, feature as co- pilots. New 
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legislation could also be elaborated and specific provisions put before the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) for approval.21
Nixon’s proposition caught the delegates of Western European 
countries unprepared and they wondered if a defence alliance was 
really equipped to deal with environmental protection. In particular, the 
proposition escalated a contrast between US and British officials, who 
had already collided on the directions and future agenda of the Atlantic 
alliance. Statements at NAC meetings and information relayed in secret 
US memos reiterated that UK delegates believed NATO to be an unsuit-
able candidate for promoting environmental actions and that other 
organisations should have taken the lead in environmental diplomacy.22 
This was a position that UK officials had developed much earlier on the 
basis of their understanding that NATO- led initiatives outside the realm 
of defence stifled East– West collaboration. UK criticism reiterated a 
stance popular at the Royal Society (and Whitehall departments) since a 
similar polemic had previously typified international scientific collabor-
ation. For instance NATO work under the aegis of the Science Committee 
was viewed in the UK as disruptive to collaboration in the context of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), of which 
the Soviet Union was a member.23 So the UK representative at NATO, Sir 
Bernard Burrows, rebuffed Nixon’s initiative and warned that the OECD 
and the Council of Europe were equally apprehensive.24 Britain’s initial 
contribution to CCMS activities was thus construed as an effort to prove 
Nixon’s initiative as ill- conceived. And it produced an embarrassing 
fiasco.
I’ll prove you wrong! UK stances on NATO’s 
environmental turn
Already in the summer of 1969, the US State Department had canvassed 
support for the CCMS among NATO delegations, also urging national 
representatives in private talks to take responsibility for pilot projects. 
Despite the initial scepticism of the allies, the diplomacy effort even-
tually paid off. Some delegates were persuaded especially when US 
representatives agreed to set up pioneering collaborative schemes. For 
instance, they were busy negotiating with West Germans and Turks a 
new pilot project focusing on air pollution of urban conglomerates. From 
1970 the pollution in the cities of St Louis, Ankara and Frankfurt, which 
presented a similar degradation in the quality of air, was thus monitored 
in order to find out about the nature, volumes and circulation of air 
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contaminants. A NATO list of environmental actions containing potential 
subjects for pilot projects was finally released in May 1969 with the view 
of promoting more collaboration.25
UK criticism of Nixon’s initiative had by then already been reiterated 
at NAC meetings and in official correspondence. There was therefore 
little that could be done to restate it further. But UK officials feared that 
the lack of enthusiasm they had shown would make them look too nega-
tive in the eyes of other NATO delegations. The Science and Technology 
Department of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) thus 
took responsibility for elaborating a new strategy. The option to ‘give way 
to American pressure’ and be more collaborative was now considered 
for the first time, but only, notably, on the condition of steering clear of 
problems of the physical environment.26 Actually, since the NATO docu-
ment sponsored CCMS interventions in the social environment too, they 
agreed that the UK would initially take responsibility only for actions in 
the social domain exactly to prove the Americans wrong in proposing 
NATO’s environmental turn.27
So in June 1969 a number of government departments were hur-
riedly approached in order to find someone who could elaborate a UK 
pilot project deliberately ignoring environmental problems. The search 
proved successful when the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) 
appeared to be interested in carrying out an analysis of satisfaction and 
motivation in workplaces. This seemed to be promising as it could have 
been construed as a response to what a CCMS document had hazily 
indicated as a study on ‘Individual and Group Motivation’.28 The UK dele-
gation thus proposed the study at the first CCMS plenary meeting of 8 
December 1969. But since the SSRC had by then yet to commit, no fur-
ther details were provided in Brussels and the UK delegate had to impro-
vise (‘obliged to try to make bricks without straw’).29 Unsurprisingly, the 
UK proposal failed to attract co- pilots.
If straw was lacking among UK diplomats, so was expertise on 
environmental issues. With Zuckerman about to retire from his role as 
UK Scientific Adviser, it was the metallurgist Alan Cottrell who agreed 
to take responsibility for upcoming CCMS business as he had done, 
on and off, for Science Committee affairs. Zuckerman’s deputy at the 
Ministry of Defence, Cottrell shared with him the same lack of knowl-
edge on how to tackle environmental threats, having previously dealt 
with defence research items, such as, for instance, UK’s new reconnais-
sance aircraft.30
Moreover, in examining how to expedite a contribution to the new 
NATO scheme, Cottrell and FCO officials faced complications. Due to 
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the looming general elections, the workers’ conditions represented a 
particularly sensitive topic, especially given the growing mineworkers’ 
influence in national affairs.31 Proposing a NATO study of work satis-
faction was thus rather unfortunate, as the FCO’s senior minister Alun 
Arthur Gwynne (Lord Chalfont) pointed out, as it would have irked 
the trade unions and suggested a plan to involve NATO in industrial 
disputes.32 The worst had yet to come though: SSRC managers now let 
the FCO know that they no longer intended to lead the pilot project. One 
of its civil servants now apprehensively remarked that championing a 
UK project that no UK agency was willing to carry out would make their 
NATO delegate ‘look pretty silly’.33
Desperate not to look so in the eyes of allies as well as to retain the 
strategy of steering clear of environmental issues, Cottrell hurried to find 
one such organisation and, with time running out, he finally obtained a 
positive response from a Ministry of Defence retiring psychologist.34 But 
aware of Lord Chalfont’s remarks, Cottrell swiftly agreed to change the 
UK pilot project’s title again, and gave instructions to avoid publicising 
its content.35
The now renamed ‘Work and Its Satisfactions in a Technological 
Era’ was presented for the first time at the CCMS meeting of 13/ 14 
April 1970, but given the lack of preparation on the subject, Cottrell 
failed to impress. Particularly unconvinced was the US chief delegate 
Patrick Moynihan, who had led a 20- strong delegation comprising 
experts from a variety of US departments. Since the FCO sent Cottrell 
alone, Moynihan now made an official complaint about ‘leaving our 
representation … in the hands of a metallurgist from the Ministry of 
Defence who was not necessarily very well- versed in the problems of 
the environment’.36
Meanwhile, a question in the UK Parliament materialised Lord 
Chalfont’s fears:  a Conservative MP learnt about the unpublicised 
project and thus asked if NATO was to investigate workers’ pay and 
conditions.37 No longer happy to sponsor the scheme as a NATO exer-
cise, the FCO now agreed with a proposition by Train (who in 1972 
replaced Moynihan) that the UK project be transferred to the OECD.38
The diplomatic fiasco convinced Cottrell and FCO officials that 
engaging only with the non- environmental aspects in NATO’s environ-
mental programme had been wrong. They now considered a change 
of strategy. By now Labour Prime Minister Harold  Wilson had been 
ousted from power following the general elections of June 1970 and his 
successor, the Conservative party leader Edward Heath, was as inclined 
as Nixon was to put the environment in the national political agenda. 
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The SS Torrey Canyon disaster was decisive to this policy transition,39 
and Heath agreed to establish a Department of the Environment. The 
Conservative MP Peter Walker was called to direct it.
Hamblin claims that in 1971 the ‘whole NATO environmental 
enterprise left British environmental officials cold’.40 But actually 
this was the time when they started to warm up a little. In an effort 
to avoid humiliation Walker’s undersecretary reiterated in front of 
journalists assembled at NATO headquarters that US officials were too 
emotional in dealing with environmental problems.41 But both Walker 
and Cottrell (who was about to replace Zuckerman as Heath’s Chief 
Scientific Adviser) were by then pushing for promoting environmental 
initiatives. They had also shown considerable interest in the recent 
Limits of Growth, a forecast of the impact of pollution (among other 
environmental constraints) completed through computational ana-
lysis and modelling.42 While rejecting open ententes at NATO, FCO 
officials now secretly agreed with their US colleagues to give in to their 
request that a high- profile delegate like Zuckerman take responsibility 
for CCMS business, something that brought the retiring science adviser 
back to Brussels.43 They also agreed that the UK would contribute 
more to the committee’s pilot projects.44 Although one, on Advanced 
Health Care (which led to a study on automation in clinical labora-
tories), reiterated a UK commitment to CCMS projects not dealing 
with the physical environment, the British delegation also agreed to 
join a French- piloted Environmental and Regional Planning project, 
meant to provide environmental guidelines on land use. And by now, 
it had prepared a new submission for one on Advanced Waste Water 
Treatment.45 Cottrell, who had acquired more knowledge on envir-
onmental issues, now sought to have a more prominent role in inter-
national environmental negotiations, representing the UK at the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (June 1972). He 
also presided over an official committee on Future World Trends, and 
he proposed that London host an international conference on waste sea 
dumping (which resulted in a follow- up international convention).46
These démarches notwithstanding, the newly found environ-
mentalism of Her Majesty’s Government retained the distinctive lack 
of enthusiasm that had typified its origins, especially in so far as envir-
onmental ambitions hardly ever received priority in the presence of 
overarching business imperatives. It is especially the reactions in the UK 
to NATO plans for new international legislation abating oil spills at sea 
that vividly illustrates this ambivalence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261thE uK govErnmEnt’s EnvironmEntAlism
261
Make it sink! The oil spills ban and UK resistance
With the populace of the Cornish coast still struggling to get rid of 
polluting oil washing their beaches, the CCMS proposed to discuss a ban 
on oil discharges at sea. Now the Science and Technology Department 
liaised with other FCO branches such as that of Marine and Transport, 
as well as other UK agencies like the Board of Trade and the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI), to discuss the proposal. If on the one hand 
the civil servants involved agreed that the environment should find a 
space in international policy- making, they also resisted new legislation 
that would disadvantage UK-based oil and shipping concerns.
Fears of tougher oil shipping provisions were openly stated in a 
September 1970 memo on a Belgian proposal for a CCMS colloquium on 
oil spills.47 What worried FCO officials was especially that a high- profile 
meeting could lead other delegations to advocate stronger measures to 
counter oil spills at the next NAC meeting, and that the council would, in 
turn, approve them.
The UK position was presented as an effort to avoid NATO 
interfering with the activities of other international organisations 
responsible for sea affairs, and especially the International Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (IMCO). But the UK stance wove in an ambi-
tion to dampen far- reaching plans to abate oil pollution. The IMCO 
was underfunded and proposals to raise its budget had been rejected 
several times. Furthermore, national delegates had been successful in 
jeopardising IMCO environmental propositions they did not agree with, 
given the lack of underlying Cold War allegiances in the organisation 
(the Soviet Union was a member). One DTI official even noted, with 
some satisfaction, that the Soviets had recently succeeded in resisting 
a US proposal on oil pollution so that the American application had to 
be withdrawn.48
When Belgian plans for an oil spills colloquium materialised, 
officials of the FCO Marine and Transport Department adopted a 
passive stance, deciding that no UK cabinet- rank minister should be 
present at the NATO meeting. Unsurprisingly the decision irritated 
US negotiators as it was rightly perceived as an attempt to avoid 
engaging with policy- level propositions. But on this specific item UK 
officials would not budge:  ‘we have expressed our opposition … in 
forthright terms. We have also told the Americans that we would be 
bound to resist if they were to try and steer the Colloquium towards 
recommendations for “actions” by NATO.’49
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Tensions between US and UK officials escalated again. Those of the 
FCO Marine and Transport Department sought to liaise with their Dutch 
colleagues to ramp up dissent within NATO.50 Conversely, an attaché of 
the US embassy in London alleged that unless a high- ranking UK offi-
cial was sent to the meeting and the attitude changed, the colloquium 
would end in a public row between delegations. The standoff led the UK 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alec Douglas Home, to intervene and, after an 
exchange with the DTI Secretary, Home instructed his deputy to attend 
the meeting.51 The colloquium went exactly in the direction that the FCO 
personnel had feared. Recommendations for a ban on oil discharges were 
put forward. And in December 1970 the NAC endorsed them so that the 
plan for a NATO action gained momentum.52
While few in the UK government may have been against the 
provisions, they certainly feared the consequences they might have had 
for British business. Technological solutions were available but expen-
sive, especially as Torrey Canyon- like accidents represented, metaphor-
ically, just the tip of a polluting iceberg. If each year one million tons of 
oil poured in the sea as a result of accidental spills, three times as much 
leaked in routine operations such as the tankers’ ballasting (increasing 
buoyancy by taking in and out sea water). Oil tankers in the 1970s had no 
segregated cargoes. Thus during these operations sea water mixed with 
oil, which was then released at sea. The UK solution to this problem was 
load- on- top, namely transferring the ballast mixture to a slop tank so that 
water and oil could separate before release. But many environmentalists, 
including Train, believed it not effective enough as some of the contam-
inating oil could still be released at sea after separation. Instead, what 
Train campaigned for was the overhaul of the existing oil- shipping 
industry and a transformation of existing tankers so as to segregate cargo 
and ballast water in different tanks. Officials of the UK shipping industry, 
whose interests were represented within the FCO Marine and Transport 
Department, had already concluded that the introduction of segregated 
tanks was ‘unrealistic’, as it would entail re furbishing the entire tanker 
fleet.53
When the NAC approved actions to abate oil pollution, UK officials 
became even more anxious about the traction of such a proposition. But 
(luckily for them), US diplomats were divided over the issue too, and in 
1971 the influence of those opposing radical solutions had grown. When 
Train sought support from the US shipping industry’s representatives, 
he was openly challenged.54 Unsurprisingly, the NATO press release 
circulated after the NAC meeting of December 1970 left the question of 
implementations deliberately in the background so as to avoid upsetting 
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the representatives of the shipping industry further.55 The following 
April, when Train met with the president of the American Institute 
of Merchant Shipping (AIMS), he was told in clear terms that the 
entrepreneurs viewed the NATO resolution as ‘beyond attainment’.56 One 
of Train’s collaborators now advised him to lobby with ‘certain interested 
governments’ for the swift implementation of the amended NATO reso-
lution and was told that Britain was ‘key in this context’ as its officials 
were against the concept of segregated ballast.57
The UK position eventually prevailed as NATO delegations agreed 
to transfer the NAC recommendations to the IMCO and start a conversa-
tion with more countries on their enactment. The decision slowed down 
the implementation process significantly.58 And if the 1973 IMCO draft 
enforced more stringent principles in dealing with oil spills, including 
segregation, then it did not press governments hard enough to comply. 
New provisions would initially apply only to new tankers over 70,000 
tons deadweight, with smaller ones let free to continue polluting.59 
Furthermore the resolution was ratified only in the 1980s in line with 
the UK delegates’ wish to postpone its implementation. In May 1971 one 
official of the FCO Marine and Transport Department could therefore 
satisfactorily note that the US– UK controversy about oil discharges was 
about to ‘die a natural death’.60 The decease demonstrated that business 
and industrial priorities were paramount in the UK government when 
considering environmental actions. And when other CCMS proposals did 
not die out naturally, UK officials sought to kill them through vigorous 
diplomatic work.
Don’t let it fly! The CCMS project on air pollution and 
Concorde
In the early 1970s the upper atmosphere, as much as the seas, was a 
focus of environmental concerns especially because of the nitrate and 
sulphate oxides that jet planes released. A growing number of scientists 
viewed these pollutants as affecting both the formation of cloud cover 
and the ozone layer.61 Yet when the Canadian delegation at NATO put 
forward a proposal to investigate how to combat pollution of the upper 
atmosphere at the CCMS meeting of April 1973, the proposition was met 
with silence by the British delegation. Its officers’ unstated opposition 
derived from the forthcoming launch of the first supersonic passenger 
jet liner, the Concorde, as the new aircraft would be entering into service 
three years later and approval was sought from the US Federal Aviation 
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Administration to allow its landing in the USA.62 The supersonic jet 
released a terrific amount of nitrous oxide, whose depleting impact on the 
ozone layer had been stated in a recent study by the Dutch atmospheric 
chemist Paul Jozef Crutzen.63 This notwithstanding, FCO officials at the 
Science and Technology Department agreed to ‘have a word’ with the 
Canadians to dissuade them.64 A few months later a two- pronged attack 
materialised. The British High Commission in Ottawa was asked to probe 
the Canadians’ intentions so as to encourage them not to pursue their pro-
posal at the CCMS without informing their British colleagues first. The 
French were also alerted to coordinate future initiatives at NATO head-
quarters, especially since the Concorde had by then become a staple of 
Anglo- French relations, intertwined with the early French opposition to, 
and then support for, Britain’s entrance into the European common 
market.65 Meanwhile DTI officials provided further scientific information 
on nitrous oxide emissions in the upper atmosphere in an effort to play 
down the polluting effects; evidence on the subject matter was scanty and 
inconclusive, they reiterated.66
Now even the UK’s Meteorological Office got involved. When 
in April 1973 the NATO Advisory Group on Aeronautics Research 
and Development (AGARD) organised a conference on Atmospheric 
Pollution by Aircraft Engines in London, the office’s research meteor-
ologist Philip Goldsmith presented novel evidence ruling out a sig-
nificant thinning of the ozone layer as a result of increased nitrous 
oxide emissions. Published in separate articles for Nature and Science, 
the study compared emissions from past nuclear tests and those from 
Concorde. It concluded that since ‘no detectable changes’ had occurred 
because of testing, there was no reason to believe that this would be the 
case for the Concorde. It would have taken an incredibly high number 
of Concorde flights each year (over 1,600) to match emissions due to 
nuclear tests.67
Harold S. Johnston, a US scientist who had originally warned about 
the negative impacts of supersonic flights, also gave a presentation at the 
same meeting. But he criticised these findings.68 He was not the only one 
to be unconvinced. Scepticism existed in the UK diplomacy camp too, but 
was deliberately kept under wraps. One FCO memo claimed the study 
to have done little favour to the Concorde project due to the mounting 
scientific evidence about the thinning of the ozone layer as a result of 
atomic testing. Moreover, the Met Office team had provided different 
figures for the number of Concorde flights at the AGARD meeting and 
for those published in Nature so that it was ‘particularly unfortunate to 
have been caught doing our sums wrong’.69 As Jon Agar has shown, a few 
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years later the Cabinet Office would also turn to the UK Meteorological 
Office for advice, and this time on the topic of climate change. And once 
again the agency provided the scientific evidence desperately sought 
to prove that no environmental actions were needed. So, as Concorde 
was about to take off, the office’s response took the wind out of environ-
mental initiatives, suggesting that the evidence on global warming due 
to CO2 emissions was insufficient.70
Meanwhile Canadian officials had informed their UK colleagues 
at the High Commission in Ottawa that they were still mulling over the 
setting up of a CCMS pilot project, while DTI officials now relayed the 
Met Office results to show that no harm could come from a supersonic 
liner.71 Eventually the Canadians decided to go ahead with their proposal 
for a CCMS project on pollution of the upper atmosphere as they had 
already announced it. But in the end, they agreed to appease the Britons 
and pulled their punches at the next CCMS meeting. One FCO official 
satisfactorily noted that: ‘they spoke at not too great length and with not 
very much force; and we in turn contented ourselves with the modest 
response set out’.72
Epilogue: a contaminant?
In light of what this chapter has shown it is worth asking if current 
UK approaches to climate change diplomacy echo earlier government 
stances on environmental diplomacy. We now know that the British 
government’s early overtures to international environmental provisions 
were not exactly  displaying enthusiasm.73 A  distinctly hollow pragma-
tism failed to produce a UK agenda on international environmental pro-
tection even after the Torrey Canyon disaster vividly demonstrated the 
lack of adequate plans to abate sea pollution and some NATO delegates 
manifested the wish to play a role in reducing it. The decision to appoint, 
as NATO representatives on environmental negotiations, science advisers 
whose background was not in environmental studies (like Zuckerman 
and Cottrell) reiterated this cold approach.
This does not mean that UK representatives were entirely 
wrong in showing their reservations regarding an environmentally 
focused defence alliance. While CCMS actions were widely publicised 
and led to resounding propositions, they achieved much less than 
expected and not just in tackling oil spills. By 1974 Nixon’s adviser 
Henry Kissinger informed Train that the CCMS programme was under 
review. The oil crisis and the president’s impeachment accelerated a 
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US divestment from environmental affairs, which typified the adminis-
tration at least up until the appointment of US president Jimmy Carter 
in 1977. Ironically, by then NATO had yet to deal with the pollution it 
produced in the form of military wastes. This meant that while advo-
cating a number of new provisions that should have found application 
in NATO countries, the alliance would continue for several years to 
produce noxious land and sea pollutants in military exercises, and 
that nobody – within or outside the alliance – would seek to assess this 
environmental threat.74
But if the US and NATO positions were idiosyncratic (contradictory, 
even), the British one denoted an effort to win a diplomacy argument 
with US colleagues over attention to environmental actions at home 
and internationally. And while from 1971, partly because of the debacle 
such a strategy produced, the  UK government showed some keenness 
for environmentalism, some of its departments’ officials still considered 
environmental conservation to be second rank when compared with 
other government imperatives. In particular, the web of relations 
between Foreign Office departments materialised efforts to disengage 
from support to international environmental regulations that might have 
required reconsidering UK’s business priorities. In particular, these gov-
ernment agencies supported only resolutions that would not stifle large 
technological projects (such as Concorde, for instance).
This is not to say that the UK’s administration was entirely passive 
and over the years it found a much better way to harmonise diplomatic 
and environmental ambitions. At NATO, for instance, the British dele-
gation championed more CCMS projects with a focus on water waste 
treatment (Drinking Water, 1977– 82), hazardous substances (Disposal 
of Hazardous Wastes, 1974– 81; Contaminated Land, 1981– 4) and muni-
cipal sewage (Utilisation and Disposal of Municipal Sewage Sludge, 
1979– 85).75
But in the early days of environmental diplomacy the British stance 
at NATO betrayed a blasé attitude towards pollution, one imprudently 
abridged in the jargon utilised at the FCO. While scheming against CCMS 
propositions, seeking the support of UK scientists in denying environ-
mental change and quarrelling with US colleagues, the British civil 
servants kept restating that, when dealing with environmental issues, 
the alliance should only have been a ‘contaminant’. The word was used 
metaphorically to stress that the alliance should only invigorate the 
work of other international agencies and not take the lead. Yet, its rou-
tine adoption in diplomatic lingo admirably exemplifies the protracted 
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ambivalence of Her Majesty’s Government towards environmental 
protection.
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Simulating the global environment: 
the British Government’s response to 
The Limits to Growth
Thomas Turnbull
Published in 1972, The Limits to Growth argued that unless concerted 
international action was taken the Earth’s population risked ‘over-
shoot’.1 Collective demands on the environment would exceed the 
Earth’s carrying capacity, resulting in demographic ‘collapse’ as a result 
of both ‘pollution’ and ‘non- renewable resource depletion’.2 The his-
tory of Limits has proved an important but well- worn story in the his-
tory of environmentalism. Encapsulated by American political scientist 
Lynton Caldwell, the report heralded a ‘new environmental paradigm’, 
in which the ‘view of an earth unlimited in abundance’ ended.3 Instead 
of pursuing economic growth, the report bolstered a radical view, 
shared by some in positions of power, that post- war economic growth 
should end before disaster struck.4 Much effort has subsequently been 
taken to describe the role Limits played in constructing the concept of 
a ‘global’ environmental space and divining a common future for ‘man-
kind’.5 Others have described how the technology upon which the book’s 
thesis was based, computer simulation, granted long- held fears of envir-
onmental catastrophe a new- found credibility.6 But the simplicity of 
the underlying model, ‘World3’, caused others to deride the exercise on 
methodological grounds and question the motives of those involved.7 In 
recent years, however, some have defended the study, emphasising its 
role as a warning rather than a prediction, and asserting that the con-
cept of limits to growth remains prescient,8 particularly as it challenges 
the subsequent message of ‘sustainable development’, and its comforting 
mantra that economic growth can improve rather than denude the envir-
onment.9 Moreover Limits can be seen as a precursor to contemporary 
earth systems science, and the vision of planetary management that has 
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been reinvigorated by the proposed notion of the Anthropocene.10 While 
these are important arguments, rather than looking at the planetary 
implications of this much- studied model, the chapter attempts to ‘pro-
vincialise the Globe’, in order to show how the idea of an enveloping 
global environmental system was something received, constructed and 
contested locally11 – in this case, in a forward- looking, modern Britain.
While there have been attempts at tracing the public response to 
Limits in various countries, including Britain, the question addressed 
here is how the report, and the technology upon which it was based, was 
received and responded to by those in power. The aim of this chapter 
is to offer an account of the relation between forecasting simulations 
and the environment in this context.12 Limits was remarkable in so far 
as it marked the hybridisation of two fields, environmentalism and 
‘future studies’.13 Often pluralised, futures studies, or futurology, was 
a collection of practices, largely developed in the Cold War period, 
whose adherents claimed to be able to forecast the future in a scientific 
or otherwise systematic way, often beginning from the study of existing 
trajectories in demography, technology or other variables deemed suit-
ably determinate.14 Histories of these ‘futures- of- the- past’ have recently 
attracted a burst of scholarly attention, revealing a growing enthusiasm 
for such studies at the cusp of the 1970s across the world.15 Emerging out 
of this wave, Paul Warde and Sverker Sörlin argue that the ‘environment’, 
as a definite article, was a concept that emerged alongside efforts to fore-
cast the future of humankind, often speculatively, after the Second World 
War. Migrating from its original meaning in evolutionary biology, the 
forward- looking ‘environment’ was  contrasted with the nostalgic term 
‘nature’.16 Limits, in using a computer to forecast the dynamics of the 
global environment, adds weight to their argument, suggesting a co- con-
stitutive relation between simulation technology and the future- oriented 
concept of the environment.
What was Britain’s role in establishing this interaction between the 
future and the environment? Histories of British futurology are scant. 
One explanation is cultural. Britain had a long history of using science to 
guide policy, including forecasting, which emerged from wartime efforts 
to optimise military operations. In 1961, leading figures in British war-
time Operations Research (‘OR’), Patrick Blackett and Solly Zuckerman, 
became openly hostile to the work of RAND Corporation analyst Herman 
Kahn. Kahn had written a game- theoretical approach to nuclear strategy, 
published in 1960, that managed to be both dispassionate and sensation-
alist. Both Blackett and Zuckerman condemned Kahn’s work in the press, 
and sought to distance their commitment to ‘operational realities’ from the 
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abstracted and ill- considered ‘futurology’ being done by such American 
defence analysts.17 As this chapter hopes to show, rather than revealing 
methodological archaism in British policy- making, this kind of boundary 
work indicated the existence of a distinct, somewhat oppositional, British 
school of futures studies. Attesting to this, Jon Agar has uncovered the 
forgotten work of the World Future Trends Committee (WFTC), a Cabinet 
research group established at the behest of Prime Minister Edward Heath. 
Agar suggests the interest around Limits kick- started this ‘new interest’ in 
futurology in government. Agar traces how this committee encouraged 
the government to undertake long- range climate forecasts, allowing the 
notion of climate change to enter Whitehall.18 Contributing further to 
the history of British futures, this chapter re- constructs the earlier work 
of the WFTC, documenting how the committee reacted to Limits and the 
model on which it was based. In doing so, one intention is to add fur-
ther weight to Warde and Sörlin’s thesis about the constitutive relation 
between forecasting technologies and the environment.
This chapter will also argue the use of simulation in policy forma-
tion was well established in Britain before the arrival of Limits. By 1970, 
both the Labour government and Conservative opposition had shown 
enthusiasm for futurological research, whether or not they employed 
that term. The existence of the little-known ‘Programmes Analysis 
Unit’ (PAU) of the Labour government  and the Conservative party’s 
‘Conservative Systems Research Centre’ (CSRC) suggests Limits was 
received into a political culture already familiar with computer- based 
forecasting. A fine- grained account of this reception is then told, based 
upon on two other sources. The first is an ‘insiders’ account of the work of 
the Club of Rome, the somewhat elusive organisation that commissioned 
the world model, found in the papers of British MP Jeremy Bray. There 
were other British members of the Club, including founding member 
Alexander King, Science Director at the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the physicist Dennis Gabor, 
biologist Conrad Waddington, and historian Asa Briggs. But only Bray 
was actively engaged in, and a vocal critic of, the technical development 
of World3, the version of the model upon which Limits was based.19
The second source of archival material is the Cabinet papers 
detailing the British government’s attempts to imitate and then better 
the World3 model via the work of the WFTC. While other historians have 
acknowledged the Heath government’s interest in Limits, no one has 
told an inside story of the British government’s attempt to create its own 
computer model of the global environment.20 In detailing this story, it is 
argued that simulation of a global ‘system’ was one of the principal ways 
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in which the environment became understood as a political problem. 
Second, extending an argument first made by the historian Timothy 
Mitchell, it is suggested that in Britain during the 1970s the environment 
became ‘an object of politics’ that could rival the economy as a justifica-
tion for political intervention.21 A third and final argument is that govern-
ment- led interrogation of the World3 model indicated that, with minor 
adjustment, the model could be used as a means of demonstrating the 
political conditions by which environmental limits could be transcended. 
In doing so, the environment was no longer understood in a biological 
sense, as the aggregate conditions that sustain organisms, but as a modi-
fiable, human- directed system.22
British futures
The use of computers to ordain the future is not a practice one immedi-
ately associates with 1970s Britain, a period more popularly recognised 
for recession, strikes, blackouts, public disorder and the failure of the 
ideals of the 1960s.23 Despite a wave of revisionism, today, the warning 
that a certain course of political action will ‘take us back to the 70s’ still 
chastens in some quarters.24 One document that helped establish this pes-
simistic view was published in December 1974, just eight months after 
Heath had lost the general election during a strike by the National Union 
of Mineworkers, which resulted in the imposition of a three- day working 
week, as a result of fuel shortages. Hudson Europe, a branch of American 
think tank the Hudson Institute, had published a study, The United 
Kingdom in 1980, which forecast Britain’s ‘relative decline’ in comparison 
with its neighbours, a gloomy portent given Heath’s plan for Britain to 
enter the European Economic Community (EEC). The study claimed this 
decline was the result of ‘a peculiarly British problem’, as rather than 
looking to the future the political class were ‘prone to archaism’ and 
‘flights into pre- socialist, pre- capitalist fantasy’. Britain, it was argued, 
was stunted by its factional class system and aversion to technologic-
ally enhanced policy- making of the kind Hudson proffered. A  ‘shift in 
national style’ was prescribed, involving the establishment of a future- 
oriented ‘Planning Commission’ consisting of ‘Britain’s best economists 
and administrators and engineers’.25 But questions of the environment, 
raised by Limits, played only a minor role. Hudson’s report considered 
the state of Britain’s ‘industrial experience, a greater threat to growth 
than exhausting our resource reserves’, and that the ‘real pollution is that 
which is caused by poverty and archaic industries’.26
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Aside from its futurological perspective, the report was typically 
‘declinist’, a genre of historical writing that denigrated post- war Britain 
and its commitment to scientific and technical progress as compared 
with other nations.27 While declinism has proved influential, the his-
torian David Edgerton has assembled a wealth of evidence to demon-
strate that Britain’s post- war investment in science and technology, by 
both industry and government, was prodigious, second only to that 
of the United States. As such, Edgerton argues that Britain was ‘the scien-
tific and technological powerhouse of Western Europe’ by the 1960s, and 
declinist texts are ‘anti- histories’, inverse to evidence, that must be seen 
either as self- serving rhetoric for those seeking to provoke further invest-
ment in Britain’s state- funded science and technology programmes, or 
as political polemics intended to denigrate the government of the time.28 
For example, Edgerton describes the American historian Martin Wiener’s 
book English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, published 
in 1981, as an ‘ideologically significant’ part of Thatcherite thought. Its 
account of the entropic effect of Britain’s aristocratic culture on British 
industry emboldened an ascendant new right.29 Less well known is 
that the thesis of Wiener’s book had first been delivered at a confer-
ence organised by Hudson Europe, held at Hertfordshire’s Ashridge 
Management School, during the report’s research process.30
The Hudson Institute was largely the work of Herman Kahn, the 
infamous American policy analyst who had developed the pre- emptive 
strategies in case of thermonuclear war that Blackett and Zuckerman had 
been critical of. Based on the principles of game theory, the strategies 
had been developed on behalf of Californian think tank, and oftentimes 
client of the American military, the RAND Corporation. At RAND, Kahn 
had contributed to and employed some of futurology’s most influential 
methods, from harnessing the unpredictability of random numbers using 
the ‘Monte Carlo’ method, to the more hypothetical and imaginative 
‘scenario planning’, and the discursive the ‘Delphi method’.31 However, 
published in 1960, On Thermonuclear War not only irritated the elders 
of British OR, it also created media outcry in America, prompting Kahn 
to leave RAND to set  up his own research organisation in New  York.32 
Hudson’s selling point, in light of the controversy his book had provoked, 
was to ‘think the unthinkable’ and offer uncomfortable truths to policy-
makers, which he did so with some success.33 In 1973, with character-
istic entrepreneurialism, Kahn oversaw the establishment of a European 
office, hoping to capitalise on the political uncertainties of the end of the 
Bretton Woods agreement and ongoing expansion of the EEC.34 Britain 
seemed ripe for Hudson’s style of heterodox, future- oriented, policy 
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advice. Initially, they had some influence. In September 1973 Kahn, in 
Britain to promote Hudson’s work, met with Victor Rothschild, head 
of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS). His gloomy prognoses of 
Britain’s future found their way into a speech by Rothschild in September, 
to attendant press, at the Agricultural Research Council Laboratory in 
Wantage. His pessimism provoking a disciplinary rebuke from Heath.35
The report left the press irate. The Sunday Times claimed it was 
‘more a prolonged attempt to shake the national psyche than a piece of 
original research’, the Guardian suggested it should be met with ‘howls 
of derision’, and the Daily Mail derided its presentation of ‘the obvious 
and the speculative’.36 However, on the left, Tom Nairn agreed with its 
portrayal of a self- serving ruling class retarding innovation.37 But the 
generally poor reception the report received on publication seemed only 
to affirm Hudson’s thesis. Lead author, the American political scientist 
Edmund Stillman, had warned that from the outset their style of research 
had been met with ‘reactions ranging from dismissive scepticism to utter 
hostility’.38 Was there a ‘profound domestic intellectual resentment of 
economic and socio- political forecasting’ as James Bellini, the sole British 
author, had warned, or did the report have an ulterior motive?39 With 
parallels to Edgerton’s anti- history thesis, writing in the journal Futures, 
Israeli futurologist Yehezkel Dror, a visiting scholar at the London School 
of Economics, revealed the report had emerged from a failed attempt to 
gain a research contract from Britain’s government, as they had from the 
French.40 Dror’s review of the self- funded work argued the problem was 
not British archaism so much as the publication’s ‘shallow argumentation 
and spotty treatment’ that seemingly borrowed from the French project 
for much of its content. Denigrating Britain’s future, like its past, seemed 
to be driven by the pursuit of funding.41
For its detractors, the issue was not the report’s futurological 
approach, so much as the feeling it did a disservice to futurology and 
underestimated Britain’s forecasting capabilities. Another Futures 
reviewer regretted its prescriptive shortcomings, and elsewhere the 
fashionable British economist Ezra Mishan derided the report’s ‘naïve 
extrapolation’.42 But to extend Edgerton’s argument, just as declinist 
histories obscured Britain’s scientific and technological capabilities, a 
similar case could be made for its futurological capacities in the 1970s. 
The journal Futures, in which Bellini and Dror argued about the quality 
of the Hudson report, had been established in Guildford in 1968.43 In 
1971, ‘Political and Economic Planning’ (PEP), a London- based think 
tank in all but name, carried out a survey of futures studies, identi-
fying over six hundred organisations and individuals interested in all 
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kinds of ‘exploratory forecasting’ globally, over a hundred of which 
were in Britain. These ranged from PEP itself, to Royal Dutch Shell, 
the University of Bradford, the Nature Conservancy and the Electricity 
Council’s forecasting section.44
Forecasting was also being done by government. Though largely 
forgotten today, Harold Wilson’s Labour government had established a 
future- oriented research organisation, the ‘Programmes Analysis Unit’ 
(PAU), in 1967. In opposition, Wilson’s famed ‘White Heat’ speech had 
warned that Britain risked becoming a ‘stagnant backwater’ if govern-
ment did not take full advantage of computation and automation in 
executing a programme of planned modernisation.45 In power, his gov-
ernment sought to improve the productivity of Britain’s industry through 
state intervention, overseen by an expansive Ministry of Technology 
(‘Mintech’). Situated in Harwell, at the site of the Atomic Energy Agency 
(AEA), the PAU analysed how Mintech could maximise the returns on 
government investment in research by carrying out ‘economic and market 
surveys as well as forecasts of future environment’.46 One analyst, Derek 
Medford, described how futurology- like ‘exploratory forecasts’, ‘tem-
poral extrapolation’ and the intriguing value- led ‘normative forecasting’ 
were carried out by 25 staff, often using the AEA’s computers.47 These 
methods were intended to produce disinterested evidence on the benefit 
of investing in new technologies, ranging from carbon fibres to cryo-
genics.48 Echoing Blackett’s earlier criticisms, Medford claimed the PAU’s 
work was distinct from the ‘pseudo- science’ of Kahn and other ‘hubristic’ 
futurologists owing to its practical applications and lack of pretension, 
‘buttressed by Britain’s invention of operations research’. Accordingly, 
Medford warned Britain’s scientists to involve themselves in evaluating 
the future applications of their work, else ‘they may awake too late and 
become the chattels of business school graduates’.49
In opposition, the Conservative party were also intrigued by the 
promises of forecasting, though of the kind Medford feared. In 1966, as 
opposition leader, Heath, already a self- acknowledged moderniser, issued 
a Conservative party pamphlet proposing a ‘Central Cost Effectiveness 
Department’ that would apply the latest ‘American management science’ 
to the problems of public spending, the most important of which was 
‘the Systems Analysis approach’, which could be used to ‘simulate activ-
ities with the help of a computer’.50 Accordingly, in 1968 a Conservative 
Systems Research Centre (CSRC) was launched at the party’s head office. 
The aim was to create a computer- based forecasting tool ‘for scrutinising, 
comparing and discussing ranges of policy alternatives before rather 
than after the event’.51 Overseen by MP Mervyn Pike, the organisation 
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had four staff, including an analyst on loan from IBM. The group used 
the telephone network to connect to a time- sharing computer in London 
Victoria. Operated by Service in Informatics and Analysis Ltd, the ‘6600’ 
was supposedly the world’s most powerful computer at the time.52 Led 
by the computer- savvy young Conservative Michael Spicer, the team 
developed a ‘Policy and Information Control System’, a linear pro-
gramming matrix for simulating how proposed adjustments to tax and 
spending would affect different parts of the economy.53 Techniques of 
this kind, described as American managerial science, were seen by many 
in the Conservative party as an antidote to the myopia and inefficiency of 
the public sector.54
Such aspersions came from the belief that British civil servants 
tended towards ‘arts- based’ training, producing generalists rather than 
technical experts. The 1965 All- Party Fulton Committee had investigated 
Civil Service reform, and concluded that ‘new modes of specialised ana-
lysis’ such as ‘linear programming and cost- benefit analysis’ should be 
used in the work of government.55 This call for greater technical expertise 
led to an almost five fold increase in computing staff in the Civil Service. 
By 1972 there were 12,000 computer workers in central government, 
the majority of whom were involved in secretarial and clerical work.56 
But simulation remained a marginal activity.57 Among the first and most 
sophisticated were models to forecast economic income and expenditure 
at the Treasury after the war, consisting of sets of equations calculated by 
hand. These became increasingly sophisticated in the following decades, 
and experimental computer models were intermittently trialled. In 1966 
the London Business School produced the first fully computerised British 
macro- economic model, which the Treasury adopted in 1971.58 But 
alongside the Treasury’s work, with growing fears about human ecology, 
the government soon took an interest in modelling the environment as if 
it were a rival object of political knowledge.59
Simulating environments
By the end of the 1960s the environment was becoming an increas-
ingly prominent concern in British public life. In 1963 the National 
Environmental Research Council (NERC) was established, in 1969 the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, and 1970 was declared 
a Year of Conservation by the European Council. But perhaps most sig-
nificantly Prime Minister Edward Heath established a ‘Department of the 
Environment’ in 1970 when he formed his government, with responsibility 
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for ‘the whole range of functions which affect people’s living environ-
ment’.60 For those who had long studied the relation between the human 
and natural worlds, this sudden elevation of the environment in polit-
ical discourse was disconcerting.61 Timothy O’Riordan, a British geog-
rapher based in Canada, remarked that the ‘academic world seems to be 
going topsy- turvey. While the political scientist talks about ecology … 
the ecologist is discussing public policy.’62 This semantic shift was mani-
fest in the launch of the Ecologist magazine that year, a periodical that 
promoted ecologically sound rather than economically expansive ways 
of life.63 One explanation was that the term ‘ecology’ had expanded in 
scope. It no longer meant just the study of biota and their environment, 
but also actions intended to preserve the environment against degrad-
ation. As historian Peter Taylor later suggested, in the Anglophone world 
more generally ‘Ecology, and the prefix eco- became a call for social 
action as well as a science.’64
However, the World model’s methodology drew on industrial man-
agement rather than ecology. As the many biographers of its creator, 
American electrical engineer Jay Forrester, have noted, his approach 
stemmed from wartime experience. He had worked on analogue 
servomechanisms, electrical control mechanisms that responded to 
informational feedback to fulfil a given task.65 After the war, he worked at 
MIT’s Digital Computer Laboratory, constructing an early form of digital 
computer, and later helped develop the US Air Force’s ‘Semi- automated 
Ground Environment’ radar tracking system.66 But in 1956 Forrester’s 
career changed. He was offered a professorship at MIT’s School of 
Management, one of the first centres for managerial education. There 
he attempted to apply the principles of control engineering to industry. 
Coded appropriately, industrial operations were represented by differen-
tial equations that linked temporally contingent reactions, via a mass of 
circular referents, or feedback loops, which could simulate change over 
time. Such models often depicted a ‘rollercoaster’ effect. An unexpected 
10 per cent increase in demand, for example, could cause an increase 
in profit followed by a sharp decrease, like the stomach- churning ascent 
and descent of the funfair ride.67
Forrester increasingly believed his Systems Dynamics approach 
could be generalised. By simulating the behaviour of any given system, 
he believed you could learn how to manage it. In doing so, he increasingly 
stepped beyond observable systems, such as a single industry, towards 
‘systems’ exceeding human perceptual abilities.68 Accordingly, he began 
work on a global model, World2, following an undocumented prototype. 
His World models were based on the idea that the Earth’s major dynamics 
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could be symbolised numerically as a series of stocks and flows. In order 
to make this visually comprehensible, these global dynamics, such as 
‘natural resource use rate’, could be presented graphically as nodes 
(‘stocks’) and their relation to other material and informational variables 
represented by vertices (‘flows’). The relations between dynamics could 
be programmed into a computer as a sequence of differential equations, 
representing actual or hypothetical relations between nodes. Typed into 
over one hundred lines of code using DYNAMO programming language, 
Forrester claimed his model could be used to model all of Earth’s most 
significant environmental dynamics.69 Belying his engineering roots, 
Forrester’s pragmatic approach seemed to suggest global dynamics could, 
in some sense, be programmed if the model’s evidence was acted upon.70
In modelling the flows of resources, population, energy and infor-
mation, Forrester’s World models reiterated, seemingly unaware, the ana-
lytical approach systems ecologists had developed in the 1960s to model 
‘ecosystems’ and his method was later employed by ecologists.71 This easy 
migration of concepts was possible in a period in which both nature and 
society could be cast in the abstract language of ‘systems’, which as the 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons concisely defined it in 1968, meant 
‘a network of interconnection, the state or activity of one component 
influencing the state or activity of other components’.72 Such systems 
could consist of heterogeneous components: mechanical, informational 
and biological. Society itself was a system, which, rendered into suitably 
abstract forms, could become amenable to mathematical or computa-
tional analysis, allowing the modeller to transform a complex reality into 
an instrumental tool to achieve a desired outcome.73 For policy makers, 
this systemic rendering of society seemed to promise the ability to achieve 
pre- determined futures by altering behaviour in the present.74
Jeremy Bray
When it came to the technicalities of computer modelling, Jeremy Bray 
was well informed. Somewhat incongruously, given his physique and 
professorial manner, Bray had originally planned to become a coal miner, 
but soon realised he was entirely unsuited to the job. Harold Wilson’s 
secretary, Marcia Williams, had once acknowledged Bray’s brilliance but 
unkindly remarked that he looked like ‘every mad professor of comic 
fiction’.75 Instead of mining, he had achieved a double first in mathe-
matics at Cambridge. Later, in the 1950s, he attended Claude Shannon’s 
seminars at MIT, which had established the science of information theory 
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as a distinct counterpart to cybernetics.76 After some years at Imperial 
Chemical Industries (ICI), Bray joined the University of Cambridge’s 
Department of Applied Economics, a group well recognised for their dis-
tinct approach to econometrics. Building on the university’s strength in 
theoretical statistics, the group specialised in time series analysis, the 
statistical (probabilistic) analysis of dependent sequential values in tem-
poral data. Another strength was detailed empirical studies based on the 
vast amounts of data on income, expenditure and consumer demand, first 
collected to support post- war recovery and rationing programmes.77 The 
department also housed what Bray described as ‘the most sophisticated 
model of its kind in the world’, a computer- based model of Britain’s 
economy for forecasting growth and the effects of policy interventions 
that he believed was superior to that of the Treasury.78
Alongside his econometric research, Bray had become a Labour 
parliamentary  candidate in 1959, winning Middlesbrough West in 
1962. Four years later he became junior minister at Mintech, where he 
oversaw the use of computer models to forecast future power demand.79 
He also became increasingly concerned with the problem of pollution, 
which he considered a manifestation of ‘interacting, ecological, systemic 
problems’.80 Drawing on these interests, in 1970 he had published Decision 
in Government, a highly technical proposal for a form of ‘regenerative’ 
socialism. Central to his plan was the idea of an ‘adaptive economy’, dis-
tinct from a liberalised economy as it was directed towards collective 
welfare, but similar, he hoped, in so far as ‘control action’ would be ‘no 
more centralised than it need be’. He envisioned a decentralised net-
work of computers able to relay information to central government, so 
that decision- making could be significantly decentralised, without losing 
the oversight of Westminster or the goal of redistributing wealth.81 In 
essence, Bray believed he had developed a system of government that 
could harness the allocative capabilities of the market but in pursuit of a 
socialist agenda.82 The book was densely written, full of detailed econo-
metric arguments decipherable to few. But whatever its opacity, Wilson 
considered the book a criticism of his more conventional proposals for a 
planned economy and encouraged Bray’s resignation.83
In January 1970, Aurelio Peccei, an Italian industrialist and the 
head of the Club of Rome, became aware of Bray’s situation.84 He invited 
the former MP to join. Bray, on his part, was impressed by the involve-
ment of Turkish– American long- range planner Hasan Özbekhan, whom 
he had first met at a Long- Range Planning symposium in 1968. There, 
he had proposed a ‘general theory of planning’ in which forecasters 
abandoned the assumption that individuals acted in pursuit of the 
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‘maximisation of self- interest’, as most economic models suggested, lest 
the model become reality. Instead, Özbekhan claimed planning should 
be ‘inspired by a higher principle’.85 As a Methodist minister, Bray was 
moved by his suggestion that the principle should be ‘love’.86 Accordingly, 
Bray responded enthusiastically to Peccei’s invitation, though he warned 
that the Club’s stated proposal ‘to contribute to the comprehension of 
the problems of modern society’ using systems analysis ran counter to 
the traditions of British philosophy, politics and social science, which 
was ‘highly empirical, and rather non- systematic’. Listing other nations’ 
intellectual strengths, such as French ‘logic and lucidity’ and Japanese 
‘organisation’, he claimed Britain’s research tradition could offer only 
‘an empirical approach to specific problems’, a warning that would prove 
prescient.87
The Club of Rome
In June 1970, around 40 members of the Club held a meeting at the 
Bellevue Palace in Bern, a luxurious hotel owned by the Swiss govern-
ment. Described as an ‘informal, multi- national, non- political group of 
scientists, economists, planners, educators and business leaders’, they 
assembled alongside journalists in the hotel’s impressive art nouveau 
meeting room with the ambitious agenda to address the ‘Predicament 
of Mankind’.88 This situation, Özbekhan had proposed, was the result of 
interconnected problems of overpopulation, malnutrition, poverty and 
pollution, which in combination, might result in a ‘generalized meta- 
problem’ with potentially deleterious consequences for humankind. He 
outlined a plan to address this ‘problematique’ using a complex of diag-
nostic computer models that would allow the extension of human percep-
tion beyond the ‘fragmentation of reality into closed and well- bounded 
problems’.89 By creating a model that could show the interactions 
between Earth’s major problems, it was hoped that the most dangerous 
interactions between these various dynamics could become the focus of 
concerted global action.
One Club member, Caroll Wilson, a professor of management 
at MIT, had invited his colleague, Forrester. Following Özbekhan, the 
American engineer outlined his proposal to develop a single ‘World’ 
model to address this meta- problem. Explaining his existing work, he 
suggested he could extend his numerical model of the Earth’s major 
dynamics to more accurately forecast the future conditions of human 
life on Earth. He seemed to offer a simple formalisation of the Club’s 
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concerns, which could give some indication as to when limits might be 
reached. Most accounts of the meeting suggest Forrester’s proposal was 
positively received by Club members. However, Bray was at the meeting, 
and his handwritten notes revealed a deep scepticism towards Forrester’s 
technique, his proposed use of data and the means by which the findings 
might be meaningfully implemented as policy. More fundamentally, his 
handwritten notes asked, ‘at what level of aggregation is it possible to 
make meaningful forecast or arrive at action?’90
At Forrester’s request, the Club’s second meeting was held six 
weeks later at MIT’s School of Management in Boston, Massachusetts. 
There, over 10  days of presentations and discussion, members were 
introduced to the principles of Forrester’s ‘System Dynamics’ and its pos-
sible use in simulating global problems. The model that was presented to 
Club members, World2, contained only five variables and two empirical 
sets of data. But despite its shortcomings, every model run indicated a 
catastrophic collapse of the global system in the coming century. Both 
population and capital investment would increase, while resource avail-
ability remained fixed. Within these parameters, collapse was inevitable. 
Peccei was particularly impressed by the fact that each run of the model 
resulted in collapse, as he had predicted this in his own speculative book 
about the global future, The Chasm Ahead, published in 1968.91
Forrester had implored Bray to come to Boston, promising to 
deliver a ‘more orderly presentation’ of his model.92 Bray had planned to 
attend, sending a dense book, Time Series and Analysis Forecasting and 
Control, published in 1970 by the British econometricians George Box 
and Gwilym Jenkins, which he suggested Forrester read.93 But that June, 
Labour lost the general election, and Bray his seat.94 Peccei offered to pay 
for Bray’s travel to Boston, but the former MP regretfully cancelled.95
In his absence Bray became increasingly critical. His preferred can-
didate to lead the project, Özbekhan, felt his participation was ‘no longer 
advisable’ following the selection of Forrester’s approach.96 Forrester 
was not leading the project, in favour of his 29- year- old lead researcher 
Dennis Meadows. But, as the work developed, Bray, still a Club member, 
wrote to Peccei to reiterate the concerns about the World model he had 
first raised in Bern.97 But in June 1971, the Observer published ‘Shock 
Findings on the Environment Crisis’, a report based on preliminary 
results leaked from MIT.98 In response, Bray penned a letter to the paper 
describing the model as ‘an exotic device for confirming the prejudices of 
the investigator’.99 He then wrote to Peccei again to warn him about his 
letter, copying in Forrester. He repeated that Forrester had still failed to 
acknowledge his concerns, raised over a year earlier. Bray also argued the 
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Club needed greater balance and should include developing countries 
and trade unions. As it was, Bray warned that ‘there is a danger that the 
Club of Rome will become known as a technocratic but unscientific right- 
wing organisation’.100
Bray’s public letter prompted a response from Conrad Waddington, 
the Edinburgh University biologist famed for his work in theoretical 
biology. Waddington had also founded Britain’s first Science Studies 
Unit in 1966, and he would establish another significant research group, 
drawing on his interest in futurology, Edinburgh University’s ‘School 
of the Man- Made Future’ in 1972.101 In his letter to Bray, Waddington 
agreed with his criticisms of the Club but pointed out that the mathe-
matics used in World3 was almost identical to that used by biologists in 
his laboratory working on complex interacting systems of enzymes. He 
had asked them to check the model.102 Systems science, in abstracting 
the objects of analysis, rendered all environments, from the global to the 
macromolecular, in such a way that they could be analysed in almost the 
same way. Reflecting in 1977, Waddington stated his belief that the World 
model had overdetermined the relations between dynamics. His experi-
ence was that ‘we usually have almost no notion of how these strengths of 
interactions are going to change as the system itself changes’.103
In July Peccei responded to Bray’s letters, acknowledging his 
concerns but also suggesting they were best channelled into criticising 
the enclosed draft of Meadows’ report.104 Meadows also contacted Bray, 
pointing out the refinements he had added to Forrester’s work, and 
noting that he was ‘particularly anxious’ to receive Bray’s well- informed 
comments. He also mentioned a forthcoming visit to Whitehall, and his 
hope they could meet.105 Bray replied, reiterating his point about the 
model’s lack of econometric sophistication, but agreed to meet, enclosing 
a copy of Decision in Government.106 Meadows, somewhat provoked, 
responded by suggesting Bray had little sense of his refinements as he 
had not come to recent Club meetings. He also defended his model, 
suggesting its simplicity was intentional, mirroring the invariant struc-
ture of the modern world, and his belief that ‘We have moved globally 
into a period where the gross behaviour modes are set by relatively few 
relationships and are insensitive to even medium changes in their precise 
co- efficient values.’107
In November, Forrester finally responded to Bray, in a less polite 
tone than his researcher; he accused Bray of wanting to ‘wait for some 
utopian future when everything is known’ and signed off asking him 
to ‘demonstrate where [his] methods would lead to a better model’.108 
Spurning Forrester’s pointed letter, Bray instead wrote to Meadows again 
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with a detailed reiteration of his criticisms. Once more, he stated that the 
model was overly determinate and insufficiently probabilistic, and that 
too little had been done to test it with alternative parameters. In doing so, 
drawing on his econometric expertise, Bray articulated his fundamental 
disagreement with the very idea of limits to growth:  ‘bearing in mind 
that the percentage composition of gross domestic product changes, and 
that price relativities change, it is perfectly possible to maintain constant 
growth at constant prices indefinitely, without the volume of any physical 
resource consumed per head exceeding a fixed limit’.109 Shifting relations 
in prices would encourage substitution, such as an increase in human 
labour or the use of a less scarce or recycled resource, altering the com-
position of the gross product of the economy, but not causing limits to 
growth.110 The idea that price rises caused consumers to seek substitute 
goods or develop technological solutions was a highly orthodox position 
in neoclassical economics since the late nineteenth  century.111 Given that 
World3 ignored this very basic idea, Bray sounded a final warning, telling 
Meadows ‘the methods you have used are not sound and your conclusions 
point in a potentially reactionary and potentially disastrous direction’.112
A British world model
In March 1972 Limits was launched at an event at the Smithsonian 
Institution in Washington. Peccei had hired a public relations company, 
Calvin Kytle Associates, to heighten the publication’s impact. They had 
contacted the world’s major newspapers and sent 12,000 copies of the 
report in six languages to world leaders.113 The publication described 
Earth as a system of feedback loops, which gave the global system a clear 
trajectory: ‘Whereas positive feedback loops generate runaway growth, 
negative feedback loops tend to regulate growth and to hold a system 
in some stable state.’ However, a growing imbalance meant ‘if present 
growth trends … continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this 
planet will be reached sometime in the next one hundred years’.114 This 
message, given its concerted promotional effort, seemed to capture both 
public and policy makers’ imaginations.115
In fact, Edward Heath had allowed his Chief Scientific Adviser Alan 
Cottrell to attend the Boston meeting of the Club. Cottrell had trained 
as a metallurgist, and had no specific interest in the environment aside 
from working at the AEA in the 1950s, though he had come into con-
tact with environmentalist concerns following the Torrey Canyon oil spill 
in 1967.116 Whereas Bray had been highly sceptical of the World model, 
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Cottrell had been enthused by its demonstration. Returning to Britain, 
he proposed that the British government develop a similar model, stating 
his belief that ‘Forrester’s approach is the most important development of 
its kind since Keynes’ general theory’.117
Given the centrality of Keynesianism in post- war economic policy, 
this was a significant claim. Heath, as his early enthusiasm for manage-
ment science had revealed, had some interest in forecasting and simu-
lation, and gave his permission for a scoping study on the feasibility 
of a British world model. Cottrell held a meeting on the subject at the 
Cabinet Office in September 1971, in which he had told the assembled 
civil servants that developing a global model for British purposes would 
require £50,000 and four staff. In response, an unnamed civil servant 
argued that the Treasury had a more sophisticated econometric model 
that it used for forecasting. Despite this criticism, the general idea of a 
global environmental model was well received, and further work was 
proposed.118 At a second meeting in November 1971, Forrester’s lead 
researcher, Meadows, was flown in to explain the model at an event 
hosted by the American Embassy.119
The visit provoked considerable excitement, encouraging the 
retired Treasury economist James Meade, pupil of Keynes and 1977 
Nobel laureate, to wryly request an audience with the ‘computer forecasts 
of doom’.120 British cybernetician Stafford Beer, British- Canadian OR 
pioneer Charles Goodeve and economist Wilfred Beckerman also 
attended.121 Addressing the audience, Meadows confidently explained 
that ‘numerical values … were of little importance’ when it came to 
modelling global dynamics. ‘Much more critical was the structure.’122 
This was a familiar refrain in cybernetic science: structure rather than 
the values of variables determined the behaviour of a system.123 The 
structure of the world, according to the model, indicated that continued 
economic growth, given environmental limits, would cause population 
growth to ‘cease’ or ‘overshoot’ and ‘collapse back’ in the near future. 
Meadows warned such feedback would mean large- scale famine, social 
disorder, and possibly the breakdown of government. He also cautioned 
the assembled civil servants that further results of the Club’s study would 
be published in 1972 and, improperly handled, the findings might lead 
the press to ‘alarmist conclusions’. Given the severity of this portent, crit-
ical voices were again raised by some attendees. A specific complaint was 
that the model failed to account for the role of the economy in mitigating 
against fixed limits.124
Five months later, as Limits was published in Washington, a sense 
of crisis pervaded Heath’s government. In the preceding three months, 
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the National Union of Mineworkers had gone on strike, unemploy-
ment had risen past one million, and a  state of emergency had been 
declared owing to a lack of coal- power.125 Against the backdrop of union- 
engineered scarcity, Environment Secretary Peter Walker wrote to the 
prime minister suggesting that ‘a Research Group, within government 
should study the MIT method and produce its own forecast’ as a matter 
of urgency owing to ‘a mounting tide of public interest’.126 Heath agreed 
to set up a committee to expand upon Cottrell’s earlier investigation.127 
But as civil servants began contacting Bray about his involvement in the 
Club, to learn more about the veracity of the study, he distanced him-
self, telling Walter Marshall, head of research at the AEA, that the organ-
isation was ‘insubstantial’ and ‘a vehicle for Dr Peccei’ and that he was 
‘rather ashamed of the whole business’.128 By that time, correspondence 
between Bray and Meadows had descended into vitriol, with Meadows 
accusing Bray of treating Limits as a ‘straw man’ against which he was 
planning to launch his re- election bid.129
In June that year the United Nations convened what was understood 
to be the first global meeting on the environment, in Stockholm, and Limits 
dominated the agenda.130 Keen to show off the British government’s ini-
tiative, Walker announced the planned forecasting group. Speaking with 
both caution and foreboding, he told the assembled journalists that the 
British government was ‘not persuaded by everything that has been said 
about these matters lately’, but warned that ‘if research teaches us that 
a tendency we now see could lead to devastation in 30  years, the fact 
that it can only be averted by unprecedented response is irrelevant’.131 
He seemed to imply the threat of unparalleled government interven-
tion were the report’s most dramatic conclusions proved credible.132 
Environmental futurology seemed to have found favour with the current 
government, while the former chief scientific adviser, Zuckerman, took 
his address at the conference as an opportunity to deride ‘hysterical 
computerized gloom’.133
Unsurprisingly, given the timing, the press dubbed the group the 
‘limits- to- growth unit’,134 though the official title was the World Future 
Trends Committee (WFTC). Its staff consisted of natural scientists from 
various relevant departments, including Agriculture, the Treasury 
and Heath’s ‘think tank’, the CPRS. At the first meeting, there was 
some debate as to where the group should be based, as some thought 
the DOE should only be concerned with Britain’s environment rather 
than the global system envisioned by modellers.135 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office had pushed the idea that WFTC should examine 
the European rather than world system, given Heath’s recent attempts 
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to persuade European states to grant British accession to the EEC, and 
on the presumption that European countries faced similar environmental 
problems.136 This discussion seemed to open up the possible use of global 
models as tools of diplomacy, technological affirmations of shared 
goals.137
At a second meeting scale was raised again,  though this time as 
a possible means of validating the model, by comparing observable 
disaggregated outcomes at a regional level with computer- based global 
forecasts. When Meadows had first presented the World model to the Civil 
Service he had explained that regional, national and city-level models 
would become necessary as there ‘were no global decision makers’.138 
But there was a methodological problem with the idea of a British 
model. At that first meeting convened by Cottrell in September 1971, 
civil servants had complained that, because Forrester’s model analysed 
the Earth as a ‘closed system’, it would be difficult to disaggregate the 
approach to analyse individual countries, as migration, trade and envir-
onmental dynamics did not recognise national boundaries. As such, it 
was decided the CPRS should explore what kind of ‘self- contained’ eco-
logical problems could be fruitfully modelled.139
But instead of developing a model within Whitehall, one of the 
committee’s first steps was to contact a number of universities, via Brian 
Flowers, Chairperson of the Science Research Council  (SRC), to see if 
they might be commissioned to carry out a critical study of the World 
model.140 This sub- contracting was in line with Heath’s attempts to mod-
ernise government, as the conditions of state-funded research were 
undergoing reform. The British government was recast as a ‘consumer’ 
who would commission specific research from ‘contractors’, the idea 
being that scientists would become subject to a modicum of the com-
petitive forces at play in a free market, with expected gains in efficiency 
and productivity.141 In line with this change to the conditions of scientific 
funding, the government was keen to have MIT’s model tested at a uni-
versity, unaware that one British university was doing exactly that.
Cottrell received a response from Chris Freeman, director of Sussex 
University’s Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU). Established in 1966, 
SPRU’s aim was to take a sociologically informed approach to the study of 
scientific and industrial research. Broadly optimistic regarding the pro-
ductive power of science, the group’s ethos was also broadly in line with 
the radical politics of the university at the time, playing host to Marxists 
and radical scientists, promoting new modes of research in developing 
countries, interdisciplinarity and experimental approaches to teaching 
and learning.142 The SPRU team had already acquired a copy of World3’s 
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code from MIT after a staff member had travelled there in January 1971, 
invited by Meadows, who had wanted to persuade the university to 
establish a forecasting group in England.143 They had begun running the 
model on the PAU’s IBM 360/ 165 computer at the AEA’s Harwell labora-
tory.144 Approving of the ongoing work, the SRC awarded an £11,000 
contract to SPRU to formally review and evaluate current ‘future’ studies, 
including Limits.145
On closer inspection SPRU researchers were concerned that 
Meadows’ conclusions were over determined, and the Club’s adoption 
of them risked an overly technocratic response. To counter this, a 
research group called STAFF (‘Social and Technological Alternatives 
for the Future’) was established in 1971 with government funding, to 
allow SPRU researchers to interrogate the model as both ‘technologists 
and social scientists’. In contrast to American futurological efforts, 
SPRU staff felt their work addressed the ‘social’ determinants of the 
future, in contrast to ‘technological assessment’, the extrapolation of 
technological trends, which evinced a crude conception of the social. 
STAFF had access to World2 and World3 and ran the simulation sev-
eral hundred times in a process of ‘sensitivity analysis’ to identify the 
assumptions that underlay the two models. An important finding was 
that if parameters were shifted, so that the model assumed a 1– 2 per 
cent rate of natural resource discovery and a similar rate of increase in 
the technical ability to reduce pollution, neither scarcity nor pollution 
appeared deleterious.146 In the MIT models these parameters were 
fixed and limits pre- ordained. Given the gravity of their conclusion, 
the output of both Forrester’s and Meadows’ models seemed highly 
sensitive to plausible developments.
Alongside the SPRU grant, Scottish economist James Mirrlees, at 
the University of Oxford, was given £2,000 to write a general critique 
of ‘system dynamics’.147 Like Bray, Mirrlees was a highly accomplished 
econometrician, recognised for his influential work on optimum taxation 
rates.148 His study compared system dynamics models with those used 
in econometrics. He came to three conclusions: modellers mistook com-
plexity for realism; unlike many econometric models, system dynamics 
models lacked means of statistical validation; but most damning, he 
noted the conclusions reached in Limits were obvious, and had not 
needed a computer to demonstrate: if an economy grew and the resource 
base was fixed, of course a limit would be reached. As such, he concluded 
that ‘this kind of scientific activity is, at best, worthless’, and that the work 
was akin to that of ‘oracles, clairvoyants and other charlatans throughout 
the ages’.149
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tEChnology,  EnvironmEnt And modErn britAin290
290
Bray and Mirrlees were part of a national econometric trad-
ition that considered itself more statistically rigorous and empirically 
grounded than the American or Dutch schools. In this vein, leaning on 
developments in control theory, time series analysis was a particular 
British strength that the World modellers had ignored.150 George Box and 
Gwilym Jenkins, the British econometricians Bray had encouraged both 
MIT researchers to read, had developed a method for making forecasts 
from temporal data in a probabilistic way, rather than using co- efficient 
sums as World3 had done. This allowed forecasts to be made in a more 
mathematically defensible way from extant data.151 Bray and Mirrlees 
also argued that the World model lacked the means of verification by 
which econometric models attained validity. Testing was required, 
whereby multiple runs could be used to compare simulated values with 
actual values. Once calibrated, a forecaster could then claim a forecasted 
outcome was probable rather than asserting it as an inevitable result of 
determinate relations.152 Worse still, as Bray had complained, whereas 
economists formulate questions, develop models and then produce a 
narrative, the Club of Rome seemed to have begun with a narrative – that 
of a coming crisis – and then used a model to bolster its authority.153
Rather than reject global models entirely, from 1974 onward, the 
Department of the Environment maintained a Systems Analysis Research 
Unit (SARU). Led by the physicist Peter Roberts, SARU monitored other 
global models, tested their feasibility and explored disaggregation of spe-
cific resources or geopolitical regions. In January, SARU’s observations 
were outlined to the WFTC. Their central claim was that if world models 
accounted for ‘economic feedback mechanisms’, the propensity for 
consumers to reduce the rate or find a substitute for their demand for 
resources, in response to price rises, for example. The models ‘result in 
a much more robust structure’.154 In the course of their work, SARU and 
the WFTC had been well aware of Bray’s similar criticisms of World3, as 
he had communicated these to Cottrell and others in Whitehall, while 
Forrester and Meadows had attempted to pre- empt him by similarly 
copying Whitehall into their correspondence.155 These criticisms found 
their way into the British government’s final response to Limits, published 
in 1976. With regard to the environment, Future World Trends claimed 
there were ‘no hard and fast physical limits to resources; the limits are 
economic and technological and can vary widely’.156
SARU’s own model, ‘SARUM 76’, was launched at the Royal Society 
in 1977.157 The model was disaggregated into over 15 regions, each 
containing 13 economic sectors. Despite its greater sophistication, the 
model was free of the hubris and ambition heaped on World3. The aim 
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was to learn about the relationships between dynamics, rather than to 
produce forecasts; SPRU researchers were employed to critique the work; 
and little effort was made to publicly promote its findings.158 However, 
what truly distinguished the model was the inclusion of feedback loops 
representing the effect of ‘technology plus the market’, two dynamics 
that, as Bray, SPRU and others working on behalf of the British gov-
ernment had argued, could iteratively transcend environmental limits 
if left to respond to a freely operating price mechanism.159 As Donella 
Meadows, co- author and partner of Dennis, noted, the theoretical 
assumptions underlying SARUM, and its forecast of a more abundant 
future, were those of neoclassical economics. The model assumed individ-
uals maximised the value they could derive from scarce resources, which 
would mean substitution and increased technological efficiency would 
take place as resources became scarce.160 In effect, the environment had 
been reduced to a subset of economic theory. But the idea that the freely 
operating markets could transcend resource limits was a distant prospect 
for Heath’s government which, despite coming to power with a plan 
for liberalisation, had been forced to impose wage and price controls in 
November 1972 in an attempt to fight inflation and manage the demands 
of the Trades Unions Congress and the nationalised industries.161
Conclusion
In his opening chapter, Agar proposes eight ways in which technology 
and the environment intersected in modern Britain.162 This chapter 
documented the arrival of a representation of the global environment, 
represented by just 150 lines of code.163 This was not an ‘artificial world’ 
of the kind mentioned in Agar’s type (4), as World3 was not intended to 
impose a border between nature and society so much as draw attention 
to the wrongheadedness of those who believed they were not subject to 
natural limits. This simulated environment perhaps sits best somewhere 
between Agar’s type (6) and (7) interactions. Global models represent the 
dynamics of the environment just as prose or photography can do, but their 
mode of representation is analogical, consisting of code and numbers. As a 
‘mediating’ technology (6), computer simulations of dynamic systems were 
not designed to represent the environment so much as allow its analysis. 
But owing to its abstractive form of mediation, simulations are able to simu-
late a wide range of historical processes from the denaturing of enzymes 
to the growth of global industry. But interaction (7)  implies that tech-
nology can provide a means of registering and organising environmental 
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knowledge. Here simulation fits well, as by rendering various dynamics 
into mathematical relations, and feeding these relations with numerical 
data, the intention was to both register and organise pertinent elements 
of global environmental change in such a way that the global dynamics of 
environmental change might be understood, critically, over time.
Bray published his final thoughts on Limits in a Fabian Society 
pamphlet. Drawing on the information- theoretical vision outlined in 
Decision in Government, he suggested the ‘process of decision in human 
society’, involving individuals, parliamentary debates, boardroom 
discussions and myriad other interactions, was itself a ‘vast “computer 
model”’ of which the World model was just one part. Computer models 
were ‘intelligence amplifiers’ but could not hope to rival the greater 
reasoning power of the collective ‘human decision system’.164 In effect, this 
explanation nicely characterises what happened when World3 arrived 
in Britain. The model, and the objectives of the Club, were received 
with initial enthusiasm, which was soon tempered by British expertise 
in forecasting and modelling, which stemmed from fields ranging from 
econometrics to biology and OR, and it involved a wide range of private 
and public institutions, from the PAU to Cambridge University. And aside 
from being able to dissect the model on a technical and theoretical basis, 
Britain’s futurological capacities suggested this was a nation that was 
self- consciously modern, in so far as policy based upon forecasting, done 
correctly, was seen as a means of breaking from past mistakes.
A concern with ‘the environment’ was also seen as something dis-
continuous with past modes of government. The problem, from the British 
government’s perspective, was that World3’s conception of the environ-
ment was too limited. Its creators understood it as simply the intersection 
between ecology and technology, and that this could be captured in three 
figures of computer code.165 But Britain’s experts argued World3 was too 
crude. It failed to account for the effects of market forces and techno-
logical change. In effect, the MIT team had failed to account for the dyna-
mism of human society that neoclassical economic theory assumed. As 
a result, the British attempt to remodel global dynamics countered con-
cern for the environment with a re- assertion of liberal economic theory, 
which ran against the interventionist post-war consensus. The result was 
a contrasting model that mathematically formalised a future means for 
achieving environmental abundance through the free operation of the 
market. This became one of the central tenets of ‘modern’ environmen-
talism, the idea that environmental change could, in some sense, be 
programmed by collective human action, manifest, in this case, in the 
aggregated agency of a liberalised market.
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